

S E C R E T

Due to light activity during the day - JOB picked up only 3 locations, Sound turning in two to confirm known locations. 1225 QG and 0924 PL, both locations were reported to be just 1/G. Flash had one poor accuracy plot which appears to confirm the known locations 1323 MS.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Although visibility during the period was good activity by the artillery with the Corps was limited due to a lack of remunerative targets. Observed missions fired by Div Arty units were largely on close in targets consisting of personnel, machine guns and mortars, and registrations. The observed missions fired by Corps Arty units were principally registrations. The majority of all unobserved missions fired were on harassing and counterbattery targets.

The night's harassing program was fired on ey battery locations, CP's, supply points, and the road net.

During the period the 242 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to the 36 Div and attached to the 103 Div.

At 1500A the 232 FA Bn was adjusted by an Inf Platoon leader on ey personnel and automatic weapons at Q8057-3757. The weapons were silenced and personnel dispersed and aided a friendly patrol to return. A total of 40 rds were fired.

At 1358A the 36 FA AOP adjusted his Bn on one gun at R1234-2644. 24 rds were fired with good effect reported.

The 500 AFA Bn fired 4 times at 1145A, 1220A, 1335A, and 1655A on ey personnel at Q9101-3201 with excellent effect being reported.

At 2210A the 501 AFA Bn fired 3 rds on a MG at Q9126-2800 effectively silencing it.

At 0900A the 501 AFA Bn fired 11 rds on an ey SP at Q9347-2833 forcing it to take cover.

An FO of the 132 FA Bn adjusted his Bn on an ey mortar at R0064-2533 at 1320A. One direct hit on the mortar was reported.

The 59 AFA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on vehicles and personnel at R096-225 at 171730A. Three or four hits on vehicles and 15 casualties were reported.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					1	1	1	1
Per	6		20		10	10	2	1
Veh			4				1	
MG & Mor	1		13		2	9	3	1
Prep				3				
Armor			1					
Dcf	2	3	12	5				
Har	2	12		16		23	3	14
Reg	10		17		21		15	
Misc	3		4		2	4	7	
Prop	8							
TOTAL	32	15	71	24	35	47	32	17

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	10		3		1	1	2
Per	2				2	2		
Har		3		4		4		6
Reg	10		3		2			
	13	13	3	7	4	7	1	8

AOP Missions: 16

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn continued anti tank defense. All Co gun positions, equipment, and personnel were inspected by CO and inspection teams. First Rcn Plt continued patrols in Div area.

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636 TD Bn providing AT defense and firing indirect harassing missions. Company "A" fired 36 rds HE harassing fire on ey Inf observed in HAGUENAU forest. Definite results of this firing was undetermined. Rcn Co--no change.

645 TD Bn maintaining AT defense and firing indirect harassing missions. During period Co "B" expended a total of 123 rds HE unobserved harassing fire on ey supply routes, bridge at Q80664125, and towns of MELCH (Q7940) and BAERENTHAHL (8442). Rcn Co--no change.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Front Lines: No changes

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S E C R

Due to light activity during the day JOB picked up only 3 locations, Sound turning in two to confirm known locations. 1225 QG and 0924 PL, both locations were reported to be just 1/G. Flash had one poor accuracy plot which appears to confirm the known locations 1323 MS.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Although visibility during the period was good activity by the artillery with the Corps was limited due to a lack of remunerative targets. Observed missions fired by Div Arty units were largely on close in targets consisting of

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

S E C R E T
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: 202
Date: 3 March 45
From: 021800A Mar 45
To : 031800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIOD REPORT #175.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

1. a. The ey was very quiet during period but was alert to our patrol activity. A patrol from 36th Inf Div to R045241 heard movement in houses, and received MG fire from one of the houses; patrol also reported flares and mines in that area. Patrols from 411th Inf heard veh sounds in UHRWILLER and reported a minefield at Q8845-2935. Vehicular movement was reported at CR Q908-287 at 2038A, and in vic KINDWILLER at 0220A. Ey was heard singing vic KINDWILLER at 0500A. A large horse drawn vehicle was observed entering ENGWILLER from NW at 1000A.

b. During the afternoon, there was no change in the enemy's defensive attitude. Arty fire remained light and scattered. Some groups of enemy were observe vic Q909-323. A 42d Inf Div patrol routed an enemy patrol. Two ey were killed and two captured - there were no identifications.

2. There were no radar targets during period.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. The enemy artillery during the first three quarters of the period maintained its now usual passive attitude, but in the afternoon, taking advantage of a snow flurry which grounded our ACP's and cut off observation, its activity increased to make the day more lively than several preceding, though concentrations were generally light. Except for a little harassing fire W of HAGUENAU, the night was very quiet, and the morning was the same with only HAGUENAU, SCHWEIGHAUSEN, and LICHTENBERG being lightly hit. Starting off with 25 rounds in NIEDERMODERN (9227) at 1225A, the fire picked up, however, for guns in the ZINSWILLER area and NE of HAGUENAU opened up, with the former placing intermittent CB fire in the INGWILLER (8131) area, and HAGUENAU and KALTENHOUSE receiving several small concentrations from the latter. PFAFFENNOFFEN and DAUENDORF areas were also shelled in the course of a rather busy afternoon.

Shellrep total: 51

36 Div	103 Div	42 Div	405 Gp	35 Gp	6 Gp	2 FOB
33	5	2	4	1	3	3

b. Changes to EB List #25:

(1) Additions:

CONC NO.	COORD	ACC.	SOURCE	NO/TYPE
7542 M4R	7560-4250	A	AP 28 Feb	3/Lt
7744 S4R	7755-4461	A	" " "	2/Lt
7842 N4H	7878-4215	A	" 22 "	3/Lt
7843 O4G	7857-4308	A	" 14 "	4/Lt
8345 P4Q	8307-4503	A	" 25 "	3/DP
8547 S4Q	8514-4714	A	" 28 "	2/Lt
9536 VX	9509-3604	A	" 2 Mar	6/Lt

(2) Deletions:

8144 QB	1024 WN	1621 WZ
8442 VA	1035 VD	1719 VN
9435 WW	1122 XH	1722 ZD

(3) Amendments:

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Activity by the artillery with the Corps was again light and about equally distributed among units. Observed missions were fired on personnel, vehicles, machine guns and mortars. Unobserved missions were generally confined to ey battery and harassing targets.

A light harassing program was fired during the night on lines of communication and ey batteries.

At 1632A the 938th FA AOP adjusted the 36th FA Bn on approximately 20 ey personnel in a house at R1765-2495. One direct hit on the house resulted in the personnel taking cover in a ditch along a RR embankment. The observer reported the remaining rounds right along the ditch. A total of 19 rds were fired.

The 995th FA Bn AOP adjusted his unit at 1650A on a building being used as a strong point at Q7739-4109. 28 rds were fired with 5 target hits and several close rounds being obtained. The building was reported as badly gutted.

The 939th FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on ey personnel at R0013-2719. 9 rds were fired with one tree burst injuring personnel being reported.

At 1645A a GOP of the 143rd Inf adjusted the 133d FA Bn on a house at R0323-2480 from which a MG had been firing. 29 rds were fired with 5 hits on the house being reported.

At 1250A the 59th AFA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on a building at R0812-2141 around which personnel and vehicular activity was noted. 36 rds were expended inflicting casualties on the personnel and destroying one vehicle.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					2	3	2	
Per	19		14		4	2	4	
Veh	2		3				1	
MG & Mor			6		6	5	2	
Armor			1					
Def Fire				1				
Har		12		12		18		16
Reg	6		10		6		16	
Misc	1	11	2		7		6	2
Prop		26			1			
TOTALS	28	49	36	13	26	28	31	18

(2) Corps Arty:

	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		1		1		4	1	2
Per	3	2			2			
Armor	1							
Har		3		6		10		4
Reg	1		5		2		4	
Misc		3						
Dest							1	
TOTALS	5	9	5	7	4	14	6	6

AOP Missions: 16

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn maintaining AT defense in assigned sector. During period, classes in technical training were held for Officers and NCO's by all gun companies. The 1st Rcn platoon continued their security patrol of the Div. zone.

636 TD Bn providing AT defense in assigned sector. The 1st and 3rd platoons of "A" Co. exchanged positions during period. The 1st platoon of "C" Co. fired roving missions during the night, in support of the 2nd Bn, 143rd R.C.T. The targets were enemy supply routes leading out of CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN (R-0882). 59 rds HE and 1 rd Star Shell were expended on missions. The results of firing were undetermined. Rcn Co assembled vicinity (Q-843176) for rest and rehabilitation.

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645 T.D. Bn maintaining A.T. defense in assigned sector, continued to fire direct, and indirect missions. The 2nd platoon of "B" Co, in indirect fire positions vicinity SPARSBACH (Q7631) expended a total of 40 rds HE in unobserved harassing fire on enemy supply routes. One T.D. of "C" Co, vicinity (Q-758388) fired 30 rds HE direct fire, on enemy dug in positions on hill vicinity (Q-768392). Rcn Co - No change.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Front Lines: No change.

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #176

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

1. a. The ey was quiet but sensitive to patrol activity during the night. Some flares and motor movement were reported from the 42 Inf Div sector. From the 103 Inf Div sector vehicular movement was reported from vic OBERBRONN (Q9233) at 1900A. A patrol to UHRWILLER (Q8831) reported ey there but sounds of vehicular traffic was believed to be coming from a recording machine. Three PWs were captured in vic BISCHHOLTZ (Q8532) from 6th Co, 87th Regt. Troops of 36 Inf Div across the MODER River in houses vic (R045241) received small amount S/A fire from N and E. Patrol entering woods at Q9442/4 were fired on by MG from immediate right. During the forenoon ey was unusually quiet.

b. Sector remained quiet during the afternoon with arty activity increasing moderately on forward areas.

2. Radar reported a stationary object with some activity around it at 0934-3660 at 2010A.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. Due to an evening demonstration and bad weather with consequent poor visibility throughout the day, which favored extensive harassing operations, the ey arty activity showed a marked increase during the period. Possibly provoked by our own propaganda demonstration, and with an idea towards reassuring the ey inf that they are well supported by hvy supporting weapons, several batteries, apparently 5 to 8, in the GUNDERSHOFFEN-ESCHBACH (0050) area subjected the towns of PFATTENHOFFEN LA WALCK, EUEBERACH, and NIEDERMODERN, to an estimated 100 rds, mixed lt and med cal, and followed it up with a few moderate concentrations in the next hour. About the same time the HAGUENAU area drew scattered harassing concentrations, with particular attention being devoted to the road intersection at 045233. After midnight there was little firing, and this phase lasted until well into the morning, except for a few 10-20 rd concentrations vic BATZENDORF (9720), DAUENDORF, NEUBURG, and SCHWEIGHAUSEN. In the afternoon the ey began harassing the HAGUENAU and SCHWEIGHAUSEN areas, not heavily, but quite persistently. Around 1400A and again at 1620A the REIPERTSWILLER area drew sudden 40-50 rd lt cal concentrations, but otherwise shelling in this sector was lt. The 14 A.D. held another propaganda demonstration in the afternoon, and the ey followed it up with 40-50 rds 75mm on NEIDERMODERN between 1735 and 1750A.

Shellrep total - 109

36 Div	14 A.D.	6 Gp	42 Div	2 FOB	405 Gp
66	7	13	10	8	5

b. Changes to EB List #25:

(1) Additions:-

CONC NO	COORDINATE	ACC	SOURCE	NO/TYPE
9231 RZ	9208-3185	A	A/F	4/G
9536 VY	9515-3621	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Lt
0125 RY	0176-2570	B	B/F	1/G

(2) Deletions:-

7648 RE	9131 RJ	0726 RR
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(3) Amendments:-

0826 RI #2	0809-2688	A	2 FOB/S	2/Lt
0827 RI #1	0808-2712	A	2 FOB/S	4/Lt
1125 QG #2	1187-2564	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Med
1226 QG #1	1217-2600	A	2 FOB/S	4/Med

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(4) Suspect List #25-11:-

9209-2993	14 Armd OP's	1/Rocket
9207-3094	A/F	4/G
921 - 358	62 Inf	1/105
9347-2992	14 Armd OP's	Rocket
936 - 293	62 Inf	1/SP
9562-3245	A/F	1/G
960 - 275	GOP	1/75
0256-3552	B/F	1/G
164 - 294	62 Inf	1/G

Due to generally poor visibility over Corps front Jerry took advantage and used his arty much more than usual. Though bad weather conditions prevailed, 2 FOB turned in 8 sound and 5 flash locations during the period. 3 of the sound locations confirmed old locations; 1225 AG, 1226 OG & 0826 RI.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. Due to limited visibility caused by rain and snow missions fired by the Artv with the Corps during the period were very lt. However, the 36 Div Arty and 14 Armd Div Arty were particularly active in obtaining observed missions on targets such as personnel, vehicles, machine guns, and mortars. Unobserved missions were again largely confined to harassing and counter-battery targets.

The nights harassing program was fired on ey btry locations, CP's, supply points, and a few critical CR's. The use of 50% Pozit fuze was specified where applicable.

"A" Flash, 2 FA Obsn Bn adjusted the 141 FA Bn from 2043A to 2143A on 4 guns at Q92083135 and from 2115A to 2135A on 4 guns at Q9207-3094. 29 rds were expended on the first target and 20 rds were fired on the second location. All rds were reported right in the area for both targets.

The 141 FA Bn was adjusted by its AOP on one ey tank at Q88853499 from 0800A to 0845A. 32 rds were fired with two hits being obtained and the tank being reported as damaged.

At 1223A an FO of the 143 Inf adjusted the 939 FA Bn on an ey OP in a house at R02332461. 28 rds were fired. The observer reported 1 hit with delay fuze in the cellar and 1 hit, also with delay fuze, on the upper floor. Another house along side the OP was reported as demolished with 4 hits.

At 1610A, "A" Flash 2 FA Obsn Bn started adjusting Btry "B", 216 AAA Bn on ey personnel at Q899320. The mission was not completed as a red alert was received after 3 rds were fired and the btry had to take up its primary role.

From 1430A to 1530A the 103 Div Arty fired a demonstration shoot vic UHR-WILLER (Q8831) using the Pozit fuze. Weapons used were the 105 How, 155 How, and 8" How. Using high angle fire the 105 How gave a height of burst of about 5 yards and the 155 How gave a height of burst of about the height of the buildings over which it was fired. With low angle fire the 105 How and 155 How gave heights of bursts of approx 25 and 30 yds, respectively. Using low angle fire only, the 8" How gave a height of burst of 60-70 yds.

At 1615A the GOP of the 501 AFA Bn adjusted his bn on approx a squad of ey at Q9096-3248. 8 casualties were reported.

The AOP of the 155 FA Bn adjusted his bn on a house at Q973271 at 1400A. 20 rds were fired with 5 hits being reported.

At 1625A an observer from the 143 Inf adjusted the 155 FA Bn on an OP at R028247. Out of 19 rds fired 5 direct hits were reported.

From 1000A to 1015A the 59 AFA Bn was adjusted by it's AOP on a bldg with personnel activity noted around it at R072242. 27 rds were fired with 2 hits being reported.

b. Summary of Missions:-

(1) Div Arty:-

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB						2		
Per	11		17		1	2	1	1
Veh	2		3					
MG & Mor	1		8		1			
Armor	1		2					
Def Fires			8	1		2		
Har		5		9		11	1	14
Reg	5		7		3		5	
Misc	2	10	4				1	
Prop	8			2		1		
TOTAL	30	15	49	12	5	18	8	15

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(2) Corps Arty:-

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	14		5		7	2	5
Per		2			1	5	1	
Armor							1	
Har		2		8		7		7
Reg					1			
Misc								1
TOTAL	1	18	0	13	2	19	4	13

AOP Missions - 2

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations:-

614 TD Bn - continued anti-tank defense and security patrols. 2d Rcn Plt rel'd 1st Rcn Plt of patrol missions. Elements of the bn witnessed a rocket firing demonstration during the period.

636 TD Bn - providing AT defense and firing indirect missions. 1 TD of "A" Co expended 75 rds HE and 3 rds star shell on night harassing fires. "B" Co test fired 12 new M36's on VI Corps tank and TD range. The 2d Plt of "C" Co fired 186 rds HE on targets selected by 143 RCT. Rcn Co assembled in MELSHEIM (Q8417) for rest and rehabilitation.

645 TD Bn - bn less Co "A" assembled and prepared to move to new sector. Co "A" rel'd Co "B" of AT defense and now supports 222d and 232d Inf Regts. "A" Co CP vic Q805316, 2 TD's Q805316, 2 TD's Q790367, 2 TD's Q790361, 2 TD's Q804359, 2 TD's Q725397, and 2 TD's Q748387.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS

No change.

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #177.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Enemy activity was negligible in early part of period. A small enemy patrol attempted to penetrate our lines vic Q847343. A group of 25 enemy, attempting a crossing of the MODER RIVER near KALTENHOUSE (R0721), were fired on by our arty. At BITECHHOFFEN (Q9128) tracked vehicles were heard leaving town going N. In the early part of the period, 3 PW's were taken and later, 7 deserters from 3d Co, 1st Bn, 104th Regt, 47 VG Div entered our lines vic UETTERACH (Q9227).

b. In last portion of period, enemy was quiet with exception of scattered arty and mortar fire. 103rd Inf Div AOP observed 2 heavy trucks loaded with personnel at 907-325 moving toward ZINSWILLER. Intermittent troop movement on road at 904324 was reported throughout the period.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. During the period the ey arty continued their rather extensive harassing operations with scattered shelling along the entire Corps front. The majority of concentrations were under 15 rds but shelling was persistent throughout the period with night harassing fire being slightly heavier than during the day. The rear areas received more shelling than usual, especially the road intersection at 955-205 which was subjected to 30 rds of med fire between 0400 and 0530 hrs. About the same time C btry of the 634 FA Bn had 10-12 rds of 1t cal fall in their area; however the shelling was not thought to be CB fire as the concentration was very light and the btry had not fired for quite some time. HAGUENAU, BATZENDORF, WIMMENAU, WILDENGUTH, REIFERTSWILLER, BISCHWILLER, LA WALCK, MAUENDORF all received 1t harassing fire during the night and early morning with HAGUENAU, BATZENDORF and MAUENDORF getting a few med cal concentrations as well. Activity during the morning slackened up with only HAGUENAU, WILDENGUTH, REIFERTSWILLER and ALTHORN reporting 1t shelling. WIMMENAU reported 6 rds of 170 during the afternoon and SCHWEIGHAUSEN received a 1t concentration of med cal fire as did CRASSENDORF. The rest of the afternoon's activity was confined to 1t shelling on our fwd elements. Ey arty in the MOUTERHOUSE-BARENTHAL area and the GUNDERSHOFFEN-ESCHBACH area was responsible for the majority of the shelling received.

Shellrep total: 85

36 Div-25, 42 Div-19, 14 A Div-7, 46 Gp-7, 6 Gp-19, 405 Gp-2, 35 Gp-1, 2 FOB-5.

b. Enemy Btry List #26 accompanies this report.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. With considerably improved visibility during the period the number of AOP missions rose appreciably. During the period the artillery with the Corps was moderately active in firing observed missions on ey battery locations, personnel, vehicles, machine guns, and mortars. The preponderance of unobserved missions fired were on counter-battery and harassing targets.

A light harassing program was fired during the night on CR'S, ey batteries, CP's, and supply points. Where appropriate, the use of 75% POZIT fuze was specified.

The advance party of the 1st FA Obsn Bn reported in during the period. The party is reconnoitering for positions in the eastern (right) portion of the Corps sector.

At 1637A the 46 Gp AOP adjusted the 36 FA Bn on one ey gun at R0004-3022. 23 rounds were expended; however it was too hazy to observe any definite results.

At 1749A the 938 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on 3 ey guns at R0556-2757. 27 rds were fired resulting in one small explosion.

The 194 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn at 1513A on a house at R0014-2642. 4 hits and 3 near misses were obtained resulting in the destruction of the house. A total of 16 rds were fired.

At 1211A an FO of the 928 FA Bn adjusted his Bn on 4 ey personnel near a dug-out at Q866-338. 10 rds were fired. The observer reported two ey killed and the other two dispersed.

From 1800A to 1820A the 133 FA Bn AOP adjusted the 155 FA Bn on 3 ey guns at R0063-3062. 35 rds were expended resulting in one explosion and a fire being started.

From 1800A to

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From 1800A to 1830A the 133 FA Bn was active in adjusting the 155 FA Bn on one ey gun at R0073-2982, 2 ey guns at Q9912-3004, and 3 ey guns at Q9544-2931. 27, 25, and 15 rounds, respectively, were fired on these locations. The observer reported the area well covered in each case.

From 1518A to 1600A the 6 Gp AOP adjusted the 698 FA Bn on the RR tracks at R0002-2595. 14 rds were fired resulting in 3 hits on the tracks and damaging it considerably. This mission was requested by the 36 Div Arty.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			5			4		
Per	8		20		3	5	3	2
Veh	2		3				3	
MG & Mor	2		5		1	2	1	
Armor			3					
Def Fire				2				
Har		8		5		19		14
Reg	10		21		17		15	
Misc	5	6			5		1	
Prop	2	5		3			4	4
TOTAL	29	19	57	10	26	30	27	20

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	17		6	2	20	1	3
Per	1	1			1		2	
Veh							1	
Har		2		10		6		3
Reg	6		4		6		1	
Misc								5
Dest	2				1			
TOTAL	10	20	4	16	10	26	5	11

AOP Missions: 19

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn providing anti tank defense and security patrols. Co CO's continued unit training and improving gun positions.

636 TD Bn maintaining anti tank defense and firing indirect harassing missions. One TD of "A" Co at R957215 fired 60 rds HE and 1 rd star shell on RJ vic R003264. Co "B" reld "C" Co at Q42327A and under direct support of 141 RCT. 2d Plt of Co "B" moved to indirect fire positions (Q991198) to support the fires of 131 FA Bn. Co "C" moved to assembly area vic GINGSHEIM (Q8913) on completion of relief.

Co "A" 645 TD Bn continued anti tank defense of assigned sector. Company CP and 4 TD's moved to Q728358 vic WINGEN. No firing for the period.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. The value of groove azimuths is clearly proved by the following example. The 575th FA turned in a groove azimuth on a light caliber shelling vic BERTSHEIM (9521) during the night and the 499 FA (14 AD) turned in a groove on a shelling they received vic MORSCHWILLER (9224). It so happened that "B" Btry, 2 FOB, located by flash, a btry in the 0030 grid square at each of the times at which the above areas were shelled. This location, of better than 100 yd accuracy, was exactly intersected by the 575th groove, and the intersection of the two grooves was only about 200 yards away. Fragments from the shelled areas identified the guns as light caliber. The flash location, incidentally, was only 30 yards away from an old location ZM, which air photos showed unoccupied on 16 Feb, indicating that it was now reoccupied. The 2 FOB had a good day, obtaining a total of 16 plots from both flash and sound. Of these flash scored one new location, and confirmed one old btry. Sound obtained two new btry positions and confirmed three old ones. The rest of the plots were repeats of the others, except for one "A" acc location on a possible mortar by flash.

b. Front Lines: No change.

S E C R E T

ANNEX #1, TO PERIODIC REPORT #177.

INTERROGATION REPORT

Prisoners: 7 (deserters)

Organization: 3rd Co. 141st Regt. 47th V.G. Division

Captured by : 14th Arm. Div., 62nd Arm. Inf. Bn.

Personalities: CO, 3rd Co. - Lt. Unboni
CO, 1st Bn. - Capt. Preustedt
CO, 141st Regt. - Lt. Col. Knuettel
CG, 47th V.G. Division - Maj. Gen. Bork

Strength: 3rd Co. approx. 40 men

Locations: CP, 3rd Co. 141st Regt in bunker at 93252790
CP, 1st Bn. 141st Regt in bunker at 93642845

Trains for 3rd Co., 141st Regt. in factory near Walbourg at 03823171. There are 8 vehicles and 13 horses. Food for the 3rd Co. is being picked up from there and reaches Co. area between 1500 and 1600 daily.

Artillery:

- 1 - 105mm How. 96392873 as of 20 Feb 45
- 1 - AT - gun, (Caliber unknown to PW, probably 75mm) at 96212862 as of 20 Feb 45.
- 3 - 105mm Hows near Mertzwiller vic. 95323068, PW claims guns about 300 meters apart. as of 20 Feb 45.
- 3 - 75mm Inf. Hows behind steel-mill at Mertzwiller at 95603030 also mortars in this vic., exact location unknown to PW. Rumors say that SP-guns are hidden in steel-mill but do not move out for lack of gasoline. All this as of 20 Feb 45.

Entrenchments with MG-positions near ravine running from 93202843 to 93322835 and 93372814, 4 heavy machineguns.

Morale: Very low, according to one PW about 75% would desert if they would not be afraid of being shot at by their own men and if they would know the minegaps through their own minefields.

In 3rd Co. only 5 men are real Nazis, distrusted by the rest of the men, who are sick and tired of war, hope for a soon end and "don't want to die anymore for the Fuehrer".

Interrogated by
IPW team 182 (VI Corps Arty)

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From 1800A to 1830A the 133 FA Bn was active in adjusting the 155 FA Bn on one ey gun at R0073-2982, 2 ey guns at Q9912-3004, and 3 ey guns at Q9544-2931. 27, 25, and 15 rounds, respectively, were fired on these locations. The observer reported the area well covered in each case.

From 1518A to 1600A the 6 Gp AOP adjusted the 698 FA Bn on the RR tracks at R0002-2595. 14 rds were fired resulting in 3 hits on the tracks and damaging it considerably. This mission was requested by the 36 Div Arty.

b. Summary of Missions:

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ENEMY BATTERY LIST #26

<u>COORD NO.</u>	<u>COORDS</u>	<u>ACC</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>NO./TYPE</u>
7542 M4R	7560-4250	A	AP-28 Feb	3/Lt
7744 S4R	7755-4461	A	AP-28 Feb	2/Lt
7839 QM	7860-3985	A	AP-14 Feb	Prob Btry
7840 QN	7884-4057	A	AP-14 Feb	Prob Btry
7842 N4H	7878-4215	A	AP-22 Feb	3/Lt
7845 KU	7868-4545	A	AP-2 Mar	3/G
7942 QQ	7931-4285	A	PW, AP-14 Feb	Btry
7943 QP	7929-4303	A	AP-14 Feb	4/DP
8144 VS	8149-4432	A	AP-2 Mar	5/G
8345 P4Q	8307-4503	A	AP-25 Feb	3/DP
8442 PZ	8460-4200	A	AP-28 Feb	4/Lt
8547 S4Q	8514-4714	A	AP-28 Feb	2/Lt
8835 RV	8885-3565	B	AOP, 28 Feb	2/Med
8935 XP	8910-3594	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
8935 XO	8950-3599	A	AP-2 Mar	1/Lt Prob
8935 QO	8991-3515	A	AP-2 Mar	2-3/Lt
9034 XU	9021-3452	A	AP-25 Feb	6/Nebel
9035 QR	9099-3507	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Lt
9037 VV	9025-3706	A	AP-28 Feb	2/Lt
9133 FW	9192-3321	A	AP-16 Feb, PW	4/Lt
9134 WX	9154-3483	A	AP-25 Feb	1/Lt
9231 RZ	9208-3185	A	2 FOB/F	4/G
9231 AE	9209-3116	A	2 FOB/F	4/G
9232 VK	9246-3270	A	AP-2 Mar	4/Lt
9331 ZS	9357-3150	A	AP-22 Feb	1/Lt
9332 OP	9344-3225	A	AP-22 Feb	2/Lt
9430 YW	9415-3053	A	AP-11 Feb	2/Lt
9432 WV	9404-3213	A	AP-25 Feb	2/Lt
9440 WR	9456-4047	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
9529 RO	9544-2931	B	AOP	3/G
9532 WU	9584-3270	A	AP-25 Feb	3-4/Lt
9533 VX	9509-3604	A	AP-2 Mar	6/Lt
9536 VY	9515-3621	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Lt
9634 VM	9679-3478	A	AP-25 Feb	3/Lt
9831 OI	9878-3138	A	AP-16 Feb	3/Med
9831 WL	9874-3179	A	AP-2 Mar	1/Lt
9835 WT	9812-3540	A	AP-25 Feb	2/Lt
9930 QW	9931-3071	A	AP-14 Feb	3/Lt
9930 AA	9912-3004	B	AOP	2/G
9931 XE	9906-3131	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
9931 OJ	9905-3185	A	AP-2 Mar	Poss Dummy
9933 QX	9962-3316	A	GOP 21 Feb	2/G
			2 FOB/F 15 Feb	
9935 VP	9960-3522	A	AP-28 Feb	4/Lt
0030 ZM	0095-3005	A	2 FOB/F 4 Mar	4/Lt
0030 RL	0040-3054	A	AP-22 Feb	2/Lt
0030 WB	0061-3059	A	2 FOB/F AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
0030 ZN	0031-3077	A	AP-2 Mar	4/Lt
0031 WA	0090-3125	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
0125 RY	0176-2570	B	B/F 3 Mar	1/G
0131 WJ	0180-3177	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
0234 RW	0295-3405	B	AOP-28 Feb	-/G
0238 WS	0258-3805	A	AP-2 Mar	4/HAA
0326 RX	0368-2651	B	AOP-2 Mar	1/G
0326 VG	0309-2607	A	AP-25 Feb	1/Lt
0328 FU	0316-2835	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
0426 AB	0418-2662	B	AOP	1/-
0431 RK	0443-3180	B	AOP & GOP	1/G
0436 WC	0467-3628	A	AP-2 Mar	4/HAA
0527 AC	0556-2757	B	AOP	3/G
0628 WM	0688-2839	A	AP-2 Mar	4/Lt
0728 RG	0799-2809	A	AP-25 Feb	1/G
0735 WK	0714-3500	A	AP-2 Mar	4/HAA

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<u>CONC NO.</u>	<u>COORDS</u>	<u>ACC</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>NO./TYPE</u>
0824 RA	0859-2426	A	AP-22 Feb	4/Lt
0827 RI #1	0808-2712	A	2 FOB/S 4 Mar	4/Lt
0826 RI #2	0809-2688	A	2 FOB/S 4 Mar	2/Lt
0827 PP	0861-2716	A	2 FOB/S	1/Med
0924 PL	0900-2490	A	AP & B/S	4/Lt
0928 RU	0917-2839	B	2 FOB/S	1/Med
1022 MT	1080-2238	B	PW 22 Feb	4/88
1024 RT	1045-2416	B	2 FOB/S 28 Feb	2/Lt
1024 PH	1020-2492	A	AP-22 Feb B/S 3 Mar	3/Lt
1122 AD	1152-2281	A	B/S 5 Mar	1/G
1123 NX	1122-2310	A	AP-2 Mar	Poss 2/Lt
1226 QC #1	1217-2600	A	2 FOB/S 4 Mar	4/Med
1226 QC #2	1187-2564	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Med
1226 XI	1241-2667	A	AP-2 Mar	1/Med
1322 MS	1384-2312	A	Sound & Flash	2/G
1525 VA	1595-2555	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Lt
1525 QA	1591-2595	A	AP-25 Feb	4/G Poss Dummy
1617 VJ	1622-1797	A	AP-25 Feb	1/HAA
1624 ZE	1685-2461	A	AP-23 Feb	4/HAA
1719 VD	1793-1965	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
1821 QT	1806-2117	A	2 FOB/S	2/G
1821 QF	1821-2203	A	AP-23 Feb	1/Lt
2124 VQ	2190-2485	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Lt
2224 VR	2208-2468	A	AP-2 Mar	2/Lt

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #178.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

a. The Corps sector was generally quiet during the night. There were flares in 42 Div sector vic (Q7641) early in the period. A patrol in 103rd Div sector heard MG fire vic (Q865319). An ey patrol was fired on when they attempted to come out of MUHLHAUSEN (Q8631). In the 36th Div sector, ey fired against houses in vic (R045-243) during early part of the night. Our patrols drew MG fire from both flanks and grenades from the front at (Q946-274). Ey were heard in woods at Q972267 and Q968270. PW's taken during the night included one deserter vic (Q844349) from 2 Co. 16 Fus. Bn. and one deserter vic (R078212) from communications platoon, 1 Bn, 2nd SS police Regt. Seven PW's were reported by the 14th Armd Div. The ey remained quiet during the morning offering no opposition to our reoccupation of three houses vic (R-044243). Five deserters came in during the morning from 2 Co. 16 Fus Bn., vic (Q-988254). Two deserters reported from 2 Bn, 115 VGR vic (Q988254).

b. The Corps sector was very quiet during the afternoon. The only activity was light harassing.

c. Enemy defenses. PIU reports indicate two delaying positions between our present front and the SIEGFRIED LINE, both recently prepared. Defenses consist of entrenchments and road blocks for the most part. The first defense position runs from ZINSWILLER (Q8935) along the ZINTIL DU NORD River through GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q9233) and MERTZWILLER (Q9630) and to HAGUENAU. The second line of defense extends from NIEDERBRONN (Q9139) east through REICHSHOFFEN (Q9436) and the woods south of WOERTH (R0037). It runs intermittent to MERKWILLER (R0637) thence to SOULTZ (R1037), and SELTZ (R2732). Road blocks consist mainly of felled trees. No attempt has been made to construct concrete fortifications which indicates preparation for delaying tactics: Many small trails as well as main roads in the HAGUENAU Forest have a number of road blocks. Few changes have been noted in the SIEGFRIED LINE. Some trenches have been extended but no new concrete structures have appeared.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Due to decrease in artillery fire in the right sector of the Corps front and lack of shelling in the 42nd Div sector, enemy artillery activity was light during the period. The chief target of harassing fires which formed the bulk of the missions was the high ground vic MORSCHWILLER and RINGELDORF, where several of our OP's are located, and since the fire fell during the middle of the day when visibility was slightly better, it probably had for its object neutralization of these OP's. Night harassment was all before midnight and consisted of only a few rounds vic LICHTENBERG, BERTSHEIM, SCHILLERSDORF, and HAGUENAU. During the day, besides the MORSCHWILLER-RINGELDORF area the enemy shelled NIEDERMODERN with 30-40 rounds med. cal. at 1005A, and lightly harassed in vic of NEUBURG, SCHWEIGHAUSEN, PHAFFENHOFFEN, and HAGUENAU. Most of this harassing fire was of medium caliber.

The heavy caliber gun which shelled WIMMENAU the night of 4-5 Mar., is identified as the same type of 210mm gun which shelled SCHILLERSDORF a few days previously. It is interesting to note that one of this type of gun, which fires a semi-armor piercing projectile, was knocked out on the Anzio beachhead. In that instance, from its location it appeared that 29 or 30,000 yards was its best shooting range. The 42nd Div Arty obtained a good groove bearing from the WIMMENAU shelling, and if this battery follows the tactics of the Anzio battery, it appears that the gun may be located in vic of FISHBACH (9854), or if firing at a shorter range, in vic of NEUDORFFEL (9147).

Attention is invited to the PW interrogation Annex accompanying this report. On the night of 17 Feb., despite a ground haze which prevented an accurate location, 2 FOB - "B" Battery flash obtained an area flash location on this gun, which in conjunction with flashes turned in by OP's of the 938th, and 194th FA Bn, was sufficient to identify the RR bend W of SURBOURG as the location. The "track runner" consisting of a TOT and battery volleys every 100 yards along the bend were fired by the 939th, 977th, and 36th FA Bns, with harassing until daylight by the 939th FA Bn. The railroad gun battery commander was killed by this harassing fire when he came to look for his wounded men. This PW statement, believed reliable, substantiates a previous PW report of damage to the gun and casualties to the crew. Congratulations to all

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the above units for their work in the first known instance that American Artillery has located and fired on one of these railroad guns while it was in firing position.

Shellrep total: 40
 36 Div 14 AD 103 Div 42 Div 405 Gp 6 Gp 46 Gp 2 FOB
 13 4 3 1 7 9 1 2

b. Changes to EB List #26.

(1) Amendments:

0030 WB	To read	3/Med
1226 QC	" "	1226 QC
1719 VD	" "	1719 VO

(2) Suspect List #26-1

0655-3000	CBO	1/Med
003-267	VI C.A. IPW	6/75/SP's

Sound and flash NTR.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. With continued poor visibility and slight cy activity on the Corps front, operations by Corps Arty remained at a minimum. Corps Arty AOP's were unable to make a single adjustment during the period, while ground observers were able to locate and adjust on only a very few targets.

Activity around a dugout at Q95722746, observed by 132nd FA Bn, GOP, was effectively neutralized by fire from 634th FA Bn.

In another personnel mission 499th AFA Bn., was adjusted on a group of cy at Q96403294. The Bn's ground observer reported the area very well covered by the fire.

Mortars at Q91662878 were silenced by 12 rds from 500 AFA Bn. The adjustment was made by ground observer.

405th FA Gp., conducted a series of demonstrations for personnel of 103rd Inf Div Arty. These demonstrations are designed to show the function and operation of Corps Arty, in order to more closely correlate the operations of Div and Corps Arty.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		1	10		1		1	
Per	3		11		2	4	4	1
Veh	1		5			4		
MG & Mor	2		11		3	4		
Prep				3				
Def Fire			20	1				
Har		12		9		16		19
Reg	3		14		6		9	
Misc	1	13	3	1			1	1
Prop	10	15		1				
TOTALS	20	41	74	15	11	29	14	22

(2) Corps Arty:

	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		10		1		8		3
Per	1	2	1		2			
Har			7		11		4	
Misc							5	
TOTALS	1	12	1	8	0	21	0	12

AOP Missions: 0

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SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn continued anti-tank defense of assigned sector and security patrols in Div area. Co. "C" moved several guns to better firing positions early in the period. Bn. C.O. and Ass't Div Comdr., made an inspection tour of Unit positions.

636 TD Bn providing anti-tank defense and firing indirect harassing missions. The 1st and 3rd Plts. of Co. "A" exchanged positions during the period. One TD of "A" Co., in indirect fire position at Q957215 fired 17 rds HE, 3 rds smoke, and 2 rds APC at an ey SP gun at range approx. 11,000 yds. The Inf. observer reported 2 direct hits on SP with extent of damage unknown. This same TD expended 70 rds HE and 8 rds illuminating shell on night harassing fires. The 2nd Plt. of Co. "B" completed check point registration. "C" and Rcn Co., - no change.

Co. "A" 645 TD Bn maintaining anti-tank defense in 42 Inf Div. sector. No firing for period.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Front Lines: No change.

Schroeder
SCHROEDER
Asst S-3

Special IPW ReportHINTS ON THE WAR IN THE WEST1. Preamble:

Officer PW was a member of a Divl Hq Staff and as such had access to much material. Intelligent and cultured, he was acquaintance and crony of many war-experienced Offs. The following report is in substance an account written by the PW himself. After he had furnished the tactical knowledge obtained in interrogation, he was asked to write about the consensus of opinion among German Offs on the present phase of the war in the West. Here is the translation:

2. The Situation in the West:

It is known to the German High Command, or, it assumes, that the Western Allies will try to end the war with the troops now available on the Continent. It is not believed that any further contingents of troops will be landed. Based on this knowledge or assumption the German High Command has evolved the following plan:

Germany will effect the greatest possible concentration of force at those places where Allied main effort is believed or known to form. At all the other sectors of the front weak German forces will engage in a suicidal mission of pinning down disproportionately larger Allied forces: every yard of ground, every house is to be defended with tenacity and fanaticism; every local success is to be fully exploited, every weakness of the enemy is to be seized upon immediately to cause the Allies losses.

There are two main problems which have beset the Germans that render the continued war effort exceedingly difficult:

- a. The small number of adequate Inf Repls available for the front;
- b. The aggravation of the critical problem of logistics.

Thus, a Bn will often have a front line strength of only 30 men, including Off; which is given the mission of defending a sector 3000 yards wide. In the field of supply, food and Am, especially gasoline, have become very scarce. The evacuation of wounded can only be effected under the most primitive circumstances.

3. Criticism of American Tactics:

With matters having come to such a pass, German unit commanders are unable to explain why the Americans do not exploit local successes accordingly with their superiority in men and material. Since it has become practically impossible to provide relief for the German Inf men, they are for the most part almost at the end of their power of physical and mental resistance. It is a well-known fact that the Americans are apt to content themselves with an accomplished penetration or a small advance and that they stop their Tks as soon as they suspect that they face AT guns or Panzerfaeuste in Posn. By the time American Arty has taken up new advanced Posns and the attack is resumed there has been sufficient pause to consolidate a new main line of resistance.

If it were made a rule to continue the attack ruthlessly after making a penetration it would invariably be possible to overrun the German Arty Posns or to surprise the Arty at a time when it is just engaged in pulling back. Many an unwary Divl CP could be caught in this manner. Divl or corps reserves are now a rare thing, and if they are provided, transportation is usually lacking to commit them where needed.

A basic error in American night patrol tactics has been observed by German unit commanders on several occasions. Whenever an American night patrol is fired upon after it has penetrated German lines it will change its route to a course running parallel with the main line of resistance instead of continuing on with the original patrol route at right angles with the MLR with a slight offset or retreating straight to the rear. In this way the patrol risks running the gauntlet of fire all along the MLR. Generally speaking, amazing results could be produced if strong assault groups were sent out at night since the Germans do not expect to have to deal with anything stronger than reconnaissance patrols at night.

4. What the Germans would do in our Place:

In spite of the huge Arty preparations the number of casualties is on the average small. Strong mortar barrages which are brought to bear up to the time when

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assault operations begin would produce better results in the case of already depleted German Divs. With present conditions prevailing on the West front many German Offs in their discussions among themselves point out that the present type of German troops would be most vulnerable to the following tactics:

- a. Undertake a maneuver of deception by increased sound of Tk and truck motors at a strong part of the Divl sector during the night.
- b. Send out a strong reconnaissance patrol for screening purposes.
- c. Irruption at a weak point with strong assault groups at dawn.
- d. A short surrender demand stressing good treatment, return to relatives, and unnecessary bloodshed in the alternative.
- e. Strong harassing fire by Arty (phosphorous) on all zones behind the MLR to choke off communications to the rear.
- f. Breakthrough in the area of penetration with Tks and Inf as far as the rear Arty Posns and Div CP.

Fighter-bombers are highly effective. For this reason Rd transport only takes place at night or in the daytime during bad weather. Increased use of night fighters would be highly successful.

It is generally admitted that the concentration of bombing effort on the cities contributes much to the war purpose. But among leading political and military circles it is felt that on the average this only increases the German will to resist. Greater and more decisive results could be obtained for the Allied cause by concentrating without let-up on all communications, on railroad centers, smaller railroad stations, secondary railroad lines, automobile highways, roads (especially on open stretches instead of on towns because detours are more difficult and it is harder to bring up clearing and construction labor), on shipping lanes, etc. Concentrated air attacks on all RHINE bridges simultaneously for several days in a row would have catastrophic consequences in the field of supply for the West front and the supply of Germany proper with coal, ore, etc. Such an undertaking in the West may well make future ground operations within limited geographical space decisive. (Source: Third US Army special IPW Report, 1 March 1945).

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ANNEX #2 TO PERIODIC REPORT #178

INTERROGATION REPORT

6 March 1945

PRISONERS: 5 (Deserters)

CAPTURED BY: 142nd Inf, 36th Div.

ORGANIZATION: 2d Co - 115th Regt - 47th VG Div
3d Co - " " " " "

PERSONALITIES: CO 2d Co 115th Regt 47th VG Div -- Lt Shirmer
" 3d Co " " " " " -- Lt Hoelig
" 1st Bn " " " " " -- Capt Oetter
CG " " " " " -- Maj Gen Bork

STRENGTH: 2d Co 115th Regt 47th VG Div 40 men (approx)
3d Co " " " " " 50 men "

LOCATIONS: CP 2d Co 115th Regt 47th VG Div - (992263)
" 3d " " " " " " - (00452549)
" 2d Bn " " " " " " - (000266)

Food distribution point (990264) (usually at 1900-2000 hrs)

6 How (cal unknown) vic 044318 to 037319 with 70-100m between guns
seen Feb 14th.

6 - 75mm SP AT guns 003267

4 - 88mm and 4-20mm AA guns along Right side of Rd area 07083520 to
07103470 seen 20th Feb.

MORALE: Low

MISCELLANEOUS: Our Arty considered good by PW's

PW's claim food was poor lately and insufficient.

Leaflets are being read by PW's and many of them plan desertion.
(Last leaflets fired to them were all torn and mutilated.)

PW stated that he was in a Hospital at SURBOURG from the 7th Feb
to 20th Feb. He heard from Hospital personnel that about the
15th (?) Feb., a RR gun, located vic R073353 was damaged by our
Arty and the Battery had suffered 4 dead and 15 wounded. It was
believed that the gun was not damaged beyond repair.

Interrogated by
IPW Team 182 VI Corps Arty)

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panied by vehicles on a narrow canyon road at Q869-371. The first rds pinned the ey
down, and the following rds covered the area effectively.

35 Gp AOP also adjusted 141 FA Bn on a tank at Q8684-3525. 16 rds were fired,
of which 3 hit and damaged the tank and several hit a house beside which the tank
was located.

36 FA Bn ground observer adjusted his bn on two ey btries with good results
reported in both cases. The first, completed at 1527A, was at Q9684-3343. 22 rds
HE and 4 rds smk were fired, effecting 1 hit on a house near a gun pit and other
near misses in the btry area. The other, a single gun at Q9943-3286, was neutral-
ized by 15 rds HE and 4 rds smk. A small fire was started as a result of this

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #179

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

a. During the night, the front was generally quiet except for patrol contact. An ey patrol of approx 28 men was encountered vic SAEGMUHL (Q7937) and was repulsed. Our patrols reported ey vic Q884-291 and an ey OP at Q8930-2935. A patrol to Q959-277 drew S/A, MG, and arty fire and also located an ey minefield at that point. 1 ey tracked vehicle, vic Q908-305, was fired on with undetermined results. 2 deserters from G Company, 104 GVR, 47 VG Div, were apprehended vic UEBERACH. Also, 5 PW's from 2d Company, 16 Fusilier Bn, were captured. The ey remained alert to our patrol activity throughout the day.

b. In the afternoon ey activity increased. At 1600A, 200 ey and several vehicles were seen moving SE on road at Q876-366. This target was taken under fire by our arty. Vehicle movement was also observed between REICHSHOFFEN and GUNDERSHOFFEN, and between GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN and UHRWILLER, late in the afternoon. Civilians with carts were reported leaving OFFWILLER and ROTHBACH going N.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. Ey shelling continued to be lt and scattered with most of the concentrations being 5 - 10 rds. Harassing fire on fwd elements and suspected OP's formed the bulk of the activity with the HAGUENAU area again being the favored target with med and lt cal to the NE of HAGUENAU responsible for the fire received in that area. Night harassing was very lt and ceased between midnight and 0700 when there was a slight flurry in the HAGUENAU area including 1 20 rd concentration of lt cal fire. During the morning meds and lts were active but on a very minor scale. In the afternoon REIPERTSWILLER -LICHTENBERG areas caught most of the fire with HAGUENAU and NIEDERMOERN reporting a few rds of med cal shelling.

Shellrep total - 48

36 Div	42 Div	103 Div	14 AD	6 Gp	46 Gp	35 Gp	2 FOB
17	8	2	1	7	7	1	5

b. Changes to EB List #26:-

(1) Additions:

CONC NO	COORDINATE	ACC	SOURCE	NO/TYPE
8539 AI	8544-3900	B	2 FOB - S	1/Lt
9932 AJ	9943-3286	B	36 AOP	1/-
1128 AH	1181-2869	A	2 FOB - S	1/Lt
1228 AF	1222-2890	A	2 FOB - S, AP-2 Mar	3/Lt

(2) Suspect List #26-2

788 - 481	-/G	Civ
788 - 428	-/G	Civ
954 - 344	2/Med	36 GOP
0892-2884	1/G	2 FOB - S
1344-3532	1/G	2 FOB - S

Sound had a fairly good day, considering the lt ey arty activity. 10 plots were made of which 3 indicated new locations, 5 confirmed other locations, and 2 were of poor accuracy.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. Visibility, generally poor throughout the period, increased sufficiently during the middle of the afternoon to permit air and ground observers to register their battalions as well as adjust on a number of targets of opportunity.

On one of the most lucrative targets reported, 35 FA Gp AOP adjusted 141 FA Bn with 16 rds HE POZIT and 995 FA Bn with 35 rds M1A1 on an est 200 ey personnel accompanied by vehicles on a narrow canyon road at Q869-371. The first rds pinned the ey down, and the following rds covered the area effectively.

35 Gp AOP also adjusted 141 FA Bn on a tank at Q8684-3525. 16 rds were fired, of which 3 hit and damaged the tank and several hit a house beside which the tank was located.

36 FA Bn ground observer adjusted his bn on two ey btries with good results reported in both cases. The first, completed at 1527A, was at Q9684-3343. 22 rds HE and 4 rds smk were fired, effecting 1 hit on a house near a gun pit and other near misses in the btry area. The other, a single gun at Q9943-3286, was neutralized by 15 rds HE and 4 rds smk. A small fire was started as a result of this

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mission.

An ey OP in a bldg at Q8656-3146 was destroyed by 995 FA Bn. 928 FA Bn. ground observer, made the adjustment using 22 rds HE.

1 FA Obsn Bn closed into VI Corps area at 1245A today. The mission of the Bn is to provide obsn in the right of the Corps sector. "B" Flash, 2 FA Obsn Bn, was relieved in posn by "A" Flash, 1 FA Obsn Bn, during the period.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:-

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2		3			3	1	
Per	5		14		5	8	9	
Veh						1	5	
MG & Mor			20		3	8	2	
Prep				2				
Armor			3			1	1	
Def Fire				1		1		
Har	7	10		10		15		14
Reg			6		3		18	
Misc	3	3		1	1	5		
Prop		1						
TOTAL	17	14	46	14	12	42	36	14

(2) Corps Arty:-

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	4	15	1	3	1	20		
Per		1					2	
Armor							1	
Har				11		7		8
Reg	1				4			
Misc								2
Dest					1		1	
TOTAL	5	16	1	14	6	27	4	10

AOP Missions - 11

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations:

614 TD Bn :- Continued anti-tank defense and security patrols in 103 Inf Div sector. Rear area-personnel from all companies fired on small arms range.

636 TD Bn :- Maintaining AT defense in 36 Inf Div sector and firing direct and indirect fire missions. 1 TD of "A" Co at Q957-215 fired 12 rds of star shell for 1st Bn, 142 Inf Regt with excellent results. The 1st Plt of "B" Co fired 10 rds HE direct fire into houses to be taken by our inf. The 2d Plt of Co "B" in indirect fire positions at Q991-198 expended 133 rds HE on ey occupied houses vic R050-245. 3d Plt guns expended 15 rds HE assault fire on ey occupied houses N and NE of HAGUENAU. Results of this firing were very good, destroying the walls and tops of the houses. Company "C" received 8 new M36's during the period.

645 TD Bn :- Co "A" providing anti-tank defense in 42 Inf Div sector with no change in positions or firing for the period.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS

No change.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 US ARMY

S E C R E T
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: 615
Date: 8 Mar 45
From: 071800A Mar 45
To: 081800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #180.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

a. The ey was exceptionally quiet in Corps sector during the night. One deserter was taken in 42nd Div sector from 2 Co, 87 VGR at (Q842366). A patrol of the 103rd Div encountered ey with MG at (Q87653015) at approximately 0100A. Vehicular movement was heard in vic (Q8485-3420) and vic BISCHHOLTZ (Q8532). A deserter was picked up in vic (Q899-289) from 5 Com 118th Regt. PW states that his Co of 70 men are in KINDWILLER (Q8929). In the 36th Div sector patrols received MG fire from (Q944274 and (R078218). Activity was heard at (R050246) and (Q989257). Two PWs were captured from 2 Co 115 VGR vic of (Q989257). During the early part of the morning, 40mm fire was received from behind the pumping station vic (R002257).

b. The ey remained quiet during the last part of the period. Arty and mortar fires were only activity reported.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. In spite of cloudy, rainy weather which ordinarily would bring a rise in harassing fire by the enemy artillery, thus favored by denial of our observation, the enemy artillery activity continued to be very light. Most of the harassing fire during the night was directed into the 42nd Div sector in the early hours of the period, with 20 round concentrations reported vic WIMMENAU, WILDENGUTH, and LICHTENBERG. Light concentrations also fell vic HAGUENAU and SCHILLERSDORF. No shelling at all was reported in the morning, and, except for a total of 40 rounds light caliber that fell in PHAFFENHOFFEN-LA WALCK in mid-afternoon, only a few small concentrations elsewhere were reported, including HAGUENAU, SCHILLERSDORF, and ROTHACH.

Shellrep total: 37

36 Div	42 Div	14 AD	2 FOB	6 Gp	103 Div	405 Gp	35 Gp
4	8	2	3	14	2	2	2

b. Changes to EB List #26:

(1) Additions:

8442 AK 8480-4282 A 2 FOB-S 1/G

(2) Amendments:

1128 AH to read 1175-2892 A AP-25 Feb 1/Med

Suspect List #26-3

8421-4347 2 FOB-S 1/G

Both 2 FOB and 1 FOB sound bases were active during the period with the former turning in 3 locations and the latter 2 locations. 2 FOB-A sound made a new A acc location in the 8442 square and confirmed 8441 PZ with A acc and in addition had a B acc plot in the 8443 square. Two confirmations of existing batteries were turned in by 1 FOB. 9532 WU and 9932 AJ were the locations made by B sound base. Corps arty welcomed the reappearance of the 1 FOB, with VI Corps again for the first time since the Italian Campaign, by placing a TOT of 54 rds on WU, their first location made for Corps in France.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. In a demonstration, designed to produce a reaction from the ey, 42 Inf Div Arty supported the Div by firing preparation and propaganda missions between 1130A and 1145A. Corps Arty joined the demonstration by firing TOT's on ey btry locations. Results of the demonstration are not yet available.

With poor visibility in effect over the Corps front during the period, AOP activity was at a minimum. Corps Arty ground observers were able to conduct only one adjustment during the day.

995 FA Bn destroyed three buildings at Q85683448 reported as strong points by 103 Div, with 31 rds HE. 928 FA Bn ground observer made the adjustment.

"B" Flash, 1 FA Obsn Bn, went into operation in the right of the Corps sector at 1825A.

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b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		2	2			1		
Per	3	1	13			7	2	
Veh	2		1			3		
MG & Mor	1		7				2	
Prep						90		
Har		12		8		18		18
Reg	3		26		8		4	
Misc	1	4					1	
Prop						26		7
TOTAL	10	19	49	8	8	145	9	25

(2) Corps Arty:

	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		9		13		5		13
Per		3						8
Har		7		27		10		2
Misc						2		
Dest							1	
TOTAL		19		40		17	1	23

AOP Missions: None.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations.

614 TD Bn providing AT defense in 103rd Div sector. The 2nd Rcn platoon continued patrol mission of Div zone. The Bn staff inspected gun positions during period.

636 TD Bn maintaining AT defense in 36th Div sector, and firing indirect fire missions. One TD of 2nd platoon A Co, was hit by enemy shell fire, believed to be about 150mm. TD was evacuated to OHLUNGEN. The 2nd platoon B Co, in indirect fire positions, fired missions, suspected OP, and enemy occupied houses. The total expenditures were 119 rds HE and 15 rds APC (90mm). The 15 rds APC were fired at suspected enemy OP, and 15 hits were scored. Excellent results were also obtained in the firing on enemy installations and houses, but the full extent of damage was undetermined.

Co A, 645 TD Bn providing AT defense in 42nd Inf Div sector, with no firing and no change in positions during period.

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #182

Date: 10 Mar 45
From: 091800A Mar 45
To : 101800A Mar 45SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

a. The ey remained relatively quiet but generally alert over the Corps sector during the night. In the 42 Div sector small ey groups were contacted in vic (Q811-378) and (Q807-367) and 2 PWs were taken from 2 Co, 87 Regt at (Q829-368). 6 PWs were taken from 3 Co, 221 VGR (Q772-389) and 1 from 6 Co, 223 VGR (Q753-414). 14 Armd Div patrols went to (Q922-287) then to (Q918-288) between 2305A and 0245A. A trip flare field was encountered at (Q918-288). Scattered MG fire was drawn from E of BITSCHHOFFEN (Q9128) and ey horsedrawn wagons were heard moving along road E of BITSCHHOFFEN. Ey vehicles were heard moving N of BITSCHHOFFEN (Q9128). Patrols from the 103 Div reported unknown number of ey at (Q8833-2965), (Q8843-2964) and vic (Q884-290) before midnight. The patrol received S/A fire from a mill vic (Q862-234). In the 36 Div sector, patrols drew S/A and MG fire vic (R0285-2420) and (R076-226) but failed to make contact in vic (R008-253) and vic KESTLER FARM (R06-23) sq. Barbed wire was found at (Q978-264).

b. During the morning, 2 PWs were captured in 42 Div sector by a combat patrol. The 36 Div received a few MG burst in the early afternoon vic (R032-244). The 42 Div took 1 PW (deserter) from 2 Co, 221 VGR at (Q8015-3715).

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. No change occurred during the period in the lt activity which is now becoming the usual thing with the ey arty. The DAUENDORF area received most of the night's lt harassing fire, for 2 med cals fired a total of 24 rds into it early in the evening, and 120mm mortars put approx 30 rds into it later. SCHILLERSDORF was also subjected to 30 rds 120mm mortar, and HAGUENAU drew a few rds of med cal. There was a slight increase in harassing fire during the day, including several 10-20 rd concentrations, when HAGUENAU, PFAFFENHOFFEN, BISCHOLTZ, MULHAUSEN, ROTHBACH, and the LICHTENBERG area were shelled. ACP's in the PFAFFENHOFFEN area again drew AA fire today.

Shellrep total - 43

6 Gp	36 Div	42 Div	103 Div	35 Gp	46 Gp	1 FOB	2 FOB
15	11	2	3	1	3	5	3

b. Changes to EB List #26:

(1) Additions:

CONC NO	COORDINATE	ACC	SOURCE	NO/TYFE
0929 AO	0972-2937	B	1 FOB - A/S	1/Lt
1032 AN	1035-3220	A	1 FOB - B/F	1/Med
1621 WZ	1609-2155	B	1 FOB - A/S	4/Lt

(2) Suspect List #26-5:

1068-2379	1 FOB - A/S	1/Lt	SP?
1098-2369	1 FOB - A/S	1/Lt	SP?
1093-2382	1 FOB - A/S	1/Lt	SP?

"A" sound base of 1 FOB was again active during the period, turning in 5 locations. 0929 AO is a new location and 1621 WZ makes it's reappearance after having been on the Dead List since 2 March. 3 locations were made on SPs or tanks in the 10-23 sq; however, these locations were not included among the additions to the EB List but were placed on the suspect list to await further confirmation as definite positions. A med gun in the 1032 sq was picked up by "B" flash base for another new location.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. The visibility during the period was extremely limited and the observed shooting was mostly confined to close-in registrations. Unobserved firing during the night consisted mainly of counterbattery and harassing fire on ammo dumps, supply points, CP's, and lines of communication.

The 500 AFA Bn was adjusted on a MG at Q9141-2839 at 1022A by this bn's GOP. A total of 16 rds was fired and MG was silenced. This same combination fired on another MG at Q9106-2848 at 1617A and recorded 1 direct hit out of 19 rds fired.

The GOP of the 131 FA Bn adjusted his bn on an ey OP in house at R081-216 at 1430A and obtained 4 direct hits on house out of 10 rds expended.

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The 59 AFA Bn obtained 3 hits on House containing ey personnel at Q981-263 at 1113A. The GOP of this bn observed the total expenditure of 24 rds. A repeat performance by this same combination obtained 2 direct hits on house containing ey personnel at R0125-2527 at 1420A. A total of 11 rds was expended.

At 1411A the 928 FA Bn FO adjusted his bn on an ey gun at Q8725-3152. A total of 44 rds was fired and gun was neutralized.

The installations of the 1 FA Obsn Bn are located as follows:

"A" Btry flash base - OP #1 at R0933-1839, OP #2 at R0578-1691, OP #3 at R0030-1915, OP #4 at Q9670-2140.

"A" Btry sound base consists of a 5 microphone, 4 sec straight base with mike #1 at R0934-1775 and mike #5 at R0520-2130.

"B" Btry flash base - OP #1 at Q9584-2161, OP #2 at Q9549-2499, OP #3 at Q9211-2520.

"B" Btry operates a 5 microphone, 4 sec straight sound base with mike #3 located at Q9515-2435 and azimuth of base being 297° 50' 40".

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:-

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			1			1	2	
Per	2		19		3	5	2	10
Veh	1		3					
MG & Mor	2		7		1	4		
Def Fire				1		6		
Har		8		5		17		16
Reg	2		15		10		9	
Misc		6			4			
Prop		6						
TOTAL	7	20	45	6	18	33	13	26

(2) Corps Arty:-

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		8		4		1		9
Har		9		11		6		4
Reg	1				6		1	
Misc						1		1
TOTAL	1	17	0	15	6	8	1	14

AOP Missions - 7

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations:-

614 TD Bn - Providing anti-tank defense in 103 Inf Div sector. 2d Rcn Plt continued patrol missions in Div zone and elements of all Co's fired on small arms range.

536 TD Bn - Maintaining anti-tank defense and firing indirect harassing missions. 1 TD of "A" Co fired 8 rds HE for new registration on RJ in MERTZWILLER (Q964-299). The 2d Plt of Co "B" in indirect fire positions at Q991-198 fired 5 missions in support of 131 FA Bn. Targets included ey MG's, mortars, and an OP with a total of 56 rds HE being expended. 6 M36's (90mm) of "C" Co completed test firing on tank range.

645 TD Bn - Co "A" continued anti-tank defense in 42 Inf Div sector. The 1st Plt was making preparation to relieve 2d Plt TD's at the end of the period.

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #183

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

1. Throughout the night the enemy limited his activities to small patrol action. A FWB broadcast during early evening drew heavy enemy SA and AW fire in reply. Scattered SA and MG fire was received in the 36th Inf Div Sector. A friendly patrol heard enemy in house vic R051245 and encountered AT and AP mines vic R022244. Some harassing SP and mortar fire fell in the HAGUENAU - KALTENHOUSE area. Two Mg's NE of SCHWEIGHAUSEN (Q9924) fired at friendly AOP. An enemy road block of freshly felled trees was observed from R003256 to R003266 by AOP. An AOP also reported three road blocks being constructed in MULHAUSEN late in the afternoon. Ten rds propaganda shells fell vic R050232 about 1330A. During the period 3 PW's were taken from 6 Co., 103 GR, 47th VG Div.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

1. The only change in the light activity of the enemy artillery was a resumption of heavy caliber shelling, possibly 210mm, in the left center of the Corps front. Night harassing fire was very light, only 15 rds light caliber being reported as landing NW of INGWILLER, though several flashreps indicated other shelling. For the first time no artillery fire was reported in HAGUENAU. The small 2-10 round concentrations that fell during the day in vicinity of PHAFFENHOFFEN, MORSCHWILLER, SCHWEIGHAUSEN, RINGELDORF, and OBERMODERN, which drew most of them were all of an harassing nature. Between 1640A and 1710A six rounds of heavy caliber fell via 829-244.

Shellrep total - 40

36 Div	103 Div	42 Div	14 A.D.	6 Gp	405 Gp	35 Gp	46 Gp	2 FOB	1 FOB
6	8	2	1	12	4	1	1	2	3

2. Changes to EB List #26:

(a) Additions:

CONC NO	COORDINATE	ACC	SOURCE	NO/TYPER
9131 XC	9138-3189	B	2 FOB A/S	2/G
9431 AP	9440-3183	B	AOP	3/G
9431 AQ	9455-3163	B	AOP	2/G

(b) Amendments:

9133 FW	to read	9190-3320	A	AP-10 Mar	3/-
9932 AJ	" "	1/Med			
0431 RK	" "	-/Med			

(c) Deletions: 7744 S4R

(d) Suspect List #26-6:

8448-4264	AOP	1/G
9035-3430	AOP	3/G
935-311	FW	Med/Rocket

Four sound locations were received during the period, 2 from 1 FOB and 2 from 2 FOB. 9131 XC was picked up by 2 FOB as was a confirmation on 8144 VS. 0130 AL and 0628 WM were confirmed by locations from 1 FOB.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS:

1. Visibility during the period was better than it had been for the past few days and numerous observed missions on ey personnel and batteries were reported. Unobserved fires during the night consisted of a harassing program on ey CP's, batteries, and lines of communication.

The 634th FA Bn was adjusted on three ey guns at Q9440-3183 by 698th FA Bn., AOP at 0820A. Ammunition expended was 27 rds and guns were neutralized. This same combination scored again on another ey 2 gun battery at Q9455-3163 at 0824A. A total of 19 rds was fired and battery was neutralized.

The 17th FA Bn., fired on 1 gun at Q8448-4264 at 0943A. The 42nd Inf Div Arty AOP adjusted and 10 rds were fired with ey gun being neutralized.

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A GOP of the 35th FA Gp., picked up an ey 3 gun battery at Q9035-3430 at 1535A. This information was passed on to 405th FA Gp., AOP who adjusted the 995th FA Bn., on target. A total of 16 rds., was fired with target hits reported on 2 guns and hits on the gun pit of the other gun.

The 634th FA Bn., GOP and AOP combined in adjusting this Bn., on ey personnel at Q9072-2894 at 1059A. Ammunition expenditure amounted to 26 rds and hits were observed among personnel.

The 141st FA Bn., was adjusted on an ey AA btry at Q8976-3622 by 17th FA Bn., AOP. Btry was neutralized with bracket fire and in precision adjustment 3 hits were observed on one gun. A total of 32 rds was fired at 1440A.

The GOP of the 131st FA Bn., adjusted his Bn., on an ey ammo. dump at R056-244 at 1515A. Two target hits were observed out of the 11 rds fired.

The GOP of the 59th AFA Bn., adjusted his Bn. on ey activity around house at Q9460-2759 at 1656A. Twenty-four rounds were fired and ey definitely dispersed.

2. Summary of Missions:

(a) Div Arty:-

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			4		2			
Per	4		13		2	1	7	6
Veh			4					
MG & Mor	4		9		4	3	1	2
Prep						1		
Armor	1							
Def Fire				1	5			
Har		10		2		14		40
Reg	19		13		11		10	
Misc		5			4	2		
Prop						9	10	
TOTAL	28	15	43	3	26	32	28	48

(b) Corps Arty:-

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	3	6	1	3		5	2	6
Per	2							
MG & Mor					1			
Har		1		7		8		6
Reg	6		2		3		3	
Dest						1		
TOTAL	11	7	3	10	4	14	5	12

AOP Missions - 17

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations:-

614 TD Bn providing A.T. defense in 103rd Div sector. No firing or change in positions occurred during period. The 2nd Rcn platoon continued patrol missions in Div zone.

636 TD Bn maintaining A.T. defense in assigned sector, continued to fire direct and indirect missions. One T.D. of "A" Co, in indirect fire position expended 30 rds HE on road junction in MERTZWILLER (Q-9529). The 1st and 2nd platoons of "B" Co, exchanged positions during period. The 3rd platoon fired one direct mission, at a range of 40 yds, on a house at (R045243). 10 rds HE were expended and house was completely destroyed. The 2nd platoon "B" Co, fired a total of 100 rds, in 3 indirect missions, on suspected enemy machine gun positions. Results of firing were unknown.

"A" Co., 645 TD Bn continued to provide A.T. defense in 42nd Inf., Div sector. Co., did no firing during period.

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ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #183

INTERROGATION REPORT

PW's : 3 (Deserters)

Captured By: 68th A. I. Bn. -- 14th Arm'd Div.

Pw's Unit: 6th Co. - 2d Bn - 103d Reg't - 47th VG Div.

Strength: 6th Co - 2d Bn - 103rd Reg't - 47th VG Div - Approximately 50 men.

Personalities:	CO - 6th Co, 2d Bn, 103rd Reg't, 47th VG Div	-- Lt. Roehrich
	CO " " " "	-- Capt. Schoenlau
	CO " " " "	-- Lt Col Leiher
	CG " " " "	-- Gen. Bork

Locations: CP, 6th Co, 2d Bn., 103rd Reg't, 47th VG Div -- Vic (93342840).
Co train - DURRENBACH vic (02323308)
Arty., possibly 105mm, just outside (NE side) of MIETESHEIM. Exact location unknown to PW.

Miscellaneous: According to Pw's, Pozit effective in "getting" what HE can't get at vince fragments come down.
6th Co. has only about one "old timer" per squad, who are to take the new men; drawn from Limited Service, Air Corps, Ground Force, and young men (18-19 yrs. old) in hand.
Gasoline shortage is very acute.
Training Tanks and many other vehicles are being - and have been - converted to wood burners.
Ammo is said to be short. Gun crews are to keep a reserve of at least 50 shells.

Morale: Very low. Men are mentally and physically tired. Openly "Bitch" in no uncertain terms without worrying who overhears them.
Some soldiers hesitate to desert because they feel the war will soon be over, and as a PW it would take longer to return home than the regular demobilization process.
There is friction between "SS" and other Army units.
Clothing issues are old and worn. New clothing is scarce and usually from captured stock.
According to PW, the Austrians are "fed up" with war and criticize openly. No "Good Nazis" are supposed to be left. The Austrians would prefer occupation by U. S. and British Troops, but would resist the Russians.
British and American broadcasts are listened to frequently by the civilians.

VI Corps Arty
IPW Team

S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #184.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

a. The ey continued quiet during the night. A few ey flares appeared along 42nd Inf Div front. The 103rd Inf Div received sporadic rifle and rifle grenade fire from vic (Q848341). A patrol heard two small groups of ey vic (Q866338). Truck movement as reported in OFFWILLER at 2155A. In 14th Armd Div sector vehicles were heard going E from BITSCHHOFFEN (Q9128). In the 36th Inf. Div sector, an ey patrol of u/k strengt attempted to infiltrate our positions N of the MODER R. vic (R046243) at about 2100A but were dispersed by our Arty and mortar fire. Patrols drew MG fire vic of (R023244). patrol going to (R053244) made no contact.

b. PW's taken: 1 PW from 1 Co, 221 VGR at WINDENGUTH (Q7837) by 42 Div; 2 deserters from 6 Co 118 VGR vic KINDWILLER (Q8929). The ey fired several propaganda shells into HAGUENAU during the afternoon but they were not of particularly high quality. One leaflet read:

BUDDY, HERE'S AN IDEA



L I F E S A V E R S

GET IT?

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Today a slight increase in enemy artillery fire occurred over most of the Corps front, though it was most noticeable in the center, where the MORSCHWILLER-RINGELDORF area received a large portion of the shelling. Most of the fire continued to be of a light harassing nature, and the heaviest concentration reported consisted of 25 rds, while the majority averaged 10-15 rds. As usual the night harassing was confined to the early hours of the period, and included 20 rds 105mm caliber vic WILDENGUTH and light shelling in the NEUBURG and MORSCHWILLER areas. Except for a few rounds vic HAFFENHOFFEN, ROTHBACH, and REIPERTSWILLER, the morning was quiet. Soon after midday, however, the activity increased and lasted till dark. In the early afternoon, SCHWEIGHAUSEN, OHLUNGEN, WINTERSHOUSE, HAGUENAU, LICHTENBERG, ALTHORN and MORSCHWILLER were all hit, generally by light calibers. Later, the MORSCHWILLER-RINGELDORF region became the center of attention, especially of single medium guns and a little more shelling was reported in HAGUENAU, UEBERACH, and PHAFFENHOFFEN. Increased movement in the center of the Corps front may have been responsible for the rise in shelling there, for with a change in weather conditions and visibility from preceding days, little other reason exists for it. It is possible that the enemy may have been attempting to test our artillery reaction, since the light shelling of both sides in the last few days must have him in some doubt as to our dispositions.

Shellrep total: 52.

36 Div	103 Div	42 Div	14 A.D.	6 Gp	35 Gp	46 Gp	2 FOB	1 FOB
11	3	8	5	7	2	1	2	13

b. Changes to EB List #26:

(1) Additions:

0727 AR 0787 - 2758 B 1 FOB A/S 1/Lt

Suspect List #26-7.

8834 - 3081	103 AOP	2-4/Lt
8842 - 3051	"	-/G
0735 - 2399	131 FO	1/SP
1218 - 2179	1 FOB A/S	1/Lt
128 - 229	1 FOB A/S	1/Lt
2229 - 2539	"	1/Med

SECRET
-1-

Fourteen sound locations were received and three sound adjustments on ey batteries were made during the period. A sound of 1 FOB adjusted on 1226 XI, 1122 AD, 1024 PH and also turned in 11 locations for the most part confirmations of known batteries. B sound of 1 FOB made 3 locations 2 of which were also confirmations of known locations and one new location 0727 AR.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. An overcast, general lack of activity and a passive counter-battery policy reduced activity to a minimum.

After receiving mortar fire on his O.P. 938 FA's observer took what was believed to be 3 active mortars at 0317-2669 under fire with his battalion at 1038A hours. Twenty-nine rounds neutralized the ey position.

Following two unsuccessful attempts with 938 FA and 194 FA, 1 FOB successfully conducted a Sound on Sound adjustment with 194 FA at 1511A hours on the ey btry, 1122 A-D. Nine rounds were used in the adjustment and the btry neutralized.

500 FA's GOPs picked up several remunerative targets during the afternoon, including ey personnel in house at 9596-2755 (2 hits on house), MG at 931284 (neutralized) and two gun positions at 930-310 and 9176-3116 (both neutralized).

499 FA's AOP adjusted its bn on ey gun at 9798-2832 at 1435A hours and reported area well covered.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2		3				5	
Per	7		13		2	3	9	11
Vch			3			1	1	
MG & Mor	1		8			1	2	
Prep				6		1		
Def Fire				6	3			
Har		14		8		15		15
Reg	10		16		3		6	
Misc	6	5			6		3	
Prop		9		2	1			
TOTAL	26	28	43	22	15	21	26	26

(2) Corps Arty:

	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		7		6	4	5		2
Har		2		9		8		8
Misc						7		1
TOTAL		9		15	4	20		11

AOP Missions: 0

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations: 614 TD Bn continued anti-tank defense in 103 Inf Div sector with no change in unit locations or gun positions. The 2nd Rcn Plt. continued security patrols in Div. area.

636 TD Bn providing anti-tank defense and firing indirect fire missions. Co "A" moved from front line positions to reserve vic SCHWINDRATZHEIM (Q9017). The 1st Plt. of "B" Co fired 40 rds HE at ey occupied houses and MG nests vic R027246 with very good effect. Later, 18 rds HE were expended on another ey occupied house vic R020260. Rcn Co and Co "C" continued to follow training schedule.

Co "A" 645 TD Bn maintaining anti-tank defense in 42 Inf Div sector with no change and no firing for the period.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

No change in front lines.

Williamson
WILLIAMSON
5-2

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT 184

12 MAR 1945

INTERROGATION REPORT

PW: 1 (Deserter)

CAPTURED BY: 42nd Division

PW's UNIT: 1st Co - 1st Bn (Bn "Morg") 221st Reg't - 16 VG Div.

STRENGTH: Approximately 40 men.

PERSONALITIES: C.O. - 1st Co. - 1st Bn - 221st Regt -- Lt Dornhard

LOCATIONS: CP, 1st Co., 1st Bn, 221st Regt, -- vic (79423862)
1st Bn train (6 veh. - 12 horses) at (81604426)
CP - 16th VG Div rumored to be in SELTZ.
CP - Div "Ober - Rhein" rumored to be in Fort - Louis.
1 Btry - 4 x 88mm guns 2 at (81554425)
2 at (81554415)

Approximately 30 m between guns (as of 5 March).
1 Btry - 3 x 20mm (AA) (Vierlinge" - four barrel jobs) near FORT-LOUIS
at (23252135)

MISCELLANEOUS: According to PW "Hitler has ordered that ^{FOOD RATION} stamps will be taken from relatives of deserting German soldiers. Also -- German soldiers taken PW by our troops in good condition (not wounded) will be considered deserters, and relatives will be treated accordingly."

VI CORPS ARTY
IPW Team

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

US ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: CPS
Date: 13 Mar 45
From: 121800A Mar 45
To : 131800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #185.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Throughout the night, the enemy was alert and sensitive to our patrols. Intermittent flare activity was reported on both flanks. A bridge at R064232 was reported recently prepared for demolition. Later in the period, the 36 Inf Div made a limited attack vic R045243 and gained 35 PW's from 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 14th Companies, 457 VGR, 257 VGD. In the last portion of the period, the enemy remained quiet except in the 36 Inf Div sector where a sharp increase in enemy artillery activity was noted. In addition to the indentifications cited above, deserters from the following units were picked up: 6th Co, 115 VGR, 47 VGD; 1st Co, 221 VGR, 16 VGD; 6th Co, 118 VGR, 36 VGD; 5th Co, 165 VGR, 36 VGD; 1st Co, 47 Fus Bn, 47 VGD.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Perhaps due to better visibility which permitted observation on movements in our forward area, the enemy artillery activity continued to increase; also there was an increase in moderate to heavy concentrations. In the early part of the period our aggressive patrolling north of PHAFFENHOFFEN drew a moderate artillery reaction, consisting of several 30-40 round concentrations, possibly intended as defensive fires, vic PHAFFENHOFFEN, BUESWILLER (8724), RINGELDORF, with lighter shellings near DAUENDORF, MORSCHWILLER, and HAGUENAU. After midnight the night was quiet. During the day, especially in the late afternoon, the enemy's attention shifted to the HAGUENAU area where both light and medium calibers threw in concentrations varying from 5 to 50 rounds, keeping up an intermittent harassing fire, particularly in the NE part of the city. In the morning, other areas shelled were SCHEIGHAUSEN, DAUENDORF, OHLUNGEN, and PHAFFENHOFFEN.

Shellrep total: 66

36 Div	42 Div	14 AD	405 Gp	6 Gp	1 FOB	2 FOB
19	2	4	3	18	13	7

b. Changes to EB List #26-8

(1) Additions:

1428 AS	1479-2805	1 FOB-S	B	1/Med
---------	-----------	---------	---	-------

(2) Suspect List #26-8

088-260	Civilian Rept	4/G
114-263	Civilian Rept	2/G
8671-3762	Inf Patrol	1/Lt
8526-3788	Inf Patrol	4/Lt
088-375	1 FOB-S	1/Med
0481-4345	1 FOB-S	2/Med
957-307	1 FOB-S	1/Lt

12 Sound locations were made by 1 FOB; for one new location, 1428AS, 3 suspect locations, and 8 confirmations of known batteries. 2 FOB made one location during the period, a confirmation of 8144 VS. Two Sound on Sound adjustments were also made by 1 FOB on 9931 OJ and 9831 WL.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Visibility was limited during the morning but increased during the afternoon to allow some observed shoots on miscellaneous type targets; however, the Germans failed to fully cooperate and kept their activity to a minimum. During the night a harassing program was fired on ey lines of communication.

The 575 FA Bn completed a successful CI adjustment on both 8 inch guns at R1115-3870. The shoot was observed by a high performance aircraft (P-51) from 1500A to 1612A and a total of 17 rds was fired.

SECRET

LIBRARY
Field Artillery School
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

The 938 FA Bn AOP was registering his Bn on a RJ at R0390-2646 at 0907A when 1 rd hit a house near the registering point, and the house was completely destroyed when ammunition exploded within it. A total of 7 rds was fired and a successful registration obtained.

The 1 FOB made a sound adjustment on an ey btry at Q9893-3167. The 995 FA Bn fired 11 rds at 2230A and the btry was neutralized. At 2240A this same combination silenced an ey btry at Q9888-3191 with 11 rds.

The 402 FA Bn AOP adjusted the 232 FA Bn on 2 ey vehicles at Q799402 at 1735A. A total of 12 rds was fired with direct hits being reported on both vehicles.

The 131 FA Bn GOP adjusted the 155 FA Bn on an ey OP at R04682475. Twenty four rounds were fired at 1200A and the OP completely destroyed with several direct hits.

The 141 Inf outpost adjusted the 155 FA Bn on a self propelled gun at R07352399. A total of 9 rds was fired with 2 direct hits on gun being reported.

At 1745A the 1 FOB made a sound adjustment on an ey btry at R06782818. The 194 FA Bn fired the adjusting rds and then at 1800A a TOT was fired on the adjusted location by the guns of the 6 FA Gp and 36 Inf Div Arty.

FO #12 was published during the period and attachments of Corps Arty units as stated in FO became effective at 131200A March.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		1	2	2			1	1
Per	7		14		5	1	2	5
Veh					1		1	
MG & Mbr	1	3	2		3	1	1	1
Prop		1		1	2			
Armor		1	1					
Def Fires				3				
Har		7		5		12		14
Reg	11		14		26		9	
Misc	2	6			6		2	
Prop		1						
TOTAL	21	20	33	11	43	14	16	21

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	20		1	1	5	2	1
Per			1					
Prop		1						
Har		7		6		4		2
Reg	4		2		4			
Misc								1
Dest					1			
TOTAL	5	28	3	7	6	9	2	4

AOP Missions: 8

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn maintaining anti tank defense in 103 Inf Div sector. Co "B" and "C" hold a showdown inspection during the period and the 2nd Rcn Plt continued its patrol missions.

The 636 TD Bn atched to 36 Inf Div now has a total of 36 new M36's. The Bn continued to provide AT defense and fired one direct fire mission. One TD of Co "B" expended 10 rds HE on an enemy OP in tower at R079226. The other Co's of the Bn followed training schedule and firing program.

Co "A" 645 TD provided anti tank defense in 42 Inf Div sector during the period. The Co was making preparations to rejoin its parent unit as the period closed.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Front Lines: No change.

EVANS
Asst S-3

INTERROGATION REPORT

13 March 1945

PW'S: 35Captured by: 141st Inf, 36th Div.

Units: 1st Co, 1st Bn, 457th Regt, 257th VG Div.
 3rd Co, " " " " " "
 4th Co " " " " " "
 14th Co " " " " " "

Personalities: CO, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 457th Regt--1st Lt Koenig
 CO, 3rd Co " " " --1st Lt Merz
 CO, 14th Co " " " --1st Lt Guenther
 CO, " " " --Capt Gellenhausen
 CO, " " " --Lt Col Kleave

Strength: 1st Co, 1st Bn, 457th Regt--approx 40 men
 3rd Co " " " " -- " 40-45 men
 14th Co " " " " -- " 32 men

Locations: CP, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 457th Regt--in house vic (R04452475).
 CP, 3rd Co, " " " " --in house vic R04952460)
 1 Btry, 3 X 150mm (PW uncertain) vic (R023347) as of 10th Feb.
 Trains of 1st Co at (R06502935).

Weapons: 14th Co (AT Co) equipped with 16 bazookas only. Allott 2 to each Rifle Co.

Miscellaneous: Pozit is often referred to by PW's as "Shrapnel" and "Tree-bursts."

Leaflets: Read by PW's but must be "turned in" to CO now.


Morale: - Low.

VI Corps Arty IPW
 2d Lt W. M. Peters
 S/Sgt P. Balog
 T/3 F. Stevens

BA 2382

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO #46
U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *hcb*
Date: 14 Mar 45
From: 131800A Mar 45
To : 141800A Mar 45



DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #186

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

- a. In the HAGUENAU (R0324) area, ey made a determined effort to reduce the 36 Div bridgehead over the MODER R while remaining alert and sensitive to our patrols across the remainder of the Corps front. In this bridgehead area, 2 ey tanks supported by inf knocked down several houses occupied by our troops but were forced to withdraw shortly before midnight. 37 PWs were reported by 36 Div. In 14 Armd Div sector, tracked vehicles were heard at about 1900 vic MERTZWILLER (Q9529) and to the S and SW and there was a large amount of flare activity. 2 PWs were reported. In the 103 Div sector, a patrol received AW fire from (Q879309), (Q875313) and (Q875305). Sound of tracked vehicles was heard vic BISCHHOLTZ (Q8532) and OFFWILLER (Q8534) at 1900. SA and MG fire was received vic (Q851334) at 2000A. The 42 Div maintained ey contact with patrols reporting sporadic MG and SA fire along front.
- b. The ey was extremely quiet throughout the daylight hours. Rcn patrols maintained contact with ey on W flank of Corps front.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

- a. After a very active period between 1800A and midnight, ey arty fire declined considerably, especially during the day, which was one of the lightest experienced in some time. Practically all of the shelling fell in the HAGUENAU area, during the night, when our bridgehead across the MODER River there attracted considerable mortar, SP, and arty fire, of lt, med, and hvy cal. Between 1900A and 1930A when the fire reached its peak, the total approximated 350 rds. The gun areas to the N, NE, and E of the city were responsible for this fire. HAGUENAU and PFARFENHOFFEN were lightly shelled during the day.

Photo coverage taken yesterday, while not entirely covering the gun areas, indicates that the ey arty deployment remains essentially the same, except for a slight continuation of btries moving back to take up defensive positions. As far as can be ascertained from photos and other sources, the strongest arty areas are the valley between the HARDT Mountains and the HAGUENAU forest, particularly the LAU-LACH - ESCHERACH area; and the forest group NE of the line HAGUENAU - BISCHWILLER. Directly N of HAGUENAU very few guns are located, though this approach can be covered by those guns both in the NE and NW, and also in the HARDT Mountains in the BAERENTHAL - PHILLIPSBURG - ZINSWILLER triangle arty support seems weak. The Corps flanks were not covered by the photos, hence dispositions and strength in those areas is doubtful, in view of the long lack of activity from guns situated there.

Shellrep total - 32

36 Div	103 Div	42 Div	14 AD	13 FA Brig	6 Gp	46 Gp
11	1	1	1	3	6	5
		1 FOB	2 FOB			
		3	1			

- b. Changes to EB List #26:

(1) Additions:

CONC NO	COORDINATE	ACC	SOURCE	NO/TYPE
8441 UA	8495-1151	A	AP - 13 Mar	4/Lt
9431 UG	9426-3193	A	AP - 13 Mar	3/Lt
9437 UC	9144-3748	A	AP - 13 Mar	4/Lt
9437 UE	9470-3767	A	AP - 13 Mar	2/Lt
9831 UB	9800-3193	A	AP - 13 Mar	4/Lt
0924 UF	0981-2433	A	AP - 13 Mar	4/Lt
1123 VZ	1136-2371	A	AP - 13 Mar	4/Lt
1228 UD	1244-2813	A	AP - 13 Mar	6/Lt

(2) Amendments:

- 8442 PZ to read 8442 VU
9133 PW to read 9192-3321 A AP - 13 Mar Poss 4/Nebel
8332 OP to read 1/G
9431 AP to read 1/Lt
9432 WV to read 2/G occ.
9831 OI to read 2/G
0030 ZN to read 3/Lt
1022 MT to read 1088-2238
1123 NX to read 1136-2371 A Civ & AP-13 Mar 4/Lt

S E C R E T

(3) Deletions:

8345 P4	9134 WX	0031 WA	0426 AB	1526 XJ
8442 AK	9232 VK	0125 RY	0431 RK	1624 ZE
8547 S4	9431 AQ	0131 WJ	1122 AD	
8835 RV	9532 WU	0234 RW	1123 NX	
8935 RV	9835 WT	0238 HS	1322 MS	
9034 XU	0030 WB	0326 RX	1525 VB (QA)	

1 FOB sound obtained 10 locations during the period, of which 4 were new, and 6 confirmed old locations. The trend evident in recent weeks from sound locations indicating that the German army was doing comparatively little shifting of positions even though fired on was borne out by the photo coverage taken yesterday which showed many old locations still occupied.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. During the morning hours visibility was poor due to a hvy fog but improved rapidly during the afternoon. As a result the number of AOP missions rose appreciably over those of the previous period. Observed missions were fired on various types of targets of opportunity while unobserved missions were generally confined to harassing and a few counterbattery targets.

A lt harassing program was fired during the night on CPs, supply points and RJs.

The Hq & Hq Btry 13 FA Brig, 257 FA Bn (155 H), 752 FA Bn (155 H), 514 FA Bn (155 G) and Btry C, 991 FA Bn (155 G SP) are welcomed to the ranks of the army with the Corps. For locations and attachments see Station List No. 8, 14 Mar 45.

The 17 FA AOP adjusted his bn on an ey tank at 4868-375 at 1248A. A total of 17 rds were fired resulting in the bn getting 1 direct hit and knocking the tank into a ditch. 3 more rds were very close. An ambulance was seen coming to the tank's assistance.

The 17 FA AOP also fired his bn on an ey vehicle among bushes at 48827-3662 from 1730A to 1745A. 11 rds were fired on this mission. 1 rd hit in the bushes and caused a large flash.

From 1400A to 1530A the 131 FA Bn AOP adjusted the 938 FA Bn on a group of 4 targets consisting of houses and strong points at R0688-2315, R0645-2390, R0506-2500 and R0721-2236. Effect was excellent with many hits being reported.

At 1600A an inf observer adjusted the 383 FA Bn on an ey tank at 48940-2928. 10 rds were fired with 1 direct hit being reported.

b.. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
Per	2		5		9	4	4	
Veh	4				2		1	
MG & Mor	2		4		3	4	1	
Prep				7				
Armor	1				1		1	
Def Fire				33				
Har		3		13		21		12
Reg	9		13		17		22	
Misc	1	2	2	2	1		5	1
Prop		1						6
TOTAL	19	6	24	55	33	29	34	19

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	13 FAB		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	4	10				1		
Per		1						
Veh			1					
Armor			1					
Har				7		9		4
Reg	7	13	6		4		2	
Misc		1				3		1
Dest	4							
TOTAL	15	25	8	7	4	13	2	5

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

a. Missions and attachments:

610 TD Bn (90mm) SP atchd to 42 Inf Div for direct fire support and mobile AT defense.

614 TD Bn (3") towed - No change.

636 TD Bn (90mm) SP - No change.

b. Operations:

610 TD Bn closed into Div area at the beginning of the period and took over AT responsibility in that sector. Co "B" relieved Co "A" 645 TD Bn of forward gun positions with Co CP vic WINGEN (Q7335). The Bn CP is now located in LA PETITE-PIERRE (Q6929).

614 TD Bn carried on with it's primary mission in 103 Inf Div sector. Co "B" held another inspection and 2d Rcn Plt continued patrols in Div area.

636 TD Bn provided AT defense and fired direct and indirect fire missions. The 1st Plt (4 guns) of "B" Co in indirect fire position vic Q991198 fired on TOT at R049250 in support of 2d Bn, 141 Inf Regt. This Plt also fired harassing missions during the night expending 106 rds HE. 2 TD's of the 2d Plt moved to firing positions at R057234 and fired 29 rds HE direct fire on ey occupied houses at R045245. The remainder of the Bn continue to follow the training program and maintenance of materiel.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS

No change.

Byrne
BYRNE
Asst S-3

HEADQUARTERS VI. CORPS ARTILLERY
AFO 46

INCLOSURE I TO PERIODIC REPORT #186

MODEL - ON WAR

The following is translation of document received by 27 VG Regt (12 VG Div), 22 February 1945:

High Command of Army Group B
G-3, No 1762/45 Secret

Headquarters, 14 Feb 1945

Trapping the Beast - Tactics

1. Enemy attack procedure.

The main characteristics of British /American attack procedures are:

Action in accordance with a pre-determined plan

Short-term objectives

Feeling-out of the front by reconnaissance

Reducing of individual strongpoints by the use of individual pincer attack.

Strengths: Commitment of material, use of main effort. Armored forces everywhere. Short-term objectives that promise success. Unsuccessful frontal attacks are broken off and forces quickly regrouped.

Weaknesses: Infantry does not shove forward vigorously. It only follows the armored forces and occupies the terrain. Rather long "stops" after taking the goal of an attack. Very sensitive on the flanks.

Every infantry division is teamed with a Combat Command of an armored division. Formation in the attack is narrow and deep.

Every attack is prepared for by a concentration of artillery fire and strongest possible air support. Then, after feeling out the front, infantry units infiltrate into the soft points.

To exploit a success, an armored combat command is pressed ahead to attack with limited objectives. Usually the infantry remains where it is after the said combat command moves forward, moving up only after attaining its short-term objective in order to dig in before the armored point, to act as security for the supply of the armored command and to allow the artillery to change positions. On the following day, the armored command moves forward again past the stationary troops. This overlapping commitment is repeated schematically with continual reinforcements from the rear. When a breakthrough or penetration succeeds, the attack elements do not move very far forward, but turn inwards, in order to neutralize the enemy strongpoints by pincer attack. This procedure is used for the smallest local attacks as well as in large-scale offensives.

Localities and strongpoints are bypassed by the attack elements, and are only mopped up by the infantry which closes in after thorough-going artillery preparation.

In order to forestall counterattacks, suspected assembly areas are immediately taken under concentrated artillery fire, if possible with observation by artillery planes, and the forward attack elements boxed in by artillery ("durch Feuergrößen abgesichert").

Early commitment of infantry units is necessary for psychological effects.

2. Before the beginning of the enemy attack, it is desirable to harass the enemy by all conceivable means, to inflict the highest possible losses on him through projectors, artillery and night bombers, and thus to weaken him. He must be kept in the dark about our strength until the last moment, in order to increase his feeling of uncertainty.

S E C R E T

The forward line is to be thinly posted before an impending attack. Hvy weapons are to be drawn back to the rear of the MLR. The strongpoints holding the front line must so channelize the enemy attack that the enemy runs into his own supporting fire. By laying all kinds of obstacles and traps in the rear areas of the MLR, considerable losses can be inflicted upon the enemy. Effectiveness is increased by laying S-mines.

For the battle on the MLR, ingeniousness, trickiness, adaptability, mobility, deception and camouflage are the prerequisites for later attacking and destroying the enemy. But above all, the independent action of individual assault patrols and anti-tank patrols, fighting in the strongpoints, is of decisive significance.

As long as the MLR is well protected with every conceivable kind of engineer obstacle, it will always be difficult for the enemy to quickly develop his penetration into a breakthrough.

In this way, time for planned countermeasures is won:

It should be a principle that every pincer should be met by another pincer with the goal of destroying the enemy attack point. In order to make our traps and ditches effective, it should be a principle that they be covered by our own weapons.

Counterblows by local reserves (counter-pincers) in the depth of the MLR are so to be prepared and organized that they can be supported very economically, i.e., by exploitation of all disposable forces, through the fire of mortars, anti-tank, and assault guns of all kinds, taking advantage of surprise. It is always necessary to recognize the enemy's main effort immediately, in order that after a successful breakthrough we can begin strengthening the resistance in our own flanks, and thus create the prerequisites for a counter-pincer. Anti-tank weapons and MGs must be in ambushed positions, so that they can open fire particularly effectively when the enemy has been lured through the obstacles and his attack has been channelized.

Counter-blows (counter-pincers) on the enemy's flanks should cut him off decisively like a beast in a trap. They promise the greatest success if carried out at a time when the enemy is beginning to clean up trenches or is temporarily immobilized by small-arms fire and obstacles.

Individual guns of the artillery, TDs and assault gun brigades of the division, kept constantly mobile as wandering guns, can be of decisive importance in the direct support of these counterblows.

If the counterblows do not succeed and the enemy win a further ground on the MLR, the development of the situation must be recognized at once and countermeasures with a view to further developments must be taken. Losses must be continually inflicted on the enemy by means of concentrated storming fire from the troops in the strongpoints, directed by the commanders of the strongpoints. The goal is to shatter the enemy attack more and more by these strongpoints, and to divert it from its direction. Only in this way can the enemy attack be gradually forced to slow down and to halt. And in this way the most essential pre-requisites of limited counterattacks (counter-pincers, traps) are created!!

There must be assault reserves in the artillery security zone, strengthened by assault guns and TDs, as divisional reserves; these go into action, under the concentrated fire of all artillery, as soon as the enemy attack approaches the artillery security zone, in order to destroy the enemy before the artillery security zone through our own counter-pincer in collaboration with the strongpoints that are still fighting in the MLR. We also recommend partial smoke-screen in order to facilitate the approach, or the blinding of enemy units on the battle field itself.

In the case of still stronger enemy breakthroughs, it is the duty of the leadership of corps and armies to commit quickly brought-up motorized assault units and thus achieve the necessary counterpincer or trap without loss of time; this must be brought into play with greatest impetus and with the goal of total annihilation of the beast.

MODEL
Field Marshall

STATION LIST NO. 8

	COORDS	CL
Hq VI Corps Arty	Q715173	
2 FA Obsn Bn	Q716167	
A Btry	Q830210	
B Btry	Q678239	
SIC	Q716167	
Hq 13 FA Brig	Q932177	
1 FA Obsn Bn	Q958200	
A Btry	R030175	
B Btry	Q970202	
SIC	Q958200	
6 FA Gp	Q917207	
36 FA Bn (155 G)	Q979204	
A Btry	R011207	750
B Btry	Q942206	700
C Btry	R008194	950
194 FA Bn (8" H)	Q995176	
A Btry	Q979176	825
B Btry	Q951220	500
C Btry	Q983210	100
634 FA Bn (155 H)	Q942203	
A Btry	Q912210	400
B Btry	Q893223	500
C Btry	Q926226	600
938 FA Bn (155 H)	R031174	
A Btry	R030176	300
B Btry	R036179	100
C Btry	R039187	750
35 FA Gp	Q759251	
17 FA Bn (155 H)	Q789281	
A Btry	Q807320	900
B Btry	Q803318	550
C Btry	Q803280	600
752 FA Bn (155 H)	Q765310	
A Btry	Q750308	650
B Btry	Q765312	950
C Btry	Q760310	950
976 FA Bn (155 G)	Q782239	
A Btry	Q854234	650
B Btry	Q776274	650
C Btry	Q762254	450
46 FA Gp	Q891217	
514 FA Bn (155 G)	Q889238	
A Btry	Q883237	800
B Btry	Q877234	750
C Btry	EN ROUTE	
575 FA Bn (8" G) (-A & C Btries)	Q957197	
B Btry #1	Q958214	600
#2	Q955210	600
698 FA Bn (240 H)	Q880175	
A Btry #1	Q892219	665
#2	Q891225	665
B Btry #1	Q882183	900
#2	Q880181	200
C Btry #1	Q890229	670
#2	Q890232	700
939 FA Bn (4.5" G)	Q996176	
A Btry	R001189	1000
B Btry	Q999176	370
C Btry	Q997193	6270

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S E C R E T

	<u>COORDS</u>	<u>CL</u>
405 FA Gp	Q810250	
141 FA Bn (155 G)	Q829242	
A Btry	Q820281	800
B Btry	Q837264	600
C Btry	Q813258	700
257 FA Bn (155 H)	Q805277	
A Btry	Q829270	1100
B Btry	Q802308	1200
C Btry	Q810285	1100
C Btry, 991 FA Bn (155 G SP)	Q792267	
995 FA Bn (8" H)	Q765281	
A Btry	Q808313	6200 & 550
B Btry	Q825285	1000
C Btry	Q805278	950 & 1250
14 Armd Div Arty	Q918206	
499 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	Q977216	
500 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	Q887234	
501 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	Q889237	
36 Inf Div Arty	Q975215	
131 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q996208	
132 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q932225	
133 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q918247	
155 FA Bn (155 H)	Q929225	
A Btry	Q933242	400
B Btry	Q929243	6100
C Btry	Q931235	100
59 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	Q910244	
42 Inf Div Arty	Q781338	
232 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q770348	
392 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q740356	
402 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q727365	
542 FA Bn (155 H)	Q766348	
A Btry	Q759342	800
B Btry	Q747343	500
C Btry	Q737352	500
69 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	Q734302	
103 Inf Div Arty	Q810234	
382 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q872244	
383 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q850240	
928 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q814302	
384 FA Bn (155 H)	Q849238	
A Btry	Q854270	800
B Btry	Q849244	600
C Btry	Q819274	600
242 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q811304	
Locations of AOR Fields		
VI Corps Arty	Q772171	
13 FA Brig	Q963183	
6 FA Gp	Q963183	
35 FA Gp	Q789261	
46 FA Gp	Q963183	
405 FA Gp	Q790260	
14 Armd Div Arty	Q897188	
36 Inf Div Arty	Q908173	
42 Inf Div Arty	Q656305	
103 Inf Div Arty	Q776224	

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

U. S. ARMY

SECRET

Auth: GQ VI Corps Arty

Init: 54.5

Date: 18 Mar 45

CHANGE NO. 4 TO STATION LIST NO. 8

Hq VI Corps Arty.

Hq 13 FA Brig

Hq 6 FA Gp

Hq 35 FA Gp

Hq 46 FA Gp

Hq 405 FA Gp

2 FA Obsn Bn

1 FA Obsn Bn

69 FA Bn

17 FA Bn

36 FA Bn

141 FA Bn

A Btry

B Btry

194 FA Bn

257 FA Bn

A Btry

B Btry

C Btry

514 FA Bn

575 FA Bn

B #2

634 FA Bn

698 FA Bn

A Btry

B Btry

C Btry

752 FA Bn

938 FA Bn

939 FA Bn

976 FA Bn

A Btry

C Btry

995 FA Bn

A Btry

B Btry

C Btry

14 Armd Div Arty

36 Inf Div Arty

131 FA Bn

132 FA Bn

133 FA Bn

155 FA Bn

R008369

Displacing

R120329

Q908381

R021350

Q983437

R008377

Displacing

Q923463

Displacing

Displacing

Q976403

Q977391

Q975394

Displacing

Q995370

Q989365

Q987366

Q986368

Displacing

Q957322

Q956325

Displacing

R045382

Displacing

Displacing

Displacing

Displacing

Displacing

Displacing

Q938381

Q943374

Q946391

Q952368

Q971353

Q949373

Q982389

R130334

R109371

R080405

R056371

R017362

675

1000

200

700

SECRET

S E C R E T

	<u>COORDS</u>	<u>CL</u>
405 FA Gp	Q810250	
141 FA Bn (155 G)	Q829242	
A Btry	Q820281	800
B Btry	Q837264	600
C Btry	Q813258	700
257 FA Bn (155 H)	Q805277	
A Btry	Q829270	1100
B Btry	Q802308	1200
C Btry	Q810285	1100
C Btry, 991 FA Bn (155 G SP)	Q792267	

S E C R E T

42 Inf Div Arty	Q910460	
232 FA Bn	Q910459	
542 FA Bn		
A Btry	Q949452	800
B Btry	Q916456	600
C Btry	Q914458	400
103 Inf Div Arty	Vic LEMRACH	
382 FA Bn	R088431	
928 FA Bn	R000412	
384 FA Bn	R004405	
A Btry	R004403	
B Btry	Q992409	
C Btry	Q999403	

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CHANGE NO. 5 TO STATION LIST NO. 8

HQ VI Corps Arty	094425	
13 FA Brig	151393	
6 FA Gp	193388	
35 FA Cp	016482	
46 FA Gp	107418	
405 FA Gp	055444	
1 FA Obsn Bn	151393	
A Btry	244389	
B Btry	185410	
SIC	151393	
2 FA Obsn Bn	094427	
A Btry	068383	
B Btry	043463	
SIC	094427	
59 AFA Bn	13-47	
0 Btry 991 FA Bn (SP)	105499	
17 FA Bn	9644	
A Btry	967441	400
B Btry	965440	200
C Btry	964443	300
36 FA Bn	217370	
A Btry	218382	450
B Btry	252388	600
C Btry	248368	800
141 FA Bn	057481	
A Btry	069476	400
B Btry	067482	400
C Btry	096485	400
194 FA Bn	151393	
A Btry	148395	300
B Btry	154392	700
C Btry	110397	500
514 FA Bn	132391	
A Btry	136399	6400
B Btry	136400	6400
C Btry	133390	6400
634 FA Bn	148417	
A Btry	159405	600
B Btry	155411	700
C Btry	145419	500
698 FA Bn	107420	
B Btry #1	118431	90
B Btry #2	120430	100
C Btry #1	085401	630
C Btry #2	083402	630
752 FA Bn	115460	
A Btry	124462	400
B Btry	119473	6400
C Btry	116459	6100

S E C R E T

	<u>COORDS</u>	<u>CL</u>
405 FA Gp	Q810250	
141 FA Bn (155 G)	Q829242	
A Btry	Q820281	800
B Btry	Q837264	600
C Btry	Q813258	700
257 FA Bn (155 H)	Q805277	
A Btry	Q829270	1100
B Btry	Q802308	1200
C Btry	Q810285	1100
C Btry, 991 FA Bn (155 G SP)	Q792267	

S E C R E T

976 FA Bn	947483	
A Btry	963480	700
B Btry	955485	100
C Btry	969479	250
995 FA Bn	107418	
A Btry	074440	6200, 700
B Btry	086451	500
C Btry	113454	100
42 Inf Div Arty	965484	
103 Inf Div Arty	039449	
382 FA Bn	125488	
383 FA Bn	092514	
928 FA Bn	087513	
384 FA Bn	084465	

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO #46 U. S. ARMY

S E C R E T
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Initials: *EAS*
Date: 20 March 1945

CHANGE #6 TO STATION LIST #8

HQ VI Corps Arty	R131491	
2 FA Obsn Bn	R121498	
A Btry	R166436	
B Btry	R043463	
SIC	R121498	
46 FA Gp	R160485	
59 AFA Bn	R158498	
17 FA Bn	R014500	
A Btry	R022498	CL 100
B Btry	R023499	200
C Btry	R015499	5800
194 FA Bn		
C Btry	R166445	1 Plt 600 2 Plt 500
514 FA Bn		
A Btry	R151456	725
575 FA Bn	R184406	
B #1	R222394	1350
B #2	R227399	200
698 FA Bn		
A #1	R123429	750
A #2	R118432	735
938 FA Bn	R219435	
A Btry	R219436	600
B Btry	R195393	800
C Btry	R203396	1000
939 FA Bn	R125471	
A Btry	R129468	6300
B Btry	R132474	400
C Btry	R128470	700
257 FA Bn	R014451	
A Btry	R107450	800
B Btry	R183442	800
C Btry	R135471	800
Hq 36 Div Arty	R152487	
131 FA Bn	R172482	
152 FA Bn	R160503	
133 FA Bn	R153488	
155 FA Bn	R158485	
A Btry	R164488	800
B Btry	R166486	800
C Btry	R156477	100
VI Corps AOP	R035317	
6 FA Gp AOP	R067343	
35 FA Gp AOP	Q980395	
46 FA Gp AOP	R113415	

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S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #187.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Until midnight ey remained generally quiet but our attack after midnight in BITSCHHOFFEN (9128) - MERTZWILLER (9629) area caused extensive flare activity and brought into action MGs and AWs situated all along S edge of BOIS DE MIETESHEIM (9423). Lack of arty fire after the attack over the entire Corps front developed shortly after daylight was light and this can be attributed to the counter-battery program fired by the arty with the Corps. Although 14th Arm'd Div repulsed an attack launched by 40-50 ey vic 977-262 in the early morning and 36th Div encountered very heavy resistance on the northern outskirts of HAGUENAU, throughout the period, the great majority of PWs testified the attack was a complete surprise and our advances, especially in the 103d Div and 36 Div sectors, bear this out. 3 D.I.A. (French) reported stiff opposition in CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN (0921) and vic CR (181214).

During the afternoon 42d Div elements were rapidly pushing into the BARENTAL (8442) valley and at the close of the period no contact was reported vic 8342. AW SA and MG fire was encountered along line ZINSWILLER (8935) - GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (9234) - GUNDERSHOFFEN (9434) but elements of 103d Div were still advancing during the afternoon in the central part of their sector. 36th Div cleared MIETESHEIM (9330) and MERTZWILLER (9629) south of ZINTZEL River; mopping up was in progress in MARXHAUSEN (0424).

Estimated PW count for 24 hour period ending 151800A March: 886.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The activity of the enemy artillery showed only a moderate increase during the period, despite our launching a vigorous attack all along the Corps front, resulting in a penetration in the valley between the HARDT mountains and the HAGUENAU forest. The night was very active, for the enemy, apparently sensing an attack and alarmed by the 36th Division infiltration in the HAGUENAU area, threw frequent harassing and interdiction concentrations varying from 5 to 40 rounds both light and medium caliber, into that area and the approaches to it, also the road centers of PHAFFENHOFFEN, NIEDERMODERN, and DAUENDORF. The two heaviest concentrations reported were 120 rounds in HAGUENAU between 0520A and 0533A, and an estimated 150 rounds in the SCHWEIGSHAUSEN area, and N of it, at 0700A. However, after the attack jumped off in the morning, and the extensive on call CB program was executed, the volume of fire decreased considerably, and generally light shelling reported indicated that the enemy artillery was unable to affect the situation materially. Good visibility enabled our alert AOP's to be a very important factor in neutralizing the enemy artillery. During the day only a few concentrations fell in the west sector vic REIPERTSWILLER and LICHTENBERG, and on the right, E of HAGUENAU, only very light fire was reported. The HAGUENAU area and the zone of the penetration the PHAFFENHOFFEN - ENGWILLER - MIETESHEIM area, drew intermittent 6 to 12 round concentrations only, except for three 30 to 40 round shellings in the morning, but in the afternoon the front was generally quiet.

In view of our advance toward GUNDERSHOFFEN, considerable displacements in the formerly strong artillery groupments in the valley between the HARDT mountains and the HAGUENAU forest especially that in the LAUBACH - ESCHBACH area, may now be expected. These batteries will probably move to new position areas in the valley between WALBOURG and WOERTH.

Shellrep total: 85

36 Div	42 Div	13 Brig	103 Div	46 Gp	6 Gp	1 FOB	2 FOB
39	10	7	5	5	2	11	6


22 MAR 45 PM

Changes to EB List #26:

(1) Additions:

9036 BD	906-365	B	103 Div Arty GOP	-/G
9037 BC	908-376	B	PA	4/105
9335 AX	9310-3505	A	AP 13 Mar 45	2/Lt
9734 BB	974-343	B		4/G
0031 AY	0000-3112	A	AP 13 Mar	2/Lt
0037 BA	0003-3712	B	RECEIVED	1/G

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Changes to EB List #26 Additions (Cont)

0130 AZ	0180-3034	A	1 FOB/S	2/Med
0443 AT	0506-4332	A	VIC PIU & 1 FOB/S	2/Hvy
0837 AU	0857-3757	A	"	3/Med
1125 AV	1134-2506	A	AP - 13 Feb	2/Lt
1129 AV	1161-2947	A	VIC PIU & 1 FOB/S	2/Lt

(2) Amendments: 15 45

1123 NX to read 1123 VZ

0129 AL	0154-2985	A	AP - 1 FOB/S	4/Lt
0928 RU	0915-2846	A	" "	3/Med
1126 QG #1	1198-2608	A	AP - 13 Mar	2/Med
1226 QG #2	1260-2610	A	" "	2/Med
9931 OJ	9910-3185	A	AP & FW	4/G

(3) Deletions:

7542 M4R	9131 AE	9331 ZS	9432 WV
7839 QM	9131 XC	9332 OP	9529 RO
7840 QN	9231 RZ	9430 YW	9530 AG
7842 N4H	9233 FW	9431 UG	0326 VG
7942 QQ	9330 AM	9431 AP	

Suspect List #26-9:

922 - 359	GOP	-/G
935 - 344	FW	4/G
9365 - 3429	AOP	3/Med
9406 - 3371	"	5/G
0815 - 2502	"	3/G
0998 - 2258	"	1/Webel
111 - 248	FW	3/G
198 - 148	A/S	1/Med

1 FOB sound picked up six locations, 4 of which confirmed old locations, and one new battery AZ, which was partly responsible for the 100 rounds into HAGUENAU in the morning. The other location on the E bank of the RHINE, went into the suspect list. 2 FOB sound obtained one location, confirming an old location in the 42 Div sector.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. With good visibility prevailing during the period the artillery with the Corps was very active in supporting the attack of the Corps. Beginning at 0645A the 13 EA Brigade, 35, 46 and 405 EA Groups fired Program CATFISH. This program consisted of supply points, ammo dumps, CP's, and critical CR's across the Corps front. Corps Arty units also assisted in firing a preparation in support of the 103 Div's attack which started at 0645A. A CB program was fired as part of the preparation of the 3 DIA (French). On call CB programs were fired after the attack had begun for the 35th and 103rd Div Artys.

The AOP's were very active during the period and turned in a very high number of observed missions on targets of opportunity such as personnel and vehicular traffic on the roads, enemy guns, and tanks.

Div Arty units were active in firing missions in support of their respective Divisions. Numerous observed missions were fired on personnel, vehicles, machine guns, and mortars. Unobserved missions were largely confined to preparation and harassing targets.

A/light harassing program was fired during the night on enemy battery locations and the ey road net.

The 141 EA Bn had an unusually busy day with a variety of lucrative targets. At 1030A the Bn, adjusted by its own AOP fired on 30 ey personnel and 3 HD vehicles at Q8985-3285. A total of 15 rds were expended, inflicting many casualties. At 1120A, this time adjusted by its GOP, the 141 fired 14 rds on another group of ey personnel at Q8575-3452, effectively covering the area. Again at 1150A this same

S E C R E T

bn, adjusted by the 928 FA Bn GOP fired on ey personnel in dugouts at Q8824-3473. Of 14 rds expended, one was a direct hit on a dugout, others landing in the target area. In the afternoon, the bn, again adjusted by its ACP, expended 24 rds on 3 ey guns at Q904-367. Two direct hits were obtained on one gun, remaining rounds effectively neutralizing the area. An SP gun taken under fire at Q902372, withdrew from the Bn's range after three rds had been expended.

Late in the afternoon, the 141 FA Bn fired two more missions on ey trucks at Q9030-3659 and Q8838-3554, obtaining several direct hits and claiming three trucks destroyed. The 141 AOP, making the adjustments, reported that a gun in the area was damaged. A total of 56 rds was expended on these last two missions.

At 1010A, the 257 FA Bn, adjusted by the 141 AOP, fired 17 rds HE and 2 smoke on 3 ey guns at Q91343806, effectively neutralizing the area. Again at 1530A, this bn, adjusted by 995 ACP fired on a horse-drawn artillery piece and ey personnel at Q9346-3488. 20 rds HE and 2 smoke were expended, with 2 hits on the weapon being reported and the personnel were seen to disperse.

The 938 FA Bn, at 1100A adjusted by the 141 Inf GOP obtained a direct hit on an SP gun at R060242. A machine-gun in the vicinity was destroyed in the course of the adjustment. The bn expended 27 rds on this mission.

At 1745A, the 976 ACP adjusted his bn on an ey gun at Q935-345, effectively neutralized it with 11 rds. Just as he was finishing that mission, the observer spotted an ey tank at Q925-345 and switched his bn to that target. Of 11 rds fired, one was a direct hit on the tank. Near misses caused an explosion and started a fire in the vicinity of the tank.

The 35 Gp ACP at 1725A adjusted the 17 FA Bn on a horse-drawn vehicle at Q907-371. Expending 14 rds, the target was destroyed with one hit on the vehicle being reported.

At 1025A the 17 FA Bn ACP adjusted the 976 FA Bn on an ey artillery column at Q907339. During the course of the adjustment, 4 ey tanks suddenly appeared in the vicinity of the arty column and the observer switched the fire of the Long Toms to the armor. A total of 81 rds was expended on both targets. Due to the holocaust raised in the target area, accurate results could not be observed, but the tanks were seen to disperse in a neighboring woods and the ey arty column was scattered in confusion.

The 995 FA Bn continued its tank-busting program throughout the day with claims of 3 definitely destroyed and several probables. At 1325A the bn ACP adjusted the 8 inchers on two tanks at Q925-342, destroying both while expending only 15 rds. Earlier in the day, at 1035A, this same bn, adjusted by 405 Gp ACP, fired 40 rds on two tanks at Q907341, destroying one and disabling the other. At 1400A hrs, this same bn showed its versatile hand by firing on and destroying 2 horse-drawn artillery pieces at Q910350 with a total of 24 rds. Personnel accompanying the pieces were either killed or became casualties, as upon completion of the mission, no movement was observed in the target area.

"C" Btry of the 991 FA Bn, (155 GSP) was employed in firing on point targets at ranges from 1800 to 5500 yds. Delayed and T-105 fuzes used on about a 50-50 basis. Firing positions were occupied for approximately 10 minutes. Targets in the towns of KINDWILLER, ENGWILLER and MULHAUSEN were hit. It was reported that as a result of 45 rds put into MULHAUSEN, there is little of the town left standing.

The 698 FA Bn had a very interesting mission in the town of MORSEBOMM. The mission started out as a registration on the CR at R006-335 which is in the town. 4 rds were fired for adjustment then, upon instructions from the ACP, the Bn shifted 25 R and 100 over and fired 10 rds on a destruction mission. 7 of these rounds caused large explosions resulting in flames and smoke rising very high in the air. This mission was fired from 1348A to 1418A and was observed by the 938 FA Bn ACP.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		3		1		7	5	2
Per	1	4	4	1	6		12	8
Veh	6				1	1	5	
MG & Mor	6		1		11	3	28	2
Prep	2	12	9	3		38	2	183
Armor	2						7	
Def Fire			19	8				
Har		13				20		23
Reg	10		10		5		17	
Misc	2	5			5	1	2	

S E C R E T

Summary of Missions Div Arty (Cont)

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
Prop					1			
Smoke							10	142
Totals	29	37	43	13	29	70	88	360

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	13 Brig		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	5	54	3	12		34	9	16
Per		4					2	
Vch			2				3	
Frop		47						45
Armor	1	5	2				2	
Har		22		21	1	14		6
Reg	11		6		4		10	
Misc	3							5
Dest	1						2	
	21	132	13	33	5	48	28	72

AOP Missions: 54

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

(a) Missions and attachments:

- 610 TD Bn (90 mm) SP -- no change.
- 614 TD Bn (3") towed -- no change.
- 630 TD Bn (3") towed -- atchd to 13 FA Brig for indirect fire missions.
- 636 TD Bn (90 mm) SP -- no change.

(b) Operations:

610 TD Bn atchd to 42 Inf Div for direct fire support and AT defense. Co "A" supporting Regt attack of 222 Inf Regt. Co "B" less two plts. in Bn reserve vic WENGEN (Q7336). 1st Plt. of "B" Co supporting TF COLMAN and 2nd Plt TD's supporting 117 Rcn Sqd. Co "C" in direct support of 242 Inf Regt. Rcn Co has assigned Rcn Plts. to operate with each gun Co.

614 TD Bn in direct support of 103 Inf Div with primary mission of anti-tank defense.

630 TD Bn closed into assb. area at 141800A and became atchd to 13 FA Brig. Co "A" will be under fire control of 938 FA Bn with CO CP in WEITERBUCH (R0317). Co "B" under 634 FA Bn, CP in DAUENDORF (Q9326) and Co "C" under 155 FA Bn (36 IDA) with CO CP in HUTTENDORF (Q9222). Bn CP is in MOMMENHEIM (Q9317).

636 TD Bn provided direct fire support with the attack of the 36 Inf Div Co "A" atchd 143 Inf Regt, Co "B" -- 141 Inf Regt, Co "C" -- 143 Inf Regt. TD's of the Bn fired approximately 300 rds of HE and APC during the period on MG's, strong pts., cy pers., and other direct fire targets. Rcn Plts. have been assigned to each of the gun CO's.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

790-420,	791-404,	830-420,	850-370,	860-345,
870-345,	880-350,	895-350,	904-337,	915-320,
934-315,	942-308,	950-307,	960-295,	960-265,
034-244,	043-251,	050-252,	056-248,	058-244,
060-236,	078-213,	084-214,	087-212,	092-212,
098-207,	105-210,	105-180,	130-180,	170-174.

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DECEPTION, GERMAN-STYLE

A set of German training instructions covering various methods for deceiving Allied soldiers appears to have been so successful with German troops in Russia that Field Marshal Kesselring thought it worth adopting for the German Southwest Command. Most of the tricks suggested in these instructions Apply to troops on the defensive or in retreat. While some of the methods are old stand-bys, others are fresh little masterpieces of enemy cunning. The instructions certainly do not leave much to the student's imagination, but go straight to the business of teaching him how to be barbarous by the numbers. Here they are:

1. Divert the enemy's attention in the opposite direction, so that you can approach him silently from the rear and make your kill, or so that you bypass him unnoticed. Make a noise by throwing stones. Use small parties to attract attention while the main body carries out the envelopment.
2. Draw mines across the road just in front of a hostile vehicle, and kill the crew from ambush as they climb out.
3. If a member of your ambush party who has been hit and who has moved away from cover calls for help, do not go to his aid immediately. The man who does so will also be exposed to enemy fire.
4. Noise-making devices in the vicinity of wire obstacles, as well as the use of dummies, can induce Allied soldiers to open fire. In this way the number and location of hostile weapons can be determined.
5. If it is necessary for you to pretend to be dead, lie down as close as possible to enemy dead until the danger is past or until night has fallen. A helmet pierced by small-arms fire will lend added realism when you are feigning death.
6. Mine deserted trenches.
7. Cut telephone cables at night, and draw one end into an ambush so that hostile linemen can be killed or captured.
8. When hostile patrols approach, hold your fire until the last possible minute. This increases your chance of killing or capturing personnel.
9. By using single rounds from a 20mm MG in an armored car, you can make the enemy think you have a heavy anti-tank gun.
10. By warming up your vehicle engines, you can imitate the sound of vehicles approaching and departing, and thus can simulate troop movements.
11. Put up boards with "Danger--Mines!" and a death's head painted on them. Fence off the area with wire. Make tracks around the resulting dummy minefield and mine them.
12. Patrols using captured vehicles often can achieve surprise. Captured vehicles also can be useful when you are trying to lure hostile soldiers into an ambush.
13. When your patrols approach populated places, they may find it profitable to stop suddenly, fire a few shots in the direction of the village, turn, and make a getaway. The opposition is likely to disclose itself by firing.
14. Patrols operating behind the enemy's front lines should turn sign posts and notice boards to face the wrong direction or to lead into an ambush.
15. If the enemy locates an observation patrol, the men should set up dummies, and depart so that they may be employed to advantage elsewhere.
16. If a reconnaissance or combat patrol is observed by the enemy and finds it necessary to withdraw, the members of the patrol should hang jackets on the wire or place helmets with the tops showing, to hold the enemy's attention.

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17. Cover weapon positions with boards, and camouflage them to resemble the surrounding terrain. The occupant of a position then can push the board up with his helmet, fire at hostile personnel at close range, and duck back into his hidden position again.

18. Place piles of straw or wood around gasoline cans in the vicinity of your positions. If the enemy approaches you at night, fire on these materials and thus illuminate the attackers.

19. In a system of defense based on strongpoints, build a dummy position between the strongpoints. At night fire light signals to give the impression of a continuous line of defense. Put up artificial cover for the enemy in front of such a position and mine it. Or else arrange that the exits lead him into your field of fire.

20. Prepare dummy fuel dumps out of old cans and barrels, so as to lure hostile air attacks.

21. Prepare dummy bivouacs and other concentrations by using tents, wooden crates, and derelict vehicles.

22. At night, leave lights in partly blacked-out houses--or keep small fires burning--in areas well away from genuine bivouacs.

23. Deflect bombing attacks by displaying swastika flags prominently on knocked-out vehicles at a safe distance from your own positions.

(Source: Intelligence Bulletin Vol III, No 5, War Department)

ANNEX "B"

GERMAN INTERROGATION METHODS

347th Div interrogation team had at its disposal a nicely furnished house where selected Allied PWs were specially treated, source states. The house was completely isolated, but was located in the vicinity of the Division G-2 office. Whenever a PW thought to have interesting information was found, he was brought to this place for a period of 4-5 days. An interrogator is permanently assigned to each PW for the time of his stay at the house. This interrogator takes his meals with his PW, plays cards with him, takes him for walks, etc, and generally tries to gain the PW's complete confidence and friendship. During the conversation questions pertaining to military matters are asked, but the interrogator never insists when the PW shows reluctance in answering his questions.

During his walks with the interrogator the PW is never under guard; the interrogator, however, carries a pistol in his pocket. It is common practice to suggest that the PW take a nap after dinner. That gives the interrogator time to write his report and contact the G-2 office to find out what additional information might be desired.

Source claims that this method produced excellent results. Young Allied officers, security conscious after their capture, often became overwhelmed by the treatment accorded them and eventually gave all information desired by the interrogator. PW emphasized that the most stubborn PWs were elderly sergeants of the American Regular Army, from whom it was practically impossible to elicit any information at all.

Source knows that similar interrogation methods are used in 17th SS Pz Gren Div and in 36th VG Div.

(Source: Hq Seventh Army, Ref No 733, "German Intelligence Methods", 8 Mar 45)

S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #188.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

During the night ey launched 4 limited objective attacks in an apparent effort to cover the regrouping of his forces but all were repulsed. At 2000A hours 42 Div repulsed a C/A by 50-75 ey vic Hill 336 (8038) without loss of ground; at same time unknown number of inf, supported by 4 tanks or SPs, forced 103 Div troops to withdraw to wooded area NE of NIETESHEIM (9331). At 0430A hours, another unsuccessful C/A was launched vic 951318 against the 36 Div and the fourth was launched against 3 DIA vic 0920 after an arty preparation.

Total PWs for 36 hr period ending 160600 March: 1066.

During this morning 3 DIA cleared CAMP D' OBERHOFFEN (0821) and advanced to the north edge of the camp's firing range vic 0924. In the afternoon ey arty fire was persistent on 103 Div's front but generally light across the Corps front. 36 Div cleared MERTZWILLER (9330) of all but a few ey and then were held up by mined and defended roadblocks vic 980288, 997273, 002263 and 002257.

103 Div troops along ZINTZEL River received hvy SA, AW and mortar fire from high ground E of ZINSWILLER (8935). At 1405A hrs ey counterattacked with 50 men from 923347 but this was repulsed by 1530A hours. 4 tanks in 892273 and 2 tanks at 976339 were fired on by our arty and three tanks were reported hit. In 42 Div sector ey was defending in isolated small groups N of REIFERTSWILLER (8037) but resistance seemed to be crumbling on high ground NW of ZINSWILLER.

XV Corps reported a steady advance by 3 and 45 Div against considerable arty fire and many mines and the capture by 100 Div of BITCHE (7750) and CAMP DE BITCHE (8150)--important communication centers on our left flank.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The enemy artillery continued to offer only slight hindrance to our advance, for the shelling varied only from light to moderate, and the heaviest concentration reported did not exceed 20 rounds. Most of the activity came before midnight, with the bulk of it consisting of the usual harassing fires, mostly by SPs on the front line in the HAGUENAU sector. The LICHTENBERG area was hit once, and the critical points on the axis of our advance, FRAFFENHOFFEN, UEBERACH and MERTZWILLER, received several light and medium cal concentrations. After midnight, however, the shelling ceased, and this indicates that it was done by guns assigned to a delaying force, which had to stop shooting in order to start marching for their new positions ready to fire by daylight. During the day, the fire was very light, due probably to the close watch maintained by our ACPs, aided by good visibility. Scattered concentrations were reported falling on attacking 103rd Div infantry, and MERTZWILLER drew occasional interdiction fires, the total for the afternoon being 30 rounds.

Ey batteries observed by ACPs today were located mainly in the WALBOURG-WOERTH valley, showing that guns in front of our penetration withdrew to that area as expected. If former withdrawal routes are used, these guns will probably displace during the night to the LANGENSCHULTZBACH-LEMBACH valley. Artillery in the HAGUENAU forest will possibly move to the HATTEN-SURBOURG area.

Shellrep total: 42

36 Div	46 Gp	42 Div	14 AD	13 Brig	1 FOB
19	5	2	1	4	4

1st FOB sound bases made 8 plots during the period, confirming 4 old locations, with the rest of area accuracy, indicating new position areas.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The artillery with the Corps was again very active and continued to support the attack of the Corps. Visibility was excellent during the period. Numerous observed missions were fired on tgts of opportunity consisting of personnel, vehicles, tanks, and ey traffic on the roads. Unobserved fires were placed on counterbattery, preparation, and harassing targets.

Due to the good visibility and increased activity the ACP's turned in a very large number of missions and accounted for the majority of the observed targets fired on during the day.

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A very heavy harassing program was fired throughout the night on the enemy's primary and secondary road net and also cy battery locations.

The 35 Gp AOP adjusted the 976 FA Bn on cy vehicles at Q955-333 at 0800A. A total of 29 rds were fired resulting in a direct hit on one vehicle and dispersing the remainder.

At 1000A the 35 Gp AOP fired a mission on 3 cy tanks at Q8762-4205 obtaining 5 hits out of 21 rds fired. 2 tanks were reported destroyed and 1 was disabled. The 17 FA Bn fired the mission.

Between 1140A and 1200A the 46 Gp AOP adjusted the 514 FA Bn on the CR at R010-346, knocking 2 vehicles off the road and also fired the same Bn on horse drawn artillery on the road at Q999-327 forcing 2 pieces off the road, one of which was reported as blowing up. Two other vehicles were also reported hit. A total of 29 rds were fired on these two missions.

The 939 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on an cy tank at Q970-332 from 1245A to 1320 firing 37 rds. The tank was reported knocked out. The AOP again adjusted his Bn on tanks from 1530A to 1550A. This time the target was 3 cy tanks at Q9796-3392. 33 rds were fired with one of the tanks being knocked out.

The 257 FA Bn fired on vehicles in a woods at Q9390-3514 at 0950A. 24 rds were fired leaving two of the vehicles damaged. The mission was observed by the 405 Gp AOP. This same combination also fired on an cy vehicle and gun at Q9360-3699 from 0800A to 0900A expending a total of 17 rds. 1 hit was obtained on the vehicle and 2 hits were obtained on the gun and pit. Later in the day the Bn fired on 2 light guns at R000-345 and expended 30 rds. The area was neutralized and the guns silenced. This mission was observed by the 35 Gp AOP from 1755A to 1805A.

The 995 FA Bn had another successful mission on an cy tank at Q900-367. Two target hits were observed out of 7 rds fired. The 405 Gp AOP furnished observation from 0830A to 0853A.

At 1040A the 131 FA Bn FO adjusted his Bn on a house at R028-246 occupied by cy personnel. 17 rds were fired with 4 direct hits being reported. At 1700A this Bn was again adjusted by one of its FO's on a group of 20-40 cy Inf at R024-248 and fired 20 rds with effect reported as very good.

At 0837A the 194 FA AOP adjusted his Bn on a house at R0246-2626 and expended 15 rds. 5 tgt hits were obtained and the house was badly damaged. The Bn's AOP also adjusted the Bn on an cy strong point at R031-262 at 0900A. 25 rds were fired of which 15 rds were reported as tgt hits. The strong point was destroyed.

At 1600A the 13 FA Brigade AOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on a 4 gun cy battery at R0092-3161 which was active at that time. The adjustment effectively stopped the firing.

At approximately 1700A the 36 FA Bn AOP located and adjusted his Bn on an active 2-gun cy battery at Q984-374 and another 2-gun battery at R005-362. Adjustments on both batteries promptly stopped the firing.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			5	4	1	4	5	2
Per	10		21		6		16	
Veh	2				5	1	3	
MG & Mor			7		3		8	
Prep	3	8		27	3	7	13	15
Armor	2		8				2	
Def Fires		1	11	6				
Har				29	2	4		37
Reg	12		13		8		17	
Misc	1		12	10	3		2	
Smoke							8	2
TOTALS	30	9	77	76	31	16	74	56

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(2) Corps Arty:

Type	13 Brig		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CD	4	13				3	2	8
Per	2		1				1	
Veh			1				3	
MG & Mbr							1	
Prep		7						
Armor	1		1				6	
Har		32		26		20		8
Reg	9		4		4			
Misc		8	1		1	2		
Dest	2				10			
TOTALS	18	60	8	26	15	25	13	16

AOP Missions: 53

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

a. Missions and attachments:

610 TD Bn -- No change
 614 TD Bn -- No change
 630 TD Bn -- No change
 636 TD Bn -- No change
 692 TD Bn (90mm) SP arrived and assigned to VI Corps.

b. Operations:

610 TD Bn continued direct support of 42 Inf Div. Gun Co's of the Bn remained attached to same units with light opposition opposing forward TD's.

614 TD Bn supporting advance of 103 Inf Div. The Bn formed task forces and raiding parties that attacked with very good success. A total of 50 PWs were taken on all actions and many others were killed and wounded. 3rd Plt TDs of "A" Co fired 22 rds HE and 15 rds APC with observed results of 1 AA gun and 4 light MG's destroyed.

630 TD Bn provided indirect fire support for 13 FA Brig with gun Co's remaining under fire control of same FA Bns. Fire missions were mostly night harassing missions on ey gun positions.

636 TD Bn supporting the attack of the 36 Inf Div. All ren Plts rejoined the Ren Co for operations with a new task force being formed. Co "D" fired on strong points and ey occupied houses in support of friendly tanks. "A" and "C" Cos continued with advance of same Inf Regts.

692 TD Bn detrained and assembled in Corps sector during early part of period. The exact attachment and mission for this Bn was not known at the end of the period.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

Q757-417, Q819-429, Q830-430, Q840-420, Q876-382, Q886-404, Q895-358, Q900-366, Q933-358, Q948-338, Q960-324, Q960-313, R050-266, R058-248, R085-244, R100-225, R114-234, R125-225, R150-176, R165-175.

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ENEMY BATTERY LIST #27

<u>CONC NO.</u>	<u>COORDS</u>	<u>ACC</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>NO./TYPE</u>
7845 KU	7868-4545	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
9440 WR	9456-4047	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
9739 DE	9793-3962	A	AP-16 Mar-AOP	2/Med
9837 BH	9835-3765	A	AP-16 Mar-AOP	1/G
0037 EA	0003-3712	B	AOP	2/Lt
0036 DG	005-362	B	AOP	Btry
0328 PU	0316-2835	A	AP-2 Mar	3/Lt
0543 AT	0506-4332	A	AP VICA PIU	2/Hvy
0628 WM	0688-2839	A	AP-13 Mar	4/Lt
0837 AU	0857-3757	A	AP VICA PIU	3/Med
0928 RU	0915-2846	A	AP VICA PIU	3/Med
0929 AO	0927-2937	B	1 FOB-S	1/Lt
1032 AN	1035-3220	A	1 FOB-S	1/Med
1129 AV	1161-2947	A	AP VICA PIU	2/Lt
1228 UD	1244-2813	A	AP-PRU	6/Lt
1228 AF	1222-2890	A	AP & 2 FOB-S	3/Lt
1428 AS	1430-2793	B	1 FOB-S	1/Med

S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #189

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

The nature of the resistance all along the Corps front indicates a series of delaying actions before a withdrawal behind the SIEGFRIED LINE. The ey is apparently unaware of the threat presented by 3d Army elements proceeding south into our sector along the W bank of the RHINE. 1 PW captured vic 886405 stated the 87 Regt (36 VG Div) had organized positions N of OBERSTEINBACH (9648), were planning to fight a delaying action from there to SCHONAU (0051) and then fall back to the SIEGFRIED positions.

42 Div found no organized resistance in their area and elements advancing vic 9142 met only occasional snipers. During the morning 103 Div occupied GUNDERSHOFFEN (9434), REICHSOFFEN (9436) and NIEDERBRONN (9339) without contact or arty fire. Vic GUNSTETT (0234) 36 Div met determined inf resistance supported by lt cal arty fire but at the close of the period occupied that town as well as BIBLISHEIM (0433). No ey activity was reported in woods N of HAGUENAU where engineers are busy clearing obstacles and road blocks. In 3 DIA's sector, against only lt resistance French armor occupied SOUFFLENHEIM (1625) and inf elements found SESSENHEIM (1822) clear. Well informed PW stated 47 VG Div is to withdraw through four phase lines to LAUTER River by 19 March and then to occupy SIEGFRIED defenses if LAUTER line is penetrated.

42 Div entered PHILLIPSBURG (8742) and at the end of the period reported no contact in their entire sector. 103 Div continued their progress and during late afternoon entered WOERTH (0037) against lt resistance.

PW count for VI Corps for 24 hour period ending 162400 March: 873. Total for present operation to 162400 March: 2013.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. With ey arty fire very lt and scattered over the entire Corps front, all indications, including lack of prepared positions on recent photo cover, point to an almost complete and precipitate withdrawal of the ey arty, now that the MODER River shell and several possible delaying positions have been overrun. Guns observed by AOP's today were generally deployed along the line LANGENSOULTZBACH-FREUSCHDORF-SURBOURG, and appear to have been in many cases, SP guns or tanks. Very little arty seems to be attached to the delaying forces, and long range fire has been rare. Until midnight the ey put light harassing fire on towns and bridge sites on the axis of advance, including MIETISHEIM, GUMBRECHTHOFFEN, GUNDERSHOFFEN, and PHILLIPSBURG. The bridge site at GUNSTETT was shelled during the morning and forward elements of the 103 and 36 Divs were lightly harassed.

Shellrep total - 11

103 Div	42 Div	46 Gp	6 Gp	1 FOB
1	1	2	5	1

All locations on EB list #27 are deleted. The rapid advance makes the continued activity of btries picked up today very doubtful.
Flash and Sound NTR.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. Despite limited visibility due to a ground haze the arty with the Corps continued to actively support the attack by firing observed missions on ey guns, personnel, tanks and IGs and mortars. Unobserved fires were largely confined to counterbattery, personnel and harassing targets.

A hvy harassing program was fired during the night on the ey road net. Due to the advance of the Corps all sound and flash installations of the 2 FA Obsn Bn became out of range and were closed shortly after dark. Reconnaissance was made for new installations and Btry A Flash occupied a two post base, coordinates OP #1, 9285-3232, OP #2, 9205-3377. This base is being expanded into a three post base with OP #3 in the 9037 sq.

The 995 FA Bn ACP adjusted his bn at 1820A on 2 ey half-tracks at 99525-3705. 13 rds were fired resulting in both half-tracks being destroyed. Later, at 1840A, he shifted the bn to 3 ey guns observed firing at 9977-378 and fired 32 rds. The guns were silenced and the area effectively neutralized.

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From 1700A to 1725A the 995 FA Bn AOP fired his bn on 2 ey guns at R0134-4234. 15 rds were fired and effectively neutralized the guns. At 1750A the Bn's AOP adjusted on one ey gun at 9156-4620. Only 4 rds were fired with 1 hit in the position being reported.

At 1645A the 995 FA Bn AOP adjusted the Bn on 1 ey gun at R0127-4244. 8 rds were fired resulting in an explosion in the gun position.

From 0870A to 0900A Btry C, 991 FA Bn, fired on 6 ey guns at R037-380 and 4 ey guns at R032-380 expending 56 rds and 29 rds, respectively. The area was reported neutralized; however, effect could not be determined due to poor visibility.

At 1030A an FO of the 131 FA Bn adjusted his bn on ey personnel and horse-drawn vehicles at R056-278. 35 rds were fired with 1 vehicle being hit and the personnel dispersed.

An FO of the 131 FA Bn also adjusted his bn at 1532A on an ey tank at R068-303. 45 rds were fired and the tank was reported knocked out.

At 0750A the 59 AFA Bn's AOP adjusted the bn on an ey vehicle at 99799-3389. The vehicle was reported destroyed with only 4 rds being fired.

From 1315A to 1500A the VI Corps Arty AOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on 4 ey tanks at R035-357. 2 of the tanks were reported immobilized. Approximately 50 rds were fired on this mission.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:-

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	2	3				7	
Per	1		15				12	
Veh			3		Not Available		2	
MG & Mor							3	
Prop		3		6				
Armor	1		5				1	
Def Fire			3					
Har				2				26
Reg	5		11				15	
Misc	1	8	15	12				1
TOTAL	9	13	55	20			40	27

(2) Corps Arty:-

Type	13 FAB		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	3	11		7		4	8	
Per	1	2	1			2		
Veh							2	
Prop		2						
Armor	1							
Har		10		16		25		15
Reg	2		3		1		3	
Dest					2	6		
TOTAL	7	25	4	23	3	37	13	15

AOP Missions - 24

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

a. Missions and attachments:

614 TD Bn (3") towed - no change.

630 TD Bn (3") towed - no change.

636 TD Bn (90mm) SP - no change.

692 TD Bn (90mm) SP - Relieved 610 TD Bn and atchd to 42 Inf Div for operations.

b. Operations:

614 TD Bn continued with the attack of 103 Inf Div and displacing guns forward with the progress of advance.

630 TD Bn atchd to 13 FA Brig. Continued indirect fire support. Co "A" supporting the 938 FA Bn, expended 76 rds HE on harassing missions. All units of the bn displaced forward during the period.

636 TD Bn advanced with 36 Inf Div firing close support assault missions. Co "A" in direct support of 142 Inf Regt fired on ey occupied houses and bunkers killing and wounding many of the ey and routing 56 PWs. Co "B" maintained road blocks and fired on ey personnel in buildings causing 2 to surrender. The 1st and 2d Plts of "C" Co advanced to

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FORSTHEIM (49833), and 3d Plt TD's advancing with Flying Column Force fired 6 rds HE on targets of opportunity.

692 TD Bn atchd 42 Inf Div effective 160300A and relieved all elements of 610 TD Bn during the period. Rcn Plts were assigned to each gun Co for operations with 1 TD Co in direct support of respective inf regts "A" Co - 222 Inf Regt, "B" Co - 232 Inf Regt, and "C" Co - 242 Inf Regt. Bn CP is located in LICHTENBERG (48135).

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS

a. NEWS ITEMS: A war correspondent is now attached to Hqs, VI Corps Artillery, who submits each night to the 6th Army Group Press Camp a summary of the missions fired by Corps Arty Bns. This summary is used by Beachhead News, Stars and Stripes, AP and other leading news agencies. If you have fired an interesting problem with good results, telephone the news in to S-3, Hq VI Corps Arty with full details as soon as possible. This service is for you and your families at home.

b. Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:
795428, 826488, 852450, 880427, 895411, 964420, 980385, 008378, 020348, 043335, 020333, 970290, 050265, 087250, 101261, 133264, 174265, 188221.

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(Source: 103d Inf Div G-2 Rpt, 15 Mar 45)

ENEMY PLANS FOR CONTINUED RESISTANCE

(While the reports on this subject cannot be considered conclusive, the volume and persistency of the information received on the subject cannot be overlooked. There is a close analogy between the intelligence received on this subject, and that received on V-weapons in 1943 and 1944. In the case of the V-weapons, early reports indicated little more than that the enemy was preparing a secret weapon, while the original reports on this subject indicated the general idea of a plan for a National REDOUBT. The later reports on secret weapons became more specific and on the nature of the weapon, more precise, just as in this instance the definitions of the area to be used as the REDOUBT, the plans for underground activity, and the preparations being made are more clearly outlining the enemy's plans. In both instances the enemy has done his utmost to prevent intelligence from reaching the Allies. The following article draws together the threads of the latest information received on the subject of enemy plans for continued resistance.)

HITLER has often expressed the determination to fight to the last. While there may be some question as to whether the FUEHRER personally will survive the debacle following the collapse of his armies, there is little question but that the arch criminals of the Nazi Party, along with the SS, the SD, and others implicated in the crimes of the present German government, are planning to fall back into Southern GERMANY and AUSTRIA in one last desperate attempt to wear out the Allies and escape the fate they deserve.

1. SUMMARY: The Nazi plans for continuing resistance take the following outline.

a. The war criminals and those who could not possibly operate undetected in Allied occupied territory will retire into the REDOUBT, which will be defended by SS troops. Here the enemy leaders will attempt to hold out in the mountains against Allied troops, and by directing underground activities and partisan bands against the occupying forces hope to revive German nationalism after the Allies tire of occupying the REICH. The hope that the Allies might quarrel among themselves also is included in this plan.

b. A carefully organized resistance movement utilizing all known forms of subversive activity will operate in Allied occupied territories. This underground activity will be carried on by Nazis who will assume new identities to protect them from detection by the Allies. These new identities will be acquired by bi-lingual Nazis taking the identification of foreign workers in GERMANY who have died or been disposed of, and by those who do not speak a second language assuming the identity of untainted Germans who have been killed in air raids. This underground will engage in the murder of Germans who cooperate with the Allied forces, thus instituting a reign of terror against those who attempt in assisting in the restoration of democracy in GERMANY. By utilizing the SKORZENY technique employed in 150 Panzer Brig, the underground will go into American or other Allied uniforms and sabotage Allied installations, commit outrages against civilians to turn the Germans against the occupying powers, and engage in activities calculated to turn one Ally against the other. The underground will be controlled from the REDOUBT through a carefully compartmentalized cell system so that the discovery of one cell by the Allies will not jeopardize any large proportion of the underground. Financial support and supplies for both the REDOUBT and the underground will be furnished by Nazis already sent out of GERMANY into other countries under assumed identities specifically for this purpose.

c. Partisan bands will wage guerilla warfare on the Allies in the areas of the REICH best adapted for this purpose. These bands will be modeled on the French Maquis and the Russian and Yugoslav Partisans, whom the Nazis discovered by experience to be very effective. These groups will also be supplied and directed from the REDOUBT. Their areas of activity will include such regions as the BLACK FOREST, ODENWALD, VOGELSBERG, and in the GLANT Mountains and BOHEMIAN Highlands.

Supplementing these underground activities will be a continuation of National Socialist ideology kept alive by permeating religious, political and military thinking with Nazi ideas. This will take advantage of the natural resurgence of German patriotism and nationalism brought about by being occupied by foreign powers. The Nazis hope to take advantage of discontent brought about by the inevitable food shortage in the wake of the war following the disruption of transportation and distribution facilities, the housing shortage, and unemployment caused by the destruction of German industry. The revival of Nazism will be aided and abetted by the Nazis who have already been planted abroad and who will use every facility for arousing sympathy for the defeated GERMANY, and will endeavor to cause dissension and disagreement among the United Nations, particularly in regard to the treatment of the REICH.

S E C R E T

2. PREPARATIONS: The exact preparations by which the enemy is implementing his plans for continuing resistance are difficult to determine precisely. From the information available, it appears that the enemy is moving the files of key offices into the REDOUBT, preparing bomb-proof shelters and houses, erecting some fortifications to supplement the natural terrain features, installing telephone and telegraph systems, and possibly building underground power plants.

There have been conflicting reports concerning the movement of key government offices into the area. According to reports from SPAIN, the Spanish Embassy in BERLIN was moving to either MUNICH or SALZBURG. The Foreign Ministry was also rptd as moving to SALZBURG, as well as the Air Ministry, and bomb-proof buildings were reported as being prepared to house them. HIMMLER has been reported as moving his headquarters to VORARLBERG, where provisions were ordered for 100,000 men. MUSSOLINI is stated to have moved his entourage into the area, and there are even indications that some of the Quisling governments supported by the Germans may be moving into the final refuge. RIBBENTROP and GOERING also have refuges in the area, and HITLER has BERCHTESGADEN. Of a more sinister nature is the report that certain of the high-ranking prisoners which the Germans hold are to be moved into the REDOUBT, where they will undoubtedly be used as hostages. Among those mentioned as being taken to the area are the King of the Belgians, General WEYGAND, BLUM, REYNAUD and the son of Marshal STALIN (a PW). One report also stated that high-ranking Allied military prisoners of war might also be taken into the area as hostages. As would be expected, a considerable number of reports have been received designating BERCHTESGADEN as the center of the REDOUBT, and speak of preparations being made in that area. It is general knowledge that HITLER's hide-out possesses great "bomb-proof" chambers, and is well protected by anti-aircraft guns.

The preparations being made for the underground movement include a screening of the members of the Nazi party by the GESTAPO. Several reports indicate that two lists are being drawn up. The first list includes the names of those Party members known to be 100 per cent loyal to the cause. These are divided into units or cells under local leaders with responsibility directly to the central party office. The members of one cell are not known to the members of other cells. These Nazis are being schooled in the activities of underground espionage and sabotage, and wireless operators are being trained, particularly among members of the HITLER YOUTH. The second list of Party members being prepared by the GESTAPO are the members considered as politically unreliable. This list will be allowed to fall into the hands of the Allies, according to some reports, thus presenting a facade of coverage.

The training for partisan warfare is being directed by HIMMLER, who has had printed a booklet on the subject entitled "Anweisung fuer Klein-und-Partisanenkrieg". This book is reportedly a very complete guide to the methods used by the Maquis and eastern Partisans. It includes the method for establishment of strongpoints including hospitals and chemical laboratories, for forging papers, printing plants for the publication of underground newspapers, and radio stations. Instructions are issued for the establishment of secret arms depots, and methods described for using weapons for either sabotage or guerilla warfare. Special schools have been established, according to reports, to teach partisan warfare, where films and experienced officers demonstrate the methods so successfully used against the Germans. Women are supposed to play a large part in the German plans for partisan warfare, being able to escape detection more easily than a man, and thus considered valuable for use as couriers and spys. Women are also more fanatical.

3. LOCATION: There have been a great variety of reports concerning the location of the great national REDOUBT. However, the center of the area appears to revolve around BERCHTESGADEN and SALZBURG, with the salt mine regions around the latter being utilized as underground supply depots, power plants and factories. The location places the area selected to the S of MUNICH - the home of Nazism - and the place selected for the files of the Nazi Party according to many sources. The southern border of the area is along the Swiss and Italian frontiers, while the eastern border encompasses part of the Austrian TYROL. The area, by nature is well suited for a last ditch battle with narrow mountain passes and difficult terrain giving the defenders the advantage. The places most frequently reported as being the center of activity are BREGENZ, RHEIN-ILL, ARLBERG, ILLER VALLEY, LECH VALLEY, TOELZ-INNSBRUCK, the Valley of the INN, KITZBUHEL, SALZBURG and BERCHTESGADEN. No coherent picture of a defense network emerges as yet from the reports available. Fortifications appear to have been built in the RHEIN-ILL gap, and around BERCHTESGADEN, while the ILLER and LECH Valleys emerge as storage areas. As to the methods of fighting the enemy will employ in this area, the best reference is to the activities of the French Maquis in the HAUTE-SOVIET region.

There are two versions of the exact delimitations of the area. The first allegedly came from a member of HITLER's staff and describes a REDOUBT of roughly oval shape with the contours touching the following localities: BREGENZ, IMMENSTADT, FUESSEN, SAULGRUB, BAD TOELZ, ROSENHEIM, SALZBURG, BAD AUSSEE, MURAU, HOCHGOLLING, and...

S E C R E T

KATSCHBERG, LIENZ, CORTINA, BOZEN, STEVIO. The second version allegedly comes from a wall map seen at the headquarters of Wehrkreis XVII at SALZBURG. The area shown on this map encompassed: HOHER YEEN, OBERSTDORF, FUSSEN, UNTERAMMERGAU, KOCHEL, BAD TOELZ, GMUND, NIEDERASCHAU, THEISENDORF, FREILASSING, SEEKIRCHEN, SCHARFBERG, DACHSTEIN, HOCH-GOLLING, GROSS-GLOCKNER, GROSS VENEDIGER, BRENNER, ZUCKERHUTL, MAUDERS, SILVRETTA, SCESA PLANA, LICHTENSTEIN. A glance at the map will show the strong defensive potentialities of this area, bordered as it is by chains of lakes and mountains.

There is a strong possibility that the plan for the REDOUBT envisages an outer and inner ring of defense. The location of the REDOUBT near the Swiss and Italian frontiers has a double advantage. KESSELRING's troops in ITALY will be able to retire northward into the ALPS and protect the southern defenses of the area. By being located near the Swiss border the Nazis will be in a position to maintain contact with their agents in SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, SPAIN, ITALY and scattered throughout the world, and should the REDOUBT collapse a quick exit by the leading characters through SWITZERLAND would be in the script.

4. TROOPS: The enemy at this point does not have sufficient forces to man the REDOUBT, in addition to fighting the war on both fronts. A source of unknown reliability very recently reported that Field Marshal MODEL opposed holding the ODER River line in the E while trying to protect the Northern plains of GERMANY in the W, because it would not leave sufficient troops to garrison the great national REDOUBT. If this report is true, it indicates that certain of the war criminals, such as MODEL, are already thinking about the manpower question in the light of garrisoning the last stronghold. A prisoner added some light to the subject by stating that the enemy intends to put ten SS Divs and fifteen assorted Divs in the REDOUBT. It is interesting to note in conjunction with this report that a considerable proportion of the SS Divs on the Eastern Front are on the southern sector in a good position to fall back on the REDOUBT, while the two SS Divs remaining in the W are also located on the southern part of the front. At the end of Feb reports indicated a considerable proportion of enemy troops in the ALLGAU, some as reserves, some from camps, and others recruited by the SS. Whether these are being concentrated as the garrison or as part of the replacement system is unfortunately impossible to determine. Other reports indicate that the SS troops are replacing Wehrmacht troops in the region. Unfortunately the volume of intelligence reports coming from the region makes it impossible to draw any conclusions as to the extent to which the enemy is at present garrisoning the REDOUBT.

5. SUPPLIES: According to one report the enemy has concentrated two years of supplies in the area, but that the Nazis hope to negotiate before that period elapses. It would appear unlikely, although not inconceivable, that under present conditions the enemy could spare sufficient supplies for the area to last more than a period of weeks or a few months. Other statements indicate a plan to move out all non-essential personnel from the region, leaving behind only farmers who can produce food for the supply of the garrison. One report received in Feb states that machines and power plant equipment usually earmarked for the interior of GERMANY have been sent instead to the VORARLBERG and the TYROL. VORARLBERG power plants have been ordered to retain a reserve supply of machines and tools in addition to normal stocks. Tinned food supplies and meat were reported arriving in the neighborhood of SALZBURG for storage in mountain depots, and evacuees can no longer be sent to the interior of the VORARLBERG except in transit, with points S of the ARLBERG railway closed even for transit purposes. The authenticity of these reports is naturally open to question.

6. CONCLUSIONS: There is strong evidence that the Nazi Party leaders and the war criminals are planning a "Valhalla of the Gods" in the BERCHTESGADEN region, and that the Nazi Party is already planning the underground movement to restore German nationalism after military defeat. It is logical to presume that the criminal enemy leaders will elect to go down fighting in their mountain eyrie rather than submit passively, inasmuch as they have very little future to look forward to once the German military machine is crushed. It remains to be seen how much of the Army following the example of the 1920 FREIKORPS will assist them in this fanatical last stand, and to what extent preparations of the REDOUBT and for Partisan warfare have progressed.

(Twelfth Army Group)

END

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: EDS
Date: 18 Mar 45
From: 171800A Mar 45
To : 181800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #190.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Against only light resistance our divisions cleared the last of the French territory in VI Corps zone of ey opposition. During the night 103 Div met some dug-in ey vic R028383 but overran the position quickly. 36 Div found only SA resistance in DIEFFENBACH (R0337) and 42 Div and 3 D.I.A. found their most serious opposition was mines and roadblocks. At 1130A hours 14 Armd Div, coming from the West, met elements of 3 D.I.A., attacking from the South, at NIEDERROEDERN (R2334). PWs captured by 14 Armd Div stated 257 Arty Regt left NIEDERBETSCHDORF (R1333) 172200 March for SELTZ (R2732).

That German resistance all along the border had collapsed was evidenced by the rapid and extensive advances of all divisions throughout the day. The close of the period found 42 Div elements in Germany at LUDWIGSWINKEL (Q9453) and SCHONAU (R0051) 103 Div on the high ground vic 0750 and 0950, 36 Div vic WISSEMBURG (R1548), 14 Armd Div approaching the LAUTER River and 3 D.I.A. in LAUTERBOURG (R3241).

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Continued lack of artillery fire suggests that bulk of enemy artillery, after the first day of our attack on the MOER River line, made headlong flight to dubious safety behind the Siegfried line. Early in period the EGUELSHARDT (Q8246) and BANUSTEIN (Q8344) areas were lightly shelled. Our advancing elements today drew only very light scattered fire, evidently coming from a thin screen of tanks or S.P. guns. Just at close of period the 42 Div Arty reported that their units vic Q942541 were receiving medium caliber counterbattery fire, possibly coming from guns located vic Q9761 and Q9862. As we approach the Siegfried line in our zone, artillery fire, including that from fixed defense, casemated guns, may be expected to increase.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. With the attack of the Corps gaining momentum, arty with the Corps was principally engaged in displacing forward and firing observed missions on pockets of ey resistance. Harassing fire during the night was placed on ey lines of communication and principal supply routes.

Visibility during the period was only fair, but Cubs were able to maintain continuous patrol flights during the daylight hours, as well as adjust on targets of opportunity.


A P-51 adjustment of 575 F. Bn on the crossroad south of WISSEMBURG had to be cancelled because of poor visibility at the time the plane was scheduled.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	36 IDA	Obs	Unobs
CB	6		
Per	15		
Veh	3		
MG & Mor	1		
Prop			5
Armor	5		
Def Fire	6		8
Har			2
Reg	10		
Misc			8
TOTAL	46	23	

14 ADA, 103 IDA, and 42 IDA report not available.



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(2) Corps Arty:

	13 FA Brig		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			6					
Veh			1					
Armor		1						
Har		6		8		8		2
Reg	2		3		3			
Misc						1		
Dest					1	2		
TOTAL	2	7	4	14	4	11	0	2

AOP Missions: 7

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn continued displacing guns forward supporting the attack of 103 Inf Div

630 TD Bn fired a full program of night harassing and interdiction missions.

All CO's displaced forward with the progress of advance.

636 TD Bn fired supporting assault missions for the 36 Inf Div. All units of the Bn were on the move making very good progress at the end of the period.

692 TD Bn providing direct fire support for the 42 Inf Div. All elements of this Bn continued to move forward with very good success.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

935543, 946538, 920543, 952535, 960515, 988499, BOBENTHAL (0951),
086453, 103443, 148418, HOFFEN (1536), ALTENSTADT (1747), WINTZEN-
BATH (2737), LAUTERBOURG (3241).

b. As units enter Germany, individuals in their personal correspondence are authorized to state that they are "Somewhere in Germany."

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S E C R E T

WAGNERIAN MISTS SHROUD NAZI SCHOOL

From the palaces and terraces of this "school for Fuehrers," at Vogelsang, which Adolf Hitler founded to train future generations of world masters, one could look out on a Wagnerian scene. This vast establishment ascends a serried mountain overlooking the cold, black Urfstausee and the steep round-topped mountains across an arm of the lake. It was a rainy, cloudy day and fog rose in writhing plumes from those other mountain tops. This slowly twisting fog gave a mysterious and almost horrible tone to the scene's beauty a scene worthy of a twilight of the gods and into which Valkyries might fittingly ride. It seemed all the more appropriate, too, since American soldiers who captured the school swarmed over the buildings and grounds that only a few months ago were sacred to youths who had dreamed of administering a conquered world. Today on the road up -- a fine broad highway along which Hitler used to motor on his frequent inspection trips to this place, which was his pride -- we passed a column of American tanks, with a dozen young American infantrymen roosting on each, clattering up to drive still farther back into his own country that enemy who would have ruled all countries.

In the library of Ordensburg-Vogelsang we found an album of photographs of German leaders taken on their visits here. They showed Hitler, of course, all over the place. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels smiling as he walked beside Marshal Hermann Goering and Heinrich Himmler. One showed Hitler and all his hierarchy standing on a balcony and looking out over that landscape that looked so ominous. The battle was still going on and on this same balcony we found a knot of American troops watching our heavy shells landing on German pillboxes across the lake near the base of that mountain of the Valkyries. One gun emplaced temporarily in part of this German fortress was firing colored tracer shells across the gloomy scene, -- the only flash of color in the whole landscape. The crowning touch of irony was the bedraggled tatters of a German banner still flapping in the wind.

This school is so big that one could spend many days exploring its dozens of great buildings. In the little time available today one could visit only a small part. It was bombed by our air force last fall to catch the Germans who, driven from France, had flocked to Ordensburg-Vogelsang for sanctuary. Our bombs destroyed or badly damaged a third of the school's many structures. The dormitories of the fledgling fuehrers which lie midway down the slope, were among the worst damaged parts. The big administration building, topped by a tower, was also badly pummeled, though the tower itself escaped. In this "tower of wisdom" Hitler had intended to deposit some day a sequel to "Mein Kampf" that would be the new testament of the Nazi religion. Other buildings here and there were smashed or damaged. But most of this astonishing monument to ruthlessness still remains. These great buildings spread over countless acres. They are of chipped brownstone masonry in irregular slabs over reinforced concrete. The walls are four feet thick. They are handsome buildings and in fairly good taste, though as graceless and overbearing as the "philosophy" that used to be taught within them. Administration buildings, a guest house, a huge mess hall and similar key structures are on the highest level. Some of them enclose a court, in the center of which is a circular fountain flanked by two German eagles scowling at each other. Here and there are harsh statues of over-muscled men and mounted Teutonic knights. The classrooms look much like those of any modern school, with practical desks and blackboards. Broad stone staircases lead down the hill to more classrooms and the students' dormitories. These dormitories, though partly wrecked, seem to have been comfortable -- not at all Spartan. Farther down toward the water are a drill ground, a game field, a gymnasium, a swimming pool and a large open-air theater. In the rear of the main buildings are an equitation ground and stables wherein there are still some fine horses. This establishment houses 2,000 students, but several partly constructed buildings show that it was to have been enlarged, perhaps in anticipation of an increased demand for Fuehrers that would have followed a German world conquest. These enlargements, of course, will not now be necessary.

The whole plant is undermined by great passages and chambers, but we had no time to visit these. The amazing thing is that the Germans let this lavish plant fall almost undefended, for all its symbolic value, when groups of our Ninth Infantry Division stormed into it. No fight was made in the school itself and, once the neighboring village of Wellseifen had been taken -- with surprisingly little trouble the school was abandoned. Only four German soldiers were found in it and they were quietly awaiting capture. But on the field approaching the school we saw one German lying dead on his back, his hands clutching at the sky. He was just a common soldier and had not been chosen to be a leader.

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: E. S.
Date: 19 Mar 45
From: 181800A Mar 45
To : 191800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #191.

LIBRARY
Field Artillery School,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Our troops advanced through light resistance earlier in the day and met ever increasing resistance toward the close of the period with contact generally across the front. Ey resistance increasing especially in L half of zone where contact with Siegfried positions was made. 42d Div found ey resisting with strong SA, MG and mortar activity N of LUDWIGSWINKEL vic (Q9554) to (Q9754). 103rd Div found the enemy fighting a delaying action in Siegfried positions and increased resistance vic NIEDERSCHLETTENBACH (R-0854) and REISDORF (R-1154) with ey, in bunkers, extremely alert. 36th Div troops occupied OBERHOFFEN (R-1346) without ey contact, failed to make contact in ROTT (R-1247) and cleared WISSEMBOURG (R1548) without resistance. Also entered OBEROTTERBACH (R-1752), without opposition earlier in period, a SA fight developed as outpost troops advanced through town. 14th Armd Div reported light and scattered contact -- also personnel horse-drawn vehicles, and some MT moving E on WISSEMBOURG-SCHWEIGHOFFEN Rd. Also an unknown number of MK IV tks in N edge of ALTENSTADT (R1724). Light contact developed at bridge in ALTSTADT (R1747) later in the period. 3 DIA reported river at LAUTERBOURG swollen and fire was received from across river.

Identifications were received of: 14th Co 466th AT Bn; Repl Bn of 257th Div, taken by 14th Armd Div; 1st and 3rd Co's, 58th Fortress MG Bn (vic ROTT (R1347); 405th AT Bn (vic ALTENSTADT); 4097th (?) VOLKSTURM Bn (vic NIEDER SCHLETTENBACH); 2d Co 52 GAF Bn (vic REISDORF.)

Fighter bombers reported (as of 1020A) that RR bridges at GERMERSHEIM, KAISERLAUTERN, SPEYER were all intact. Road bridge at KAISERLAUTERN was also reported intact.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Shelling along the Corps front was very light and scattered on our fwd elements during most of the period but increased somewhat during the afternoon as we neared the Siegfried line. Numerous adjusted missions by the AOP's and also photo coverage taken today shows that the ey arty, as was expected, has taken up positions generally along the Siegfried line. Apparently the bulk of the arty is on the plain to the N and NE of WISSEMBOURG. Med and Lt Arty shelled OBER-OTTERBACH when our troops moved in. SCHONAU (O151) and SCHESTAL (2143) were shelled lightly during the afternoon. The bridge in ALTENSTADT (1742) was the target for intermittent shelling and WISSEMBOURG was hit with 12 rd concentrations of 1t cal fire in the vic of the bridge throughout the afternoon.

EB List #28 accompanies this report.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Stiffening enemy resistance along the Corps front was met by increased fire from Arty with the Corps. Visibility remained good throughout the daylight hours and numerous missions were fired on ey personnel, vehicular convoys, tanks, strong points and btrys. AOP's were extremely active, both on patrol and firing missions.

The majority of Corps Arty displaced forward in support of the attack. At the end of the period all Corps Bn's were capable of firing well into Germany.

Arty of the 14 Armd Div fired on rocket guns firing from R215538. The area was well covered by our fire and personnel were seen running from the site. AOP observed another rocket btry firing from R212521. 14 Armd Div Arty also fired on two other btry's one at R215552, the other at R212552, with good results.

103 Div Arty AOP adjusted 995 FA Bn on a 4/G Btry at R17435456. 19 rds fired were reported as in the area.

6 guns, 4 of which were in casemates and 2 in the open, at R198564 were adjusted on by 995 FA Bn. Precision fire was placed on 3 of the casemated guns with hits on the casemates with T-105 fuze were reported. The Bn AOP made the adjustment.

103 Div requested 995 FA Bn to destroy a pillbox at R10365386. The request was honored with a total of 22 rds of which at least 2 were direct hits.

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b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		42 IDA		103 IDA (-1 Bn.) C	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			1	6	1	
Per	2		7	14	4	
Veh			2		2	
MG & Mor			2	12	1	
Prop	1	1	2	21	1	
Armor	3		2			
Def Fire			4			
Har				42		1
Reg	17		14		6	
Misc	8	5	3	9	2	
Prop		1				
TOTAL	31	7	37	104	17	1

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	13 Brig		35 Gp		405 Gp		46 Gp Not available
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	
CB	1				2		
Per	4						
Veh			2				
Har				10			
Reg	5		3		4		
Dest					2		
TOTAL	10	0	5	10	8		

ACP Missions: 19

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn continued direct support and displacing forward with the progress of the 103 Inf Div. Co "C" and "D" atchd to 411 and 409 Inf Regts respectively with "A" Co in Bn reserve. Elements of Rcn Co moving forward with the Inf, cleared the road leading N our of NOTHEIMER (R0452).

630 TD Bn moved forward with 13 FA Brig and gun Co's displacing with respective FA Bns. At the end of the period Co "A" had arrived at new positions, completed registrations, and preparing for night harassing missions.

636 TD Bn advancing and firing direct fire missions for 36 Inf Div. Co "A" supporting the 142 Inf Regt fired on 2 MG's silencing both. Co "B" with TD Plts atchd to Inf Bns of the 141st advanced rapidly covering the flanks and providing frontal support. All of Co "C" was atchd to 3rd Bn 143 Inf Regt for operations. Co "C" reported an oy half-track and pers. carrier destroyed on 17 Mar. A report received at the end of the period reported 40 PW's taken by units of the Bn during the afternoon of the 19th. Bn CP is is WISSEMBOURG (R1548).

692 TD Bn advanced with 42 Inf Div with TD companies in direct support of each Inf Regt. Rcn Plts provided route reconnaissance for advancing TD's and the Pioneer Plt repaired bridge at Q972483 and by-pass at Q968483.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

Q925547, Q952545, Q965543, Q975525, Q995537, R020534, R072541, R089549, R105535, R118544, R170523, R192516, R240455, R325420.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

ENEMY BATTERY LIST #28.

<u>CONC NO</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>ACC</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>NO/TYPE</u>
1855 UK	1680-5540	A	AP - 19 Mar	2/Lt
2053 UT	2024-5382	A	AP - 19 Mar	1/Lt
2059 TA	2060-5940	A	AP - 19 Mar	4/HAA
2153 UP	2160-5368	"	" "	6/Lt
2155 UV	2188-5576	"	" "	5/Lt
2159 TB	2140-5954	"	" "	4/HAA
2253 UO	2250-5387	"	" "	1/Lt
2254 US	2259-5498	"	" "	4/Lt
2354 UN	2395-5496	"	" "	4/Lt
2359 TC	2312-5924	"	" "	4/HAA
2459 TD	2440-5912	"	" "	4/HAA
2639 TE	2664-5904	"	" "	4/HAA
2752 UL1	2735-5269	"	" "	1/Med
2752 UL2	2745-5259	"	" "	1/Med
2752 UL3	2750-5260	"	" "	1/Med
2752 UL4	2760-5263	"	" "	1/Med
2754 UW	2739-5426	"	" "	3/Med
2754 UX	2785-5416	"	" "	3/Med
2852 UM	2834-5250	"	" "	1/Lt
2852 UR1	2811-5310	"	" "	1/Med
2852 UR2	2820-5304	"	" "	1/Med
2852 UR3	2834-5307	"	" "	1/Med
2852 UR4	2860-5305	"	" "	1/Med
2860 TG	2842-6086	"	" "	4/HAA
2952 UZ	2927-5278	"	" "	4/Med
2957 TF	2940-5760	"	" "	4/HAA

S E C R E T

2055 CH 2046-5523 A AP - 19 Mar Btry
2155 UT 2120-5518 AP - 19 Mar Btry

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #192

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

Date: 20 March 1945
From: 191800A Mar 45
To : 201800A Mar 45

During the night ey arty and nebelwerfers harassed WISSEMBOURG (1548) and at 0430A hours an unknown number of ey launched a C/A vic 960540 forcing 42 Div elements to withdraw temporarily. N of OBER-OTTERBACH (1752) 36 Div met S/A resistance and considerable mortar and MG fire.

Daylight found a thinly spread but determined ey holding strong defenses in the SIEGFRIED Line all along the Corps front. M-12's were used to good advantage by 103 Div in blasting its way down the REISDORF (1154) valley and 36 Div found little opposition in the hill mass vic 145525 although stubborn fighting was still taking place N of OBER-OTTERBACH. 102 Cav Gp reported a time bomb went off in NIEDERBRONN in a building where some of their troops were quartered.

14 Armd Div ran into increasing S/A resistance and fire from SIEGFRIED pillboxes as they occupied the SW edge of STEINFELD (2250). One pillbox via 224497 pinned down their inf in that vic in the early afternoon. 3 DIA made good progress through the BIENWALD and reached 318460 against lt opposition. French forces also occupied BERG (3442) and were proceeding N against moderate resistance at the close of the period. Because of the strongly hold SIEGFRIED pillboxes 42 Div and 103 Div were limited to only local gains.

SPOT NEWS: At 200840A March elements of 10 Armd Div reached KAISERLAUTERN (0295).

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. Ey arty fire on our fwd elements increased during the period and 1 case of attempted CB fire was reported when the 976 FA Bn received 7 or 8 rds of high burst over a btry position during the early morning hours. Arty in the 42 Div sector was extremely lt with only occasional harassing fire reported. Lt and med cal arty harassed BOENTHAL (0851) during the night and morning but most of the fire in that area was from 120mm mortars. The road junction at 117-538 was hit with 40 rds of 105 between 1240 and 1255 and the road junction at 152-462 was interdicted during the night by 88's. WISSEMBOURG was harassed during the night by lt cals but the shelling dropped off during the day. SCHWEIGHAUSEN and KAPSMAYER received continuous shelling during the afternoon from lt cals, nebls, & 210 rockets. Arty in the LAUTERSCHAM area 1257 and BERGZERN-OBERHAUSEN area was responsible for the bulk of the shelling received during the period.

AOP's were very active throughout the day and 38 locations were turned in, however due to the number of locations received only those confirmed by air photo will be added to the EB list and the rest will be published in the suspect list.

Shellrep total - 8

103 Div	42 Div	405 Gp	35 Gp	46 Gp
4	1	1	1	1

b. Changes to EB List #28:

(1) Additions:

CONC NO	COORDINATE	ACC	SOURCE	NO/TYPE
1158 CA	1154-5823	A	AP - 19 Mar	1/Med
1158 CB	1177-5815	A	AP - 19 Mar	1/Med
1257 CC	1241-5745	A	AP - 19 Mar	3/Lt
1258 CD	1220-5829	A	AP - 19 Mar	1/G
1258 CE	1213-5824	A	AP - 19 Mar	1/G
1258 CF	1236-5870	A	AP - 19 Mar	4/Lt
2053 CG	2008-5366	A	AP - 19 Mar	Rocket
2055 CH	2046-5523	A	AP - 19 Mar	Btry
2155 CI	2120-5518	A	AP - 19 Mar	Btry
2155 CK	2105-5580	A	AP, S & AP - 19 Mar	1/Med
2155 CL	2125-5585	A	-	1/Med
2157 CJ	219 - 572	A	AP - 19 Mar	-/G's
3848 TJ	3828-4846	A	AP - 19 Mar	3/Lt
3851 TI	3840-5103	A	AP - 19 Mar	6/HAA
3857 TH	3813-5785	A	AP - 19 Mar	4/HAA

SECRET

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S E C R E T

(2) Suspect List #28-1:

198 - 563	4/G	AOP
219 - 581	2/G	1 FOB - S
247 - 558	Nebels	AOP
2074-5672	4/G	AOP
219 - 572	3/Nebels	AOP
175 - 546	Nebel	AOP
1966-5658	4/G	AOP
212 - 521	Rockets	AOP
228 - 534	Rockets	AOP
241 - 539	Rockets	AOP

1 FOB sound turned in 2 "C" accuracy locations during the period, 1 a confirmation of 2155 CK and the other a suspect in the 2158 sq.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. Activity by arty with the Corps increased appreciably as resistance along the front stiffened. Visibility was only fair, being marred by clouds and occasional lt showers during the period, but AOP's were still able to maintain continuous patrols during the daylight hours as well as adjust on numerous targets. The majority of ey btries, located by cubs and neutralized by observed fire, were later TOT'd by Corps and Div Arty.

Harassing fire during the night was placed principally on ey btries and lines of communication.

13 FA Brig AOP adjusted on and neutralized 2 guns at R245-598 in the morning. In the afternoon the same guns were seen active again so more fire was laid down. Fires and explosions were started in the area.

4 guns in casemates at R206-555 were taken under fire by 36 FA Bn. 6 FA Cp AOP adjusted the bn on the individual casemates, and reported the rds right on the target. Effect on the casemates could not be determined.

6 FA Cp AOP also adjusted 36 FA Bn on a Nebel btry at R247-558.

At 1510A, 59 AFA Bn fired on ey guns in dugouts at R187-547. A total of 7 rds was placed on the area and the air observer who made the adjustment reported hits on the emplacements.

103 Div Arty reported it's bns fired on 2 ey btries, 1 at R1195-5850 and the other at R1250-5750, during the period. These locations were TOT'd heavily with all available arty later in the period.

AOP in 42 Div Arty adjusted an ey guns at R0508-5829. After the Div bn completed the adjustment 17 FA Bn was called for thickening fire. Later a TOT was placed on the area.

59 AFA Bn fired 190 rds on a veh and tank assembly at R159-493. 132 FA Bn FO adjusted on the target. At least 1 vehicle was KO'd.

8 target hits were registered on a pillbox at R228-499 by 194 FA Bn. 36 FA Bn AOP made the adjustment.

542 FA Bn scored 7 hits on a pillbox in 42 Div sector. A total of 46 rds was fired on this mission.

"A" Btry, 2 FA Obsn Bn, occupied its former sound base near SWEIGHOFFEN during the period. Coordinates are as follows: Mic #1 R1874-4868, Mic #5 R1623-4966, OP R185-500. The base was ready for occupation at 1230A.

"A" Btry, 2 FA Obsn Bn, also occupied a 3 OP flash base: OP 1 R1593-4609, OP 2 R1421-4720, and OP 3 R1503-5019. A fourth OP at R188-510 will be occupied shortly.

b. Missions fired:

(1) Div Arty:-

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1		8		3		6	3
Per	1		16		14	6	9	3
Veh			2		4	3	1	
Mt & Mor			6		7		4	
Prep		11					10	
Armor	2		1					
Def Fire			3	5				
Har		7		6		44		37
Reg	11		12		16		16	
Misc	7	13			3	11	5	2
Prop		5				1		
TOTAL	22	26	48	11	47	66	51	46

S E C R E T

(2) Corps Arty:-

Type	<u>13 FAB</u>		<u>35 Gp</u>		<u>46 Gp</u>		<u>405 Gp</u>	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	9	39	1	2			1	2
Per	3							3
Veh			1		Not Available			
Hrep		19						9
Har	1	10		18				5
Reg	17		4				6	
Misc				2				9
Dest							6	
TOTAL	<u>30</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>22</u>			<u>13</u>	<u>28</u>

AOP Missions - 52

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations:-

614 TD Bn continued direct support of 103 Inf Div. Co "B" and "C" remained atchd to same Inf Regts with "A" Co being reatchd to the 410th.

630 TD Bn fired various indirect missions during the period.

"A" Co supporting 938 FA Bn fired 2 counter-battery and 4 harassing missions expending 493 rds HE. "D" Co supporting 634 FA Bn fired 2 counterbattery, 2 preparation missions, and 2 registrations for a total of 373 rds HE. "C" Co expended 22 rds on new registrations.

636 TD Bn supported 36 Inf Div with direct fire missions. "A" Co fired 17 rds HE and MGs on a group of ey destroying 1 motorcycle and killing 5. "D" Co advancing with 141 Inf Regt, fired on ey personnel and captured 1 75mm AT gun, 4 81mm mortars and 24 PWs. "C" Co remained with 3d Bn, 143 Inf Regt in WISSENBURG (R1548).

692 TD Bn continued supporting the attack of 42 Inf Div with gun Co's working in direct support of each Inf Regt.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

Q970-538; Q990-536; R020-532; R070-541; R090-550; R120-544; R145-527; R165-523; R205-513; R215-499; R249-480; R300-450; R318-459; R345-435.

Schroeder

SCHROEDER
Ass't S-3

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

SECRET


Auth: CG VI Corps Arty

Init: CD-5

Date: 21 Mar 45

From: 201800A Mar 45

To: 211800A Mar 45



DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #193.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Across the entire Corps front the enemy continued to defend his heavily fortified positions in the SIEGFRIED LINE. At 1950A a 25 man patrol infiltrated our lines vic FISCHBACH (88-54). Also during the night, vehicles were heard moving N from FISCHBACH. The enemy was quick to fire on our patrols with SA and MG fire. Heavy mortar and arty fire fell in NIEDER-SCHLETTENBACH (08-54) during the early part of the period. Our troops vic DORRENBACH (16-54) received considerable SA and rocket fire. The high ground N of NIEDER-SCHLETTENBACH (08-54) remained a formidable line of resistance and the enemy maintained a strong point in REISDORF (11-54). Enemy artillery was generally light with a noticeable decrease in vic of STEINFELD (22-50) during the afternoon. There was considerable vehicular movement vic 10-58 which was taken under fire with good results. At 1300A a counter attack vic of STEINFELD by an enemy force estimated at one company was repulsed. Throughout the period, enemy resistance continued undiminished.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Enemy artillery activity increased somewhat during the period but most of the reported concentrations were under 10 rds. Rockets and nebelwerfers were responsible for a great deal of the fire received while the concentrations from mediums and lights were generally small. Most of the shelling was on fwd elements but some shelling was reported on our OP's and the CP of Rhondo in WISSENBURG was hit with 1 rd of 210 or larger during the early morning hrs. NIEDER-SCHLETTENBACH 0854 was harassed during the night and fwd elements of the 36 Div were also hit lightly. Arty activity picked up during the morning in the 14 Armd Div sector and shelling was reported from mediums, lights and rockets. One 24 rd concentration of nebel fire was received in STEINFELDT around noon. 88's and 105s harassed the 42 Div sector lightly during the morning but the fire slackened off during the afternoon. BOENTHAL reported 3 rds of hvy cal fire at 1300 hrs and was hit again during the afternoon by a lt concentration of 105's and another 3 rd concentration of hvy. Arty decreased sharply in the 14 Armd Div sector during the afternoon but SCHLEITHAL received some harassing fire from 88's. The high ground in the vic of 1549 was harassed by both lts and meds just prior to the close of the period.

Shellrep total: 44.

103 Div-11, 42 Div-4, 14 Armd Div-3, 36 Div-2, 13 Brig-3, 46 Gp-2, 2 FOB-15, 1 FOB-4.

b. Changes to EB List #28:

(1) Additions:

1953 CN	1945-5331	Z	1 FOB/F	3/Nebel
1956 CO	1952-5610	B	2 FOB/S	1/G
1957 CR	1946-5730	B	1 FOB/S	2/Med
2053 CQ	2484-5212	B	1 FOB/S	2/Lt
2554 CP	2518-5489	B	1 FOB/S	2/Lt
2654 CT	2650-5454	B	1 FOB/S	2/Med
2953 CM	2938-5320	A	AP-VICA	210/Rocket

(2) Amendments:

2582 UR1 to read 2583 UR1
2582 UR2 to read 2583 UR2
2582 UR3 to read 2583 UR3
2582 UR4 to read 2583 UR4

Both Sound and Flash were active during the period and 5 new sound locations and 1 new flash location was made in addition to confirmations of 1953 UT, 2053 CG, and 2852 UR. 11 sound locations and 3 flash locations were received during the period.

SECRET

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Arty activity increased sharply as the ey slowed our advance over the entire Corps front. An active counterbattery policy was pursued throughout the period. Corps Arty fired a total of 245 counterbattery missions, both observed and unobserved. Harassing fire during the night centered on the road net in front of the Corps.

AOP's were again active during daylight hours on patrol flights and firing missions. Visibility was only fair, being somewhat obscured by dust and smoke.

A preparation, including a counterbattery program, was fired in support of 14 Armd Div during the early morning hours.

Harassing fire was initiated on the KARLSRUHE bridge (R4148) over the RHINE during the afternoon. Guns of 938 FA Bn and 630 TD Bn were registered on the approaches to the bridge and commenced an interdiction program consisting of 300 rds per hour. Fr arty with 3 DIA is thickening this fire during the night.

In the afternoon, AOP's of the 103 Div Arty directed destructive fire on enemy vehicular columns moving before our advance. The AOP of 382 FA Bn adjusted the 384 FA Bn on traffic at R10035914. 6 vehicles were seen burning as a result of the fire at 1445A and 8 additional vehicles were destroyed there 15 minutes later by the same bn. 383 FA Bn AOP firing his own bn accounted for two vehicles at R08715671 at 1830A. 103 Div Arty AOP reported a direct hit on a NEBEL at R14605551 with the 384 FA Bn firing the mission.

A pill box, Q958546 camouflaged as a cabin was fired on by 995 FA Bn. Direct hits on the structure demolished the framework, exposing the pill box. Damage to the pill box could not be determined, but friendly tanks nearby started firing on it to neutralize it as the inf moved up.

141 FA Bn was adjusted on a column of trucks at R11256023. The Bn's AOP, which made the adjustment, reported one truck KO'd by a direct hit.

"A" Btry, 542 FA Bn, scored 6 hits with T-105 fuze on a pill box at Q946542. Results of the fire could not be determined.

"A" Btry Flash, 2 FA Obsn Bn, adjusted 155 FA Bn on a pill box, R20405292, and obtained two direct hits with no apparent damage to the pill box. 194 FA Bn was then called in but no hits were made.

A ground observer from 103 Div located a btry at R087568. He attempted to register his Bn on the location but was unable to continue with the adjustment. A TOT of 3 Corps Bns on the area silenced the btry.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	6	2	1		4	9	4	4
Per	17	5	12		13	17	4	5
Veh	1	1			5	4	3	1
MG & Mor			9		7	10		1
Prop	1	47	6	13		2	7	
Armor	1		2		2			
Def Fire		9	8	8				62
Har		1		12		83		
Reg	5		16		13		4	
Misc	1	3	18	11	16	10	1	1
Smoke			3				6	2
TOTAL	32	68	75	44	60	135	29	76

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	13 Brig		35 Gp		405 Gp		Groupm't Clifton	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	8	93		9	8	68	2	57
Per	2	2			1	14		5
Veh	2							9
Prep		15						
Har		39		34		9	4	36
Reg	3		5		1		1	
Misc	1	3	2	1				
Dest	8		2		4			
TOTAL	24	152	9	44	14	92	7	107

AOP Missions: 41

S E C R E T

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn supporting attack of 103 Inf Div. All gun companies are now well forward with respective Inf Regts. Rcn Plt had missions of holding important road junctions and clearing road blocks.

630 TD Bn continued supporting in arty role. Gun companies fired harassing missions and general reinforcing fires.

636 TD Bn fired direct fire mission for 36 Inf Div. Co "A" and "B" in direct support of 142 and 141 Inf Regts respectively, fired over 200 rds on pill boxes. The TD's fired mostly APCBDF with some HE severely damaging 2 pill boxes and damaged 10 more with many direct hits.

692 TD Bn continued direct support to 42 Inf Div with gun companies remaining with same Inf Regts. The Pioneer Plt cleared road blocks, mines, and improved roads.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

Q935-542, Q950-545, Q990-536, R020-532, R085-556, R115-552, R130-546, R160-544, R163-522, R214-512, R220-500, R255-485, R290-458, R318-462, R350-442.

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Asst S-3

S E C R E T

STATION LIST NO. 9

Hq VI Corps Arty

2d FA Obsn Bn

Btry A

Btry B

SIC

13 FA Brigade

1st FA Obsn Bn

Btry A

Btry B

SIC

6 FA Group

36 FA Bn (155 G)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

938 FA Bn (155 H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

46 FA Group

194 FA Bn (8" H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

257 FA Bn (155 H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

634 FA Bn (155 H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

630 TD Bn (3" G TD)

Co A (Atchd 938 FA)

Co B (Atchd 634 FA)

Co C (Atchd 155 FA)

35 FA Group

17 FA Bn (155 H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

976 FA Bn (155 G)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

Btry A, 995 FA Bn (8" H)

405 FA Group

141 FA Bn (155 H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

752 FA Bn (155 H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

COORDS

R131491

R121498

R166436

R043463

R121498

R151393

R151393

R244389

R185410

R151393

R193388

R217370

R218382

R252388

R243425

R215437

R219436

R212438

R238428

R160485

R151393

R148395

R154392

R166445

R134465

R132476

R133474

R134471

R148411

R167472

R162476

R153459

R151393

Platoon R210439

Platoon R208439

Platoon R163492

Platoon R166492

Platoon R169485

Platoon R173484

R016482

R014500

R022498

R023499

R015499

Q947483

Q963480

Q955485

Q969479

Q912465

R055445

R057481

R069476

R067482


R096485

R115460

R124462

R119473

R140491



450
600
900

400
600
500

300
700
500 & 600

600
700
800

800
800
600

100
200
5800

700
100
250
100, 550

500
400
400

400
6100
500

	COORDS	CL
405 FA Group (Cont'd)	R146491	
995 FA Bn (-Btry A) (8" H)	R123496	6300
Btry B	R129499	500, 200
Btry C	R107420	
Groupment CLIFTON	R145455	
514 FA Bn (155 G)	R151458	700
Btry A	R148461	200
Btry B	R154454	450
Btry C	R126470	
939 FA Bn (4.5" G)	R129468	6300
Btry A	R132473	400
Btry B	R129469	700
Btry C	R107420	
698 FA Bn (240 H)	R123429	800
Btry A #1	R118432	735
#2	R120430	100
Btry B #1	R118436	90
#2	R125468	530
Btry C #1	R125470	540
#2	R107420	
575 FA Bn (-A & C Btries) (8" G)	R222394	1350
Btry B #1	R221399	200
#2	R188402	
14 Armd Div Arty	R168481	
499 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	R227434	
500 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	R182432	
501 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	R152487	
36 Inf Div Arty	R172482	
131 FA Bn (105 H T)	R160503	
132 FA Bn (105 H T)	R153488	
133 FA Bn (105 H T)	R158485	
155 FA Bn (155 H)	R164488	800
Btry A	R166486	800
Btry B	R156477	100
Btry C	R158498	
59 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	Q954486	
42 Inf Div Arty	Q967486	
232 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q982478	
392 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q911507	
402 FA Bn (105 H T)	Q970486	
542 FA Bn (155 H)	Q957482	6300
Btry A	Q960489	6400
Btry B	Q960487	100
Btry C	Q984501	
69 AFA Bn (105 H SP)	R040449	
103 Inf Div Arty	R125488	
382 FA Bn (105 H T)	R092514	
383 FA Bn (105 H T)	R087513	
928 FA Bn (105 H T)	R084465	
384 FA Bn (155 H)	R081467	300
Btry A	R087461	300
Btry B	R084457	300
Btry C	R127487	
242 FA Bn (105 H T)	R105499	
Btry C, 991 FA Bn (155 G SP)		
Locations of AOP Fields:		
VI Corps Arty	R035317	
13 FA Brigade	R067343	
6 FA Group	R067343	
35 FA Group	Q980395	
46 FA Group	R113415	
405 FA Group	R115419	
14 Armd Div Arty	R184395	
36 Inf Div Arty	R114417	
42 Inf Div Arty	R007406	
103 Inf Div Arty	Q991375	

OFFICIAL:

Schneider
 SCHROEDER
 Asst S-3

BAEHR
 Brig Gen

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT: #194.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

On the Corps front close contact and heavy resistance continued in the central and east sectors, but troops of the 42 and 103 Divs advanced against only scattered resistance, consisting mainly of mines and roadblocks. A small ey counterattack vic R122550 at 0230A hours was repulsed by the 103 Div. While only slight resistance was offered to the 36 Div mopping up in DORRENBACH (R1654), heavy AW, arty, mortar, and rocket fire resisted their attempts to penetrate the SEIGFRIED positions in the WISSEMBOURG plain. Elements of the 103 Div encountered a large AT ditch at R125562 which delayed their movement forward for a short period.

The 14 AD encountered extremely strong enemy resistance in clearing STEINFELD (R2250). During the afternoon, elements of the 36 Div received heavy nebelwerfer and mortar fire vic OBEROTTERBACH (R1752). Long columns of enemy traffic were observed by 103 Div AOP vic BUSENBURG (R0759) and our arty was adjusted on them with devastating results. Task Force MONSABERT received harassing fire from ey rockets. The ey also attempted to infiltrate our positions vic BUCHELEERG (R3247).

In the early afternoon, unidentified P-47R bombed a gun position of the 194 FA Bn causing no damage. It was reported that fragments indicated the bombs were of American manufacture.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. The enemy's withdrawal on the Corp's left flank resulted in a total lack of artillery fire on the fronts of 42 and 103 Inf Divisions. However, the rest of the front was subjected to moderate shelling by light and medium calibers except for noticeably quiet periods between 1800-2000 and 0530 - 0800A hours.

There was a significant increase in nebelwerfer fire and it is apparent these are being used to cover the withdrawal of field pieces to the east.

In the French sector NIEDERLAUTERRACH (2640) and LAUTERBOURG (3241) were harassed intermittently throughout the period, but the most heavily shelled areas were OBER-OTTERBACH (1752) and STEINFELD (2250). 14 Arm'd Div's repeated attacks toward SCHAIDT (2551) brought a sharp reaction from light, medium and nebelwerfer positions between OBERHAUSEN (2355) and MINFELD (2952) and it is obvious the ey is defending fiercely against our attacks on the SIEGFRIED LINE regardless of the threat presented by the advance of 3rd Army elements to his rear.

Indicative of the volume of fire received were reports of two 60-70 round concentrations of nebelwerfer fire on OBER-OTTERBACH at 0405A and 1100A hours, 150 rds of 1t cal at the same place between 1120A and 1220A hours and especially heavy concentrations in STEINFELD during the afternoon and evening.

Shellrep total: 61.

14 Armd Div	36 Div	13 Brig	1 FOB	2 FOB
12	5	16	20	8

b. Changes to EB List #28:

(1) Additions:

2454 CU	2408-5408	A	2 FOB/S	4/G
2656 CV	2620-5655	B	"	1/G

(2) Amendments:

2639 TE	to read	2659 TE
2053 CQ	to read	2452 CQ

Suspect List #28-2:

1944-5327	2 FOB/F	1/Nebel
1942-5497	AOP	1/G
1975-5653	2 FOB/S	1/Lt
2043-5461	2 FOB/S	2/Nebel
2056-5567	GOP	4/G
235-541	AOP	4/G
273-517	"	1/G
274-532	GOP	1/Med
274-545	1 FOB/S	2/Lt or Med
2940-5425	"	1/Med

S E C R E T

b. Changes to EB List #28 Suspect List #28-2 (Cont.)

2990-6086	1 FOB/S	1/Med
301-614	"	1/Lt
315-500	"	1/Med
3178-5124	"	4/G
343-510	AOP	1/FAA
3665-3428	1 FOB/S	1/Nebel
3720-3365	"	1/Med

Wind conditions were ideal for sound ranging. 2 FOB reported 19 sound locations and 3 flash and 1 FOB reported 11 sound and 3 flash. Old locations confirmed were UW, UX, UL, CH, CO, CR, UN, UK and CP.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The artillery with the Corps continued to support the attack by firing continuously during the period. In an effort to hamper enemy road movements a very heavy harassing program was fired on the enemy lines of communication during the night. A total of 4995 rds (excluding Div Artys) consisting of 240H, 155H, 155G, 4.5"G, and 8"H ammunition harassed the Germans on the above program. A preparation, including a counterbattery program, was fired in support of 14 Armd Div during the early morning hours. The interdiction program of 300 rds. per hour was completed on the KARLSHRUE bridge and AOP and Tac. Recon. planes found the west span of the bridge blown and in the river during the morning.

The visibility during the period was excellent and the AOP's had a field day as the Corps Arty AOP's fired 78 missions on various types of targets.

The 752 FA Bn took personal control of the traffic situation on the BUSENBERG - BIRKENHARDT road and fired numerous missions on vehicles from 1140A to 1505A. The AOP did the observing and a total of 104 rds was fired and 19 vehicles were definitely destroyed.

The 35 Gp took over the traffic control situation on the BUSENBERG - DAHN - ERFWEILER road where the fire possibilities of the 752 FA Bn ended. The AOP adjusted the 976 FA Bn and 17 FA Bn on critical points along the road and fired 452 rds and definitely destroyed 15 vehicles while damaging many others.

The 155 FA Bn reported 2 direct hits on a Nobelwerfer at R1871-5502 at 1715A. This mission was observed by 155 FA Bn AOP and 32 rds was fired.

The 132 FA Bn FO started a large fire in the position area of 2 Nobelwerfers at R2080-5526. This Bn fired 43 rds at 1405A.

The 141 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on 2 enemy vehicles towing a field gun at R0641-5909 at 1115A. A total of 36 rds was fired and a direct hit uncoupled the gun permanently from the towing vehicle.

In the 103 Div sector targets were plentiful and the Div Arty kept a complete box score of the day's activities, which is as follows:

<u>TYPE TGT.</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Vehicles	17	99
Arty	9	15
Tanks or SP's	9	5

The 194 AOP adjusted his Bn on a bldg at R224-538 and reported 7 direct hits and caused a huge explosion and the bldg was left burning.

During the period 1 FA Obsn Bn sound base identified an enemy btry in the R3733 sq as responsible for shelling in the Groupment MONTSAERT sector. As the location was out of traverse at the time, the btry was set up as a bombing mission. Sound plots on the bombing gave a center of impact 500 yds from the target.

III/65 RAA was shifted and an AOP adjusted the fire on the enemy gun. Over 100 rds were used in fire for effect and the battery was silenced.

A successful P-51 adjustment of the 575 FA Bn (8" G) near KARLSHRUE was completed during the afternoon in preparation for harassing military installations in the town during the night.

S E C R E T

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b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	14 ADA		36 IDA		42 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			28		1	4	4	2
Per	5		11		8	4	17	9
Veh	2				2		31	
MG & Mor	3		1			4	3	
Prop		45	6	4	5	66		
Armor			1				2	
Def Fire			3	3		3		
Har		5		43		38	1	47
Reg	12		16		13		6	
Misc	9	4	3	39	2	1	5	
Prop				3				
Dest			5					
TOTAL	31	54	74	92	31	120	69	58

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	13 Brig		35 Gp		405 Gp		Groupm't Clifton	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	9	58		1	3	3	5	26
Per	4	6	3				2	12
Veh			8		16	21		
Prop		39						
Har		66		25		27		55
Reg	8				5		6	
Misc							2	
Dest	11		1					
Interdiction		2						
TOTAL	32	171	12	26	24	51	15	93

AOP Missions: 78.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn continued direct support to 103 Inf Div. Gun companies have all Plts forward and are keeping close contact with respective Inf Regts and Bns.

630 TD Bn was alerted and preparations being made to revert to Army control. During the period the Bn fired 89 harassing, 9 counterbattery, 6 preparations, and 5 observed missions. Co "A" fired 4180 rds HE, "B" Co 1569 rds HE, and "C" Co 450 rds HE for a grand total of 6199 rds.

636 TD Bn fired assault fire missions on pill-boxes and enemy installations in support of 36 Inf Div. "A" and "B" companies with one Plt of "C" Co fired approximately 900 rds of 90mm APCBDF, HE, and HE W/T 105 fuse on pill-boxes. Approximately 25 pill-boxes were fired on with ranges 75-1000 yds. This firing produced very good results with many of the pill-boxes being severely damaged and casualties inflicted. One TD of "A" Co was hit by a shell (estimated 77mm) from one of the pill-boxes, however, TD was not penetrated and can be repaired by Bn maintenance.

692 TD Bn supported attacks of 42 Inf Div with direct fire missions. Co "C" TD's fired on 2 pill-boxes expending 18 rds with 17 direct hits. One Plt of 692 was atchd to 14 Arm'd Div for operations during the period.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

Q970-620, R030-610, R092-572, R145-576, R170-560, R205-514, R230-504, R280-488, R317-462, R347-440.

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Asst S-3

S E C R E T

(Source: G-2 Report, Hq, 103 Div, 20 Mar 45.)

NON-FRATERNIZATION

In an effort to discover the reactions of the German population to our non-fraternization policy, the Psychological Warfare Branch sent investigators into a number of occupied communities, including the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN, STOLBERG, ROETGEN, KOHLSCHIED, ALSDOFF, BARDENBERG, HERZOGENRATH, MERKSTEIN and WUERSELEN. Since there was very little variation in the reports, the following is an attempt to put together in general fashion what was discovered.

The first and most startling fact that emerges is, that a number of the German civilians do not know about the order, or know of it purely by hearsay or by noting that the troops do not fraternize. Where they do know of it, they regard it as an order to the troops only and as not binding on themselves should the troops disregard it. In this, at least in many cases, they are legally correct, since the investigators do not report a single instance where the civilian population has been officially apprised of the order or of penalties for its infraction. Indeed, one STOLBERG woman was arrested on the charge of entertaining American troops and was acquitted on her defense counsel's plea that no non-fraternization order had been published in the town.

Very few indeed of those civilians who know of the order, know, or admit to knowing the real reason for it. In most cases they affect to believe that it is merely a security measure in a tactical situation and assume that it will be lifted as the front moves on. Occasionally it is said to have been introduced to prevent looting but in a couple of cases the people interrogated said that it was to facilitate plundering. One or two suggested that it was to prevent the spread of VD. By far the majority of those who know of the order, resent it. The population which has remained behind, wishes to be known as anti-Nazi and states that it views the Americans as "liberators" to whom it would like to show friendliness. There is nowhere in the reports any trace of bitterness against the Americans as enemies. Indeed the reaction of one middle-aged woman with two sons in the German army, who stated that she could not understand why she should not give the boys a cup of coffee, that she would like people to do as much for her own sons, is fairly typical.

It would seem that on the whole, the order is reasonably well obeyed by both troops and civilians, except where sex raises its ugly head. It is the biological urge which makes both Military Government Officers and some of the older heads among the civilians wonder whether the order can be strictly enforced too long. The young ladies of SAARLAUTERN area are likely to pout if their smiles are not answered and it would seem that here and elsewhere they have not always had reason to pout. It is reliably reported that in one instance two men returned from the front for rest found the arms which had previously rested them, already occupied. They gave a warning that MPs were on the prowl, waited until their rivals had disappeared and had their rest.

There has been only one case reported of deliberate and flagrant violation of the order by civilians. A Military Government Officer reports that in ROTT where a charming woman would deliberately attract officers and then watch the results with glee. On the whole, the civilian population has grudgingly accepted the rule and nothing even approaching "tension" has been found.

Military Government Officers think that the order has reduced any contact with civilians to a minimum and that it is working fairly well. They feel, however, that it would be far easier to enforce if its provisions were not unilateral, if "resting" of troops of troops in German towns were reduced to a minimum and if, where billeting is necessary, an "off-limits" area is established and civilians kept to it. This latter solution has been tried in some places, with varying success. Laundering of clothes seems to be the most common occasion and excuse for intercourse with the population. This was solved in one instance by the establishment of a laundry in a community project. But the consensus seems to be that the difficulties of enforcement will grow as we get deeper into GERMANY and as we take larger towns. It is clear from the reports that with front-line troops the order is frequently disobeyed, so that as the front moves on it seems to be the population that a new and repressive order is being enforced. Certainly at present, the weakest point in our armor against fraternization is the lack of information of the civilian population and the lack of sanctions against civilian violators. It would also appear that our own troops have by no means been properly

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indoctrinated on the subject and that an intensive program to acquaint them with the reasons for our policy will be necessary if any intelligent cooperation is expected from them during an inevitably wearisome occupation. The rest and later the furlough problem will also need a great deal of intelligent thinking, as will entertainment of the troops. On the other hand, it is also evident that so far, at least, it has not been made clear early enough or definitely enough to the German population that we come as conquerors and not as friends. Hence, they tend to resent not only non-fraternization, but also the fact that we do not feed them. A number of the Germans seem to think that they are to be Uncle Sam's nephews.

(ALL UNITS WILL BE ADVISED AS TO THE MEANING AND INTENT
OF THE WORDS NON-FRATERNIZATION) (SHAFF)

S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #195

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

Except for continued resistance in SCHAIDT (2551) and in the BIENWALD (3047) the collapse of ey opposition on the Corps front was rapidly followed up by our troops. 42 Div advanced against only scattered resistance to the 60 northings in their zone and reported the capture of 1200 PWs for the twenty-four hour period ending 230600 March. 103 Div advanced rapidly from vic REISDORF (1159) to KLINGENMUNSTER (2060) by daylight and at the end of the period their Task Force RHINE had pushed due E some 15 kms to HEILXHEIM (3460). 36 Div also occupied BERGAZABERN (1955) during the early morning hours, then struck E through the SIEGFRIED Line positions to WINDEN (2755) from where they turned SE to MINTELD (2952); at the close of the period they were moving toward the RHINE against little opposition.

14 Armd Div's 0400A hour attack on SCHAIDT was temporarily held up by road-block covered by AT fire in E end of town, but during the day their advance cleared both SCHAIDT and FRECKENFELD (2751).

At 1300A hours, 42 Div troops met 10 Armd Div (3 Army) elements vic 105632.

Among the great quantity of materiel destroyed and captured, perhaps the most interesting was a btry of 105mm G/Hows, complete with equipment, captured by 410 Inf vic 104586.

The end of the period found the ey in full retreat on the Corps front, with 103 and 36 Divs rapidly approaching the RHINE and attempting to cut off the German retreat over the ferry sites vic 456567 and 472659.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. Apparently in an effort to shoot up their ammo rather than abandoning it or risking capture with their guns, the ey arty increased its activity and volume of fire during the period, particularly in the night and morning, but thereafter the shelling died out. In concentrations varying from 10 to 30 rds, lt and med cals, and Nobelwerfers, harassed the center of the Corps front, particularly the SCHWEIGEN, WISSEMBURG, SCHEIGHOFEN, and ALTENSTADT areas during the hours of darkness. Other harassing fire was also reported in the woods E of STEINSELTZ and in vic of SCHEIBENHARDT. Until 1115A the activity continued rather brisk, with moderate harassing concentrations being reported in the NIEDERLAUTERRACH - SCHIEBENHARDT-NEEWILLER area. The only fire reported in the western sectors during the day fell in vic of ALTENSTADT and S. of it, and consisted of both lt and med cals. Just at the end of the period the BERG area drew 16 rds lt cal harassing fire.

Preliminary reports indicate that a considerable number of guns, of all cals up to and including 150mm, have been abandoned or knocked out on the roads as a result of our air and arty bombardment of the German routes of retreat.

Shellrep total - 63

36 Div	14 AD	13 FAB	Gp Clifton	6 Gp	46 Gp	1 FOB	2 FOB
7	6	12	2	6	6	20	3
405 Gp							
1							

In view of the apparent collapse of major resistance W of the RHINE and rapid flight of disorganized ey elements, all locations on EB List No. 28 and its additions are deleted.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. At the start of the period it was evident that the ey was attempting to withdraw troops and supplies from the SIEGFRIED positions; so during the night an extremely hvy harassing program was carried out on the ey lines of communication. The 698 FA Bn continued to fire into German held towns along main supply routes while the smaller cal weapons shot road runners. A total of 3302 rds of mixed cal ammo was used on the program.

Commencing at 0500A the Corps Arty participated in the preparation fired in support of the attack of the 14 Armd Div. Also a counterbattery program was fired

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during the preparation and the ey btries were harassed for two additional hours. As the front entirely collapsed, the AOP's took the retreating personnel and vehicles under fire. In the morning the 13 FA Brig AOP adjusted the 976 FA Bn on a column of vehicles and personnel moving E on the road from ROHRBACH to HERXHEIM; this road was again worked over in the afternoon when vehicles again jammed this road. Later in the morning the 36 FA Bn AOP adjusted his bn on an ey horse-drawn column at 300526 and numerous hits were recorded on the column. The 6 Gp AOP continued the good work by firing on the road net in the BIENWALD forest on ey guns, vehicles, and personnel at 1600A and for the next two hours this observer adjusted the 976, 17 and 938 FA Bns on these remunerative targets. Considerable destruction was caused in this area as concentrations were fired at R315-503, R315-506, R326-508, R343-518, R367-506 and R357-480 and most of the time the observer was carrying on two missions at the same time. The 17 FA Bn AOP then took over and adjusted the 17 and 976 FA Bns on personnel and vehicles on the vic of R400-550 as the area was crowded with krauts attempting to reach the E bank of the RHINE.

During the heat of the battle it was impossible to keep an accurate record of the destruction caused but upon interviewing the observers the following is a conservative estimate of the damage caused:

- 7 vehicles with guns attached were hit and abandoned
- 12 horse-drawn vehicles with guns " " "
- 5 guns were destroyed with direct hits
- 85 vehicles were destroyed and left burning

Large numbers of dead personnel on roads and fields
A total of 3000 rds of ammo was fired by the 976, 17 and 938 FA Bn which continued to help keep the ey in utter confusion.

b. Summary of Missions Fired:

(1) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	3	47		20		1
Per	6				1	2
Veh					5	
Prep	2	44				
Har		46		59		
Reg	4		1		2	
Misc	5					
Dest	3		1			
TOTAL	23	137	2	79	8	3

Total AOP Missions - 27

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

a. Mission and attachments:

- 610 TD Bn (90mm) SP - Atchd to 4th Inf Div for operations.
- 614 TD Bn (3") towed- No change.
- 630 TD Bn (90mm) SP - Relieved from atachment to 13 FA Brig and assignment to VI Corps.
- 636 TD Bn (90mm) SP - No change.
- 692 TD Bn (90mm) SP - No change.

b. Operations:

- 610 TD Bn atchd to 4th Inf Div. Assembled vic Div areas on 6 hr alert status.
- 614 TD Bn moved CP to NOTHWEILER (R0452). Co "C" reld from atachment to 411 Regt and reverted to bn control. The 1st section of "C" Co fired and neutralized several pillboxes and bunkers vic R075-544 and R076-543. This direct fire was very effective, resulting in 33 ey occupants surrendering to our inf. 2d Rcn Plt was atchd to Task Force RHINE.
- 636 TD Bn reld from atachment to 13 FA Brig and assembled vic HUNS-PACH for motor march.
- 636 TD Bn continued direct support to 36 Inf Div with TD Cos supporting respective Inf Regts. TD's made very good progress with our advancing Inf during the period, however, a firing report was unavailable.
- 698 TD Bn supported the 42 Inf Div during the period by helping to mop-up isolated ey pockets. The Bn CP group, Rcn, and reserve elements were moving to an assembly area vic R0458.

Evans
EVANS

Units: 3rd Bty, 628th Heavy Artillery Bn.

4th Bty, 2nd Bn, 26th Heavy Werfer Regiment, 20th Volks Werfer Brigade

Captured by: 36th Division

Organization: The 628th Heavy Arty Bn is an independent Army unit. It consists of 3 Batteries, each Battery having 3 - 210mm Hows. The 26th Heavy Werfer Regt consists of 3 Bns. Each Bn has 5 Batteries (3 firing batteries, 1 H.Q. Bty and 1 Supply Bty). The 1st Bn is supposed to have some 150mm Nebelwerfer and some 300mm Nebelwerfer exact relationship unknown to PW; the 2nd and 3rd Bns are made up of 300mm Nebelwerfer exclusively. Each Bty has 6 6-barrel Nebelwerfer.

Weapons: All 210mm hows in the 628th Hvy Arty Bn are of newer model and completely motorized. They are pulled by 12 and 18 ton prime-movers. As an average it takes about 1½ hours to get the guns out of firing position and ready to move and about 2½ hours to set them up. Recently each gun had a supply of about 60 to 80 rounds per day. The 26th Hvy Werfer Regt is also completely motorized. It was supposed to have all tracklaying vehicles as prime movers, had, however, heavy trucks allotted to them instead. The range and weight of projectiles for the different caliber Nebelwerfers are as follows:

150mm Nebelwerfer	range	7.8 kms	weight	appr.	60 lbs
210mm "	"	7.8 "	"	"	90 lbs
300mm "	"	4.5 "	"	"	380 lbs

Locations: 3rd Bty, 628th Arty Bn was located near BERGZABERN (as of 21 Mar) and had orders to move by afternoon 21 Mar. Exact location of new position unknown to PW.
4th Bty, 26th Hvy Werfer Regt was located vic. 16995480 (as of 21 Mar morning). 4 Werfers were put out of action by near misses from planes, which smashed and bent the barrels.

Movements: 3rd Bty, 628th Hvy Arty Regt was committed near DRUSENHEIM (as of beginning of January). Later they moved into the HAGUENAU Forest where they were subjected to pretty accurate counter battery fire, received, however, no direct hits. On March 11 they were pulled back into the Westwall, near BERGZABERN and 2 days later sent up again to vic WOERTH. According to PW this was due to change in Supreme Command from Rundstedt to Kesselring. From WOERTH the Bty moved back again to BERGZABERN.
4th Bty, 26th Hvy Werfer Regt, was near BITCHE (as of beginning of February) moved from there to BAERENTHAL and MIETESHEIM, (where they stayed in rest area for 2 weeks) and went on to DOERRENBACH.

Strength: 3rd Bty, 628th Hvy Arty Bn - 120mm - about 65 men combat strength
4th Bty, 26th Hvy Werfer Regt - 60 men. Each gun had a crew of 1 NCO and 6 EM.

Personalities: 3rd Bty, 628th Hvy Arty Bn - C.O. - Capt. Kraemer
----- " C.O. - Capt. Rummert
4th Bty, 2nd Bn, 26th Hvy Werfer Regt - C.O. Capt. Lindner
----- " " C.O. Capt. Troeger
----- " C.O. Maj. Comichau

Miscellaneous: 4th Bty, 26th Hvy Werfer Regt, had very little ammunition in last few days. One shipment of 30 rounds was delivered to them without fuses and had to be sent back. Demolition charges (called Z 85) were ready to be put into barrels in order to explode them and put the guns out of commission.
According to PW the 25th Heavy Werfer Regiment was also committed with the 26th Hvy Werfer Regt near DOERRENBACH, exact location unknown to PW.

VI Corps Arty, IPW Team
Interrogated by
S/Sgt Paul J. Balog

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

US ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: 0328
Date: 24 Mar 45
From: 231800A Mar 45
To : 241800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #196

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

All organized ey resistance ceased as elements of the VI Corps smashed through strongly fortified positions in the SIEGFRIED LINE. Confusion spread like wildfire as the ey sped toward the one escape route over the RHINE east of GERMERSHEIM (R46-69). At the beginning of the period, roads jammed with ey vehicles and personnel, provided lucrative targets for the artillery units with the VI Corps.

Throughout the period, isolated spots of resistance were wiped out, and the ey surrendered in large groups in all portions of the Corps sector. The 14 AD encountered AW fire at HERXHEIM (R35-61) while the 36 Div suppressed MG fire and a small group of ey infantry at HORDT (43-63). An AOP of the 14 AD reported GERMERSHEIM Bridge blown at 1040A while ey personnel and vehicles were reported using a ferry at R475-680 at 1330A by a 36 Div AOP.

In the afternoon the 14 AD pressed on toward GERMERSHEIM (R46-69) where resistance consisting of SA, AW, mortar and arty fire was encountered. Other elements of the Corps continued mopping up operations while some artillery units found themselves escorting "Kraut" deserters to PW cages.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Except for a few very light and scattered concentrations on our advancing columns, enemy artillery activity was practically non-existent. In the morning the BERG area and roads along the west bank of the river drew a few rounds from light and medium caliber guns situated vic 4841 and 3841, but this is believed to be only sniping by a few casual guns, which probably have very recently crossed the river from this side.

Among guns abandoned by the Germans are four 152mm Russian gun hows, still in their well prepared, semi-permanent emplacements behind the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses vic 208-558. One gun has been destroyed by its crew, but the others appear to be in fair condition. This position, one of our known locations, had received accurate CB fire and several close bomb hits, but depth of gun pits and communication trenches, plus casemates for the crews, enabled it to remain comparatively unscathed, however, the accuracy of our continued harassing fire apparently made it impossible for the guns to be withdrawn.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

During most of the period the Corps Arty was "on wheels" attempting to get road clearance for movement forward. Due to the Infantry Divisions mopping up the area in sector west of the RHINE, the Corps Arty did practically no firing; however, during the night the 13 FA Brigade kept ferry sites across the RHINE river "hot" with arty fire. The 36 FA Bn was able to get two btrys forward during the day to the vicinity of KANDEL (3353) in order to fire on targets well into the German "super soil."

The SIC of the 2 FOB will open vicinity SCHWEGENHEIM (4274) at 251200A.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations:

610 TD Bn attached to 4th Inf Div Arty remained in assembly area and continued necessary maintenance.

614 TD Bn advanced forward with the progress of the 103 Inf Div covering the left flank of Div's sector. All units of the Bn helped in mopping up isolated enemy pockets.

636 TD Bn continued direct fire support to elements of the 36 Div. Early in the period many assault missions were fired on ey pill boxes with excellent results. Over 60 pill boxes were fired on for two periods which yielded many PW's for the Infantry. As this period closed all units were busy mopping up.

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S E C R E T

692 TD Bn continued fire support to Inf units of the 42 Div early in the period. Later in the period units were occupied in capturing and collecting PW's.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported on the West bank of the RHINE at points along the Corps front.

EVANS
Asst S-3

ANNEX 1 TO PERICDIO REPORT #196

a. How Good is German Intelligence

The answer appeared at III Corps in the form of an Order of Battle Chart of Army Group "B", dated 11 January 1945. The map covered almost the entire Western Front and gave the breakdown of the TWENTY-FIRST, TWELFTH and SIXTH US ARMY Groups, by armies, Corps, Divisions, and included cavalry groups. G-3 declared the maps almost entirely accurate as to names of units and approximately 90 per cent accurate as to Command Posts of units. Details of maps went so far as to give rear area and operational reserves.

Recent capture of enemy interrogators revealed that in their opinion 50 per cent of Americans taken prisoner, give only name, rank and serial number. But the other 50 percent talk.

G-2 information is disseminated in daily bulletins issued by Army G-2. They cover enemy activity, capabilities, identifications made, air activity, and captured and destroyed enemy equipment. Identifications are mostly given down to regiments. Many reports are made on movements of our units, all within one or two days after observation. Evaluation is usually accurate. The speed with which reports on movements sift through to the enemy cannot be due to prisoner of war statements only. It gives further proof of the thoroughness of operations of the net of enemy agents.

(Source: III US Corps)

b. Bridge Sabotage

The vital importance and extreme vulnerability of the bridge that has been secured across the RHINE makes it necessary that every precaution be taken to guard this important installation.

One trick used in the past with success by the enemy that must and can be guarded against is the blowing of railway and vehicular bridges by so called "GAMM SWIMMERS." Swimmers of this type attacked the railway and road bridges at NIJMEGEN on 29 September 1944, and are known to operate in the following manner:

They are clothed in woolen undergarments covering the body from neck to top; over this they wear skin-tight rubber suits which are fitted tightly at the neck and wrists and are attached to the shoes so that the leg covering is all of one piece. Attached to their shoes are large rubber fins approx 12" long and approx 9 - 10" wide at the end. Tight fitting caps are worn on their heads over which are camouflage nets or veils to lessen the likelihood of their heads and faces being observed from above. Due to the use of this camouflage it is difficult for bridge guards to recognize the swimmers from above, but they can be discovered by observers at water level. From above these swimmers have the appearance of a log floating down stream while the net presents the appearance of moss. The swimmers wear a breathing apparatus which will permit them to remain under water for one half hour during active work and for one hour if not engaged in strenuous exercise. It is possible that these swimmers are also armed with water-tight pistols for use on land, inasmuch as they have to walk to the water in their rubber suits and emerge after operations.

The type of mine used by "Gamm Swimmers" is $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3 meters long and 40 - 45 cm in diameter with semi-spherical ends. A flexible wire hand-rail runs around the mine lengthways and is useful in attaching tow ropes forward and aft. The mines as a rule are trimmed in such a manner that only 5 - 8 cm is visible above water. A firing clock is started by pressing a knob or turning a pin; the mine can be set from 0-10 hours in $\frac{1}{4}$ hour sets. Operations usually are planned so that after the mines have been placed the swimmers will leave the river at a spot designated by the firing of flares.

Captured "Gamm Swimmers" have agreed that the most effective deterrent to their activities is the placing of underwater barbed wire rolls around bridges and other targets liable to attack. The swimmers dread the tearing of their suits because of the difficulty of swimming in a torn suit, and secondly because they are quickly overcome by cold. They also greatly fear hand grenades or small depth charges dropped at irregular and unpredictable intervals. Other means of combating these swimmers are by booms and nets placed both up and down stream from the bridges.

S E C R E T

swimmers are able to submerge their mines beneath a boom but cannot pass them through a net suspended below the boom, and the mine is too heavy to lift above a properly placed boom.

Another method which may be used by bridge saboteurs is the one man submarine. These are not affected by current which does hamper "Gemm Swimmers", and can also operate in comparatively shallow depths. This submarine can also be successfully combated by the use of lights, depth charges and booms supporting submarine nets. (Source: III US Corps, 203 CIC Detachment)

c. Bunker Blues

An American interrogator, ensconced in a captured enemy bunker with its telephone still intact, was able to overhear the following choice bit of inter-bunker diplomacy:

Bunker No. 7: This is Sgt Kaiser from bunker No. 4. Our bunker received a direct hit from an American large calibre weapon. 3 men were killed, including Sgt Noyes and Sgt Seeman, forward observers, and the bunker is on fire.

CP to No. 7: As soon as the fire is out, reoccupy Bunker No. 4. I don't care if there's only a shell left - reoccupy it! We can't afford to lose that position, it would leave a hole in our loop.

Jpl Schwartz: The next bunker to mien has a large hole in it from an American shell.
Bunker No. 9
to CP:


CP to No. 9: That can't be true, artillery can't penetrate the bunkers.

No. 9 to CP: I can see the hole from just outside my bunker.

CP to No. 9: I don't see how you can talk like that. It isn't possible, and besides it's bad for morale for you to talk that way. Let's not hear any more about it.

(SOURCE: G-2, 14 Armd Div)

S E C R E T



DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #197.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

a. All organized resistance West of the RHINE ceased and 14 Armd, 36 and 71 Inf Divs were concerned solely in mopping up operations. GERMERSHEIM (4569) was the scene of some sniper fire and heavy mortar fire. The artillery fire on the town from East of the RHINE continued during the night but slackened off during the day.

Equipment of all types and description is being rounded up. 4 x 88 mms DP and 4 x 20 mm AA guns in good condition were found vic 335608. The Corp PW count since the start of the 15 March offensive is over 16,000.

In the afternoon 36 Div reported a short SA fight vic 455643 with a small group of enemy all of whom were captured.

b. Electric Generating Stations:

We have been advised by G-2, Hq, Seventh Army, that high explosives including clams and explosive filled steel oxygen cylinders of welding type have been found in German electric generating stations. Evidently, they are to be activated by stay behind agents. All public utilities, sub-stations, water pumping plants and coal gas generating stations should be carefully examined and explosives removed for examination by British Disposal personnel.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Over most of the Corps front along the RHINE, enemy artillery fire continued to be light and scattered, and consisted mainly of harassing fires on our forward elements. In the GERMERSHEIM area, however, the enemy appears sensitive to a possible crossing by our troops in that region, for during the night particularly, and intermittently during the day, the enemy directed light to moderate concentrations of mixed caliber into that sector. In the afternoon the approaches to LUDWIGSHAFEN were lightly interdicted, indicating possible observed sniping of traffic moving in that area. It is believed that lack of fire in most sectors of the Corps front is due, to some extent, to the natural disorganization inherent in a rapid flight in difficult circumstances across a formidable barrier such as the RHINE, and to involvement in movements to areas where the Germans expect crossings to be made.

Latest additions to the list of materiel abandoned by the enemy include an entire battalion of 12 x 105 mm guns K18, splendid weapons with a range of 20,000 yards. The three batteries were widely dispersed on a line in the OBERHAUSEN - HERGERSWILLER area E of BERG ZABERN. Each position was heavily camouflaged and well prepared, with deep emplacements, 6 foot deep communication trenches, and casemates for the crew. Despite the excellent protection, accurate CB fire from 155 mm guns had resulted in numerous close hits and one direct hit in an emplacement, effectively putting the gun out of action. All of the guns were destroyed by the enemy when he pulled out. Other pieces of equipment abandoned in the area include four 15 cm Nebelwerfers, one 75 mm inf how. which had been hit by interdiction fire on a CR, and two 88 mm guns.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

The Corps Arty was extremely busy during the period displacing forward and re-grouping for the next phase of the attack on Germany proper. The 13 FA Brigade moved into position on the Corps right flank, the 35 FA Group moved their Bns. to the Corps center sector while the 405 FA Group covered the Corps left flank. All units are now able to fire well across the RHINE river. During the night the 13 FA Brigade harassed all possible ferry sites across the RHINE river.

Btry "A", 1st FA Obsn Bn began operation of a 6 microphone, 4 second sound base at end of period. Mike #1 is located at R397553 and mike #6 at R408620 and azimuth of base is 09° 09' 50". "B" Btry is installing a 5 microphone, 4 second sound base which will run between LINGENFELD (4472) and HARTHAUSEN (4577).

The 100 Inf Div Arty re-joined the ranks of Arty with VI Corps while the 42 Inf Div Arty joined XXI Corps Arty as of 251200A; also the 71 Inf Div Arty joined the Corps Arty at the same time.

The 500 AFA Bn was adjusted by the GOP on an ammunition dump at R4730-6962 at 1150A. A total of 13 rds was fired and several explosions were observed. This same combination fired on flak guns at R4720-6967 and 1 gun was destroyed while firing 27 rds.

BA-2A35

S E C R E T

373 FA Bn was adjusted on a warehouse South of MANNHEIM by a 925 FA Bn observer. Two direct hits were scored and the building exploded and went up in flames.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

(a) Missions and attachments:

- 610 TD Bn -- Reled from assignment to VI Corps effective 251200A Mar 45.
- 614 TD Bn -- No change.
- 636 TD Bn -- No change.
- 692 TD Bn -- Reled from assignment to VI Corps effective 251200A Mar 45.

(b) Operations:

610 TD Bn assembled and made preparations for move to new sector.

614 TD Bn assembled all units and started a full maintenance program on all guns, vehicles, and equipment.

636 TD Bn continued to support Inf elements of 36 Div with direct fire mission on isolated ey pockets. The 2nd Plt of "C" Co fired 30 rds HE, 9 rds APC, and approx 2500 rds .30 cal MG on dug-in ey personnel, forcing approx 200 to surrender to our Infantry. The 1st and 2nd Plts of Rcn Co reached a point vic R4261 and engaged the ey in a fire fight. The Rcn Plts took 27 PW's in this action however, an Armd Car (M-8) was lost.

692 TD Bn assembled and made preparations for move to new sector. The 1st Plt of "B" Co was reled from atachment to 14 AD, effective 25800A and reverted to Bn control. While the Plt was operating with the 14th it destroyed 12 pill-boxes, 1 ey OP, 1 fuel dump, 1 ey tank, and assisted in taking approx 30 PW's.

Evans
EVANS
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

(SOURCE: G-2, Report #220, Hq VI Corps)

TRANSLATION

S E C R E T

47 VOLKS-GRENADIER DIVISION

AC of S, G-2

No 161/45 secret

5 Mar 1945

Intelligence Summary

(Closed on 3 Mar 45)

1. Development of the Enemy Situation

After having liquidated the German bridgehead in UPPER ALSACE and swiftly moved the forces thus freed to the LORRAINE - LUXEMBOURG area the enemy launched his general attack in the MOSELLE - SAAR triangle. In hard and bloody fighting he succeeded in thrusting to the area S and SE of TRIER, having utilized the river crossings forced on both sides of SAARBURG; he further succeeded in widening his bridgehead near SAARLAUTERN and penetrated toward the E into the SPICHERN Line. However, the attack from LOWER ALSACE against the PALATINATE, which he was expected to launch, did not materialize. Apart from patrol activities no operations took place between the VOSGES and the RHINE.

2. Enemy Disposition

The French formations released in UPPER ALSACE were used to guard the RHINE bank toward the East in the following manner: II French Corps in the sector DRUSENHEIM - SELESTAT, I French Corps adjacent to the S and down to the Swiss border. Since nothing is known concerning organization of new French formations, American troops must be expected to occupy the sector ROTHBACH - MODER River with the exception of the area BISCHWILLER - DRUSENHEIM.

Enemy dispositions in the ROTHBACH - MODER sector42 US Inf Div

relieved 45 US Inf on 7 and 8 Feb 45 (after a short period of refitting) with 242 and 232 Inf Regts on line and 222 Inf Regt probably in reserve.

In sector: GOETZENBRUCK - REIFERTSWILLER - LICHTENBERG - BISCHHOLTZ.

103 US Inf Div

with 411 Inf Regt in sector: MUEHLHAUSEN - ZUTZENDORF FOREST

409 Inf Regt adjacent to the E to LA WALCK
410 Inf Regt in reserve

36 US Inf Div and elmts

. . . . (Translator's Note: This part

14 US Armd Div

. . . . of document missing)

36, 42, 103 US Inf Divs and 14 US Armd Div are probably under control of the VI US Corps with CP at BOUXWILLER (Inf elmts of 14 US Armd Div are apparently employed to hold a sector of the line while the armor is probably held at disposal of Corps, bulk of it in the area of RINGELDORF - PFAFFENHOFEN - NIEDER-MODERN).

Boundary with II French Corps: W edge of BISCHWILLER - W edge of OBERHOFFEN.

3 DIA

(4 Tunis, 7 Alg, 3 Maroc Inf Regts and 67 Arty Regt) with elmts in sector: OBERHOFFEN - DRUSENHEIM.

Elements of 36 US Inf Div and 14 US Armd Div previously stationed in that area were probably moved to present positions in mid-February after withdrawal of formations (79 US Inf Div and elmts 42 US Inf Div) from the area W of HAGUENAU.

S E C R E T

Confirmed Identifications

42 US Inf Div	2d Bn, 242 Inf 3d Bn, 232 Inf	on 23 Feb vic HOCHBERG on 25 Feb vic LICHTENBERG on 2 Mar vic PULVERBRUECK
103 US Inf Div	3d Bn, 411 Inf 2d Bn, 409 Inf	on 15 Feb vic NIEFFERN on 8 Feb vic LA WALCK
14 US Armd Div	68 AIB	on 24 Feb vic UEBERACH
36 US Inf Div	3d Bn, 141 Inf	on 1 Mar vic UHRBRUCKMUEHLE (Combat patrol) (Since the patrol came up by truck from the rear it can be assumed that 141 Inf is in reserve.)

3 DIA

1st Bn, 4th Tunis Inf on 3 Mar vic OBERHOFFEN.

In addition to the above a number of unspecified GHQ units (GHQ Tk Bns, GHQ TD Bns and especially GHQ Arty Bns) must be assumed to be present in the ROTHBACH MODER River sector. 117 Cav Rcn Sqdn must be assumed located in the MARIENTHAL area (SE of HAGUENAU).

Only the 3d US Inf Div is unlocated of the Divs of XXI Corps released from UPPER ALSACE. Its commitment in the ROTHBACH - MODER River sector has not taken place yet but is considered possible. The re-appearance of the 45 US Inf Div, which left its sector for unknown destination, must also be considered.

The detailed enemy situation in front of 47 VG Div is still not clear despite the capture of PWs by 115 GR. Surprises must therefore still be expected at any time. . . . (Transl note: the original is torn here. The gist of the sentence is a request for more prisoners, documents, insignia etc.)

3. The Artillery Picture

About 15 med and 9 lt btries are assumed to be located in front of the Div sector; in addition to this 13 med and 4 lt btries in the adjacent sectors are considered capable of firing into our sector.

The enemy has apparently strengthened his arty opposing the Div sector by 9 med and 3 lt btries and moved up his med btries especially into the areas BATZEN-DORF - WINTERSHAUSEN and N of NIEDERSCHAEFFOLSHEIM.

The enemy's counterbattery fire without observation from ground or air prompts the assumption that he is using sound recognition.

Enemy arty fired by btries at forward elements and with single hvy guns at rear areas (especially crossroads), observed movements and reconnoitered btry locations.

The noticeable decrease in arty fire during the last few days is probably due to changes in disposition.

The daily average of enemy arty received during the period of 18 Feb - 27 Feb was:

836 rds med calibre
295 rds lt calibre

For the period of 28 Feb - 3 Mar:

284 rds med calibre
141 rds lt calibre

S E C R E T

4. Air situation

Intense aerial rcn by cub planes over MLR and Main Defense Zone, even during bad weather and at night. Rcn by fighter bombers over rear areas, generally starting between 0800 and 0900 hrs and interrupted during the noon hours. For particulars refer to 47 VG Div G-2 Report No 148/45 Secret dated 28 Feb 45.

5. Enemy propaganda

Enemy makes increasing use of propaganda broadcasts, probably utilizing statements made by our deserters. The unit is called by its official designation and exaggerated reports of enemy successes are broadcast to induce the unit to desert. This is followed by promises of good treatment in Allied prison camps and hints for carrying out the desertion. Troops are threatened with an allegedly impending general offensive with vastly superior forces.

6. Conclusion

(Transl note: Parts of the next lines are missing. The gist, however, appears to be: Concentration of numerous hvy arty brties in a comparatively small area situated closely behind the enemy MLR, as well as the location of the Corps CP close to the front (BOUXWILLER), seems to indicate offensive intentions. Up to now, however, no concentrations of infantry and armor have been noted.) Withdrawal of ey forces, 79 US Inf Div and 12 US Armd Div to the combat areas of SAARBRUECKEN and farther North, and the consequent regrouping of forces in the ROTHBACH - MODER River sector, tend to indicate postponement of impending offensive intentions.

The main effort of enemy rcn activity was clearly concentrated in the UEBER-ACH - BITSCHOFFEN area. For this reason and because of the already existing enemy bridgeheads in that area, as well as the suitability of the terrain for armor, it is expected that the enemy will make his main effort there. It is also to be expected that the enemy will simultaneously launch other attacks to contain our forces in the remaining sector and will probe the entire front for soft spots.

For the Division Commander
The Chief of Staff
Draft signed:

FLFETH, actg
Major, GSC

Official:
/s/ PFEIFFER
Capt

STATION LIST NO. 10

	<u>COORDS</u>	<u>CL</u>
Hq VI Corps Arty	R330672	
1st FA Obsn Bn	R335660	
Btry A	R348600	
Btry B	R411776	
SIC	R335660	
2nd FA Obsn Bn	Vic R425745	
Btry A	" R425745	
Btry B	" R375705	
SIC	" R425745	
13 FA Brigade	R340600	
46 FA Group	R402622	
17 FA Bn (155 H)	R395582	
Btry A	R393589	1600
Btry B	R399593	1600
Btry C	R397599	1600
938 FA Bn (155 H)	R409655	
Btry A	R416654	1600
Btry B	R419651	1600
Btry C	R405655	1600
939 FA Bn (4.5 G)	R412622	
Btry A	R410620	1700
Btry B	R408618	1600
Btry C	R408626	1500
35 FA Group	R395717	
36 FA Bn (155 G)	R399734	
Btry A	R389732	1300
Btry B	R402732	1600
Btry C	R402713	1900
194 FA Bn (8" H)	R401721	
Btry A	R424725	1600
Btry B	R409733	1300
Btry C	R406724	1700
698 FA Bn (240 H)	R425746	
Btry A	R432754	1800
Btry B	R423748	1600
Btry C	R423755	1300
976 FA Bn (-B Btry) (155 G)	R388696	
Btry A	R399707	1700
Btry C	R408707	1150
634 FA Bn (155 H)	R397660	
Btry A	R431699	1400
Btry B	R427694	1400
Btry C	R421666	1300
405 FA Group	R481911	
141 FA Bn (155 H)	Vic R470880	
Btry A	"	
Btry B	"	
Btry C	"	
Btry B, 976 FA Bn	"	
14 Armd Div Arty	R251519	
499 FA Bn (105 H SP)	R249519	
500 FA Bn (105 H SP)	R450680	
501 FA Bn (105 H SP)	R245517	
36 Inf Div Arty	R348603	
131 FA Bn (105 H T)	R478761	
132 FA Bn (105 H T)	R404619	
133 FA Bn (105 H T)	R423607	
155 FA Bn (155 H)	R401618	
Btry A	R396612	1000
Btry B	R395612	1000
Btry C	R396615	1000

S E C R E T

36 Inf Div Arty (Cont'd)

59 AFA Bn (105H SP)

100 Inf Div Arty

374 FA Bn (105H T)

375 FA Bn (105H T)

925 FA Bn (105H T)

373 FA Bn (155H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

103 Inf Div Arty

382 FA Bn (105H T)

383 FA Bn (105H T)

928 FA Bn (105H T)

384 FA Bn (155H)

Btry A

Btry B

Btry C

69 AFA Bn (105H SP)

242 FA Bn (105H T)

COORDS

R439722

R370900

R459992

R487899

R477916

R416934

R458951

R469915

R459916

R396664

R399665

R401720

R410670

R387714

R385719

R389709

R385711

R247632

R250600

CL

700

1700

1000

1500

1500

1500

BAEHR

Brig Gen

OFFICIAL:

Evans

EVANS

Asst S-3

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

U. S. ARMY

S E C R E T

Auth: CG VI Corps Arty

Initials: BL


Date: 29 Mar 45

CHANGE #4 TO STATION LIST #10

35 FA Gp
46 FA Gp
405 FA Gp
939 FA Bn
 Btry A
 Btry B
 Btry C
103 Div Arty
 382 FA Bn
 383 FA Bn
 928 FA Bn
100 Div Arty
100 Div Arty Air Field
35 FA Gp Air Field

R448036
R395717
R478905
R443799
R464804
R455808
R469802
R478913
R465992
R498919
R521860
R366895
R343891
R450028

CL2000
1900
1700



BAEHR
Brig Gen

OFFICIAL:

BYRNE
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

BYRNE

S E C R E T

36 Inf Div Arty (Cont'd)

59 AFA Bn (105H SP)

100 Inf Div Arty

374 FA Bn (105H T)

375 FA Bn (105H T)

925 FA Bn (105H T)

373 FA Bn (155H)

Btry A

Btry B

COORDS

R439722

R370900

R459992

R487899

R477916

R416934

R458951

R469915

CL

700

1700

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #198

LIBRARY
Field Artillery School
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

The Corps front was generally quiet, with ey activity limited to patrolling and lt sniper fire, as our troops continued mopping up operations on the W bank of the RHINE. 2 ey aircraft, venturing out under cover of darkness, strafed an area vic R4486 at 0230A. The ey also took to the water - an ey patrol in a boat was eliminated by S/A fire from infantrymen of the 71st Div.

Throughout the period, the ey continued to surrender in large numbers and 30 ey even came across the RHINE and surrendered in the 71st Div sector. Units identified were these: 719 Inf Div, 17 SS Div, 16 VG Div, 36 VG Div, 2 Mountain Div, 15 Panzer Div, 553 Inf Div, 246 PG Div, and 352 Inf Div.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

Ey arty fire continued to be very lt and scattered, consisting mostly of small harassing fires. GERMERSHEIM area drew the bulk of this shelling, including 1 of 32 rds lt cal that fell vic of 4767 and 4766 between 0935A and 1035A. Only 2 harassing fires were reported during the night, one near GERMERSHEIM and the other vic 4262. Besides GERMERSHEIM, a few rds lt cal fell E of the 4661 area during the day. Locations obtained so far from air photos, sound, and AOP's and GOP's indicate only the normal HAA scattered deployment protecting the communications between KARLSRUHE and MANNHEIM to be responsible for most of the shelling we have received. Some slight concentration of these guns and others of unidentified type is apparent in the PHILLIPSBURG - HOCKENHEIM area, opposite GERMERSHEIM and SPEYER.

Shellrep total - 8

36 Div	100 Div	35 Gp	46 Gp	405 Gp
4	1	1	1	1

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. With the situation becoming more stabilized and the majority of the arty in firing positions the activity of the arty with the Corps increased over the previous period. Visibility during the morning was very poor due to rain and low clouds but improved considerably during the afternoon permitting the AOP's to fire with good effect on targets of opportunity across the RHINE.

The Corps Arty also continued to move and regroup certain units in order to render more effective support along the wide Corps front.

A preparation in the 36 Div sector, designed to simulate an attack and support the action of the XV Corps, was fired on targets across the RHINE from 2330A to 0130A.

A harassing program on the road net and towns across the RHINE was fired during the night.

At 1230A, Btry "B", 1st FA Obsn Bn, began operation of a 6 mike, 4 second sound base facing in the direction of KRONAU (R6569). Mike #1 is located at R464-739 and mike #6 is at R488-799.

About 1430A a GOP of the 374 FA Bn adjusted his bn on a barge on the RHINE River vic MANNHEIM. 5 direct hits were obtained with 1 being very close to the water line.

A GOP of the 373 FA Bn adjusted his bn on a group of ey vehicles at R528-976 with good effect. 2 of the vehicles were reported destroyed.

The 35 FA Gp AOP adjusted the 976 FA Bn at 0700A on 3 trains at R551-635. A total of 51 rds were fired with 3 hits being reported.

At 1700A the 35 Gp AOP adjusted on 2 88's which it observed firing at it and other cubs in the vic. The adjusted coordinates were R4782-6868. The 36 FA Bn fired 30 rds on this mission with very good effect. 1 direct hit was obtained on 1 position and several large explosions resulted.

The 132 FA Bn AOP adjusted it's bn at 1330A on ey vehicles at R4758-6360. 26 rds were fired resulting in the vehicle being set on fire. Later, at 1420A, the bn fired 44 rds with very good effect on a group of 30-40 ey personnel at R4745-6402. Observation was again by the bn's AOP.

At 1230A the 938 FA Bn's AOP adjusted his bn on 30 horse-drawn vehicles at R4810-6524 firing 33 rds. 2 vehicles hit and the remainder dispersed was the observer's report at the end of the mission.

SECRET

0 1096

S E C R E T

At 1532A this headquarters assigned the 13 FA Brig a counterbattery mission on DB 5140-6719. The Brig was able to get an AOP up to observe the mission and fired 54 rds. The area was reported as effectively covered.

The 405 Gp AOP adjusted Btry "B", 976 FA Bn, on 3 ey guns at R5694-0307 at 1355A. 38 rds were fired with the area being well covered.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	36 Div		71 Div		100 Div	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					2	
Per	10				2	
Veh	5		NOT		2	
Prep		49	AVAILABLE			
Armor	2					
Har		23				4
Reg	28				14	
Dest					3	
	45	72			23	4

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	13 TAB		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1		2	15	1	1
Prep		31		1		
Har	1	4		22		8
Reg	4		8		6	
Trains			1			
TOTAL	6	35	11	38	7	9

Total AOP Missions - 20

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

a. Mission and attachments

614 TD Bn (3") towed - No change.

635 TD Bn (3") towed - Atchd to 71st Inf Div and assigned to VI Corps for operations.

636 TD Bn (90mm) SP - No change.

824 TD Bn (76mm) SP - Atchd to 100 Inf Div and assigned to VI Corps for operations.

b. Operations:-

614 TD Bn continued rehabilitation, maintenance of material, and unit training.

635 TD Bn - no report.

636 TD Bn fired indirect missions in support of the 36th Inf Div. Co "A" moved to positions vic R399669 and expended 412 rds HE on harassing fire missions. The 2d Plt of Co "C" also moved into indirect fire positions, and expended 32 rds HE on harassing missions. Other TD's of the bn took up defensive positions in support of respective Inf Regts.

824 TD Bn - no report.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS

No change.

BYRNE
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

ANNEX 1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #198

(Source: 103d Inf Div G-2 Per Rpt No 125, 25 Mar 45)

EDUCATION OF A HITLER YOUTH

The capture on 11 March of 2d Lt Klaus-Dietrich POLZ, former CO, 2d Co, 741st Jg Regt (114th Jg Div), has provided us with an articulate specimen of the product of 10 years of Nazi education and upbringing. The following adaptation of FAIC Report No. 1032, covering the career of PW POLZ from his entry into the Jungvolk at the age of nine and presenting his own (the Nazi Party's) point of view regarding Germany's future, gives an instructive insight into the processes of a Nazi-molded mentality and a hint of problems to be encountered in the future in dealing with the German younger generation. Significant, indeed, is the reflection of the German susceptibility to a Wagnerian sort of romantic mysticism in POLZ's statement: ". . . our National Socialism has the power of myth. It does not appeal to cold reasoning. It appeals to the warm depth of our feelings and emotions. We feel, we believe, we act." The report which follows gives a full account of POLZ'S national philosophy and of the career in which he came by it:

CAREER

PW POLZ entered the Junior Hitler Youth (Jungvolk) in August 1934 when he was nine years of age. On 9 November 1940, he was promoted to the rank of Rottenfuehrer (corporal). He rapidly advanced in grade from that time on, due to the increased draft of Hitler Youth members into the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS and the shortage of trained Hitler Youth leaders resulting therefrom. From November 1940 to June 1941, he was Disziplinarstellénleiter (crime investigator) of Hitler Youth "Bann" 458, at Loetzen (East Prussia). From July to August 1941, he was Hitler Youth "Gefolgschaftsfuehrer" (equivalent of a company commander in the Army), and from 14 August 1941 to 31 October 1941, he was "Leiter der Hauptstelle I" (Personnel Officer) of Bann 548. Simultaneously, he worked in the municipal administration of Loetzen. In November 1941, POLZ was selected as a student for the Langemarck Lehrgang, a Nazi educational institution in which youngsters who distinguish themselves in the Hitler Youth are given a condensed high school education (with particular stress on Nazi indoctrination and "physical conditioning.") The Langemarck Lehrgang pretends to cover in an 18 months program the requirements of the German Gymnasium (high school, nine years of schooling). The main purposes of the Langemarck Lehrgang is to prepare the academic careers of fanatical Nazis. All expenses for attendance at the Langemarck Lehrgang are borne by the German government. On 5 January 1942, POLZ entered the Nazi Student Organization (Studentenbund). In October 1943, he was drafted into the Army, and selected as an officer candidate on account of his Hitler Youth career. He was sent to an OCS at HAGUENAU (Alsace) where he was commissioned recently. PW POLZ had been with 114th Jg Div for the past six months.

VIEWS

"Germany is going to win this war, if not immediately and gloriously, at least in the long run, you may rest assured. The Allies may succeed in occupying all of Germany north of Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, and Moravia. The Russians and the Anglo-Americans may join at the Elbe River. We shall then entrench ourselves in the uncontrollable mountains and forest of Southern Germany and Austria, and hold whatever can be held of Italy. As a matter of fact, the war in Italy can go on for several years. But, whatever stretches of land you may occupy in Germany, you will never conquer or defeat the German nation. As long as there is a German alive, he will fight you. In the occupied parts of Germany we shall fight a partisan war of nerves against you. No Allied soldier will ever feel safe on German soil. There will be no traitor, no collaborationists. Although outwardly we may smile and bend under the Allied yoke, we shall resort relentlessly to ambushes and tricks of guerrilla warfare until in the end every inch of sacred German soil is freed from the hated invader. A master race born to govern cannot be held down eternally. Do not underestimate us Germans. We have learned to hate a world of nations that is denying us living space. Great deeds inspired by this immortal and sacred hatred have been performed in the past out of this hatred. New war ruses will be born and new methods of fighting. Soldierdom and domination are the two avocations of Germany, and we Germans shall not rest until we fulfill Germany's mission. This mission is closely linked with the fate of National Socialism, and if you want to destroy National Socialism you must exterminate the German people first (and by this I mean every living German). We shall never capitulate. A Herrenvolk may fail in the completion of its mission and thereafter have a wrecked existence (Verkrachte Existenz), but it does not capitulate. And then, there are our secret weapons. In his last speech the Fuehrer said: "God Almighty may pardon me the last moments of this war." Even if Germany

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should be utterly defeated, our submarines will continue to harass Allied shipping, and our secret weapons, striking from concealed sites in the mountain, will spit death and destruction on the hated invader. We may even follow the example of our national hero, Arminius, (Germann); the Germanic prince, who, posing as a friend of the Romans, went through the Roman educational institutions and war academy to acquire the military knowledge and leadership which, in the end, enabled him to ambush the Roman Legions of Varus in the Teutoburg Forest in 9 A.D. to free his enslaved tribe from the Roman yoke. There are thousands of fanatical German youngsters who are willing to sacrifice everything for the liberation of a defeated Fatherland, and who, posing as friends of the Allies, will infiltrate into the Allied military government administration. These men will acquire data on possible traitors which will lead to the punishment of these traitors. They will risk their anonymous lives in sabotaging every Allied effort. They will act as informants and contact men for the underground. One man and the spirit he created will always be the guide of our youth: our Fuehrer. Hitler united us as a nation. Hitler made Germany conscious of her mission and strength. Hitler may die, but the ideals he created will always live in the hearts and works of the German people. The British say: "Right or wrong my country." We Germans say: "Right or wrong our Fuehrer." Stronger than any clearly defined philosophy, our National Socialism has the power of myth. It does not appeal to cold reasoning. It appeals to the warm depth of our feelings and emotions, it overwhelms us by its twilight effects. We do not think. We feel, we believe, we act. We have faith in our Fatherland. And this faith will give us the strength not to capitulate, no matter how much of Germany the enemy may occupy. We shall always fight back, no matter with what weapons, no matter with what ruses, no matter for how long a period, until the last invader is killed or driven from Germany. (Fifth Army)

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ENEMY BATTERY LIST #29

<u>CONC NO</u>	<u>COORDINATE</u>	<u>ACC</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>NO/TYPE</u>
4963 TQ	4949-6372	A	AP - PRU	6/HAA
5167 DB	5140-6719	A	AP - PRU	4/HAA
5167 DH	5168-6741	B	AOP	2/HAA
5470 DI	5485-7050	A	(AP -- VI C Arty)	1/Lt
			(24 Mar)	
			(1 FOB -- S)	
5474 DA	5420-7459	A	AP -- PRU	4/HAA
5503 DF	5530-0610	B	AOP	-/HAA
5669 DD	5622-6926	B	1 FOB -- S	1 or more/HAA
5876 DC	5842-7350	A	2 FOB -- S	1/G
6076 TR	6024-7386	A	AP - PRU	2/Lt
6085 DG	6070-8522	A	2 FOB - S	2/G

SUSPECT LIST #29-1

529 -- 663	AOP	-/HAA
5588-7804	2 FOB - S	2/G
635 - 627	GOP	1/88

SECRET

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11 APR 45 PM

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *PRU*
Date: 27 Mar 45
From: 261800A Mar 45
To: 271800A Mar 45

LIBRARY

Field Artillery

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #199. Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

RECEIVED

During the night 36 Div patrols attempted to cross RHINE at 471653 and 517748 but were driven back by SA and MG fire. In the early morning several of aircraft were over the Corps area and strafed at widely scattered points but caused no damage. 71st Div also sent patrols across the RHINE, at 549842 and 551844, and these reported no contact on the East bank.

An otherwise extremely quiet day was marked by the capture by 71st Div of Maj Gen Sensfuss, CG 212 Inf Div, and Lt Col Von Rosenthal, his G-3, on a small island vic SPEYER.

2 FOB reported two of their wire lines at 474808 were cut and approximately 100 yards removed. Lines laid through woods should be checked constantly. The necessity of guarding all installations was emphasized last night when four persons beat up a driver in 44 Div motor pool and then booby-trapped six vehicles with chemical pencils, one of which exploded.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Reflecting the lack of activity on the Corps RHINE front, enemy artillery fire during the period was very light. Harassing fires, all consisting of a few rounds, not exceeding 8, again formed the bulk of the missions. Most of the shell- ing came in during the night, when SONDERNHEIM (4565), SCHIFFERSTADT (4787), and SPEYER were hit, the latter by a medium caliber in one instance. Daylight shell- ing reported consisted only of a few rounds vic SPEYER, 4661, and 4565.

A slow build-up of enemy artillery areas is becoming noticeable, with the strongest located E of MANNHEIM, though undoubtedly much of this is sited against the XV Corps bridgehead. Another groupment is deployed between SCHWETZINGEN and HEIDELBERG, and another between PHILLIPSBURG and GRABEN. *CHAI 4* continues to form the backbone of artillery strength on the Corps front, with only one medium battery, 6785 ZF, as yet located.

b. Changes to EB List #29:

(1) Additions:

5103 B3L	5142-0395	B	3 FOB/S	2/-
5262 ZC	5299-6229	A	AP-PRU	2/HAA
5362 ZN	5310-6215	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
5499 B3I	5461-9951	B	AOP	4/-
5503 DE	5544-0345	B	AOP	2/C
5696 A3L	5638-9674	A	AP-PRU	4/HAA
5696 A3K	5689-9686	A	AP-PRU	4/HAA
5696 B3E	5668-9636	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
5602 A3R	5639-0265	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
5603 A3S	5687-0305	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
5603 A3T	5648-0316	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
5898 A3X	5823-9835	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
6003 B3C	6089-0309	A	AP-PRU	8/HAA
6189 ZL	6149-8910	A	AP-PRU	5/HAA
6287 ZD	6290-8714	A	AP-PRU	3/Lt
6293 ZM	6264-9314	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
6486 ZG	6460-8621	A	AP-PRU	4/HAA
6577 ZH	6586-7759	A	AP-PRU	3/HAA
6677 ZI	6600-7765	A	AP-PRU	3/HAA
6687 ZJ	6608-8784	A	AP-PRU	6/HAA
6688 ZK	6621-8800	A	AP-PRU	3/HAA
6696 ZE	6608-9686	A	AP-PRU	3/Lt
6785 ZF	6751-8501	A	AP-PRU	3/Med

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(2) Suspect List #29-2

5057-5957	1 FOB/S	1/G
5106-6870	AOP	4/G
529-663	AOP	-/HAA
527-680	1 FOB/S	1/Lt
557-775	1 FOB/S	1/Lt
6556-9005	2 FOB/S	4/G

1 FOB/S obtained three area locations, and 2 FOB obtained an area location during the period.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The period was marked by very little activity for the artillery with the Corps. Few observed missions could be fired due to poor visibility caused by rain throughout the period. The majority of missions fired were on unobserved harassing targets across the RHINE during the night.

Btry "B", 2nd FA Obsn Bn, completed installation of a cross base to their LIMBERGERHOF sound base. This base, which is a 5 mike, 4 second base, is sited to range into the area to the rear of MANNHEIM. Mike #1 is located at R4863-9017 and Mike #5 is at R4587-9481.

A GOP of the 607 FA Bn adjusted the 634 FA Bn at 1750A on a storage tank at R5635-9297. 24 rds were fired resulting in the tank being broken open and set on fire with 3 rds of WP.

The 938 FA Bn GOP adjusted his Bn on 20 ey personnel and a vehicle near a house at R481-675. 23 rds were fired resulting in 2 hits on the house, 1 probable hit on the vehicle, and the personnel being dispersed.

The 36 Div Arty AOP adjusted the 155 FA Bn at 1715A on an ey vehicle at R485-675. A total of 19 rds were fired with effect reported as good.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	36 IDA		71 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
Per	9					
Veh	2					
MG & Mor	1					
Prep		1	Not			
Armor	4					
Def Fire Reg	3		Available			
Har		14				9
Reg	38				2	
Misc	4					
TOTAL	61	15			2	9

(2) Dorps Arty:

Type	13 Brig		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		4		2		5
Per	1				1	
Har		2		14		13
Reg			1		2	
Dest					1	
TOTAL	1	6	1	16	4	18

AOP Missions: 4

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn continued maintenance and training in assembly area.

635 TD Bn attached to 71 Inf Div with TD Co's in direct support of respective Inf Regts.

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All units were busy during the early part of the period moving into positions.

Bn CP is vic SCHIFFERSTADT (R4687).

636 TD Bn supporting the 36 Inf Div with direct and indirect fire missions. TD's fired on four (4) pill boxes across the RHINE R. with good results. Co "A" supported the fires of 132 FA Bn with night harassing missions. The other units of the Bn took up defensive positions in support of respective Inf Regts.

824 TD Bn assembled and under going training and maintenance on new M-18 TD's. Co "A" finished converting and was busy checking and preparing M18's for operation.

Bn CP is vic FUTSGONHEIM (R4096).

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Front Lines: No change.

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Asst S-3

SECRET

23 March 1945

Counterbattery Fires in Support of the Attack of the VI Corps 15 March 45.

On orders from CG, VI Corps Arty, a passive CB policy was adopted by the artillery with Corps nine days preceding the attack. During this period every available intelligence agency at the disposal of the Corps Arty Hq was utilized to obtain as complete a knowledge as possible of the disposition of the arty of German LXXIX Corps. The quantity and quality of air photos was limited because of the weather, but by an extremely fortunate coincidence, the 14th of March was a beautiful day and the 34 Rcn Sqdn, 12 TAC, provided coverage of nearly all of our immediate front and gave us an invaluable last minute check of the enemy artillery. Under the passive CB policy only enemy batteries which were causing casualties or damage were shelled and all other active locations were carefully pin-pointed but allowed to shoot. In this manner we were able to lull many batteries into a false sense of security and the photo cover on the day preceding the attack showed few changes in locations.

In preparing the CB program for the attack, the batteries were grouped by general locations, so that activity in any one of these areas could be quickly neutralized without disclosing our intention to attack all along the front. This had the further advantage of simplifying and expediting calls for fire.

By 142400 the CB program was distributed to all units. It listed some 85 positions, representing 240 guns.

By noon of the day of attack, each division had called for retaliatory fire and the entire program fired. The number of rounds placed on each position varied according to the fire possibilities of our guns but the least amounted to 44 medium or 21 heavy rounds and the greatest 132 medium or 62 heavy rounds, the average being 80 medium or 40 heavy rounds.

Officers from CB section and 2 FA Obsn Bn made a preliminary ground check of some of the positions fired upon; others, especially in the HAGUENAU Forest were impossible to reach because of mines and abattis. Cub planes helped materially. However, proof of the success of the program came from the infantry and division "Isma" which reported enemy artillery as "very light", "negligible" or "no artillery".

Of the 85 positions fired on in the CB program, 55 were inspected, with good evidence indicating a total of at least 7 - 75mm Hows, 15 - 105mm Hows, 1 - 128mm SP and 5 - 150mm Hows either destroyed or damaged by our fire. 89% of the positions were completely neutralized, the other 11% received fire in the area but not in sufficient quantity to neutralize the position.

A valuable contribution to the success of the program was made by sound and flash personnel of both 1 FOB and 2 FOB, whose operations confirmed occupation and continued activity of enemy battery locations, and in many cases, provided initial locations to the photo interpreters, thus leading to the discovery of the actual positions, and consequent exact coordinates. A total of 38 enemy batteries were located by two or more different sources, usually AP, Sound, Flash, AOP, GOP, or PW.

Btry	No/Type	Coordinates	Source	True Coords
9430 YH	2/Lt	9415-3053	AP 11 Feb	9400-3043
Dummy position at AP coord. 3/75 Inf Hows at true coords. CB fire accurate, 2 guns blown, one knocked out 5 dead Germans near guns. 1 - 75mm Pak 40 in field in front blown.				
7542 M4R	3/Lt	7878-4215	AP 22 Feb	Same
No arty positions in area. CB fire good for coordinates, 3 inf trenches and dugouts at occrdinates with bloody clothing and helmets laying around.				
7845 KU	3/Lt	7868-4545	AP 2 Mar & Civ	
Unable to get to position. Bridge blown, road blocks and mines.				

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Btry	No/Type	Coordinates	Source	True Coords
7942 QQ	2/Lt	7931-4285	AP 14 Feb & PW	Same
2 horse drawn 105 Hows. Crew lived in house to rear. CB fire within 10 yds of position, house had several hits, area neutralized.				
7943 QP	6/75	7929-4303	PW & AP 14 Feb	
3 Lt field pieces in scrub trees, area burnt due to arty fire. Fire covered area.				
7839 QM	Prob Btry	7860-3985	AP 14 Feb	Same
No prepared positions but 3 SP guns were active here. CB fire good, 10 shell holes within 25 yds of coords.				
7840 QN	Prob Btry	7884-4057	AP 14 Feb	791-406
5 105 Hows, 2 truck drawn, 3 horse drawn set up next to buildings. Town demolished by fire. Large amount of ammo left around positions.				
8144 VS	5/Lt	8149-4432	AP 28 Feb & 2 FOB/S	815-443
4/105 Hows, good effect of fire on #4 position, 5 hits near bunkers to rear of positions. Fair effect on rest of guns.				
8441 UA	4/Lt	8495-4151	AP 14 Mar	Same
4/105 Hows, CB fire best around #1 & 2 guns, other rds 70 yds in front of position nearest hit 20 yds in front of #2 gun.				
8442 VU	5/Lt	8460-4200	AP 13 Mar & 2 FOB/S	Same
5/105 Hows, CB fire very good, hit on parapet of #2 gun, bloody clothing and bashed in helmets in area.				
8539 AI	1/G	8544-3900	A/S 2 FOB	
No position found, CB fire 100 yds S.				
8935 XP	3/Lt	8910-3594	AP 14 Feb	Same
3 105 Hows, CB fire bracketed position general effect fair, one rd 20 yds from #2 gun.				
8935 QO	2,3/Lt	8991-3515	AP 14 Feb	Same
3/105 Hows, 1/150 How, CB fire poor, nearest hit 30 yds from #2 gun, no dead or wounded as result of fire.				
9035 QR	2 Lt	9099-3507	AP 14 Feb	
3/105 Hows, CB fire good, concentrated on #3 gun. Bunker to rear received direct hit. Clothing and helmets with holes found in position area.				
9037 VV	2/Lt	9025-3706	AP (PRU)	9099-3706
3/105 Hows, not dug in. CB fire very effective. Hit near #2 started ammo fire, seat of limber of #1 gun in position. Civilian report many wounded on 15 Mar.				
9137 UC	4/Lt	9144-3748	AP (PRU)	Same
4/105 Hows. Hit between #1 & #2 piece. Bulk of CB fire on dummy position at 9130-3763. Quantity of abandoned ammo at position.				
9335 AX	2/Lt	9310-3505	AP (VIC PIU)	
Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.				
9440 WR	3/Lt	9456-4047	AP	Same
4/75 Hows, CB fire fair to good, most hits to SW of position. 10 men wounded by WP, in living quarters. (Stables to W of position)				
9437 UE	2/Lt	9470-3767	AP (PRU)	
4/20mm Flak, CB fire generally 100 yds to S near bunkers, 12 wounded by fire, left position 17 March.				
9131 XC	2/G	9138-3189	AP & 2 FOB/S	
No trace of ey guns, position is one used by us previously. CB fire fair.				

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Btry	No/Type	Coordinates	Source	True Coords
9133 PW	3/Lt	9190-3320	AP (PRU & PW)	Same
4/105 Hows, CB covered area well. One rd hit in pit of #1 gun.				
9230 AE	4/G	9207-3094	A/F & AOP	
No evidence of guns. Possible SP location along rd. CB fire covers area.				
9231 RZ	4/G	9208-3185	A/F	
No sign of use as gun position.				
9330 AM	1/G	9306-3080	AOP	9320-3085
1/150 Inf How, 2/75 PAK 40. CB fire excellent. Both 75's knocked out by hits to front and side. Bloody clothing and damaged helmets left.				
9331 ZS	1/Lt	9357-3150	AP 2 Feb	9350-3125
1/75mm PAK 40, well dug in. One hit in emplacement, CB fire good in area. Gun blown, had been damaged by fire.				
9332 OP	2/Lt	9344-3225	AP	Same
3/105 Hows, well dug in & camouflaged. CB fire good. One hit to rear of #2 gun and hit on dugout to rear. Gun knocked out and 3 caissons damaged.				
9432 WV	2/Lt	9404-3213	AP	Same
2/105 Hows, CB fire good in area, lots of ammo left.				
9431 UG	2/Lt	9426-3193	AP (PRU)	
3/7.62 guns. CB fire, fair, hit to rear #3 and 1 rd between #1 & #2 pieces. Quantity of ammo abandoned.				
9430 YJ	2/Lt	9415-3053	AP	9410-3043
2/150 Hows and 3/75 Inf Hows, CB fire good, 2/75 Hows knocked out, other blown. 5 dead Germans in position by guns. 1/75 PAK 40 in field to S blown.				
9734 BB	4/G	974-343	AOP	
4/Flak wagons & 1/128 SP, CB fire covered area and the SP was knocked out by hit near track, gun was blown.				
9529 RO	3/G	9544-2931	AOP & AP	
1/75 gun and dummy position for 3 guns. CB fire covered area.				
9530 AG	3/Lt	9555-3020	AP (PRU)	
3/105 Hows & 2/75 PAK 40's, CB fire covered area and many hits near emplacements and on living quarters to rear of positions.				
9431 AP	1/Lt	9440-3183	AP (PRU & AOP)	
1/Lt, not dug in, between two bushes, CB fire in position appears to be registering position only for UG.				
9536 VX	6/Lt	9509-3604	AP (PRU & GOP)	
4/Lt AA on reverse slope of steep hill. CB fire scattered, due to steep slope.				
9536 VY	2/Lt	9515-3621	AP (PRU)	9515-3610
5/Lt AA guns, no fire in immediate area, landed 100 yds to W.				
9634 VM	3/Lt	9679-3478	AP & GOP	Same
3 SP Flak wagons, 37mm. CB fire scattered because position is on top of hill.				
9931 XE	2/Lt	9906-3131	AP 2 Mar	9903-3123
2/105 Hows, CB fire good, 2 re's between guns, 6 rds in immediate area, rest of fire near bunkers.				
9935 VP	4/Lt	9960-3522	AP	
No evidence of position, CB fire in area.				
9831 OI	3/Med	9787-3138	AP & AOP & 1 FOB/S	9880-3137
3/150 Hows, CB fire good, area well covered & hits to rear #2 gun and on bunker. One gun and caisson abandoned getting out of position.				

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Btry	No/Type	Coordinates	Source	True Coords
9930 QJ	3/Lt	9931-3071	AP 14 Feb	9935-3667
3/105 Hows, CB fire excellent, 2 hits on revetement of #3 gun. 3 rds within 5 yds #1 and 1 rd 10 yds in front of #2. Bunker to rear of #3 gun hit.				
9931 OJ	3/105	9905-3185	AP & 1 FOB/S	
4/150 Hows, CB fire excellent, direct hit on #2 gun and also on 5 ammo bunkers. Gun completely destroyed. Rest of position neutralized.				
9932 AJ	1/Med	9943-3286	AOP & 1 FOB/S	9936-3261
1/Lt How, CB fire 200 yds W.				
9933 QK	2/G	9962-3316	2 FOB A/F & GOP	
No evidence of Btry, CB fire covered area.				
9831 WL	1/Lt	9875-3195	AP 2 Mar	9875-3195
	2/Med	9865-3194	Sound	
1/105 How, CB fire good and target bracketed.				
9831 UB	4/Lt	9800-3193	AP (PRU)	9802-3191
4 dummy guns made from logs and wagon wheels. CB fire good, hit in #4 position.				
0030 ZM	2/G	0095-3005	2 FOB B/F, AP & AOP	
2/105 Hows, CB fire covered area. Close misses on #1 gun. A quantity of ammo abandoned near position.				
0030 RL	2/Lt	0040-3054	AP	
2/75 Hows, CB fire covered area.				
0030 ZN	4/Lt	0031-3077	AP	
4/105 Hows, CB fire very heavy on #1 and #2 pieces, 20 rds within 10 yds of guns, hits on houses to rear where crew lived.				
0129 AL	4/Lt	0154-2985	AP VIC PIU & 1 FOB/S	
Rd blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.				
0031 AY	2/Lt	0000-3112	AP VIC PIU	
Alternate position for Zn. Not used much. CB fire covered area.				
0130 AZ	2/Med	0180-3034	1 FOB B/S	0175-3044
2/150 Hows, CB fire generally 100 yds S.				
0326 VG	1/Lt	0309-2607	AP	
Mines prevented inspection.				
0328 FU	3/Lt	0316-2835	AP, 1 FOB/S	
Mines and road blocks prevented inspection.				
0527 AC	3/G	0556-2757	AOP	
3/SP's fired from this position. CB fire covered area.				
0628 WM	4/Lt	0688/2839	AP, 1 FOB/S	
Road blocks and mines prevented inspection.				
0728 RG	1/Med	0799-2809	AP, 2 FOB/S	
Road blocks and mines prevented inspection.				
0827 PP	1/Med	0861-2716	2 FOB B/S, AP	
Mines and road blocks prevented inspection.				
0827 RI #1	4/Lt	0808-2712	2 FOB B/S, AP	
Mines and road blocks prevent inspection.				
0826 RI #2	2/Lt	0809-2688	2 FOB/S	
Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.				

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Btry	No/Type	Coordinates	Source	Remarks
0928 RU	3/Med	0915-2846	AP VIC PIU, 1 FOB/S, 2 FOB/S	3/150 Hows, CB fire covered area, 2 guns abandoned near position.
0727 AR	1/Lt	0787-2758	1 FOB A/S	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
0929 AO	1/Lt	0972-2937	1 FOB A/S, AP	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1032 AN	1/Med	1035-3220	AP, 1 FOB/F	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1128 AH	1/Med	1175-2892	AP PIU, 2 FOB/S	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1228 AF	3/Lt	1222-2890	AP, 2 FOB/S	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
0824 RA	4/Lt	0859-2426	AP 22 Feb, 2 FOB/S	2/75 Hows, area well covered by fire.
0924 PL	4/Lt	0900-2490	AP, 2 FOB/S, PW	5/105 Hows, area very well covered by CB fire. 4 105's abandoned, getting out of position.
1024 RT	2/Lt	1038-2420	2 FOB B/S, 1 FOB/S, AP	Road blocks and mines, could not inspect.
1024 PH	3/Lt	1020-2492	AP, AOP, 2 FOB/S	3/105 Hows, area very well covered by CB fire and hits near bunkers.
0924 UF	4/Lt	0981-2433	AP (PRU)	Road blocks and mines, prevented inspection of area.
1123 VZ	4/Lt	1136-2371	AP (PRU)	4 dummy guns, CB fire covered area.
1022 MT	2/Lt	1088-2238	1 FOB A/S, PW	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1125 AV	2/Lt	1134-2506	AP VIC PIU	2/105 Hows, hits to rear of both pieces, CB fire covered area.
1225 QG #1	2/Med	1198-2608	AP VIC PIU, 2 FOB/S	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1225 QG #2	2/Med	1260-2610	AP VIC PIU, 2 FOB/S	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1226 XI	1/Med	1241-2667	AP 22 Feb, 2 FOB, AOP	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1228 UD	6/Lt	1244-2813	AP	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1525 VA	2/Lt	1595-2555	AP	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1427 AS	1/Med	1430-2793	1 FOB/S	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1621 WZ	2/Lt	1627-2186	AP, 2 FOB/S	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.
1719 VO	3/Lt	1793-1965	AP	Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.

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Stry	No/Type	Coordinates	Source	True Coords
1821 QT	2/G	1806-2117	2 FOB/S	
Road blocks and mines prevented inspection of area.				
1822 QF	1/Lt	1812-2203	AP, 2 FOB/S	
Mines and road blocks prevented inspection of area.				
2124 VQ	2/Lt	2190-2485	AP	
Mines and road blocks prevented inspection of area.				
2224 VR	2/Lt	2208-2468	AP	
Mines and road blocks prevented inspection of area.				

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *RAB*
Date: 28 Mar 45
From: 271800A Mar 45
To : 281800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #200.

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Field Artillery School
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SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

The ey remained quiet during most of the period. Scattered patrol activity was reported across the Corps front with one ey patrol attempting to cross the Rhine by boat vic 5327-8230. Infantrymen of the 71st Div repulsed this patrol after a small fire fight.

Ey stragglers continued to be apprehended throughout the Corps sector with Battery "A", 1st FOB, rounding up 13 Krauts in the battery area.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Enemy arty activity on the Corps Rhine front increased somewhat during the period but was still extremely light. The shelling consisted of the usual light harassing fire with most concentrations being under 6 rds, however two 15 rd concentrations were received during the morning. The GRAEN - PHILLIPPSBURG area and the area around SCHWETZENGEN were responsible for the bulk of the ey shelling. Intermittent harassing fire was received throughout the night but little shelling was reported during the day. The SONDERNHEIN area, 4565 and the 5181 square received most of the fire during the night, all shelling being 1t caliber. 4 med pvt 6 rds into the 5098 sq in LUDWIGSHAFEN during the early morning hrs and 15 rds into RHEINGONHEIM 4994 at 1000A hrs. 15 rds of 1t cal were received by our fwd elements along the Rhine in the 4765 sq. During the afternoon OTTERSTADT 5286 and WALDSEE 5088 caught a few rds of 1t cal fire and WALDSEE also received 3 rds of med cal.

Shellrep total: 19.

36 Div	71 Div	405 Gp	13 Brig	2 FOB
4	3	1	1	10

Changes to EB List #29:

(1) Additions:

5068 DK	5094-6859	A	AOP & AP- VIC A	4/G
5994 DL	5965-9491	B	2 FOB/S	2/G
6080 DJ	6031-8020	B	2 FOB/S	1/G

2 FOB obtained a total of 10 sound locations, most of them during the night. Six confirmed old locations, two were on the same new location, 5994 DL, another was the new location 6080 DJ, and the last was on a possible tank inside the no fire line in MANNEHEIM.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Visibility throughout the period was very limited due to a ground haze and fog. Despite the poor visibility Div Arty units were able to obtain observed mission on close in targets such as personnel, machine guns, and mortars. Practically all of the Corps Artillery firing was limited to unobserved counter-battery and harassing targets.

A harassing program was fired during the night on ey battery locations and road junctions in towns across the Rhine.

The 607th FA Bn of the 71st Div Arty had a very interesting mission during the period. At approximately 2200A the Bn's GOP adjusted on two boats on the Rhine in the R52-82 square and sank both. The targets were marked for the observer by the infantry who fired tracers at them.

At 1745A an FO of the 132 FA Bn adjusted the 59 AFA Bn on an ey OP at R4762-6934. 27 rds were fired with 3 direct hits on the OP being obtained.

From 0610A to 0635A the 155mm SP gun attached to the 36 FA Bn fired on two pill-boxes located at R476-693 and R476-694. One pill-box was destroyed and the other was badly damaged. The SP received some mortar and 88mm fire but TD's and tanks in the area fired on the 88mm gun which then promptly ceased firing. A total of 14 rds were expended on this mission.

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b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

	36 IDA		71 IDA	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
Per	19		4	
Veh	2			
MG & Mor	2		2	
Prep	2	14		
Armor	3			
Def Fire	2			
Har		20		4
Reg	6		3	
Misc	10		2	1
TOTAL	46	34	11	5

(2) Corps Arty:

	13 Brig		35 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		2	1	2		6
Har		5		8		6
Reg			1			
TOTAL	0	7	2	10	0	12

AOP Missions: 2

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

614 TD Bn following maintenance program and training schedule.

635 TD Bn continued support to Inf Regts of the 71 Inf Div. Co "A" employed vic LUDWIGSHAFEN (R4699), Co "B" vic NEUHOFEN (R5091), and Co "C" vic SPEYER (R5080). All sectors generally quiet with NTR for the period.

636 TD Bn supported the 36 Div with one direct fire mission. Co "C" fired on four (4) pill-boxes across the RHINE R with very good results. Gunners on the TD's report the pill-boxes are much more vulnerable to the 90mm fire than those encountered on the main SEIGFRIED LINE.

824 TD Bn continued maintenance and training in assembly areas.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

No change in front lines.

Byrne
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Ass't S-3

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: 6G VI Corps Arty
Initials: RJB
Date: 29 Mar 45
From: 281800A Mar 45
To : 291800A Mar 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #201

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

Ey activity was negligible along the Corps front during the period. A friendly patrol attempted to cross the river vic R456-567. They were forced back owing to swift current, but drew no ey reaction.

Prisoners continued to be picked up in the Corps sector. Notable was a case of A Btry, 2 FOB. Following information given by civilians a detail from the btry caught 4 SS men in uniform hiding in a house in RINENBERGERHOF.

Miscellaneous - 2 FOB reports a minefield, apparently freshly laid at 432-826. 71 Div Arty reports the following: A kitchen truck of our attached AAA hit a mine going into the airfield at 2000 the 26th at 421855. A vehicle ahead had been stalled, and the kitchen truck pulled off the road to go around when he hit the mine as he drove through a shallow shell crater. Truck, and towed Bofors gun on the truck ahead were demolished; three casualties, none fatal. Troops are cautioned to stay on the road.

A wireman of an adjacent unit riding on the right front fender servicing wire had his back broken by a wire strung across the road at shoulder height. The obstruction evidently had been placed by civilians after our troops had conquered the town.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

a. A small number of lt harassing fires, except for one moderate concentration, continued to be the sole activity of ey arty on the Corps front during the period. A btry in the woods E of SCHWETZINGEN was active before midnight, harassing the OTTERSTADT, and WALDSEE (5188) areas, with a few 8 to 15 rd concentrations. About this same time the 4557 vic drew two lt concentrations. The only shelling reported during the day was 4 rds vic 4765 in the morning, and 50 rds, lt and med cal, that fell vic ALTRIPP (5492) at 1430A. The latter fire could well represent a mixed btry firing its excess ammo before displacing, since the number of rds fired is much in excess of the usual number shot in the present quiet period.

b. Changes to EB List #29

(1) Deletions:

5103 B3L	5602 A3R	5696 B3E
5502 DE	6003 B3C	5696 A3L
5502 DF	5599 B3Y	6293 ZM
5603 A3T	5696 A3K	6696 ZE
5603 A3S	5898 A3X	

Suspect List #29-3:

551 - 842 2 FOB - F 1/G

One flash location, a "C" accuracy in the 5584 sq; was turned in during the period to furnish the activity for both sound & flash.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. The period was marked by very little activity on the part of the arty with the Corps. Unobserved counterbattery and harassing targets formed the majority of the missions fired during the period.

The 71 Div Arty was relieved by the 103 Div Arty during the period.

At 1200A the 69 AFA Bn and 242 FA Bn were relieved from attachment to the 71 Div Arty and attached to the 103 Div Arty.

The 698 FA Bn adjusted upon a pillbox at R4750-6636 from 1539A to 1700A. 31 rds were fired and 2 hits were obtained one of which went through the top of the pillbox. 3 ey personnel were observed running out of the pillbox. This mission was observed by an FO of the 46 FA Gp.

The 405 Gp fired a TOT at 2120A on DM 5858-8682. A total of 52 rds of mixed cals were placed on this location. Immediately after the TOT Btry A, 2 FA Obsn Bn, adjusted the 141 FA on this location by flash. 7 rds were used for the adjustment. The adjusted coordinates were R5854-8685.

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b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:-

Type	Obs	36 IDA		Obs	103 IDA	
		Unobs			Unobs	
MG & Mor		NOT		1		
Har		AVAILABLE				4
Reg				2		
				3		4
TOTAL						

(2) Corps Arty:-

Type	Obs	13 FAB		35 Gp		46 Gp		405 Gp	
		Unobs		Unobs		Unobs		Unobs	
CB		1				3		6	
Har						9		12	
Dest						1		1	
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	1	12	0	18	

Total AOP Missions - 0

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYER

Operations:-

614 TD Bn moved during the period and assembled vic WALDSEE (R5188). Bn remains assigned to VI Corps.
 635 TD Bn assembled all units during the period and made preparations for motor march. Bn remains atchd to 71 Inf Div.
 636 TD Bn remained in positions supporting Inf Regts of the 36 Div during the early part of the period. Co "C" attacked two (2) sailboats on the RHINE R at R472-655. The destroyers left one boat sunk and the other one in a sinking condition. As the period closed companies were assembling and moving to new areas with respective Inf units.
 824 TD Bn following maintenance program and training schedule.

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 Asst S-3

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #202.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Enemy activity was negligible during the period. Mopping up of rear areas continued with the 14 AD apprehending Maj Gen GAEDE, CG of the 719th VGD and Lt Col MILTZOW who were taken from a pillbox vic R1853 at 1500A.

Another instance of wire cutting was reported by Battery A, 1st FOB, who report one of their lines cut in sixteen places during the night.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Ey artillery activity during the period was practically nil, for only two shellings were reported. Five rounds medium cal fell N of OTTERSTADT in the early evening, and 6 rounds from one medium cal dropped into the 5181 area between 1315A and 1330A, but otherwise Corps units drew no fire. Undoubtedly such artillery as the enemy is capable of disposing against us has been shifted to fire on our MANNHEIM bridgehead, which presents an immediate threat to his remaining RHINE defenses.

b. Changes to EB List #29:

6085 DG, 6189 ZL, 6387 ZD, 6486 ZG, 6688 ZK, 6687 ZJ, 6785 ZF.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS:

a. With the decrease in Corps sector and the lack of activity in general over the front, Corps Artillery remained practically inactive. A light harassing program was fired during the night.

In spite of threatening weather and poor visibility, Cubs maintained a continuous patrol and were able to adjust on a few targets of opportunity.

698 FA Bn, adjusted by its fwd obs, fired on a bunker at R524807. 3 hits were scored out of a total of 15 rds fired. The bunker was damaged badly.

An inf Col at R558798 was hit by fire from 928 FA Bn. 94 rds fired on this mission dispersed the column and caused many casualties.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	103 IDA
Per	6
MG & Mor	2
Reg	4
Misc	1
TOTAL	13

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	35 Gp	46 Gp	405 Gp
	Obs Unobs	Obs Unobs	Obs Unobs
CB			3
Har		2	3
Reg		5	
Dest		1	
TOTAL		8	6

AOP Missions: 4

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

a. Mission and attachments

614 TD Bn (3") towed--Reld from atachment to 103 Inf Div and reverts to VI Corps control.

S E C R E T

635 TD Bn (3") towed--Rel'd from assignemtn to VI Corps.
636 TD Bn (90mm) SP--Rel'd from atachment to 36 Inf Div and atched to 14 AD.
824 TD Bn (76mm) SP--No change.

b. Operations:

614 TD Bn remained in assembly area vic WALDSEE (R5188) with nothing to report.


635 TD Bn rel'd of assignment to VI Corps and moved with 71 Inf Div to new sector.

636 TD Bn remained in assembly area under going maintenance and preperations for future operations.

824 TD Bn followed maintenance program and training schedule during the period.

Gun Companies fired approx 300 rds test firing new M-18 TD's.

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT#203.

LIBRARY
VIII Army Group
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Enemy activity throughout the Corps sector was light and scattered. The enemy attempted to delay the advance of the 10 A.D. by offering resistance in the form of AT, MG, and SA fire vic R6082 and the hillmass vic R9289.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

From artillery fire reported, it appears that the enemy has very little artillery opposing us at present, for shelling has been very light and scattered, being directed entirely against our advancing spearheads. On the Corps right flank, some guns, very probably AAA which has occupied the area for some time, are still located in the area opposite SPEYER-GERMERSHEIM for an approximate total of 100 rounds, 14. cal., fell in vic of SPEYER during the day, in an attempt to hinder crossing operations in progress there. These guns possibly lack transport to move them, and probably will continue to fire until our advance forces their abandonment or destruction.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Arty units with the Corps were engaged principally in displacing to assembling and position areas east of the RHINE. Firing was very limited. The AOP's however, were busily engaged in patrol missions, in addition to adjusting on a few targets of opportunity, during the period.

939 FA Bn and 698 FA Bn fired preparation and counter-battery fires in support of the French crossing of the RHINE in the vic of SPEYER (R5080)

17 FA Bn AOP was responsible for the capture or destruction of twelve 88's during the day. 969 FA Bn was adjusted on the first group of 6 at R642782. Two of these were believed KO'd by direct hits. The other group of 6 at R624778 were hit by 30 rds from 17 FA Bn. 3 guns in this position were damaged. In both cases our Inf advanced on the gun positions before the batteries were able to withdraw.

3 vehicles at R510764 were observed by 35 Gp AOP, who called on 976 FA Bn for fire. An adjusting rd scored a direct hit on one of the vehicles, leaving the car burning. In spite of 17 rds fired at them, the other two vehicles got away.

We are proud to extend a welcome to the personnel and units of 10 Armd Div Arty and 63 Inf Div Arty as well as welcome back the 100 Inf Div Arty as members of the Corps Arty. 6 FA Gp, 995 FA Bn and 93 AFA Bn were attached to VI Corps, and 13 FA Brig, 1 FA Obsn Bn and 69 AFA Bn were relv'd of attachment to the Corps during the period.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	100 IDA
Reg	Obs Unobs 3

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	35 Gp	405 Gp
CB	Obs Unobs	Obs Unobs
Prep	1	1
Reg	1	2
TOTAL	2	3

46 Gp not available.

AOP Missions: 5

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

a. Mission and attachments:

609 TD Bn (76mm SP) Atch'd to 10 Armd Div.

614 TD Bn (3" towed) Rel'd from atachment to VI Corps and reverted to Seventh Army control.

822 TD Bn -- Atch'd to 63 Inf Div.

824 TD Bn (76mm SP) No change.

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(b) Operations:

An operations report was not received from the 609 and 822 TD Bns, however assembling and actual combat support did take place. Units of the 609 TD Bn supported the advancing combat commands of the 14th Armd Div. The 824 TD Bn moved and assembled with the 100 Inf Div. Co "B" and "C" moved with respective Inf Regts and the Bn CP group with Co "A" assembled together.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

768-850,	698-810,	697-812,	579-825,	648-789,	670-830,	647-780,
694-836,	762-905,	764-885,	615-860,	580-885,	680-853.	

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S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #204

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

Road blocks and other obstacles slowed the advance of Corps units and the ey was reported in strength only vic DIELHEIM (7376). Here, some 200 ey, several tanks and some AT guns were observed by several AOPs at noon but elements of 10 Armd Div were fighting in DIELHEIM by evening. At MOSBACH (S0284) entrenched ey offered stiff resistance during the morning but our armor by-passed this pocket and our column was last reported vic ALIFELD (S0981).

In center of Corps front, hvy resistance vic WOLLENBURG (R9477) was also by-passed by 10 Armd Div's tanks. On Corps' right flank several tanks and SPs delayed our advance on BRUCHSAL (R6359). 1 ME-109 strafed NECKARGEMUND (R7788) at 1300A hours. Arty fire across the Corps front was negligible.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY

The only ey arty activity reported during the period indicated continued slight opposition from ey arty. Between 1115A and 1150A an approx total of 50 rds, 88mm cal, fell vic 67-82 and 68-80, in an attempt, apparently, to interdict the main roads there. At 1400A an AOP reported 2 guns firing from vic R746-739, and at 1800A several guns were reported by AOP to be shelling ROTT (6574) from vic R70-70. Delete all locations on EB List No. 29.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS

a. With the exception of a night harassing program the majority of missions fired by arty with the Corps were observed supporting fires directly in front of the Corps leading elements.

An observed counterbattery mission on 4 88's at R7657-7616 resulted in effectively neutralizing the btry and driving the personnel away from the guns. 20 rds from the 17 FA Bn were adjusted by the Bn's AOP.

In a close support mission on an est 400-500 ey personnel at R7615-7605, 17 FA Bn AOP was able to fire only 22 rds from his bn before friendly troops approached the area to mop up.

Our inf, mopping up in the WALDORF area, reported a total of 19 ey arty pieces knocked out in that vic. At least part of these can be credited to effective counterbattery fire laid down just ahead of our advancing inf, neutralizing the guns until they could be overrun.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:-

Type	100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	
Per	3	
Reg	7	
TOTAL	11	

(2) Corps Arty:-

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			1			
Per			1			
Har		4				
Reg			1			
TOTAL	0	4	3	0		

NOT
AVAILABLE

Total AOP Missions - 3

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to support the attack of the 10 Armd Div. The Bn CP group and Co "C" advanced with CCR, Co "A" advanced

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with CCB and Co "B" with CCA. The 3 Rcn Plts were atchd to each TD Co and Combat Commands for operations. 822 TD Bn (3" towed) advanced with the 63 Inf Div. Co "A" is in direct support of the 253 Inf Regt and Co "B" supports the 255 Inf Regt. The five (5) M-18 TD's (issued for training) have been assigned to "D" Co. Early in the last period "C" Co mounted 55 Infantrymen on the M-18's and quickly captured 2 cy towns. 824 TD Bn supported the advances of the 100 Inf Div. Co "B" and "C" moved forward with respective Inf Regts. As the period closed "A" Co was making preparations to move up in support of an Inf Regt.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

M997-003; S047-855; S068-815; S095-817; R840-953; R913-916; R943-793; R794-785; R790-750; R815-705; R786-615.

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S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

US ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: EDS
Date: 2 Apr 45
From: 011800A Apr 45
To : 021800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #205.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Our armored columns continued to advance against stubborn resistance while our infantry elements reported little or no contact. Heavy 88 fire was placed on elements of 10 AD from high ground SE of MOSBACH (S0284). Another column met stubborn resistance from ey dug in along ridge between OERHOF (S7679) and DUHREN.

In the afternoon the ey was able to launch a small unsuccessful counter attack vic R680-610 consisting of two tanks and unknown number of infantry.

Throughout the period the ey made extensive use of roadblocks and minefields in an attempt to delay the eastward thrust of the VI Corps.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The enemy artillery still finds it impossible to subject our advancing columns to more than ineffective, scattered harassing fire on our forward elements. During the night an 88mm gun lightly shelled the R7074 area. As our troops approached ADELSHEIM (S2090) about mid-day, they came under intermittent light caliber harassing fire with which the enemy sought to delay our capture of the town. Late in the afternoon AOP's observed several guns active vic EPPINGEN (8460), and WEILER (8368). At the same time shells of 105mm caliber were falling at SINSHEIM R8373.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Firing by Corps Arty units was extremely light during the period. Activity was limited principally to displacing behind the rapidly moving front.

698 FA Bn closed into assembly area vic RHEINAU (R5794), completing the movement of all Corps Arty units to the East side of the RHINE River.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Not available.

(2) Corps Arty:

	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		1		Not		Not
Har		5		Available		Available
		6				

AOP Missions: Unknown.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to give support to the advances of the 10th Armd Div. Most of the period was taken up with the companies moving to more forward positions with their respective Combat Commands.

822 TD Bn continued to advance with the 63rd Inf Div. During the period Co C was engaged in direct support of the 253 Inf Regt. Companies A and B, spent the period displacing forward. At the close of the period the Bn CP was preparing to move to vicinity R9081).

824 TD Bn spent the period giving support to the 100th Inf Div. Company A completed training, and prepared to go forward in support of our Inf Regt. Companies B and C continued to support their respective Inf Regts.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: CRS
Date: 3 Apr 45
From: 021800A Apr 45
To : 031800A Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #206.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

The ey continued to oppose our advance with the fire of all available weapons. Throughout the night, sounds of heavy vehicular movement across the front indicate further withdrawals. In the 63 Div zone, 200 entrenched ey supported by 88 fire offered increased resistance in ADELSHEIM (S2090) while snipers harassed our troops vic ZIMMERN (S1893).

The ey continues to resist stubbornly from successive positions across the entire front.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

As the enemy continued to fall back, offering moderate resistance for a few hours at important road centers, our attacking columns drew light artillery fire from guns attached to these delaying forces, which ceased when resistance was overcome. The caliber still most frequently reported is 88 mm, and apparently this flexible weapon forms the bulk of the artillery supporting the delaying forces. During the night enemy artillery was active in support of stubborn resistance vic UNTERWISHEIM (R6861), shelling being reported in that area and also vic 6465. In the EICHTERSHEIM (7571) area also approach routes continued to be under fire until midnight. The ADELSHEIM area (S-2090) received occasional 88 mm cal fire in the early evening.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

With continuing rapid movement and comparative light opposition on the Corps front, activity by Corps Arty units was limited to only a few missions. These were, for the most part, on targets of opportunity located by AOP's or forward observers.

AOP activity was restricted by high winds and poor visibility.

The majority of the Arty with the Corps displaced forward during the period.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 T.D. Bn attached to 10th Armd Div Companies continued to give close support to their respective combat commands.

822 T.D. Bn continued to support the 63rd Inf Div. Companies displacing guns forward, with the advances of their respective Inf Regts.

824 T.D. Bn attached to 100 Inf Div. Co "C" of this Bn, fired on houses occupied by enemy snipers. The buildings were demolished, but the definite results of firing were unknown. Rcn Co furnishing reconnaissance of roads and forward areas.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at:

R815650, R885640, S070645, S050715, S100805, S200905.

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #207.

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46
US ARMY

201
SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *R.V.D.*
Date: 4 Apr 45
From: 031800B Apr 45
To : 041800B Apr 45

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

a. SPOT NEWS: XV Corps

157 Inf of 45 Div has cleared ASCHAFFENBURG except for sporadic sniper fire after some of the bitterest fighting in its career. Civilians of both sexes, including children, used rifles and grenades and hand to hand fighting had to be resorted to after the air and heavy arty bombardment failed to force the town's surrender. The town has been by-passed and 14 Arm'd Div committed.

XXI Corps: 4 Inf Div has cleared two thirds of WURZBURG and captured the GO of the German XIII Corps. This Corps is reported to have approximately 15,000 troops and to be attempting to escape to the north. Elements of XXI Corps are reported at N4545, 485400, 595355, 670230 and 735215.

b. Resistance on VI Corps front stiffened generally along the line SCHWAIGERN (9661) - HEILERONN (0861) - KOCHENDORF (0870) - NEUDENAU (1178) - MOCKMUNH (1782) - ADELSHEIM (2091) - ROSENBERG (2697). Here the NECKAR, JAGST and SECKACH rivers form a natural defense line and ey is taking full advantage of it to delay our advance. Our crossing of the NECKAR river immediately North of HEILBRUNN was met with two counterattacks between 0900 and 1130B hours but both were repulsed. South of NEUDENAU, along the JAGST river, 350 ey are reported to be dug in and offering stiff resistance. At noon approximately 100 ey were resisting elements of 10 Armd and 100 Div vic 076640 with SA and MG fire. At the close of the period 100 Div was attacking SCHWAIGERN (9561) against moderate resistance and 3 DIA was closing in on EPPINGEN (8560). Artillery fire was light and no ey air or tanks were reported on our front.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Although enemy resistance is beginning to stiffen, the volume of supporting artillery fire has not, as yet, shown any marked increase, but may still be considered as varying from light to moderate, depending upon the enemy's stubbornness in defending certain localities. Thus his forces in the SCHWAIGERN area (9661) were aided by fire from guns in the woods vic 9759, which were believed to have shelled in vic GENNINGEN (9163) also. The HEILERONN defense was strengthened by the fire of several batteries located in the valley NW of WEINSBERG (1263). Another area where approximately a bn of artillery seems to be operating, judging from AOP missions today, is the woods W of NEUENSTADT, (1672), and these guns apparently place some fire on the approaches E from BAD WIMPFEN. The ADELSHEIM area continued to draw intermittent harassing fire during the day.

b. Suspect List:

1267-6941	Btry	10 AD AOP
1216-6962	2/-	10 AD AOP
0986-6339	Btry	10 AD AOP
1168-6310	Btry	10 AD AOP
120-629	Btry	10 AD AOP
1218-6275	Btry	10 AD AOP
130-718	Nebel/-	10 AD AOP
135-728	Nebel	10 AD AOP
125-716	Nebel	10 AD AOP
0991-6002	1/G	10 AD AOP
123-627	Btry	10 AD AOP
1314-6249	Btry	10 AD AOP
129-719	Nebel	10 AD AOP
121-717	Btry	10 AD AOP
145-734	4/G	35 Gp AOP
118-715	2/G	35 Gp AOP
1436-7277	6/G	35 Gp AOP

LIBRARY
Field Artillery School,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

SECRET

0 1671

SECRET

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Practically all of the artillery with the Corps displaced forward during the period. With good visibility prevailing during most of the day the AOP's were active in adjusting on targets of opportunity and patrolling the Corps front. With the right sector of the Corps front along the NECKAR River becoming somewhat stabilized activity of the artillery increased. Missions on ey guns, personnel, and vehicles were the chief targets of the day.

The 35 Gp AOP adjusted the 995 FA Bn on ey personnel and vehicles at S224-910 at 1800B. 2 vehicles were reported destroyed out of an expenditure of 8 rds.

Around 1130B the 59 AFA Bn AOP adjusted the 17 FA Bn on 3 ey tanks at 0923-7326 116 rds were fired with effect reported as very good.

At 1458B the 17 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on ey vehicles at 1361-7354. 32 rds were fired with 1 vehicle reported as destroyed and the remainder dispersed.

At 1230B a GOP of the 399 Inf Regt adjusted the 938 FA Bn on a house and ey personnel at 076-640. 29 rds were fired leaving the building burning and resulting casualties among the personnel.

The 938 FA Bn's GOP adjusted his Bn on approximately 50 ey personnel at 0971-6194 at 1500B. 26 rds were expended with a considerable number of casualties resulting.

At 0930B the 423 AFA Bn's FO adjusted his Bn on dug-in ey Inf at 037-613. 26 rds were fired and after the area was occupied by our troops 15 ey dead were counted.

The 423 AFA Bn also destroyed one MG at 020-610 at 1730B. 18 rds were fired. This mission was also observed by the Bn's FO.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2					
Per	7	1			4	
MG & Mor			Not Available		1	
Prep					3	
Har		10				
Reg	3				4	
Misc	6	2				1
TOTAL	18	13			12	1

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2	6			2	
Per	4		2		5	
Veh			1		1	
MG & Mor					1	
Prop						4
Armor			2			
Har		8		10		5
Reg	5		3		9	
TOTAL	11	14	8	10	18	9

AOP Missions: 32

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

a. Missions and attachments:

609 TD Bn (76mm SP) atchd to the 10th Armd Div.

822 TD Bn (3" Towed) atchd to the 63rd Inf Div.

824 TD Bn (76mm SP) atchd to the 100th Inf Div.

b. Operations:

The TD Battalions continued to give close support to the units to which they are attached. Guns are continually being shifted and dispersed forward to support the advances of their respective Inf Regts and Combat Commands.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at S220950, 221901, 168860, 130810, 082763, 035713, 071690, 085635, 068625, 000617, R971625, R911621.

S E C R E T

ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #207.

(Prepared by SIC 2 FOB)

SUNRISE, SUNSET, MOONRISE & MOONSET
TABLES FOR APRIL 1945
AT FRANKFURT AM MAIN, GERMANY
"B" TIME

<u>APR</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>
1	0703	1956	2351	0854
2	0701	1957		0918
3	0659	1959	0056	0950
4	0657	2001	0200	1028
5	0655	2002	0300	1115
6	0652	2004	0354	1213
7	0650	2006	0439	1321
8	0648	2008	0518	1437
9	0646	2009	0550	1557
10	0644	2011	0618	1721
11	0642	2012	0644	1845
12	0640	2014	0708	2011
13	0638	2016	0733	2137
14	0636	2017	0800	2301
15	0633	2019	0833	
16	0631	2020	0912	0021
17	0629	2022	0959	0133
18	0627	2023	1054	0234
19	0625	2025	1154	0325
20	0623	2026	1259	0405
21	0621	2028	1405	0436
22	0619	2030	1512	0502
23	0617	2031	1618	0523
24	0615	2033	1723	0543
25	0614	2034	1827	0601
26	0612	2036	1932	0619
27	0610	2037	2037	0638
28	0608	2039	2143	0658
29	0606	2040	2249	0722
30	0604	2042	2354	0750

PHASES OF THE MOON
FOR APRIL

LAST QUARTER	APRIL 5
NEW MOON	APRIL 12
FIRST QUARTER	APRIL 19
FULL MOON	APRIL 27

S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #208

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE

During the night, the ey continued to resist stubbornly and engaged in aggressive patrol activity. 100 Div ferry site at S072-644 was continuously harassed by SA, MG, and light Arty fire, but during the day the arty fires slackened considerably. A patrol from the 100 Div encountered heavy ey opposition in the northern end of HEILBRONN (S08-61) around the factory area vic S-0764, and other elements were fighting from house to house at S082-614.

During the day, while our right flank engaged in heavy fighting and made little progress along the NECKAR river, the left broke loose with elements of the 10 AD advancing rapidly eastward followed by units of the 63 Div. The ey defenses crumbled before our attack and only at the close of the period was the ey able to reorganize sufficiently to provide pockets of resistance vic S46-94, S42-94, S36-92, and S46-96.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

With the continued resistance of the ey in the HEILBRONN area ey arty activity during the period increased somewhat over the past few days. Harassing fire from lt cal arty was received at the crossing sites of the NECKAR River near HEILBRONN intermittently throughout the period. The RJ at O364 was interdicted by med cal fire and O764 sq was harassed by lt cal fire during the night. Our bridgehead area in HEILBRONN O861, was hit by both lt and med cal during the day. Mediums put 8 rds into the O764 sq at 1200 hrs and 14 rds again at 1450 hrs. ROIGHEIM 1785 was hit with 15 rds of 105 cal during the afternoon. The bulk of the ey arty fire continued to come from the WEINSEBERG area with some activity from arty in the vic of NEUSTADT.

Shellrep total: 4

63 Div -- 1, 100 Div -- 3.

Suspect List:

	Btry	AOP
1267-6944	"	"
1216-6962	"	"
0986-6339	"	"
1168-6310	"	"
1218-6275	"	"
0991-6002	1/G	"
1234-6277	1/G	"
1314-6249	1/G	"
1658-6122	4/G	"
1644-6080	4/G	"
1115-6295	Btry	"
1057-6041	"	"
103-597	"	"
108-626	1/G	"
1215-7104	2/G	"
1276-7349	1/G	"
102-709	4/G	"

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

During the period activity of the Artillery with the Corps increased, especially in the Corps right sector along the NECKAR RIVER. The AOP's were active in patrolling and adjusting on targets such as ey guns, personnel, and vehicles. A light harassing program in the Corps right sector was fired during the night.

Battery "B", 2nd FA Obsn Bn., commenced survey for a five microphone two second bases in the vicinity of FRANKENBACH (O463).

The 93 AFA Bn registered on a bridge at O38-539 and, starting at 1830B, fired one round of Pozit every two minutes. The 423 AFA Bn took over the mission at 0100E and fired at the same rate until 0530B. The 141 FA Bn resumed fire at 0930B at the same rate and fired until 1040B at which time the mission was cancelled.

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During the afternoon the 141 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on ey personnel and vehicles at 012-574 and 023-558. 2 vehicles were reported destroyed and the personnel were dispersed.

About 1545B the 405 Gp AOP fired the 423 AFA Bn on an ey vehicle at 008-568 and destroyed it.

The 93 AFA Bn's AOP was very active from 1930B to 2030B in adjusting either his own Bn or Btry B, 976 FA Bn, on 5 ey btrys at 1658-6122, 1644-6080, 1115-6295, 1130-6265, and 1057-6041. Effect could not be observed but the btrys were reported as silenced in each case.

The 100 Div Arty's AOP fired the 194 FA Bn on 2 guns at 1215-7104 about 1000B and effectively neutralized the area.

Upon request of the 100 Div Arty the 194 FA Bn fired on a pill-box at 056-718. 16 rds were fired of which 7 were hits. The pill-box was reported as destroyed. The Bn's AOP observed the mission.

The 373 FA Bn was adjusted by AOP during the morning on 3 ey tanks at 126-646. One tank was set on fire by a direct hit. Smoke obscured the target so that results on the other two could not be observed.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					6	13
Per					8	7
Veh					5	
MG & Mor	Not		Not		1	
Prep	Available		Available		1	5
Armor					1	
Def Fire					2	6
Har					4	92
Reg					16	
Misc					1	6
					45	129

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2	13	3	6	8	8
Per	3		1		7	
Veh	1		2		4	
MG & Mor					2	
Prep		2				
Armor					5	
Har		44		23		19
Reg	6		3		8	
Misc	1				2	2
Dest.	5					
	18	59	9	29	36	29

AOP Missions: 52

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 T.D. Bn continued to give A.T. support to the 10th Armd Div.
 822 T.D. Bn supporting the 63 Inf Div. The 1st platoon of A Co, fired 45 rds into the town of MOCKMUHL (S-1781). The 3d platoon moved into indirect fire positions vicinity GUNDLLSHIEM, and expended 43 rds of ammunition. Companies B and C, moved during period. Co. commanders and platoon leaders made reconnaissance for gun positions. Co C prepared to support the attack of the 255th Inf Regt, to the East. Rcn Co, making reconnaissance, and patrolling roads.

824 T.D. Bn continued to support the 100th Inf Div. Companies A and C were alerted, and prepared to make movement across the NEKAR RIVER. One platoon of B Co is over, with the 398 C.T. One gun of A Co fired 11 rds APC at an enemy OP vic

SECRET

S E C R E T

(R-300600), with good results. The OP was reported knocked out. Rcn Co continued to make reconnaissance of forward areas and keep liaison with forward Inf elements.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S03-58, S09-63, S11-76, S17-82, S24-81, S32-90, S49-93.



STUBBS
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

I. APPREHENSION OF GERMAN SOLDIERS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES

Inquiries made relative to apprehension of German soldiers in civilian clothes have motivated the publication of the following aids to success in this field. These aids have been employed with excellent results by enterprising personnel.

DOCUMENT EXAMINATION

Every German guards his identity documents as he would his life. Since 1933 at the advent of Adolph Hitler, his New World, and his ruthless police, the possession of an identity document has generally meant the difference between freedom and prison. The habit has been ingrained and it can be assumed every German will carry with him some sort of identity document if he has one. Therefore, it can be assumed also, until proved otherwise, that a man carrying no such document is attempting to hide his identity or military-civilian status.

Any healthy civilian male 17 years of age or older (of military age) probably will carry one of the following listed identity documents:

WEHRPASZ: The Wehrpasz is a bluish-gray book carrying pertinent personal information regarding the individual. His picture appears on the second page, along with data regarding date, place of birth, etc. It is issued to every man when he reaches the age of 17, and he carries it so long as he is not a soldier. When he is inducted into the Army, he turns in his Wehrpasz and receives in return a Soldbuch. Upon his discharge from the Army, the Soldbuch is taken away and his wehrpasz is restored to him. It may be stated safely that a man carrying a Wehrpasz is not a soldier.

SOLDBUCH: Every soldier in the German Army carries a Soldbuch. This is a small yellowish book, with the word Soldbuch printed on the cover. A picture of the individual in uniform appears on the second page. Every man in civilian clothes who carries a Soldbuch is automatically a soldier with no further questions necessary, which is true also of any soldier who turns himself in voluntarily.

ENTLASSUNGSSCHEIN: This is a white sheet of paper which is issued to a soldier upon his regular discharge from the German Army. At the top of the paper is the word Entlassungsschein. This paper carries the dates of the man's service in the Army. However, for some reason, not every discharged soldier is issued such a paper. When a man has a Wehrpasz and claims to be discharged from the Army, but has no Entlassungsschein, it is necessary to check the rear pages of the Wehrpasz upon discharge. In this instance the Entlassungsschein is considered an adequate identity document.

AUSMUSTERUNGSSCHEIN: This is a red piece of paper carrying a photo of the individual. When a man reports for induction but is rejected because of illness or some deformity or some other disqualifying ailment, this is the paper he receives to certify that he is 4F. A man who has such a paper on his person is not a soldier.

Question most carefully all young healthy-looking men, in their twenties or thirties who, when interrogated, claim that all their papers have been destroyed in bombing raids, fires, etc. Nine chances out of ten they are lying and are soldiers.

PHRASING OF QUESTIONS:

Put the suspect off balance by asking him questions which make him think you know already he is a German soldier; as if some one in the town has informed on him. Do NOT ask "Were you in the Army?" - Instead ask, "Where is your soldbuch?", "What is (not was) your unit in the Army?", and similarly directed questions.

SEARCHING OF SUSPECT:

Always search the suspect. A lying soldier often carries his Soldbuch to protect himself against accusation as a spy in the event of detection of his true status

S E C R E T

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION:

If a man is a long resident of a community, his statements can be checked by speaking to people residing in his alleged neighborhood. For instance, a man says he was discharged in 1943 for heart trouble, and has resided ever since at a certain address, but has no papers to prove it. A simple neighborhood check can be made in this manner. Approach about five people who state they know the suspect. Ask "Was he in the Army?", "Was he discharged?", "When?", "Why?", "Where has he lived ever since?". If all their answers jibe with those of the suspects it can be assumed he is telling the truth for it would be extremely difficult for him to prepare every neighbor for the answering of questions in such a way that his statements receive general communal backing.

POSTERS:

Military Government, within the limits of its small number of personnel, puts posters in every town instructing German soldiers to turn themselves in at a particular place. This is important because many of these soldiers in the absence of instructions take no action to give themselves up for lack of knowledge of how to do so; many in the absence of the poster, which infers treatment of them according to the Geneva Convention, do not voluntarily turn themselves in for fear of being considered a spy. Posters make the clearing of a town easier. Therefore, if necessary, request the G-5 of your echelon to have posters put up, and, in the meantime, when the situation may be especially pressing, make some of your own and put them in prominent places. In such case, be sure to state where they should report, and obtain clearance with the appropriate G-5 for the action you are taking.

DISPOSITION:

Apprehended soldiers in civilian clothes are to be treated as ordinary Prisoners of War and evacuated to the nearest PW camp, the location of which your Provost Marshal can give.

CIC: Call the CIC if you cannot handle a man to your satisfaction by application of appropriate portions of the above or if you apprehend a person who is unduly suspicious. It should be noted that in such instances you may be required to hold the man for 12 hours or overnight because there are only a handful of CIC personnel to service the thousands of Corps troops involved. In any event, CIC servicing will always be as expeditious as possible.

Remember, there are among us many of the enemy armed forces dressed in civilian clothes. These men are soldiers and as such have never hesitated to kill Americans. It is highly probable that their change to civilian clothes does not reflect an accompanying change of heart.

(Source: Supreme Hq)

COUNTER-SABOTAGE

A recently captured German saboteur has reported that agents may be equipped with a cigaret lighter which, if used to light a cigarette, poisons the cigarette smoker. A small spherical pellet about 1 mm. in diameter, of unknown chemical constitution, is fixed on the lighter near the wick, in such a way that when the wick burns, the chemical becomes heated and volatilizes. The fumes or volatile products are highly poisonous.

The lighter is about 1½" long and 3/4" - 1" wide. The corners are rounded. There is a protective metal cap the color of tin over the top of the lighter. The cap pulls off and is not hinged to the main body of the lighter. The main body of the lighter is made of green bakelite or plastic material. The agent was told that other lighters of the same size existed with a leather removable top.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Captured saboteurs should be searched for lighters answering to this description. If found, they should not be lit and should be sent to AC of S, G-2, Supreme Headquarters AEF, Main (Attention, Counter-Sabotage Unit), notification by telephone being made in advance.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

US ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: RUB
Date: 6 Apr 45
From: 051800B Apr 45
To : 061800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #209.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

During the night an ey patrol was reported in NEUDENAU (S1178) and grenade and AW resistance in REICHERTSHAUSEN (S1480) where ey captured one lt MG and a mortar at 0500B hours. SP or bazooka fire knocked out two tanks and damaged one vic S092745. In the Corp's South flank 100 Div cleared factory area in northern part of HEILBRONN but a strongpoint of small arms and MG at S079634 still holds out. The ferry site vic 0761 received lt SA fire. At 0515B hours ey counter-attacked in two coy strength north of HEILBRONN but the C/A was repulsed.

Overcoming muddy terrain, roadblocks and some ey infiltration in the WACHBACH (S4896) area, 10 Armd Div broke loose on the Corp's north flank and an AOP from 17 FA Bn reported at 1930B elements of the division and 939 FA Bn in CRAILSHEIM (S7062). This rapid advance threatens the ey on our front with encirclement and is one of the most spectacular advances made to date.

Except in ODHEIM (S1072) where resistance continued heavy, ey's actions indicated a withdrawal E from JAGST river and a delaying action from the ridges to the East. Vic S116774 approximately 30 ey counterattacked at 1230B hours but it was repulsed. Between 400-600 ey are believed to be holding the line between MOCKMUHL (S1781) and HERBOLSHEIM (S1076). In HEILBRONN bridgehead stubborn resistance continued and house to house fighting took place in the city when SA, AW and bazookas were encountered. At the close of the period a C/A supported by 2 tanks and 100 ey was launched vic S081602 and the fighting is still in progress.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Except for one heavy concentration, enemy artillery activity showed only a slight increase during the period, though medium caliber fire seemed to be a little more in evidence. Most of the shelling appeared to have for its object interdiction of road intersections leading to defiles, such as possible crossing sites over streams in the forward area. Thus the heaviest shelling fell on a CR SE of GRESHEIM (S0774) between 1840B and 1950B, and consisted of an estimated 130 rounds from two 88mm guns. NECKARSULM (0867) received 20 rds, 88 and 150mm, fire at 2000B, and an intersection at 255-825 was hit intermittently by mixed calibers during the night. During the day the stubborn enemy defense of the HEILBRONN area is evident from the fact that most of the artillery fire was laid down in this sector, where the NW outskirts, and the towns of BOCKINGEN NECKARGARTACH, and FRANKENBACH drew several 5 to 15 round mixed caliber concentrations. At 1515B, 12 to 16 rounds of 210mm Nebelwerfer fell at 067-643. Other shellings reported during the day were small concentrations vic S2682, S3085, ASSAMSTADT (4293) and E of BAD WIMPTEN at 059-703.

Among the many artillery pieces recently found abandoned by the Germans a rare collector's item, apparently in good condition discovered at S058-898 deserve special mention. This is a Russian 152mm gun, possibly a model 1939, from markings on it, though no data is available on such a model. The gun, which has no shield is a clean, well designed weapon with split trails allowing at least 45° pintle traverse, horizontal sliding breech block, iron spoke wheels, hard rubber tires, and muzzle break. Due possibly to use of a muzzle break, the size and bulk of the recoil mechanism appear to be remarkably cut-down from the cumbersome-looking mechanisms usually associated with guns approaching this caliber. Found in a traveling position with the trails resting on a bogey, the gun appeared to be a single load, either horse or tractor drawn, though in this case it is believed to have been horsedrawn. Another remarkable characteristic of the gun was that the typical Russian vertical equilibrators were lacking. The Russian 152mm gun, M35, has a range of 28,000 yards, and it may be presumed that this piece has an equal, or possibly greater range.

Shellrep total: 18.

100 Div	63 Div	405 Gp
13	4	1

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S E C R E T

b. Suspect List:

1215-7104	2/G	100 AOP
1276-7349	1/G	35 Gp AOP
102-709	4/G	AOP
079-708	4/G	35 AOP
109-601	-/105	PW
1010-6126	-/105	PW
128-628	3/G	PW
11-65	1/170	PW
101-602	-/105	PW
1267-6252	2/150	PW
1342-6254	3/150	PW
094-636	1 or 2/Btrys	PW
099-637	1/75	PW
095-619	-/88	PW

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The artillery with the Corps continued to be moderately active during the period. The 100 Div Arty was particularly active in firing numerous observed missions by AOP's and GOP's on targets consisting of personnel, ey guns, vehicles, machine guns, and mortars. Visibility was somewhat limited due to rain and a ground haze.

During the night a light harassing program was fired in 100 Div sector and the right part of the 63 Div sector.

At 1807B the 141 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on one ey gun at S0549-5767. 3 direct hits were obtained and the gun was reported destroyed.

The 194 FA Bn AOP fired his Bn on a pill box at S0479-5608 at 0930B. The pillbox was damaged with one target hit.

The 100 Div Arty AOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on a building occupied by ey personnel at S0820-6265. Five target hits out of 19 rds fired badly damaged the building.

At 1540B, the 194 FA Bn was again adjusted by the 100 Div Arty AOP on a building being used by ey personnel at S083-673. 16 rds damaged the building considerably.

The 938 FA Bn GOP adjusted his Bn at 1215B on personnel dug in at S0842-7321. 34 rds were fired with no further activity being noted. This same observer again adjusted his Bn on personnel at S100-622 at 1545B. 22 rds effectively neutralized the area.

At 1745B the 100 Div Arty AOP adjusted both the 373rd and 995 FA Bns on 4 ey tks at S081-603. One tk hid behind a building which was hit and covered the tank. The other three dispersed and were caught in the massed fire for effect of both Bns. Later on fifth tank which apparently had belonged to this group pinned down an FO of the 375 FA Bn. This FO promptly adjusted the 194 FA to within 75 yds of his position. When the mission was completed the FO was unable to state definitely whether or not the tank had been knocked out but an Inf Bn CO later confirmed the destruction of the tank.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 AFA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					5	6
Ppr	Not		Not		47	1
Veh	Available		Available		4	
MG & Mor					11	
Prep					10	
Armor					1	
Def Fires					18	
Har					4	29
Reg					30	
Misc					1	
TOTAL					131	36

S E C R E T

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		21	2	7	1	15
Per	3		1			
Vch	1				6	
Armor					1	
Har		21		25		1
Reg	2				3	
Dest	3					
TOTAL	9	42	3	32	11	16

AOP Missions: 18

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to give close support to the 10th Armd Div. The companies are moving about, giving fire support to the advances of their respective combat commands. The Rcn platoons are attached to the companies for operations.

822 TD Bn is supporting the advances of the 63rd Inf Div. The platoon leaders of Co B, made reconnaissance for gun positions, to support the attack of the 254th Inf Regt to the east. The 3rd platoon of Co C, worked with a Co of tanks, vicinity of ROIGHEIM, and assisted the Inf in taking their objective. The Rcn platoons kept up their road patrolling.

824 TD Bn continued to support the advances of the 100th Inf Div. Co A moved forward, in preparation for crossing of NEKAR RIVER. The 2nd Section of the 1st platoon B Co, provided direct fire support for the withdrawal of Rcn elements of the 1st Bn 398 Inf Regt. 16 rds HE were expended. The 2nd platoon B Co, fired in direct support of the 2d Bn 398th Inf Regt. The 3rd platoon moved into position to fire on buildings east of the NEKAR RIVER, vic (S081655). One platoon of C Co, moved into position to fire on tower believed to be an ey OP vic (S093633). The Rcn Co furnished road patrols and kept liason with forward Inf elements.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points: S695-705, S725-799, S580-862, S524-900, S468-995, S441-914, S379-895, S300-845, S260-810, S180-815, S130-762, S104-742, S067-726, S059-706, S082-672, S086-637, S081-614, S028-576.

Forward elements of the French II Corps were reported as follows: R395-378, R525-415, R640-404, R720-481, R797-478, R820-500, R790-520 R860-601, R930-590, R020-570.

b. Beware German Eats and Smokes. (Source: OCE Hq ETOUSA, Special Intelligence Bulletin No 294, 28 March 1945) Information has recently been received from captured German saboteurs which indicates that the Germans either are contemplating preparing, or have prepared poisoned Nescafe, sugar, German cigarettes and German chocolate. The German brand of chocolate SAROTTI was especially mentioned.

BYRNE

Asst S-3

S E C R E T

ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #209.

(Source: G-2 Report, Hq 7 Army, 4 April 45.)

I. ORDER OF BATTLE.

Summary for Period 26 March to 1 April 1945

Seventh U.S. Army crossing of the RHINE into the heart of GERMANY during the early hours of 26 March still showed the enemy in a daze from the blows struck at First and Seventh German Armies west of the RHINE.

Initial units contacted by XV U.S. Corps included only replacement, and above all, anti-aircraft battalions, which, according to Col. KROEMER former commanding officer of 1559 Artillery Regiment (now PW), were under his command in the MANNHEIM - KATENTHAL area. It is interesting to note that since the crossing of the RHINE up to the end of present period, Seventh U.S. Army identified elements of approximately 40-45 different anti-aircraft battalions, which are now being used in ground support, mainly in an anti-tank role; however, once their AA guns are destroyed they continue fighting as infantry.

The first divisional unit encountered was the recently reformed 696 VG Regiment, organic regiment of 340 VG-Division. PWs indicated they had been hastily rushed to the fighting area from DARMSTADT and were subordinated to Genlt. VON MUEHLEN, who commands remnants of 559 VG Division.

Possible indication of arrival in our sector of our old friend 553 VG Division, was the capture of a small detail of men from 4 Co., 1119 VG Regiment, who stated they were sent from KARLSRUHE to DARMSTADT in order to get some supplies. More elements of 553 Division were shortly thereafter contacted by 45th and 3rd U.S. Divisions.

The hopeless, confused situation in which the enemy found himself was partially brought out by PW from Battle Group HEITMAN who stated that Maj. REITMAN had ordered their guns destroyed, told his men to save themselves, and then committed suicide. During the early part of this period a considerable amount of PW's were still being mopped up west of the RHINE, amongst them many officers who apparently were not quite successful in crossing the RHINE, including Genlt. FRANZ SENSSTUSS, Commanding General 212 VG Division, and his Chief of Staff; as well as Genmaj. GAEDE, Commanding General 719 Infantry Div., and his Chief of Staff; the latter two hiding in a pillbox.

It was not until the middle of the period that some of the divisional remnants of First and Seventh German Armies were reidentified East of the RHINE. 44th U.S. Division identified elements of 198 Infantry Division, remnants 719 VG Division, and also a battle group of 246 VG Division, which, according to PWs, incorporated remnants of 212 VG Division. 3rd U.S. Division contacted remnants of 352 VG Division, while 45th U.S. Division ran into a comparatively strong 36 VG Division, remnants 256 VG Division, and 416 Infantry Division. The location of 47 VG Division was given by PWs to be in the woods vicinity of R-6182. This proved to be correct as elements of 103 VG Regiment were identified vicinity R-6578.

A document dated 29 March threw some light on the partially cloudy enemy order of battle picture, which was not due to lack of intelligence, but rather to the complete disorganization and disintegration of the enemy; it is believed that "the enemy G-3" himself was a bit hazy as to the exact location of all his units. The document located the CP of XIII Corps at S-2172 controlling remnants 246, 17 SS, 553, 19 and 16 Divisions. The Commanding General of XIII Corps, Gen. D. Art (Lt Gen) RALPH GRAF VON ORIOLA, was captured by 12th U.S. Armored Division.

A great variety of "crack fighting units", such as Induction Center Detachments, Barrage Balloon battalions, Maintenance groups, horse pack companies, Air Signal Regiments, Airport guard detachments, etc., were also being identified; thus proving again that though the days of the German Army are a thing of the past, the fanatical Nazi spirit still remains to be bent.

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT NO. 210

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Heavy resistance continued in HEILBRONN (S0861), ODHEIM (S1072), and ROTH (S5191). The 10 A.D. met scattered resistance on their rapid advance to CRAILSHEIM (S7062) where two hundred prisoners were taken. The ey employed approximately two hundred troops in an unsuccessful counterattack on ROTH (S5191) at 2330B. The towns of ALTHAUSEN (S4598), TILLSTADT (S4796), and WACHBACH (S4895), all of which had been previously vacated by friendly forces, were reoccupied by the enemy. An enemy force of approximately six hundred men continued to oppose our ODHEIM bridgehead from well dug in positions between the JAGST and KOCHER RIVERS.

During the day heavy fighting continued in HEILBRONN, although at the close of the period, resistance had lessened materially. Along the NECKAR and JAGST rivers, the ey continued to defend his positions along the high ground. The ey, supported by mortars and arty, resisted the expansion of our bridgeheads at HERLICHINGEN (S2782) and KRAUTHEIMTAL (S3789). The ey attempted to seal off the 10 AD's corridor to CRAILSHEIM (S7062) by launching an attack along the road at S5290 and by digging in along the ridge between APPELBACH (S5196) and HERBSTHAUSEN (S5292). Late in the period the 100 Div experienced heavy 88mm fire at their HEILBRONN bridgehead with fire so intense that the ponton bridge was sunk.

Ey air activity was reported at 1500B with 4 ME 109's strafing, a column and attacking an arty liaison plane vic S575870.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The increase noted yesterday in enemy artillery activity was apparently no brief flare-up, for today the enemy guns continued to be quite lively, with some organization, especially in the HEILBRONN area, evident; in contrast to the scattered fire characteristic of the pursuit. The bulk of the shelling was directed against our forces in the HEILBRONN area, with the ROTH - STUPPACH area being next in importance, though still increasing. During the night the enemy placed considerable interdiction fire on approach routes to HEILBRONN, particularly vic 071-646, where an estimated 50 rounds light and medium caliber fell between 2300B and 0700B. After dark the STUPPACH (4696) and ROTH (5094) areas received intermittent harassing fire, mostly light cal, but some medium caliber was also reported. In the morning the enemy continued to shell the possible crossing sites W of HEILBRONN, but this fire decreased somewhat after mid-day, only to resume with increased vigor near the end of the period when a total of 40 rounds light cal came in. Supporting his C/A vic 5092 with mixed calibers, the enemy kept up occasional harassing fire in that area and also vic ROTH (5094) during the day. Other areas which the enemy subjected to harassing fire during the afternoon in support of his stubborn defense were JAGSTFELD (S0671), HERLICHINGEN, (2782), ASSAMSTADT (4293), MARLACH (3685), and vic 3284 and 2783.

Shellrep. total: 11

100 Div - 8; 63 Div - 3.

EB List #30:

0958 AJ	0965-5832	FW	B	5/G
1059 AK	1032-5968	AOP	B	Btry
1060 AD	1057-6041	AOP	B	Btry
1061 AA	1037-6167	2 FOB-S	B	2/G
1065 AM	1062-6525	AOP	B	1/G
1070 AN	1035-7082	AOP	B	4/G
1262 AL	1234-6276	AOP	B	Btry
1263 AI	122-632	FW	B	5/105
1269 AG	1216-6962	AOP	B	Btry
1271 AO	1298-7177	AOP	B	Btry
1370 AH	1341-7072	AOP	B	4/G
1462 AB	1462-6290	2 FOB-S	A	1/G
1561 AC	1554-6157	2 FOB-S	A	4/G
1658 AF	1635-5886	2 FOB-S	A	3/G
1660 AE	1614-6050	2 FOB-S	B	1/G

S E C R E T

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Activity of the Artillery with the Corps continued at a moderate level in the Corps right sector while in the left sector missions fired were comparatively light and many units displaced forward to better positions.

The 100 Div Arty fired on approximately 21 targets of opportunity located by AOP's. The Div Arty claims 3 tanks and 6 vehicles definitely destroyed and counted 112 casualties as a result of their days firing.

A light harassing program was fired during the night in the 100 Div and the right portion of the 63 Div sectors.

Battery "B" 2nd FA Obsn Bn expanded its two second sound base to a five microphone four second base. Coordinates: Mike #1 S0426-6005, Mike #5 S0434-6545, OP #1 S063-609, OP #2 S061-643. This base began operating at 1400B.

About 1755B the 194 FA Bn fired on ey personnel and 3 tanks at S081-603 who were engaged in making a small counter-attack. The AOP and FDC of the 374 FA Bn and the 194 FA Bn's GOP combined efforts and knocked out two of the tanks. The third tank advanced to within 70 yds of our infantry who promptly knocked it out. A total of 49 rds was expended on this mission.

An FO of the 375 FA Bn adjusted the 938 FA on one 88mm gun at S0855-7330. One direct hit in the gun pit was obtained and caused at least 3 casualties. The gun was reported as definitely knocked out.

In mid-afternoon an FO of the 938 FA Bn adjusted his Bn on a group of ey personnel at S0767-7261 and also dug-in personnel at S0880-7076 and effectively neutralized the areas. No further activity was noted in these two areas.

The 194 FA Bn had a profitable day firing on 2 ey towers at S077-605 and S0932-6332, respectively; 3 bldgs occupied by ey personnel at S0787-5801; 1 tank at S079-585, and 1 steeple used as an OP at S0849-6625. 4 hits were obtained on each of the towers, 2 of the bldgs were knocked down and 4 hits were obtained on the other, the tank was immobilized with 1 target hit, and the steeple sustained 18 hits which left it in a badly damaged condition. These missions were fired at various times throughout the day and were observed either by the 194 FA Bn's AOP or the AOP of the 100th Div Arty.

A GOP of the 398 Inf adjusted the 938 FA Bn on a house occupied by ey personnel at S0791-6690. 7 hits were obtained and the personnel was dispersed.

The 863 FA Bn GOP adjusted the 995 FA Bn on an ey gun at S284-815. 32 rds were fired and the observer reported many hits in the gun pit.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 AFA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					2	2
Per					61	
Veh		Not		Not	5	
MG & Mor		Available		Available	3	
Armor					6	
Def Fire					3	
Har					7	27
Reg					14	
Misc					6	
Dest					3	
TOTAL					110	29

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	3	8	3	4		
Per	5	3		1		
Prep		1				
Armor	4					Net
Har		22		29		Available
Reg	3		3			
Dest	5		2			
TOTAL	20	34	8	34		

AOP Missions: 14

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to advance with the progress of the 10 A.D. Co "A" atchd CCB, moved from FRANKENBACH (S0463) and was last reported enroute to rejoin the Div. Co "B" atchd CCA, with CP vic ASSAMSTADT (S4193). 1st Plt atchd Task Force RILEY vic NENNSTETTIN (S3692); 2nd Plt atchd T/F ROBERTS vic DORZBACH (S939); and the 3d Plt atchd T/F HANKINS was last reported approaching CRAILSHEIM (S7066). Co "C" atchd CCR with 1st and 3rd Plts in ASSAMSTADT (S4193); and the 2nd Plt atchd T/F THACKSTON occupying defensive positions vic HACHTEL (S4993).

822 TD Bn supported the attacks of 63 Inf Div. The 1st and 2nd Plts of "A" Co took up defensive positions in support of 253 Inf Regt. 3rd Plt guns cross JAGST R. behind friendly tanks, took up positions in edge of woods E of UNTERGRESHEIM and fired into HEUCHLINGEN (0773) enabling our Inf to move in and occupy the town. Two Plts and CP group of "B" Co moved from MERCHINGEN to ASSAMSTADT. Co "C" remains atchd 255 Inf Regt. One Plt with Inf attacked a small village but was forced to withdraw due to intense arty and mortar fire.

824 TD Bn moved forward with the attacks of the 100 Inf Div. TD companies displaced in direct support of respective Inf Regts.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S0357 - 083612 - 0770 - 1477 - 1881 - 2681 - 4389 - 5088 - 5886 - 6576 - 7062 - 7161.

XV Corps.

4801

5202.

BYRNE

Asst S-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 US ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init:
Date: 8 Apr 45
From: 071800B Apr 45
To : 081800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #211.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

100 Div: Hvy resistance continued on all fronts, resulting in only limited gains. Throughout morning arty fire continued to fall on HEILBRONN bridgehead but decreased after one CB program at 1400B hours. Rocket fire from NE was received vic 075639. PW stated 3 Coys of 150 men each reinforced line vic NEUNSTADT (1672) last night with his coy committed at JAGSTFELD (0671). AOP reported the center of pontoon bridge N of HEILBRONN in water at 1545B hours.

63 Div: Stiff resistance from SA, AW and mortar fire was encountered along line SIGLINGEN (1479) - KRESSBACH (1477) - STEIN (1374). Hvy rocket fire received from vic 1472 and 1975 in center of sector. At 0800B an ey C/A vic 225-789 with 100 inf was dispersed by arty fire. Ey arty harassed MOCKMUHL (1781) during morning and then ey infiltrated into the town. AOP reported at 1540B hours 100 inf on road from 197789 to 205760, believed moving South.

10 Arm'd Div: Between 0645B and 0800B hours three air attacks were launched, the first involving 20 ME 109s and FW 190s and the last, one jet propelled; our column vic 650625 was strafed and bombs dropped at 225835, 224952 and 425952. At 1330B hours a coordinated air and ground attack was launched vic CRAILSHEIM (7062). A coy of SS troops were known to be vic 548915. CCA reported AT gun vic 595840 fired on all passing vehicles. 400-500 ey were reported vic 675639.

Tac/R: 1500-2000 inf moving West vic S5226 toward STUTTGART at 1400B. 3,000 ey and 15 horsedrawn vehicles vic T8145 headed South at 1500B.

Air OP at 1700B hours: 12 tanks at 600785, moving toward BLAUFELDEN (6279); large concentration of ey troops, in small groups, vic 6185 moving toward RIEDBACH (5885); 80 inf and 5 trucks in NIEDERSTETTIN (5891); 50 inf at 584913.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. The enemy supported his determined defense against our advance, particularly in the HEILBRONN area, with increased artillery fire, including a sharp use in Nebelwerfer fire in the afternoon. Again most of the shelling was directed into the HEILBRONN area, with the remainder being divided between the JAGSTFELD MOCKMUHL sector and the ROTH-BARTENSTEIN area. During the early hours of the period several guns E of HEILBRONN were active shelling possible crossing sites over the river, but after prompt counterbattery the rest of the night was quiet. In the morning, however, with good visibility aiding his observation, the enemy commenced intermittent, but persistent harassing and destruction fire on the crossing sites, notwithstanding close observation by our AOP's which netted several battery positions. In defense of the NEUNSTADT-LAMPOLDSHAUSEN area the enemy placed several 5 to 15 round concentrations vic JAGSTFELD (0761), ZUTLINGEN, (1679), and HERBOLSHEIM (1176). During the day light and medium calibers placed harassing fire on ROTH (5090) and along the road from 5290 to 5787. Just after noon a few rounds of Nebelwerfer fire fell in the HEILBRONN area, but between 1730B and 1835B an estimated 50 to 60 rounds landed vic 076-609.

Shellrep total: 31

63 Div	100 Div	6 Gp
6	16	9

b. Changes to EB List #30:

(1) Additions:

1160 AT	1196-6087	2 FOB-S	B	3/G
1161 AU	1126-6115	2 FOB-S	A	3/G
1161 AS	1156-6166	ACP	B	1/G
1265 AV	1230-6554	GOP	B	4/Nebel
1560 AP	1566-6012	2 FOB-S	B	2/G
1659 AQ	1655-5992	2 FOB-S	B	1/G
1659 AR	1672-5966	2 FOB-S	B	1/G

C 1671

SECRET

(2) Suspect List #30-1:

142-731	Nebel	PW
1749-5940	1/G	2 FOB-S
1182-6340	1/G	2 FOB-S
1149-6094	Btry	AOP
162-585	Btry	AOP
148-715	1/AA Gun	AOP
1498-7202	1/AA Gun	AOP
284-815	Btry	GOP

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The arty with the Corps was very active during the period firing obs and unobs missions on cy personnel, batteries, and armor. During the night a harassing program was fired on cy lines of communication and cy batteries. During the period the Corps Arty units alone fired a total of 126 tons of ammunition into cy territory.

The 36 FA Bn was adjusted by the AOP of the 17 FA Bn on 4 Nebelwerfers at S1492-7153 from 0909B to 0925B. A total of 36 rds was fired and the guns were neutralized. This same Bn was adjusted on two Nebelwerfer batterys at S1477-7142 by the 35 FA Gp AOP at 0946B; 57 rds were fired and area was neutralized.

The 194 FA Bn continued its attack on German armor by destroying an cy tank by 3 direct hits at S0419-5800 with 11 rds fired at 1210B; mission was observed by the 374 FA Bn AOP. This same Bn left another tank burning at S0869-6045 after firing 11 rds. The 100 Div Arty AOP observed this mission. Another cy tank was disabled after the 6 FA Gp AOP observed 13 rds fired on the tank which was located at S088-666. The 194 FA Bn destroyed its last tank for the period after getting 3 direct hits on one at S041-582. This brought their score for the period to 3 destroyed and 1 probable.

An cy OP at S0883-8422 was neutralized at 1218B when the 194 FA Bn fired 8 rds which were observed by the Bn AOP. A direct hit was recorded on the building.

The 373 FA Bn disabled a tank at S104-607 by obtaining 2 direct hits on the tank at 0930B.

At 1040B the 375 FA Bn fired on a building at S083-733 and after one direct hit a white flag and 2 PW's appeared. As soon as the white flag disappeared, another round was fired into the house and the white flag and 3 PW's appeared. This procedure continued until the house was cleaned out and the 100 Inf Div had 13 more PW's.

The 863 FA Bn AOP adjusted the 17 FA Bn on cy personnel around house at S2936-7873 at 0856A. A total of 16 rds was fired and several hits were scored on the house. A vehicle which was sitting beside the house was destroyed.

The 17 FA Bn AOP adjusted the 36 FA Bn on 16 rocket guns at S1492-7153. A total of 85 rds was fired and the area was neutralized.

Btry "A", 2nd FA Obsn Bn completed installation of a five microphone two second sound base at 1700B. Mike #1 is at S13504-82821, mike #5 is at S15745-84328, and sound OP is at S153-826.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			4		6	5
Per			42		29	2
Veh			2		2	
MG & Mor	Not		12		10	
Prep	Available			14	1	
Armor					1	
Def Fires				3	8	
Har				25	6	45
Reg			4		5	
Misc					13	
Prop			1	13		
Dest					1	
TOTAL			65	55	82	52

S E C R E T

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	6	32	2	3		
Per	3		1			
Armor	3					Not
Har		16		14		Available
Reg			3			
Dost	2					
TOTAL	14	48	6	17		

AOP Missions: 14

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn was busy during the period supporting the operations of the 10th AD.

Co "A" and Co "B" supported CCB and CCA respectively. Both companies did much shifting of positions and some firing during the period however, the exact dispositions and results of firing are not known as the period closes. Co "C" remains in support of CCR.

822 TD Bn supported the attacks of the 63 Inf Div. Co "A" attached 253 Inf Regt displaced guns forward and took up defensive positions with the progress of the advancing Infantry. All plt positions received enemy arty fire during the period. Co "B" attached 254 Inf Regt advanced with the Inf elements and captured 3 PW's. Co "C" continued to support the 255 Inf Regt. The 2nd Plt of "C" Co received some intermittent enemy arty fire in the town of ASCHAUSEN (S3187).

The 2nd Rcn Plt was attached to the 4 SP TD's and supported the attacks of the 254 Inf Regt.

824 TD Bn continued direct support to 100 Inf Div. At least 9 TD's crossed the bridge W of HEILBRONN (S0764). All companies did some moving and "C" Co some firing but the extent is not known as the period ends.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:
S082-605, S088-635, S063-715, S138-770, S210-790, S319-815, S385-880, S505-880, S568-872, S660-760, S695-700, S710-610, S520-645.

XXI Corps:

S490-955, S478-000, N522-025.

II French Corps:

R895-375, S030-455, S035-545, S035-588.

[Signature]
EVANS
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

TRANSLATION

The following letter was found in HEILDELBERG at the statue of Bismarck:

"TO: General Eisenhower, U. S. A.

"SUBJECT: Our answer to General Eisenhower.

"In answer to your Proclamation, issued by you at the time your troops entered Heildelberg, we The Women of Heidelberg wish to inform you of the following:

"In your military edict, you say you intend to destroy German militarism and the Nazi Party; that you did not come as an oppressor and you demand that we carry out your orders implicitly. We, the women of Heidelberg, expect more than that. We want the resurrection of common sense and decency. This is the deepest meaning of all existence and for us the assurance of a lasting peace.

"Today is Easter! Also the 130th birthday of our Bismarck - the rebirth of things spiritual!

"You wanted to enter Heidelberg as a victor and all you found were people with smiling faces, open arms and white flags flying from their houses. Your soldiers were hugged and kissed and served with wine.

"Were these vanquished people who stood before you whining?

"Submission is unknown to our womanly hearts. Instead we are possessed of a common pride and an iron will to fight against all senselessness regardless of what it might be.

"We despise the hypocritical holier-than-thou attitude of the National Socialists, and did not flee with them.

"At the same time we do not beg for your favor.

"We bore like white ants to undermine all things we resent.

"You proved your high regard for German spiritual things when you built our new university and spared Heidelberg the experience of terror air raids.

"However, we do not fear the bombing might of muscleless sportsmen who drop bombs from cowardly heights or shoot V-1 bombs from cowardly distances for we know that it requires only muscles and spirit to resist such force.

"Give us peace based on wisdom and you will receive our admiration. We revere the might of love formed in the depth of human hearts and which later blossoms into beauty."

The Women of Heidelberg

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

S E C R E T
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *PCE*
Date: 9 Apr 45
From: 081800B Apr 45
To : 091800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #212.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

During the night house to house fighting continued in HEILBRONN and ey resisted strongly from high ground NE of JAGSTFELD (S-0671). Following arty and rocket preparation, small ey C/A across canal vic S-077658 was dispersed at 0215B. Ey resistance continued strong in ODEHEIM bridgehead. Along the corridor to CRAILSHEIM (S-7062) the situation was confused with some convoys getting through and others running into fire fights. Ey road-block at REIDBACH (S5885) was cleared at 1840B but ey reentered BARTENSTEIN (S-5586) when fighting continued. BLAUFELDEN (S-6380) was found clear at 2130B although our troops had been forced back from there early in evening.

During the day, resistance was unchanged on our flanks but decreased in the center. Intense fire from all inf weapons opposed our advance in HEILBRONN and ODEHEIM bridgeheads but 63 Div elements virtually cleared HARDTHAUSER WALD (S-2078) and woods (S-3080) against moderate resistance. Ey infiltrated into ROTH (5291) - CRAILSHEIM corridor and created physical and mine RBs. Our attack through woods S of ROTH met SA and 88mm fire and ey was found dug-in astride road vic 6082. SA and AT fire met our armor advancing NW vic S-5372 and S-5269.

PW statements indicate ey buildup in woods NE of CRAILSHEIM. Air activity increased over the Corps zone with 101 hostiles reported; principal targets were in S-7064 and S-4295 squares. 995 FA'S cub was shot down, injuring both pilot and observer. Seven ey planes were reported destroyed.

PW's (24-hr period ending 082400B): 687.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. With a lull in operations around HEILBRONN reducing the number of profitable targets, a decrease in enemy artillery activity occurred in that sector today but elsewhere the volume of fire put out by enemy guns remained substantially the same. During the night the HEILBRONN area drew light harassing fire, but at 0200B the enemy placed a concentration of arty and rocket fire vic 0764 and 0765 in support of a counterattack in that area. Rocket and arty fire fell S of DORZBACH at 2235B, and the JAGSTFELD area received fire from the woods NE of the town. Day-time shelling of the HEILBRONN area was light, but the enemy defended the woods N and W of LAMPOLDSHAUSEN with moderate arty fire, placing concentrations in the woods vic 2178, 1476, and 1276, also vic ZUTLINGEN (1679), EICHELSHOF (3079), N of FORCHTENBERG (3279), and at 227-766. An 88mm shelled the intersection at 059-693 with 10 rounds at 1550A. Infiltration into the ROTH area was aided by harassing fire during the night, and throughout the day intermittent harassing fire was directed at the road between 519-917 and 528-896.

Shellrep total: 9

100 Div -- 6; 63 Div -- 3.

b. Changes to EB List #30.

(1) Additions:

1361 AX	1362-6143	2 FOB-S & AP	A	1/G
1365 AY	1341-6529	2 FOB-S & AP	A	1/G
1468 AW	1445-6880	AP	A	2/Lt
1980 AZ	1953-8080	2 FOB-S	B	4/Lt

(2) Amendments:

1269 AG	1225-6968	AP	A	2/G
1370 AH	1351-7076	AP	A	1/G

(3) Deletions:

1267 AL	1059 AK	0958 AJ
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Suspect List #30-2

1484-6100	2FOB-S	1/G
1780-5965	2FOB-S	1/Med
1500-6513	2FOB-S	1/G
585-911	AOP	3/88
545-908	AOP	1/88
128-628	FW	1/G
182-722	AOP	Btry

2 FOB turned in 6 locations during the period for 3 new locations and 3 suspects. Two C acc sound locations in the 1361 and 1365 sq were verified by AP on cover of 8 April and one B acc location in the 1980 sq was made. Three C acc locations in the 1461, 1759, and 1565 squares were put on the suspect list.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. With continued good visibility observed missions on ey personnel, vehicles, and armor were plentiful. During the night a harassing program was fired on ey supply lines and battery locations. The AOP'S did the majority of observing on targets of opportunity during the period.

Commencing at 1322B the 17 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on an unknown number of ey personnel at S2402-7242; 49 rds were fired and ey was dispersed with casualties. Then the observer shifted the Bn on a target of ey personnel at S2528-7374 and fired 45 rds with good effect. Another group of personnel appeared at S202-766 and they were worked over with 76 rds and personnel was dispersed with an unknown number of casualties.

The 17 F.A. Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on an ey strong point in barn at S1844-8175 and 10 rds were fired at 1716B with 3 direct hits on barn recorded. At 1809B this same combination fired on a house being used as a strong point at S1836-8171 and 2 hits were reported out of 7 rds fired on target.

At 2005B an FO of the 63d Recon Troop adjusted the 17 FA Bn on 3 ey guns at S187-808. The guns were neutralized after firing 22 rds.

The 375 F.A. Bn GOP adjusted the 938 F.A. Bn on ey personnel in house at S0690-7090 at 1855B. A total of 31 rds was fired and one end of house was knocked down and the house was left burning. An unknown number of casualties was observed in the area.

The 194 F.A. Bn was adjusted on an ey OP in church steeple by the AOP of the 100 Div Arty. A total of 43 rds was fired and 22 target hits reported; the top of steeple was knocked off and part of church wall was caved in.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			6	5
Per	8	14	47	2
Veh			9	
MG & Mor	2		8	
Prep	3		1	
Def Fire	2		2	
Har		3	10	26
Reg.	2	3	33	
Misc	11		10	
Prop				1
Dist			3	
TOTAL	28	20	129	34

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	41	1	1	8	4
Per	4		12		6	
Veh			2		4	
Armor					5	
Har	1	26		24		15

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Summary of Missions Corps Arty (Cont.)

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
Reg	3		4		5	
Misc		2				2
Dest			3			
TOTAL	9	69	22	25	28	21

AOP Missions: 50

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to support the attacks of the 10th A.D. "B" and "C" Co supported respective combat commands and Task Forces in the CRAILSHEIM area. One Plt of "C" Co has been atchd to 634 FA Bn for anti-tank protection. Co "A" atchd to CCB was busy during the period helping to keep the supply route open to CRAILSHEIM. Bn CP is now located vic ASSAMSTADT (S4193).

822 TD Bn continued support to 63 Inf Div. "A" Co atchd 253 Inf Regt supported the attack to the East receiving moderate arty fire. "B" Co atchd 254 Inf Regt captured 7 PW's after a brief fire fight. 3rd Plt guns fired 5 rds HE on enemy Inf vic DORZBACH (S4389). Co "C" continued the attack with the 255 Inf Regt crossing two Plts over the JAGST R. The SP Plt with the 2nd Rcn Plt remained atchd and supporting the attacks of the 253 Inf Regt.

824 TD Bn kept up close support to the Inf Regts of the 100 Inf Div. The TD companies are running into stiff resistance and heavy arty fire.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:
S035-545, S035-587, S080-605, S089-640, S-063-715, S160-770, S212-756, S270-800, S329-773, S385-800, S405-835, S470-833, S-465-876, S505-885, S555-865, S625-800, S695-705, S700-620, S590-655, S525-645, S530-720.

XXI Corps:

S-520-965, S528-985, N-617-035, N645-065.

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #213.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Determined ey resistance continued along the entire front with the ey assuming an aggressive attitude at several points. The ey made desperate attempts to cut the road between HERBSTHAUSEN (S5191) and BLAUFELDEN (S6380) while at 2400B, a C/A by 200 ey was launched vic SIGISWEILER (S6282) retaking 80 German prisoners. The ey attacked CRAILSHEIM (S7062) at 0500B from S and SE with SA, AW, and direct fire weapons. Approximately 600 troops participated in this attack and occupied several buildings until burned out by troops of 10 AD. At the JAGSTFELD (S0671) -- GRIESEHEIM (S0775) bridgehead and in HEILBRONN (S0861), heavy SA, AW and mortar fire continued. At 0530B, 200 ey attacked vic S078653 from NECKARSULM (S0867) preceded by an intense preparation of SA fire. This attack was repulsed by 0600B by infantrymen of the 100 Div.

Throughout the day, the road from CRAILSHEIM (S7062) to ILSHOFEN (S5965) was subject to ambush and direct arty fire. A 10 AD column moving NW met stubborn resistance vic S4880 but made contact with friendly elements at that point. Mopping up of BARTENSTEIN (S5586) continued against light opposition while three small ey groups counterattacked vic LAMPOLDSHAUSEN (S2175). Heavy fighting continued in HEILBRONN (S0861) where the ey displayed a strong SA and bazooka defense.

Ey aircraft were active again during the period with 3 bombing attacks reported on the CRAILSHEIM airport during the early morning and several planes strafing 10 AD's patrol vic 605665 at 0600B hours.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Enemy artillery fire over most of the front continued to decrease, particularly in the HEILBRONN area, though direct fire weapons were still very actively opposing operations in vic ILSHOFEN-CRAILSHEIM. Again today rocket weapons in the wooded hills E of NECKARSULM supported enemy resistance in the NEUENSTADT-HEILBRONN region. 12 rounds rocket fire fell at 127-738 at 1858B. 105's lightly shelled forward elements vic 1475 and 1476 at 1955B, and WEISSBACH was hit with 15 rounds harassing fire at 2020A. The CR at 553-881 was lightly interdicted, and the woods vic 5789 drew light harassing fire in the early hours of the period. Throughout the day the enemy subjected the ILSHOFEN-CRAILSHEIM road to intermittent interdiction by light caliber direct fire weapons. In other sectors the morning was generally quiet, but at mid-day Nebelwerfers, estimated as 210mm caliber, threw an approx total of 15 to 20 rounds into HEILBRONN near a possible crossing site over the river. CRAILSHEIM was also reported to have received 210mm rocket fire at 1045A. At various times in the afternoon light calibers placed small harassing concentrations on our forward elements vic 0974, JAGSTFELD, HEILBRONN, and vic 2275.

Shellrep total: 10

100 Div	63 Div	6 Gp	35 Gp
6	1	2	1

b. Changes to EB List #30:

(1) Additions:

0963 BB	0932-6333	AOP & AP 9 Apr	A	1 Med
1059 AK	1032-5977	2 FOB-S	B	1/G
1256 BA	1251-5680	AP 9 Apr	B	1/G

(2) Deletions:

1561 AC	1462 AB	1070 AN	1060 AD	2171 AO
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(3) Suspect List #30-3:

550-678	PW	4/150
123-622	PW	1/150
128-628	PW	1/150
585-911	AOP	4/88
186-808	AOP	1/G

Light ey arty activity in the HEILERONN area limited the sound locations during the period to two. Both locations were of B acc, one a reactivation of 1059 AK and the other a new location in the 1256 sq.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The Corps Arty continued to fire numerous observed missions on personnel, vehicles, and enemy guns as the visibility continued excellent. During the night a harassing program was fired on the ey main supply routes. Between 1215B and 1255B the 6 FA Gp and 100 Div Arty fired a series of TOT'S on large concentration of troops and vehicles in the NECKARSULM (S0968) area; the Div Arty stated this was the most ammunition at a steady rate for a prolonged length of time that they had fired since entering combat.

The 6 FA Gp AOP adjusted the 938 FA Bn on 19 small sized ey vehicles at S094-658. A total of 34 rds was fired at 1600B and the observer reported after flying low over the target, that all vehicles had been damaged or destroyed. The GOP of the 938 FA Bn adjusted his Bn on a CP and ey personnel at S076-714 at 1400B. Seventeen rounds were fired with 3 direct hits destroying the building and casualties were observed in the area. The GOP then shifted his Bn on ey personnel in a building at S0916-6821 at 1425B. The personnel were neutralized with 4 direct hits on building out of 14 rds fired. This same combination fired on ey personnel and gun at S0837-6981 at 1425B. The gun was neutralized and personnel dispersed after 26 rds were fired.

The 863 FA Bn AOP adjusted the 36 FA Bn on 2 ey guns at S3352-7800. After 48 rds were fired, the observer reported 2 direct hits on one gun and very near misses on the other gun.

After meeting stiff MG and AW fire from a group of buildings at S083-618 during the night, the 374 FA Bn FO adjusted the 194 FA Bn on these buildings. A total of 77 rds was fired from 1002B to 1230B and 3 blocks of buildings were left gutted.

The 375 FA Bn GOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on a 75mm AT gun at S0835-7325 at 1403B. After firing 11 rds the observer reported that one direct hit knocked the gun out of its pit and that personnel were scattered.

The 194 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on ey strong points in 3 buildings at S094-736 at 1223B. Two buildings were demolished and the other badly caved in after 49 rds were fired.

The 6 FA Gp AOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on ey vehicles at S0983-5476 at 1225B. A total of 20 rds was fired and 3 vehicles definitely destroyed. Observer stated the area looked as if it was a motor park; so the 6 FA Gp and 100 Div Arty fired two TOT'S in the area at 1235B and 1240B at the rate of 3 rds per gun.

The 194 FA Bn was adjusted by the 374 FA Bn GOP on an anti-tank gun at S088-605 at 1915B. After 5 rds were fired observer reported mission complete as gun had been destroyed by direct hit.

At 1922B the 938 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on ODHEIM at S107-723 and after 1 rd of HE and 6 rds of smoke were fired, the observer reported a large fire burning. An extremely large fire was started in KOCHENDORF at S078-704 by this same combination after 6 rds of smoke and 6 rds HE were fired. NECKARSULM at S085-659 received the same treatment of 30 rds of HE and 16 rds of smoke with the result being a large fire.

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b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB			1		2	1
Per			14		38	26
Veh					8	
MG & Mor	Not		2	4	5	1
Prep	Available				1	
Har			3	1	23	58
Reg			2	4	16	
Misc			21		4	
Dest					3	
TOTAL			43	9	100	86

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	3	8	2	1		
Veh	7	4	1			
Har		21		24	Not	
Reg	3		4		Available	
Misc	1					
Dest	5		2			
TOTAL	19	33	9	25		

AOP Missions: 20

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued direct support to units of 10th AD.

All TD companies remained with same combat commands and task forces as reported in the last period. All companies were very busy during this period and much moving and occupation of positions took place. Many of the TD's did some firing but the extent and effects are not known as yet.

822 TD Bn displaced guns forward with the attacks of the 63 Inf Div.

Co "C" fired 27 rds HE on enemy Inf and MG nests with good results. 2nd plt guns received heavy small arms fire and 3rd plt positions received some mortar fire. Co "B" closely supported the advances of the 254 Inf Regt.

The 3rd Plt of "C" Co knocked out an enemy mortar but received moderate to heavy arty fire during the period. The 2nd Plt of "C" Co captured 13 PW's vic CRESPIENHOFEN (S3581).

824 TD Bn attached 100 Inf Div--no report on operations.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S035-542, S038-590, S074-597, S088-636, S082-672, S062-713, S104-743, S190-742, S243-767, S295-790, S342-771, S396-795, S452-809, S491-756, S505-705, S591-655, S705-619, S695-704, S625-798, S571-885, S547-923.


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ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #213.

(Source G-2 Report HQ, VI Corps
9 April 1945.)

ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

Our current attacks from the CRAILSHEIM area, coupled with the drive E in the HEILBRONN area, threaten to cut off substantial German forces leaving the enemy but two alternatives:

(1) To reduce the threat from the CRAILSHEIM area either by destroying the forces in that area or by making their positions untenable.

(2) To withdraw to the high ground S of the general line CRAILSHEIM -- HALL -- HEILBRONN.

The enemy has been making desperate attempts to put the first alternative into effect and has been partially successful in interrupting the main supply route of the forces in the CRAILSHEIM area. However, it is not believed that he has adequate forces to interrupt this road permanently or to destroy the substantial armored elements now operating in that area. Therefore, it is likely that he will be forced to adopt the second alternative and reduced pressure on the N flank indicates that limited withdrawal to the S has already been initiated.

On our N flank, the XXI Corps bridgehead in the KITZINGEN area has breached the last defensive barrier W of the BAMBERG -- NURNBERG Valley with the exception of the moderately difficult terrain in the STEIGER Forest.

On our S flank, the First French Army is rapidly clearing the enemy from the triangle formed by the NECKAR and ENZ Rivers.

The SWABIAN Alps and the FRANKENHOHE constitute the last terrain barrier in our zone W of the DANUBE Basin. The threat of a penetration into the DANUBE Basin from the W must be causing the German High Command grave concern particularly in view of a similar threat from the E. An early juncture of our forces with Russian forces driving W from VIENNA would not only cut all escape routes to the "National Redoubt" but would also isolate German forces still battling in ITALY and the BALKANS. Therefore, any further advance to the E or SE within the Corps zone is likely to be stubbornly contested.

When forced to withdraw from his present positions, the enemy will probably take up a position along the FRANKENHOHE and high ground between CRAILSHEIM and HEILBRONN protecting the NORDLINGEN Gap which is expected to be strongly defended. When this position becomes untenable, it is believed that he will withdraw to the SWABIAN Alps, the last suitable delaying position N of the DANUBE. Inasmuch as this position could be outflanked by a drive S down the BAMBERG -- DURNBERG Valley towards MUNICH, the enemy will make every effort to block the entrance to this valley N of BAMBERG. Finally, when driven across the DANUBE, the enemy will probably make a last ditch stand to prevent the establishment of a bridgehead.

The continuation of the war in the face of seemingly hopeless odds indicates that Hitler intends to prolong the war just as long as possible. As shown on the attached overlay, the enemy on our front has received substantial reinforcements including many SS troops. From past experience, these troops will make every effort to carry out their Fuhrer's orders and will contest every foot of ground.

In view of these considerations, Capability a is favored, in conjunction with frequent air attacks and counterattacks, designed to throw our attacks off balance.

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #214.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

During the night close contact and stubborn resistance continued in HEILBRONN - NECKARSULM (0866) area and in the central front but the 10 Arm'd Div withdrew from the CRAILSHEIM (7062) corridor without incident. Night patrols to OBER (0667) and UNTER EISESHEIM (0767) were driven off with S/A fire. PWs for the 24 hr period ending 102400B April were 786, but an unconfirmed report from 10 Arm'd Div states an additional 1500 PWs were taken vic CRAILSHEIM.

Throughout the day 100 Div elements encountered heavy S/A, MG and SP fire from S bank of KOCHER River vic KOCHENDORF (0870). An estimated 60 ey and 2 SPs continue to defend ODHEIM (1072). A cub plane with allied markings was reported by a ground observer to have landed S of ODHEIM but took off and flew E when one of our cubs tried to identify it at 1505B hours.

10 Arm'd Div encountered bazooka fire and mines at 658764. As of 1030B hours, bridges at 613708 and 583728 were intact. An ey convoy, moving North, was reported in woods and on road vic 564775 and an ey column at 464775.

In 63 Div's sector, an ey patrol of 15-20 men withdrew after a fire fight vic 223744 at 0650B. At 0630B, after a short arty preparation, 40-60 ey attacked vic 346776 and a ten man patrol attempted a diversionary attack vic 338778; both were repulsed with S/A and arty fire. Two other patrol actions in this general vicinity during the afternoon indicated that the ey attempted to determine our flanks and disposition. Entrenchments were observed from N edge of woods at ERNSBACH (2978) to FORCHTENBERG (3378). PW reported 400 ey are in dug-in positions from SINDRINGEN (2677) to ERNSBACH (2978), and 3 coys on high ground from SINDRINGEN along river to OHRNBERG (2573).

At noon 6 Me 109s were reported over the Corps left flank and at 1400B hours 15 Me's vic KUNZELSAU (4277).

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Our withdrawal from the ILSHOFEN-CRAILSHEIM area brought about a considerable reduction of ey arty fire on the Corps left flank; however activity in the HEILBRONN area continued on a par with that of the last few days. Harassing fire in the HEILBRONN area increased about midnight and then fell off sharply until 1045B hrs when a TOT of 15 rds of 150 Nebelwerfer fire fell at 077-609. NAGELSEBERG (4178) was harassed intermittently during the night by 88's and during the early morning our elements in the 3577 sq S of Niedernhall were hit with 7 rds of 150 cal. The same area was hit again around 1000B hrs with 10 rds of 88 and an hour later with 8 rds of 88. During the afternoon HEILBRONN was the target for consistent light harassing fire by 88's and 105's. Today's shelling was notable for its lack of med. cal and 210 rocketed fire which heretofore has been prevalent in the HEILBRONN area. Another noteworthy factor is that most of the shelling reported was from high velocity weapons.

In the railroad tunnel at R906-968, on the NE side of the town of EBERBACH has been discovered a big addition to the list of artillery pieces abandoned by the Germans. This a 340mm railroad gun, model 1912 of French manufacture (Schneider) date of construction 1914, and modified in 1918. Darkness of the tunnel prevented detailed study, but the weapon is approximately 50 feet long, of massive construction, including a breech ring about 4 ft on a side with a very thick, heavy breechblock, and mounted on a high ruggedly built body supported by multiple trucks. Apparently firing stresses are transmitted through the carriage to the ground by a series of large pressure plates which are lowered from their travelling position under the car to the ground by individual jacks. The cars accompanying the gun car consist of a generator unit, possibly for supplying power to electrically driven elevation mechanism, power rammer, and shell-handling mechanism, and ammunition and crew cars. Some ammunition and powder are still in the magazine car, and the gun itself appears to be in good condition. The projectile has two copper rotating bands, widely separated, and is not streamlined. It will be recalled that early in January, XV Corps elements were shelled by a very heavy gun, identified at the time as a 340mm French railroad gun, and it is quite possible that this gun is the same one. From the railroad dispatch record affixed to each car, it appears that the ultimate destination of the train was ULM, by way of EBERBACH, but evidently rail cuts or lack of an engine caused the abandonment.

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S E C R E T

b. Changes to EB list #30:

(1) Additions:

0756 BC	0735-5620	100 AOP	B	-/G
1061 BD	1072-6196	100 AOP	B	-/G
1357 BG	1384-5737	2 FOB/S	B	2/G
1563 ZB	156-638	PRU/AP	A	1/Lt
2771 BF	2790-7176	17 AOP	B	4/Nebel
3073 BE	3006-7330	35 Gp AOP	B	-/G
		PW		

(2) Deletions

1660 AE	1265 AV
1262 AL	1560 AP
0958 AJ	1659 AR
1065 AM	1980 AZ
1263 AI	

Suspect List #30-4

393-786	PW	3-4/G
270-765	PW	1/G
1338-5744	2 FOB/S	1/G
1370-6500	AOP	1/G
1370-6543	AOP	3/G

Three sound locations were made during the period, all in the HEILBRONN area. One confirmed AK, one was a new location 1357 BG, and the other was of poor accuracy.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Visibility during the day continued to be excellent so the arty with the Corps obtained many observed mission on various types of targets. During the night a heavy harassing program was fired on the ey lines of communication. The 100 Div Artillery destroyed 6 vehicles, damaged 5 vehicles, and knocked out 2 TD's during the period.

The 938 FA Bn was adjusted by 100 Div Arty., AOP on ey vehicles and personnel at S1162-6720. A total of 24 rds was fired at 1358B and observer reported no visible results but that area was well covered.

The 375 FA Bn FO adjusted the 938 FA Bn on a suspected ey ammunition dump in a factory at S0812-7052. Twenty-two rds were fired at 1510B and the smoke stack was knocked down and direct hits on building reported.

The 938 FA Bn GOP adjusted his Bn on ey personnel in house at S090-685. At 1950B 15 rds were fired and one direct hit started a large fire.

The 6 FA Gp AOP adjusted the 938 FA Bn on ey personnel and 3 vehicles loading up at warehouse at S0809-6648. A total of 19 rds was fired and all three vehicles were hit; also casualties were observed lying around the loading dock.

The 995 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on an SP gun at S203-725. The area was well covered after 17 rds were fired.

The 863 FA Bn GOP adjusted the 17 FA Bn on ey vehicles at S3609-7443 at 1112B. Several vehicles were damaged after 34 rds were fired.

The M-12 went into position vic HEILBRONN and after 8 rds of direct fire knocked down a building which was used as an ey strong point. A white flag appeared in an adjoining house after the first round. As the M-12 was pulling out of position, German counterbattery fire fell 50 yds short of their previous position.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB				3	1	4
Per			29		23	12
Veh				4	7	
MG & Mor	Not		5		4	1
Prep	Available				1	
Armor					1	
Def Fire					2	

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

b. Summary of Missions; Div Arty (Cont.)

	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
Har			1	11	6	63
Reg	Not		3	6	20	
Misc	Available		26		3	
Prop						1
Dest					1	
TOTAL			64	24	69	81

(2) Corps Arty:

	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		3	2			
Per	4		1			
Veh	1		2		Not	
Har		50		27	Available	
Reg	2		11			
Dest	1		1			
TOTAL	8	53	17	27		

AOP Missions: 21

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued support to 10th AD. All companies moved and assembled with respective combat commands and Task Forces. During the period TD Companies were able to get some badly needed maintenance and general resupply. All units are making preparations for continued operations.

822 TD Bn advanced with the attacks of the 63 Inf Div. Co "A" advancing with the 253 Inf Regt received heavy Arty fire during the period. One 3" gun and one 1/4 ton was knocked out by arty fire during the advance. Co "B" fired 17 rds HE on enemy personnel and captured 1 PW. Co "C" mounted Inf of the 255 Inf Regt on half tracks and made a mtr recon patrol. The SP Plt fired 11 rds HE into an enemy occupied town in support of a tank attack.

824 TD Bn continued to support the attacks of the 100 Inf Div. TD Companies supporting respective Inf Regts continued to meet heavy enemy resistance. TD's fired 32 rds at an enemy OP with very good results.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S035-542, S038-590, S074-597, S088-636, S082-672, S062-713, S104-743, S190-742, S247-773, S305-795, S327-770, S370-770, S420-770, S460-780, S490-740, S500-780, S605-810, S629-800, S623-827, S602-854, S580-910, S548-925.

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S E C R E T

a. A thorough check of buildings or areas for booby traps and delayed charges is a difficult and tedious job, particularly if helpful information from civilians or prisoners of war is not available. The extent of the search required, the ease with which large charges can be placed and effectively camouflaged, and the many devices available to the enemy make it almost impossible to be sure that a locality has been cleared of all charges. The following is suggested as a guide, however to insure the most efficient search possible.

(1) Training

Every member of the searching party should be well trained in functioning and disarming of enemy fuzes, mines, mechanical and chemical delays. Knowledge of standard demolition equipment, electricity and building construction is a valuable asset.

(2) Equipment.

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| (a) Flashlight | (e) Stiff wire probe with tapered point |
| (b) Engr Knife | (f) Side cutting pliers |
| (c) Pocket mirror | (g) Squad pioneer or carpenter set |
| (d) Pull rope (50 yds) | (in the squad vehicle). |

(3) Method.

(a) First obtain information from all civilian, PW and military sources to determine enemy methods peculiar to the area and buildings previously occupied by the enemy.

(b) Organize detail with not more than two men per room. Prearrange a signal to denote the finding of a large charge. Instruct all teams except the one deactivating to vacate the building immediately by the route of entry.

(c) Work from the basement upward. Check, move, and mark everything moveable including valves, taps, levers, controls, screens, etc. A clock-work delay will not be heard if well hidden.

(d) Double check the basement and the first floor. Pay particular attention to: chimney flues, elevator and ventilator shafts, and insulating, dead-air spaces. Straight flues and shafts are best checked by observing from one end against a light held at the other. Dog-leg flues can be checked by lowering a brick till observed at the clean-out doors.

(e) Always investigate "repaired areas"; look for "arming" holes. Enlarge all wall and floor punctures. Cavities are best examined by reflecting the beam of the flashlight off a hand mirror.

(f) Empty all fire boxes, remove ashes, check the fire wood and move the coal pile.

(g) Remove switch plates, trace all wires which appear foreign to the circuit. Examine all appliances, close all except the main switch.

(h) "Sticky" doors, drawers or lids should be pulled, by means of a rope.

(i) After completion of thorough check, and when possible turn utilities on from outside of the building.

(j) Arrange for guards until actual occupancy of the building.

(Source: Extracted from Engr Bulletin No. 10, Hq Seventh Army)

S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #215.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Ey activity during the night indicated that the ey elements in HEILBRONN were withdrawing to the high ground E of the city, but covering forces in the E third of the town continued to offer stiff resistance. In the WEISSBACH (S3479) bridgehead, ey resistance decreased while our armor, advancing to vic S3974, reported only sporadic SA and arty fire S of the KOCHER River.

During the day, the occupation of HEILBRONN was completed against light SA fire; however, ey in barracks at 083-590 bitterly resisted our progress to the S with SA, AW, SP, rocket, and arty fire. Elements of the 10 AD advanced SW against scattered resistance to OHRINGEN (S2868) where intense SA and AT fire was encountered. At 1415B hours an ey column of 30 HD vehicles, motor transport and foot troops were observed vic 242670 moving SW.

Ey aircraft were active during the period. Three ey planes strafed HACHTEL (4993) at 0630B while at 1146B, one ME 109 was reported flying low vic 178-745.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. With the fall of HEILBRINN imminent, the activity of the enemy artillery increased today, as batterys sited for its defense expended their ammunition, possibly prior to withdrawing. The bulk of the fire was directed at our infantry in the HEILBRONN sector, with the rest of the fire scattered on our forward elements approaching the NEUNSTADT - OHRIGEN - NEUENSTEIN line. The only night harassing fire reported consisted of a total of 23 rds which fell in the 0559 square early in the period. In the morning the southeastern section of HEILBRONN was subjected to intermittent volleys of 210mm rocket and 105mm cal arty fire, which grew to such proportions that a comprehensive CB program was fired in the early afternoon, resulting in a decided decrease in volume of shelling. Light calibers were active throughout the day seeking to delay and hinder our forces in vic of NEUFELS (3774) and STEIN (1475), while the HOCHERSTEINFELD area (2172) drew medium caliber shelling in the afternoon.

Shellrep total: 12

100 Div 63 Div

6

6

b. Changes to EB List #30:

(1) Additions:

1357 BK	1338-5744
1370 BI	1398-7091
1470 BH	1410-7000
1661 BJ	1658-6122

AP 11 Apr	A	1/G
AP 11 Apr	A	3/Lt
AP 11 Apr	A	4/Lt
AP 11 Apr	A	4/Lt

(2) Deletions:

1270 EF	1061 ED	1161 AS
3073 EE	1061 AA	1160 AT
0963 EB	1061 AU	1059 AK

(3) Suspect List #30-5:

151-608	PW	1/G
182-697	AOP	1/G
1369-6315	AOP	4/G

SECRET

0 2107

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Good flying weather, combined with excellent visibility during the period, resulted in a great number of observed missions from arty supporting the attack of the Corps. Unobserved fires consisted principally of counterbattery and harassing missions plus TOT's on ey concentrations.

194 FA Bn, adjusted by various observers, continued to improve its record of destruction of German materiel. 5 rds from the bn scored 5 hits and destroyed a barracks at S08165909. The Bn AOP conducted an adjustment on a tank at S11036231, KO'ing the tank. An SP gun at S11127255 was left in a similar condition. 100 Div AOP made this adjustment. 6 Gp AOP made a registration on a building, S10165958, reported to be a Regt'l CP. 8 direct hits out of 17 rds fired left the house badly damaged and burning. Buildings, with personnel in vic, at S08866054 were destroyed with 21 rds.

In the prize mission of the period 194 FA Bn dropped 6 rds out of a total of 31 fired, in a mine shaft, around which 6 Gp AOP observed 50 ey personnel. Large explosion and flames were noted at the mine entrance.

938 FA Bn destroyed at least 9 ey vehicles during the period. 6 Gp AOP made the adjustment on 4 vehicles at S11676419, and 100 Div AOP did the observing on a group of 4 vehicles at S107700 and 1 large truck at S116721. In all cases personnel in vic of the targets were dispersed.

3 ey AA positions were the recipients of retaliatory fire when they fired on a 35 Gp Cub. The observer immediately adjusted 36 FA Bn on each of the locations in turn, putting 38 rds on guns at S19047064, 14 rds on a position at S17806725, and 22 rds on a 3d location at S17506580. On the last mission 2 houses in the vic of the guns were damaged.

Fire from 17 FA Bn adjusted by the Bn AOP destroyed 4 Nebels at S27907176. 39 rds were fired on the location initially, followed by a TOT of 28 more a short while later.

A btry of 2 ey guns was neutralized and 1 piece thought to be KO'd by fire from 995 FA Bn adjusted by AOP. The location at S190728 was well covered with 31 rds.

141 FA Bn and B Btry, 976 FA Bn, were relieved of atchmt to 405 FA Gp and atchd to 35 FA Gp during the period.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					4	9
Per					46	14
Veh					6	
MG & Mor					2	1
Prep	Not		Not		1	
Def Fires	Available		Available		7	
Har					2	50
Reg					42	
Misc					2	
Dest					2	
TOTAL					114	74

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	4	19	7	3		
Per	2	5	1		1	
Veh	4		4			
Prep						1
Armor	1					
Def Fires						2
Har		13		37		12
Reg			2		10	
Dest	3					
TOTAL	14	37	14	40	11	15

AOP Missions: 31

S E C R E T

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn supported the attacks of the 10th AD. After a brief reorganization and maintenance period, all companies moved out in direct support of respective Combat Commands and Task Forces. TD companies continue to operate with one Rcn Plt attached.

822 TD Bn continued to support the advances of the 63 Inf Div. Gun companies remain attached and supporting same Inf Regts. Two TD's from the SP Plt fired 4 rds APC in support of the 63 Rcn Tp destroying an enemy OP. The Bn is busy converting from towed guns to SP's and has received a total of 25 M-18's (76mm).

824 TD Bn supporting the attacks of the 100 Inf Div fired 20 rds HE and 4 rds APC at enemy occupied houses with very good results.

An enemy SP gun fired on about 6 Apr by TD's has been confirmed destroyed. Rcn Co early in the period guarded approx 200 PW's.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

S580-910, 630-800, 535-748, 500-780, 425-770, 315-688, 230-760, 116-750, 062-715, 079-657, 098-633, 101-601, 082-593, 036-588, 030-505.

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Asst S-3

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #216

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

During the night reports of negligible resistance vic NECKARSULM (0867) and KOCHENDORF (0871) and no discernable front lines on 63 Div's right flank indicated an ey withdrawal in this section in view of the threat on his left flank. Although resistance at SONTHEIM (0659) decreased, strong points on the outskirts of HEILBRONN at 101613 and 096643 still held out. 63 Div encountered SA, AW and scattered mortar and arty fire in their attack on GOCHSEN (1872) and KOCHERSTEINFELD (2172) but overcame SA opposition to take GALSACH (4275) and KUNSBACH (4375) during the morning.

Throughout the period 10 Arm'd Div found ey defending stubbornly the towns of NEUNSTEIN (3469) and OHRINGEN (2868) and the ey infiltrating back into towns after friendly columns had passed through. In these towns civilians armed with MGs and panzerfaust proved a formidable obstacle. SS troops were reported in civilian clothes in both towns, organizing civilians.

PWs taken by 63 Div state ey is digging in on high ground E and W of WALDENBURG (3967) and an unknown number in BARLINGEN (538736). Although the ey resisted along a general line along the 100 Div's S flank from 048580-058572-080570, AOP's reported the Div's advance east from HEILBRONN proceeding well and elements as of 2000B hours at 180610 and 162589. Except for the 100 Div's advance E from HEILBRONN toward the autobahn, there was little progress made on the Corps front.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Falling back from the HEILBRONN - OHRINGEN area, the enemy reduced his artillery activity today, probably because good position areas to support his present lines are lacking, requiring the displacement of his guns to areas well in the rear. In the early hours of the period light calibers harassed communication routes, placing a total of 30 rounds in NECKARGARTACH (0664) between 2010B and 2050B, and lighter concentrations vic 1675 and 1575. BOCKINGEN (0659) received 9 rounds from 2 med. guns at 2018B. Artillery fire reported during the day was very light, for only in the afternoon did light calibers, mostly 88's, harass our advancing columns in SONTHEIM (0658) and on the roads vic 393715 and 395705. No Nebelwerfer fire was observed at all today.

Shellrep total: 9

63 Div - 5; 100 Div - 3; 2 FOB - 1.

Delete all locations on EB list #30 and its additions.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. With cloudy weather and intermittent rains prevailing during the period, activity in the way of observed firing was somewhat limited. During the night an extensive harassing program was placed on road nets suspected of being used by the ey in a withdrawal from the Western portion of the Corps front. During the early part of the period a counter-battery program, a total of 16 locations, was fired in support of the 100 Div's drive in the HEILBRONN AREA.

In spite of unpredictable weather 35 Gp AOP made several adjustments on targets of opportunity. Personnel at S2825-7352 sustained numerous casualties and were effectively dispersed by 28 rds from 17 FA Bn. An A/T gun was silenced when 995 FA Bn dropped a total of 30 rds on the area. 995 FA Bn was also adjusted on AA guns at S218723, using 22 rds. A TOT of 2 Corps Arty Bns was later placed on this location. Traffic on road S of BRITTACH was hit with 42 rds from 36 FA Bn and later TOT'd with all available Corps Arty.

Observed counter-battery missions included two fired by 194 FA Bn with 100 Div AOP adjusting. The first location, S1486-6082, was silenced with 12 rds. The other a rocket gun firing from S142540, also received 12 rds of 8" ammo in return for its effort.

925 FA Bn ground observer neutralized a potential ey btry when he adjusted 194 FA Bn on a gun being towed by a tractor. 21 rds knocked out the tractor and the gun.

An ey tank at S215566, observed by 6 Gp AOP, was disabled by fire from 976 Bn.

At the end of the period, as the Corps front started to break, the arty with the Corps was principally engaged in displacing forward in order to more effectively support the attack.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

	100 IDA (2 Bns)	
Type	Obs	Unobs
Por	2	5
Prep		6
Def Fire	6	
Har		24
Reg	2	
TOTAL	10	35

10 ADA and 63 IDA not available.

(2) Corps Arty:

	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2	19	3	8		
Per	2		1		2	
Veh	1					
Har		28		43		4
Reg	4		1		3	
Dest	1		2			
TOTAL	10	47	7	51	5	4

AOP Missions: 20

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to give support to the attacks of the 10th Armd Div. All companies are giving direct support to their respective Combat Commands. The Rcn platoons remained attached to the TD Companies for operations.

822 TD Bn continued to support the 63 Inf Div. The 2nd platoon "B" Co, expended 21 rds HE, 1 rd APC, and 500 rds of 50 cal at enemy occupied buildings, in support of the 1st Bn, 254 Inf Regt. The 3rd platoon also fired at enemy strong-points in the town of LASSBACH (5076). The 1st platoon of "A" Co, in position vicinity of BUCHOF (2476) received a considerable amount of small arms and arty fire during period.

824 TD Bn gave support to the advances of the 100th Inf Div. The 2nd platoon "B" Co, fired on houses containing enemy personnel, vicinity (5071710) in support of the 2nd Bn 398th Inf Regt. Co "C", with all platoons attached to Bns of the 397th Inf Regt, continued to support Regtl operations vic HEILBRONN. The 2nd platoon expended 17 rds HE at enemy positions, with good effect. The Rcn platoons are furnishing road patrols, and are keeping close liaison with forward Inf elements.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S637-925, S607-886, S628-800, S535-747, S485-765, S445-765, S390-720, S340-710, S290-684, S240-740, S180-720, S160-750, S115-750, S108-725, S126-685, S180-610, S162-590, S110-575.

Schroeder

SCHROEDER
Asst S-3

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

US ARMY

Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: CRS
Date: 14 Apr 45
From: 131800B Apr 45
To : 141800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #217.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

The ey resisted our armor probing his OPLR (3065-3367-3567-3768) and 300 ey, supported by arty and four SP's, counterattacked BAYERBACH (3065) causing our troops to withdraw to OBEROHRN (3166). Infantrymen advancing S of the KOCHER River reported resistance decreasing with the ey making limited withdrawals to the SE. NEUENSTEIN (S3569) was cleared several times due to infiltration tactics employed by the ey while 100th Div infantrymen, advancing E of HEILBRONN, met little ey resistance in the early part of the period.

During the day the ey stubbornly delayed our advance SE of HEILBRONN with SA, AW, SP and arty fire. At OBER HEINRIET (1656), 92 prisoners were taken and at 1545B, an undetermined number of ey counterattacked from three directions apparently in an attempt to retake the prisoners. At the close of the period, the ey was reported improving his positions along the high ground 2666-3164-3366-3868.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Enemy arty action during the period was limited to light harassing of fwd areas and sporadic defensive fires in support of his delaying forces. However, at BAYERBACH 3065 arty fire and 4 SP's supported a counterattack at 1925 hrs. A 30 rd concentration of Nebel fire fell vic VERRENBURG 2666 at 2000 hrs and a small concentration of 1t cal fire hit our fwd elements in the woods at 280-723. During the rest of the night and up until noon arty fire was very light and scattered. During the afternoon fire was received at 073545 and BRETZFELD 2468 caught a 15 rd concentration of 105s at 1430 hrs and an hour later 10 rds of air burst. Harassing fire also landed in BRETZFELD 2465 and PFATTENWEILER 3769 during the latter part of the afternoon.

Shellrep total: 5

63 Div-4, 6 Gp-1.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Corps arty Bns were principally engaged in displacing fwd as the Corps continued to attack. TOT's on ey concentrations aided in breaking up a C/A in the 10 Armd Div sector during the early part of the period. ACP's took advantage of fair weather and good visibility to fly numerous patrol missions as well as adjust on targets of opportunity observed in front of our leading elements.

938 FA Bn AOP performed an unusual mission in directing a flight of fighter-bombers against an ey column of vehicles and personnel proceeding E out of LOWENSTEIN. By means of visual signalling and diving the Cub pilot was able to point out the target to the F/B's, who, in turn, bombed and strafed both the town and the column.

Casualties were caused in a group of 30 ey personnel at S22675610 when 938 FA Bn dropped 29 rds on this location. 976 FA Bn AOP located the target and made the adjustment.

10 Armd Div AOP fired 17 FA Bn on an est 2 Co's of ey inf in the town of HOHENAU (S388668). 129 rds were used on the mission. The ey was dispersed with many casualties. 2 fires were started in the town.

2 Nebel, firing from S28886327, were silenced when 35 Gp AOP adjusted 17 FA Bn on their location. 52 rds total were fired.

141 FA Bn was rld of atchmt to 35 FA Gp and atchd to 405 FA Gp during the period.

SECRET

0 2107

S E C R E T

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					2	
Per	52				24	8
MG & Mor					3	
Prop			2		1	3
Def Fires			17			
Har		23	3	3		19
Reg	5		3		38	
Misc			2			
Smoke					3	3
TOTAL	57	23	27	3	71	33

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2		2			
Per				4		
Armor	1					
Har		5		14		9
Reg	2		10		2	
Dest			1			
TOTAL	5	5	13	18	2	9

AOP Missions: 16

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn supported the operation of the 10th AD. Co "B" operated with the Task Forces from CCA, Co "A" with CCB, and Co "C" with CCR. TD's were in direct support of the armored attacks made during the period. As the period closed companies were assembling with respective commands.

822 TD Bn advanced in support of the 63 Inf Div. TD companies supported the local attacks of respective Inf Regts capturing 6 PW's. The 1st Rcn Plt was reld from Inf positions and returned to Bn control. The Bn now has 24 M-18's and 12 towed 3" guns in action.

824 TD Bn continued support to 100 Inf Div. Co "A" advanced with 399 Inf Regt, Co "B" with 398 Inf Regt, and Co "C" the 397 Inf Regt. All TD companies are now across the NECKAR R. and better progress has resumed.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:
S630-800, S620-765, S570-740, S460-720, S360-685, S242-650, S188-604, S180-565, S125-555, S060-555.

Schroeder
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Asst S-3

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: SA 5
Date: 15 Apr 45
From: 141800B Apr 45
To : 151300B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT No. 218

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

At the beginning of the period 100 Div's right flank ran into stubborn resistance at 059543, 067539, DONNBRUNN (1157) and OBER GRUPPENBACH (1255). An estimated 200 ey were encountered at OBER HEINREIT (1656) and SA and MG fire on N edge of woods vic 2260 delayed our advance. On the 63 Div's front ey activity consisted chiefly of sporadic artillery fire on forward elements. PWs reported 2 coys of SS troops between ESCHELBACH (3567) and MICHELBACH (3265). At 0400B an aggressive 12 man patrol engaged 63 Div elements in fire fight at RUBLINGEN (4672). By 0110B the towns of WEILERSBACH (4873) and SOMMERBERG (4874) were cleared.

During the day resistance against 100 Div's attack to the East decreased and was chiefly of a delaying nature. UNTER GRUPPENBACH (1255), UNTER HEINREIT (1655), ESCHENAU (2161) and ADOLZFURT (2464) were occupied. Ey in U/K strength resisted with SA fire vic 220605, 192558, 260634, and 296670.

63 Div met strong resistance throughout the day all along their front. Ey is believed to be using high ground vic WALDENBURG (3967) as part of his MLR. At 1135B hours a small C/A at 400685 was repulsed and woods NW of GOGGENBACH (4470) were cleared against stiff SA resistance. AW and high velocity was reported coming from ESCHENTAL (4669).

10 Armd Div interrogated a reliable civilian who stated that a Corps Hqs is located at GEISSELHARDT (3457) and an Army Group Hqs at SCHWABISCHGMUND (5124).

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

A noticeable increase occurred in enemy artillery activity during the period particularly in the area SE of NEUENSTIEN, where considerable fire supported the defense of the approaches to SCHWABISCH HALL. During the night light calibers harassed ADOLZFURT (2461) and in vic of OHRINGEN. At various times during the day guns in vic of 1655 were active harassing our advancing troops in the area S of HEILBRONN, including 25 rounds Nebelwerfer, vic 1560, and OHRINGEN received intermittent harassing fire from one gun. SE of NEUENSTIEN, however, mixed calibers from 75 to 150 mm, in greater numbers and better organized, subjected our forward elements to concentrations, varying from light to moderate in intensity, vic 4068, 3968, KESSELFELD (3668), 4169, BOLZHOFF (4070), 3867, MUNGOLDSALL (3972), and the woods at 3767. This shelling was most frequent during the morning, with some decrease apparent in the afternoon.

Shellrep total: 9.

100 Div - 1; 63 Div - 6; 35 Gp - 2.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. High clouds, which covered the sky during most of the period, did not decrease the visibility enough to seriously hamper the activity of the arty observers, both air and ground, as they adjusted the arty with the Corps on targets of opportunity opposing the attack. Unobserved harassing fire was placed on lines of communications and supply routes during the hours of darkness.

995 FA Bn air observer noted an ey rd blk, S415699, supported with MG's holding up the inf advance. He adjusted his Bn on the area and neutralized the ey fire until our inf called for the fire to be lifted as they went in to finish the job.

Vehicles at S287618 were well covered with 13 rds from 995 FA Bn. The 35 Gp air observer, who made the adjustment, did not see any direct hits but reported the fire as very effective.

The ground observer of 17 FA Bn adjusted time fire from his Bn on a group of ey personnel resisting our advance at S346682. 5 rds HE in adjustment and 21 rds time fire for effect caused casualties and effectively dispersed the ey.

35 Gp air observer noted considerable ey traffic through GAILENKIRCHEN (S425-627), WITTIGHAUSEN (S439638) and UNTER MUNKHEIM (S456635). He started to adjust arty on these towns but smoke and dust from tank battles beneath him cut off the visibility. 35 Gp placed unobserved harassing fire on these locations during the rest of the day.

B Btry, 976 FA Bn, was rlvd of atchmt to 35 Gp and atchd to 6 Gp during the period.

SECRET

S E C R E T

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

TYPE	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2		1		4	1
Per	14		44	1	26	13
Veh			1		2	1
MG & Mor			14		4	
Prep		49		11	7	
Armor			3			
Def Fire			3		7	
Har			4	19	1	19
Reg	9		8		28	
Misc			32	3		
Sm	3					4
TOTAL	28	49	110	34	79	38

(2) Corps Arty:

TYPE	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		6			2	
Per	3		1		3	
Veh	1		1			
MG & Mor			1			
Har		33		29		16
Reg	9		7		5	
Misc						2
Dest	1					
TOTAL	14	39	10	29	10	18

AOP Missions: 35

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

. Operations:

609 TD Bn moved CP to OHRINGEN (S2868) with 10th AD. Co "A" engaged in rehabilitation and maintenance in CCB assembly area. Co "B" supported the Task Forces of CCA firing 76mm HE and .50 cal MG's on enemy personnel and strong points. Co "C" atchd to CCR with the 2nd Plt supporting Task Force THACKSTON and the 1st Plt atchd to 634 FA Bn for A.T. protection.

822 TD Bn supported the advances of the 63 Inf Div. Co "A" atchd to 253 Inf Regt supported the inf advances to the Southeast. Co "B" atchd to 254 Inf Regt moved forward with the Inf elements firing direct supporting fire for the 3rd Bn. Co "C" remains atchd and supporting the 255 Inf Regt.

824 TD Bn continued to support the attacks of the 100 Inf Div. Co "A" fired 19 rds HE at an ey OP, 24 rds HE at a rd block, and 6 rds HE and 3 rds APC at ey occupied houses. Co "A" remains atchd to 399 Inf Regt. Co "B" atchd to 398 Inf Regt supported the local attacks of respective Inf Bns and some Co attacks. Co "C" continued with the 397 Inf Regt. TD's of the 2nd Plt helped the Inf to repulse an enemy counterattack.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S-045520, S060540, S160550, S178564, S170600, S217609, S252658, S325657, S374653, S395682, S440701, S515664, S560719, S620763, S642790.

SCHROEDER
Asst S-3

219
DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #209.7

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

The ey continued generally quiet on West half of zone while offering determined resistance on East. SA, SP, and mortar fire from vic 192558 delayed our troops; but except for scattered SA fire vic 122538, no ey activity was reported on the entire 100 Div front. Determined resistance was offered at WALDENBURG (3963), GOGGENSBACH (4570) and ESCHENTHAL (4669) while a heavy fire fight continued through the night at the castle vic 380667. A strong ey combat patrol vic 360633 was repulsed at 0112B.

During the day the ey strongly resisted our advance across the entire Corps front with the 100 Div meeting intense SA and MG fire from dug in positions at 056535, 120522, 191521 and 248625. The 63 Div encountered strong AW and mortar fire in MICHELBAACH (3265), WALDENBURG (3966), WESTERNACH (4268) and ESCHENTHAL (4669). All columns of the 10 AD met stiff resistance throughout the period with intense SA, mortar, flak, and arty fire reported SE and SW of PFEDELBACH (2865). Stiff resistance from ey inf and AT weapons was met at 428674 at 1015B while roadblocks and a minefield were encountered at 285640.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

In response to increased pressure all along the front, enemy artillery activity continued to increase as the enemy fought stubbornly to hold the MAINHARDT hill mass. Most of the shelling was laid down on the lower slopes of the hill mass S of the line OHRINGEN - NEUENSTEIN, and in the LOEWENSTEIN - LAUFFEN area. Only light harassing fire was reported during the night, when WALDBURG (3967) and the woods SE of OHRINGEN received a few rounds. After daylight, however, considerable harassing fire was put down in the valley vic 3064, and in the woods vic 3666, also in the town of PFEDELBACH (2865) where 105's and 150's threw in several moderate concentrations. Other places shelled in the morning included BAUERBAACH (4368), EBERSTADT (1655), and in vic of 3766 and 2070. In the afternoon shelling in this sector dropped off somewhat, but picked up vic SCHOZACH (0853), HOENACKER (2562) and in the GRUPPENBACH area (1255) where two 88's threw in an estimated 100 rounds between 1615 B and 1715B.

Shellrep total: 16

100 Div	63 Div	10 AD	35 Gp
8	4	3	1

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The artillery with the Corps continued to actively support the advance of the infantry and armor. Observed missions were fired on ey guns, personnel, machine guns and mortars. Unobserved missions, generally in the form of TOT's, were fired on personnel. The majority of the remaining unobserved fires were placed on harassing targets during the night.

Visibility during the period was somewhat limited due to a ground haze.

The AOP's were again very active and accounted for a majority of the observed missions fired.

During the period the 141 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to the 405 FA Gp and attached to the 35 FA Gp and the 17 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to the 35 FA Gp and attached to the 405 FA Gp.

The 35 Gp AOP adjusted the 995 FA Bn on a tank at 448-668 at 1000B. The tank was knocked out and additional fire was placed on the nearby town of BRACHBACH and covered the area well.

The 100 Div Arty AOP fired the 976 FA Bn on a tank at 283-590 at 1350B. The tank was destroyed.

The 100 Div Arty AOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on ey vehicles at 2130-5628. Five target hits were obtained and three of the vehicles were destroyed. The same observer then shifted his fire to a tank at 1902-5551 and knocked it out with a direct hit.

S E C R E T

The 100 Div Arty AOP also adjusted the 938 FA Bn on a variety of targets as follows: 3 ey vehicles at 2147-5507. One vehicle was destroyed, one was damaged with 2 hits, and the other escaped; 8 horse-drawn vehicles and personnel were also taken under fire with 3 being knocked out and damage inflicted on the others also a horse-drawn arty piece at 2236-5608 was taken under fire but was immediately pulled behind a nearby house. However, two hits were scored on the house.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	5			2	4	1
Per	13	3	37		21	5
Veh					2	
MG & Mor			7		7	1
Prop	9	8	9		4	
Har		53		44		30
Reg	9		5		33	
Misc	6		18	24	6	1
Prop				4		
TOTAL	42	64	76	74	77	38

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		1		7	6	
Per					17	
Veh	6		2			
Armor	1		1		3	1
Har		24		30		23
Reg					6	
Misc					1	
	7	25	3	37	33	24

AOP Missions: 30

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to support the armored operations of the 10th AD. TD companies remained attached to same Combat Commands and Task Forces during the period. The 1st and 3rd Plts of "B" Co supporting T/F RILEY and T/F HANKINS respectively, received moderate mortar and arty fire.

822 TD Bn supported the Inf attacks of the 63 Inf. Co "A" supporting the Bns of the 253 Inf Regt received moderate arty and small arms fire. 3rd Plt TD's fired on enemy Inf in a woods with good results. Co "B" supporting the 254 Inf assisted in the capture of GOGGENBACH (S4569). TD's also fired on and neutralized an enemy MG that had pinned down our Infantry. The 1st Plt of "C" Co was attached to 117 Cav Rcn Sq for direct support. 2d and 3rd Plt TD's advanced with the attacks of the 254 Inf Regt running into heavy mortar and arty fire.

824 TD Bn continued support to 100 Inf Div. Co "A" supported combat patrols, a regt task force, and local Bn attacks of the 399 Inf Regt. TD's fired HE into enemy dug in positions vic S084543 with very good results. One TD struck an enemy mine damaging the track idler and bogies, however, was repaired and back in operation within the period. Co "B" fired 47 rds direct fire in support of the 398 Inf Regt. Targets consisted of enemy occupied buildings, strong points, and general resistance delaying the Inf Bns. Co "C" did much firing in support of the 397 Inf Regt helping to stop an enemy counter attack. Many targets appeared for the TD's during the period giving both the 76mm guns and 50 cal MG's good workouts. One TD was damaged by enemy arty fire.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:
S620-763, S525-664, S475-650, S445-608, S385-634, S305-610, S195-540, S120-530, S043-520.

BYRNE

Asst S-3

ANNEX NO. 1 TO PERIODIC REPORT NO. 219.

Source: G-2 Report, Hq 103 Div, 13 April.

SOME MORE REASONS FOR NON-COLLABORATION

Recent reports indicate definitely that the enemy has every intention of continuing his fight against us from the home front. Apparently not all the German people have been or will be influenced by Goebbel's attempts to arouse them to commit acts of sabotage, but enough of them are sufficiently fanatical to demand that we remain security conscious - all the time - and that we continue to refrain from collaboration, no matter what the circumstances. The following annexes should offer sufficient reasons.

NOTES FROM 103D CIC DETACHMENT

I - CHIVALRY: While the CIC was interrogating people in BENSHEIM (M-6521) who rptd in response to the announcement made over the traveling public address system calling for all persons who had not been properly discharged from the Wehrmacht, it was discovered that the large audience was surprised that some who were in the Wehrmacht as Nachrichtenhelferinnen were not detained like the male prisoners of war. In the eyes of the Germans, these girls, whose job it is to perform clerical duties, work as messengers and telephone operators, fall under the category of Wehrmachtsbeamte (army employees) and are as such member of the Wehrmacht, to whom an army card of identity is issued, equivalent to the Soldbuch reserved for the stronger sex. Investigation made among the townspeople after the screening revealed that they were impressed by what they termed a "chivalrous act" on our part. However, whenever the letters CI/AO are found on the army cards of these Amazons, they are regarded as PWs. CI is the equivalent of our G-2 and AO stands for Abwehr organization, or secret service.

II - HITLER'S KIDS: In the AUERBACH (M-6523) area it was discovered by CIC agents, through interrogation of Hitler Jugend members that their aim and mission in this Division area was to shoot soldiers, conceal arms, do acts of sabotage and be active in espionage work. Many of the leaders of this organization left with the retreating Wehrmacht and others were intimidated by our military might in their area. However, this organization of 50 young Germans has a tendency to become more active as our military density lessens and the front advances. It is believed that a number of acts of sabotage may be committed by other members of this organization. Three of them have already been apprehended and have stated that the organization will continue its work of destruction. Units should be exceptionally alert to this possibility.

III - UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY: According to the Priest in NEUSTADT, the mayors of the towns of HETSCHERACK (M-9036), BREITENBACH (M-9536), HAINSTADT (M-9438) and SANDBACH (M-9336) are Nazi officials and still in control of the towns. There is supposed to be two SS men in the town of HETSCHERACK dressed in civilian clothes who have the people thoroughly frightened. It is rptd that the reason this priest had given this information is to avoid trouble in the towns, as there are hidden weapons in these places and on 20 April 1945, Hitler's birthday, an open revolt is supposed to take place in the town of HETSCHERACK. In the town of HAINSTADT there is rptd to be a secret radio station operated by a man named SCHROEDER. Informants say that they have been searching for this radio and are on the lookout for the operator. These informants advise that there is a TB sanitarium near SANDBACH run by a Dr Buntz, and there is rptd to be a large number of German soldiers parading as patients, and that there is some underground work going on among the patients. Also reported is that there are German soldiers hiding in the hills near this sanitarium who come here at night for food. This information has come from the priest who lives in the women's sanitarium located nearby. Buntz will not allow the priest to come to the men's sanitarium at night, indicating activities at night previously rptd.

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #220.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

The ey retained his defensive attitude and continued to improve his positions. On the East flank, resistance lessened considerably due to our armored penetration vic SCHWABISCH HALL (4659) but was unchanged elsewhere. Stubborn ey resistance was overcome at BILLENSBACH (1952), HIRWEILER (2256) and KAISERBACH (1953) while ey dug in on high ground vic UNTER HEINBACH (2661) continued to resist well into the period. Eight roving SP's were active vic 4465 and two tanks were observed vic 5867. An increase in the number of minefields across the front was reported while one field of 500 schu. mines was found at 080587.

During the day the ey continued to fight a determined delaying action with small groups fighting from dug in positions and numerous road blocks. Increased use of panzerfausts were noted in the 63 Div sector and minefields were reported at 324628, 448646 and 442587. The 10 AD reported all bridges blown over the KOCHER River between ENSLINGEN (4764) and STEINBACH (4657). In general the ey is falling back slowly under heavy pressure and is employing demolitions to the maximum.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Ey arty activity decreased somewhat during the period despite our continued pressure against his defenses of road blocks and strong points. Better visibility enabled our AOP's to pick up a greater number of enemy batteries, and very possibly the reduction in shelling was partly caused by their vigilant CB awaiting the unwary German gunner. No harassing fire at all was reported during the night. Our advance during the day in general met only scattered fire, with no concentration heavier than 30 rds being reported. Most of the fire was of an harassing and interdictory nature, and occurred between 1000B and 1325B and again at the end of the period. In the morning small concentrations fell in GOTTWELLSHAUSEN (4460), MUNKHEIM (4663), WINDISCH (5369), the woods at 0954, and GLEICHEN (3160), the latter being reported as med cal. In the afternoon, heavier concentrations, varying from 10 to 30 rounds, fell in GRUPPENBACH, which also drew a few rounds of medium caliber, ERLACH (4662), HEINRIET (1555), and in vic of 1355. At 1700B, 24 rounds Nobelwerfer fell in the woods E of WUSTENOT (2754).

The volume of arty fire received the past few days, and the small number of battery locations obtained from all sources, indicates that the number of guns on our front has decreased greatly from the days when HEILERONN was being stoutly defended. At present, only a battalion seems to be operating SW of USHOFEN, another S of SCHWABISCH HALL, another in the MAINHARDT - SPIEGELBERG area, and another in the BIELSTEIN - MÜNDELSEHEIM area. Our continued advance and lack of activity from any location after it has been fired on makes any exact estimate of enemy artillery strength difficult, for they are evidently displacing very frequently.

Shellrep total: 11

100 Div - 7; 63 Div - 3; 10 A.D. - 1.

Suspect List:

090-448	AP 16 Apr	4/1t
525-600	AOP	Guns
442-552	AOP	2/88's
420-550	AOP	Btry
430-550	AOP	1/G
5630-6554	AOP	1/G
247-504	PW	1/G
242-505	PW	1/G
254-506	PW	2/G
098-497	AOP	Guns
523-626	AOP	3/G
1650-4805	AOP	Btry
1011-4952	AOP	Guns

S E C R E T

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

With excellent visibility prevailing throughout the period the artillery with the Corps was actively engaged in supporting the advance of the Corps. Observed missions were fired on targets of opportunity such as ey guns, columns on the roads tanks, vehicles, and personnel. The majority of the unobserved missions were fired on harassing targets throughout the night. The AOP's were very active and were responsible for many of the observed missions fired.

Btry "B" 2d FA Obsn Bn commenced installation of a six microphone two second sound base in the vicinity of TALHEIM (06-54). Reconnaissance was also carried out for a flash base in the vicinity of TALHEIM.

The AOP of the 995 FA adjusted his Bn on 2 ey guns at 4441-6597 about 1220B. The observer reported a fire started in the positions. This same combination then shifted to a rapidly firing ey gun at 454-641. 19 rds were fired and effectively neutralized the area as the firing ceased.

The 995 FA Bn's AOP adjusted his Bn on a suspected CP in a house at 463-635. 5 direct hits out of 22 rds fired were scored on the house and caved it in. The Bn's AOP also adjusted the Bn on the town of SCHWABISCH HALL (45-59). 49 rds were fired and covered the town with excellent effect.

The 35 GP AOP adjusted the 36 FA Bn on ey personnel at 400-650. The mission was repeated later when ey personnel were observed coming back to the area and all activity ceased thereafter.

The 35 GP AOP fired the 995 FA Bn on vehicles and personnel at 446-625 where traffic was halted on a road. Hits were scored on two vehicles.

The 35 GP AOP, adjusting the 995 FA Bn, had an interesting mission on ey personnel at 458-634. Our tanks were chasing the ey personnel into a town at this point and the fire of the 995 FA Bn caused them to go back out into the open where the tanks resumed fire on them.

The 35 GP AOP fired the 36 FA Bn on ey personnel and vehicles in towns and along roads at the following points: 428-628, 446-602, 432-616, and 460-620. A total of 109 rds were expended with excellent effect. Numerous vehicles were reported destroyed along the road.

The 117th Cavalry Recon. Sqdn. AOP adjusted the 141 FA Bn on ey tanks and vehicles at 6645-7479. Two hits were scored on the tanks and one of them was left burning.

The 35 GP AOP adjusted the 141 FA Bn on two tanks at 5804-6781. One probable hit on one of the tanks was reported.

The 35 GP AOP was again active in firing the 36 FA Bn on two 88's at 442-552, one ey battery at 420-550, and ey guns at 430-550. Hits were reported in the position areas and effectively neutralized the guns.

The 100 Div Arty AOP fired the 976 FA Bn on an ey tank at 283-590 at 1430B. 28 rds were expended and the tank was reported as destroyed.

At 1855B the 194 FA Bn AOP fired 13 rds from the 976 FA Bn on ey personnel and a road block at 2429-5669. Some hits were scored on the road block and the personnel were scattered.

At 1147B the 100 Div Arty AOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on an ey CP in a building at 1539-5189. The house was destroyed with an expenditure of 13 rds.

Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	5	8	2		2	14
Per	8	1	24	10	18	2
Veh			4		2	
MG & Mor			5		2	1
Prop	3	2	13		1	1
Def Fire			3			
Har		29	3	18		29
Reg	7		2		26	
Misc	10		34	45		1
Total	33	40	90	73	51	48

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(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB		5	5	1	3	1
Per	2		5		10	
Veh	2		5			
Prep		1				
Armor	2		1		1	
Har		20		33		4
Reg	6		1		7	
Misc					3	
Dest	1		3			
Total	13	26	20	34	24	5

AOP Missions: 49

SECTION IV TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued supporting the 10th Armd Div Co A, atch to CCB. The CP, 1st and 2nd Platoons moved to the town of GAILLENKIRCHEN (4262). The 3rd Platoon, after being outposted in the town of UERIGHAUSEN on the morning of April 17, moved to SULZ (4461) with TF Richardson. Co B, atchd to T/F Hankins, CP in OHRINGEN (2868). At 162100 a TD of the 1st Platoon struck a mine while conveying supply trucks. The destroyer was damaged and evacuated. At 171700 the platoon moved with T/F Riley, to GEISSELHARDT (3457). The 2nd Platoon atchd to T/F Ulrick, moved towards GAILSBACH (3356). The 3rd platoon moved with T/F Hankins in the attack South on HARSBERG (3163). One TD was damaged by AT fire, but was evacuated. At 171000 the platoon moved to STEINBACH. Co C, atchd to CCR, with the CP and 3rd Platoon in WITTIGHAUSEN (4363). The 1st Platoon moved with the 634th FA Bn. The 2nd Platoon atchd to T/F Thackston moved to vicinity GOGGENBACH (4570).

822 TD Bn continued to support the attacks of the 63rd Inf Div. The 2nd Platoon of Co A, fired on ey Inf, while the 3rd Platoon expended 3 rds HE and 6 rds APC in support of our Infantry, vicinity MICHELBACH (3265). The 1st platoon of B Co, fired at ey strongpoints in support of the 1st Bn 254th Inf. The 3rd Platoon assisting in the capture of NESSELBACH (5371) destroyed a MG nest, and took 4 PW's. One TD was destroyed by a German panzerfaust. The 2nd platoon of C Co, helped the Infantry in the capture of WALDENBURG (3866). One TD of this platoon was temporarily put out of action by an 88mm. The 3rd Platoon fired a 50 cal. MG into a haystack and killed two ey soldiers. Also 9 rds of HE were expended on houses occupied by ey troops. The Rcn pltns, are patrolling roads, and keeping close liaison with forward Inf elements.

824 TD Bn supported the advances of the 100th Inf Div. Co A, atchd to 399 Inf Regt, with CP in SOUTHEIM (0658). The 2nd Platoon moved to TALHEIM (0654) and relieved the 1st Platoon. Co B, atchd 398th Inf Regt with CP in RAPPACH (2365). The 1st Platoon moved to (S208-592) to support C Co, 398th Inf, in attack on WEILER (2059). 51 rds HE were fired at targets of opportunity, consisting of MG nests and A/W positions along a line from (S219590) to S210600. The 2nd Platoon moved vic PFEDLBACH (2965) in support of the 2nd Bn 398th Inf Regt. 3rd Platoon "no change." Co C, atchd to 397th Inf Regt with CP in LEHRENSTEINFELD (1560.) The 1st platoon moved to LOWENSTEIN (1956). The 2nd Platoon in AT positions on Regt's right flank. The 3rd platoon in reserve at WILLSBACH (1860).

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:
S080-528, S195-525, S260-555, S310-595, S330-555, S370-555, S425-524, S460-595, S485-655, S560-670, S630-740.

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Asst S-3

ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #210.
(Source G-2 Report, 103d Inf Div
15 Apr 45).

CONTROL OF THE HITLER JUGEND

1. A description of the character and importance of the Hitler Jugend as taken from SHAEF Handbook EUS/G/5 is as follows:

"a. Eleven years of Nazi indoctrination at a most susceptible age in the Hitler Youth has done its work. The Hitler Youth is not a Boy Scout or Girl Guide organization. It is in no respect comparable to any organization known to the people of the western world. It is a compulsory Nazi formation which has consciously sought to breed hate, treachery and cruelty into the mind and soul of every German child. It is in the true sense of the word 'education for death.' Under no circumstances should the Hitler Youth be taken lightly as a negligible factor from an operational or occupation point of view.

"b. There are some 12 to 14 million youths organized into the four branches of the Hitler Youth: the Hitler Youth proper, including boys from 14-18; the German Jungvolk includes boys 10-14; the League of German Girls from 14-18, the young girls ages 10-14. A rough estimate was placed between 3 million and 3,500,000 into each branch of which 30,000 served as fully paid full time leaders. Approximately 500,000 17 year old youths received Hitler Youth training in pre-military training camps of which there were some 300 in operation throughout the Reich. It is well known that the Hitler Youth is the primary source of replacements for the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS and that its members have fought with the zeal of the most fanatical Nazis."

2. Before the 103d Division crossed into Germany, it was reported on numerous occasions that the Germans were using Hitler Jugend boys as espionage agents. A number of these line crossers were caught and they informed that there were several espionage schools which specialized in training Hitler Jugend as agents.

3. Upon entering Germany several agents of this Detachment received reports of nuisance activity on the part of Hitler Jugend; for example, one youth spat on a soldier, another 10 year old lad let the air out of the tires for an artillery piece, another case where the kids were playing with the powder taken out of cartridges. In all these cases proper action appeared to be to see that the kid received a spanking on the spot and was then sent on his way.

4. At Schifferstadt a dozen Hitler Jugend were apprehended who had crossed the Rhine to return to their homes, stating that they had been working in a camp of 1300 who dug trenches for the Germans for the last six months. Upon an exhaustive interrogation, four of them admitted that they had carried firearms and guarded the other members of the Hitler Jugend.

5. On 30 March 1945 the 44th Inf Div reported that 3 boys, 15 years of age, were picked up in the area of Bensheim having in their possession a pistol and four hand grenades. The boys stated, upon interrogation, that they were members of a group of 250 boys in that locality who each were sworn to kill an American soldier.

6. On 10 April 1945 two Hitler Jugend who had been inducted into the armed forces were picked up at Obbendorf by the 409th Infantry. Reluctantly, after having told several stories, they admitted having been in the Army and having been invited to join the Werewolf organization and they gave this detailed information about the resistance movement. One of the important factors revealed was that the Hitler Jugend were to supply aid of all kinds to the Werewolf. The possibility suggests itself that the Hitler Jugend may itself well be the backbone of the Werewolf.

7. On 10 April 1945 on the outskirts of Bensheim a 17 year old boy, when stopped by a road block, refused to present his papers or allow himself to be searched. After having been first searched, a pistol was found in his possession. At first he was impudent to the interrogators. The case is still pending further investigation. (Source: 103d Inf Div CIC Detachment).

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #221.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Against light to moderate resistance, 10 Arm'd Div made substantial gains S of SCHWABISCH HALL (4659) but encountered defended and undefended road-blocks and scattered mine fields throughout the period. Between 1930 and 2020B hours two large convoys were reported in vic S from S3853 to 4148 and another from 462522; both were taken under artillery fire. About 2300B hours two small C/As vic S4762 and one vic S478638 were repulsed.

During daylight the ey's delaying action continued and it is believed no stand will be made until the MURR, or possibly the REMS, river line will provide a suitable MLR. Forward elements reported stiff resistance from SA, AW, AT and arty fire at CRAB (S3450), OB ROT (S4048) and WESTHEIM (S4652). 63 Div found ey delaying in towns and defended road-blocks, but succeeded in clearing SCHWABISCH HALL, GELBINGEN (4660) and, after a stiff fire fight, ETTERSHOFFEN (4862).

At 1540B hours a large column of foot troops was observed moving SE from LENDSIEDE (S6269). AOP reported 50 MTs and 150 troops moving S into MURRHARDT (S3544) at 1500B with other scattered movement moving also to the South. After overcoming the resistance at OB ROT in the morning, 10 Arm'd Div found a German map giving new locations for three battery positions; these were taken under fire by an AOP and several of the guns were reported destroyed. As a result practically no arty fire was received during the afternoon and the advance continued against very light opposition to FICHTENBERG (S4444) at the close of the period.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. Ey artillery activity against our advance today was negligible; for only light scattered fire was reported, though moderate shelling was received from direct fire weapons in the valley S of SWABISCH HALL. Night harassment consisted of only a few rounds med cal SE of GOTTWELLSHAUSEN. During the day artillery fire was rare, though defended road blocks vic WESTHEIM (4652) were supported by a short, intense concentration at 1445B. 30 rounds from 2 light guns fell in the woods vic 1752 at 1615B, and a small light caliber concentration landed at HEINRIET (1655) at 1425B.

A captured map revealed four enemy batteries were in position vic FICHTENBERG (4344) possibly as late as this morning. It is not improbable, considering the small number of guns opposing us, that three of them were the same ones which were observed and fired on by AOP's yesterday vic BIBERSELD (4355), and were also picked upon yesterdays air photos. In all likelihood, these guns comprise the entire arty strength in the SWABISCH HALL - GÄLDORF area.

Shellrep total: 3
100 Div 63 Div
2 1

b. EB List:

0944 ZC	090-448	AP 16 Apr	A	4/Lt
3142 ZI	3170-4222	AP 17 Apr	A	4/Lt
1247 CA	1214-4714	2 FOB-S	A	3/G
0750 CB	0708-5079	2 FOB-S	B	3/G

(1) Suspect List, locations of possible further activity:

490-463	FT	3/105
483-490	AOP	1/G
489-472	AOP	1/G

2 FOB Sound turned in two locations from their new sound base in the 100 Div sector. CA is an A accuracy location of 3 guns in the 1247 Sq, and CB with two B plots is in the 0750 sq.

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S E C R E T

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. The artillery with the Corps continued to actively support the advance and fired numerous observed missions on targets of opportunity. The AOP's were very active in patrolling the Corps front and adjusting fires.

A harassing program was fired during the night on the enemy's lines of communications.

Btry "B" 2nd FA Obsn Bn completed a seven microphone, two second sound base. Coordinates: Mike #1 0704-5543, Mike #7 1104-5607, OP #1 086-543.

Btry "B" also completed installation of a three post flash base. Coordinates: OP #1 0861-5426, OP #2 1209-5522, OP #3 1277-5548.

The 6 Gp AOP adjusted the 194 FA Bn at 1636B on vehicles at 099-517. 25 rds were expended and resulted in two vehicles being disabled and a large fire started.

The 938 FA Bn AOP adjusted his own Bn on 8 vehicles at 3272-5464 and 4 caissons at 324-482. 28 rds were placed on the first target and 56 rds on the second resulting in one vehicle and one caisson being knocked out. The remainder are believed to have been disabled. This same combination also adjusted on ey personnel at 3069-5204. The personnel were dispersed and casualties were observed.

The 976 FA Bn AOP adjusted his Bn on an ey vehicle at 308-528 and destroyed it with an expenditure of 18 rds.

The 938 FA Bn AOP fired the 976 FA Bn on a group of ey personnel, estimated at company size, at 299-515. 27 rds were fired and resulted in numerous casualties.

The 63 Div Arty AOP adjusted the 995 FA Bn on 2 ey guns at 523-626 at 1815B. A total of 42 rds were fired and the guns were reported as destroyed.

The 35 Gp AOP adjusted the 995 FA Bn on ey vehicles at 385-535. 21 rds were fired and resulted in 4 of the vehicles being destroyed.

The 35 Gp AOP fired the 995 FA Bn on ey personnel at 442-524 and effectively dispersed them.

The 35 Gp AOP fired the 995 FA Bn on an ey gun at 411-546. 16 rds were fired and neutralized the area.

The 419 AFA Bn captured an ey FO party with maps showing the locations of ey artillery. Observed fire was placed upon these locations with good results reported. The adjusted data indicated the artillery was actually where the maps showed it to be.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		63 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	6		2		8	6
Per	17		32		27	2
Veh	5	6			5	
MG & Mor			8		2	
Prep	8	20			2	
Armor			1			
Def Fires			4			
Har		23	24	14		15
Reg	20		11		42	
Misc	9			16	1	
Prop			10			
TOTAL	65	49	92	30	87	23

(2) Corps Arty:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	1	7	3	2	4	
Per	5	2		8	15	
Veh	5		3		7	
Prep					1	
Armor					4	
Har		17		20		24
Reg	4		3			10
Misc						4
Dest			1			
TOTAL	15	26	10	30	31	38

AOP Missions: 60

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SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn atchd to 10th AD. TD companies continued direct support to same Combat Commands and Task Forces. TD's covered the armored advances, occupied defensive positions, and supported the local tank attacks.

822 TD Bn atched to 63 Inf Div. Units supported the Inf attacks of respective Regts and Bns. The 3rd Plt of "B" Co helping in the capture of OBERSTEINACH (S5569) took 19 PW's during the period. 1st Plt TD's of "C" Co were busy running armored recon in support of the 63 Recon Tp and 117 Recon Sq. The 1st and 2nd Recon Plts were atched to 254 Inf Regt for operations.

824 TD Bn atched to 100 Inf Div. TD Companies continued fire support to respective Inf Regts and Bns. "A" Co TD's mounted Inf on the decks and contacted French elements vic LAUFERN (S0353). Other TD's of "A" Co fired 76mm HE and 50 cal MG's at enemy personnel with good results.

The 1st Plt of "C" fired 15 rds 76mm HE and approx 400 rds 50 cal at enemy personnel in woods and buildings with excellent results.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

S465-645, S455-594, S475-500, S445-445, S353-472, S374-497, S268-515, S214-514, S168-513, S120-533, S082-528, S043-519, S515-663, S560-670, S580-715.

Byrne

BYRNE
Asst S-3

SECRET

Source: G-2 Report, 103 Inf Div, 14 April 1945.

20 JULY PLOT ON HITLER'S LIFE

The following is an account of the happenings connected with the German generals' plot culminating in the attempt to assassinate HITLER on 20 July 44, in PW GEN MAJ VON PFUEHLSTEIN's own words:

Preparations of the Plot

On 1 Feb 43 I was relieved as regt'l CO on the Eastern front and given the command of the newly organized BRANDENBURG Div. GEN MAJ OSTER, C of S, ABWEHR ABTEILUNG, disclosed to me, in numerous official conversations, substantially the following:

In the opinion of a considerable number of enlightened officers, including Field Marshals VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN, GEN DER INF VON STUELPNAGEL, and many others who were well informed, the war could no longer be won militarily. Every day that the war was prolonged meant unnecessary bloodshed and would ultimately lead to the complete collapse of Germany. The newly appointed Chief of General Staff, GENOBST ZEITZLER, was of the same opinion since the STALINGRAD debacle.

It was of primary importance to end the war somehow, as quickly as possible. The prerequisite for this would have to be the elimination, or at least the exclusion of HITLER and the Party, since any negotiations between the Allies and HITLER were impossible, - HITLER and his close supporters would never take such steps, in the first place. My opposition to HITLER and the Party had been known to Gen OSTER for years. Field Marshals VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN, GENOBST HECK and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN have decided to remove HITLER, at first from the military command only, at the earliest opportunity. The plan was approx as follows: On the appointed day the FUEHRER's Hq in East Prussia was to be seized by trustworthy anti-Nazi troops. VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN, together with other officers, then wanted to see HITLER and confront him with the following demands:

- a. Appointment of a REICHSGENERALSTABSCHEF (REICH Chief of General Staff) with full powers of command for the entire conduct of the war in all theaters;
- b. Subordination (UNTERSTELLUNG) of all three WEHRMACHT branches to a single person;
- c. Re-appointment for the vacant post of Army C in C (OBERBEFEHLSHABER DES HEERES);
- d. Establishment of a single General Staff for all three WEHRMACHT branches.

Should HITLER not accede voluntarily to this plan, suitable steps to apply force were to be taken. These measures would probably consist of placing HITLER under temporary arrest. Preparations were made to cut off all communications between the FUEHRER's Hq and the outside world at the designated time, until the desired decision would be reached one way or another. BERLIN was to be seized by anti-Nazi troops at the same time. The intentions were further to incorporate the WAFFEN SS into the Army, with the appointment of a REICH Chief of General Staff. Along with this plan there were other designs, of a political and economic nature, the details of which I am not familiar. It is fairly certain that it was hoped to establish contact with America and England through the Vatican, with the purpose of negotiating for an armistice. I think that the Vatican was chosen as the neutral meeting place for the diplomats concerned; I do not know whether the cooperation of the Pope himself was sought.

It was further made clear to me that my appointment as Commander of the BRANDENBURG Div was only a blind, that it would be my task to occupy a certain district of BERLIN with elements of the Div which were located in the town of BRANDENBURG and, above all, to eliminate Party officials, the SS, and the SD.

GEN DER INF OLERICHT handled the technical preparations in the interior. But he was unable immediately to make any headway with his preparations, due to the lack of capable and dependable officers. He finally succeeded in obtaining

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OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG as chief, and only with the arrival of this officer did the preparations begin to make progress. All preparations had to be handled with the greatest care. Only very few officers could at first be let in on the secret. Spying by HIMMLER, the SD, and the Party increased daily. The fact that the Chief of the Army Personnel Office (PERSONALMT), GENLT SCHMUNDT, was a 100% Nazi and could not be told about the plot made the situation especially difficult, because officers who were urgently desired for the accomplishment of the proposed coup could not be secured.

The further arrangements of the plan called for holding the Eastern front under all circumstances, at least to protect the German border from a Russian invasion. It was intended that a British-American invasion in the WEST should not be opposed; German troops were to be withdrawn to the interior of the REICH and to reinforce the Eastern front. The plan was to let in the Americans and British, without fighting and as fast as possible, far into Germany. The necessary preparations in the WEST were in the hands of GEN DER INF VON STUELPNAGEL, Military Commander of France, and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN, Military Commander of Belgium.

In the course of time it developed that Field Marshal VON KLUGE was somewhat undecided and had postponed the date of the undertaking. In spite of all pressure he kept postponing the appointed time for the coup. Weeks and months passed, in summer 43, during which I and many others came to the conclusion that the plan would never be carried out because of the indecision of VON KLUGE. VON KLUGE was advised, and even urged by his Ia, GENMAJ VON TRESKOW, to go on with the plot. OBST SCHULTZE-BUETTGER, Ia to Field Marshal VON MANNSTEIN, was also let in on the plans.

I received the mission of determining, during a visit to the OKH, the position and attitude of GENOBST ZEITZLER and the Operations Sec (OPERATIONS AB-TEILUNG) of the Army High Command. It was essential to know whether ZEITZLER could be let in on the plot. Through several conversations with the officers of the Operations Sec, particularly with OBST GRAF VON KIELMANNSEGG and OBSTLT SMEND, I received the impression that ZEITZLER, while he had taken over the position of Chief of the General Staff with great confidence in HITLER, realized after a few weeks that HITLER was totally incompetent as far as military matters were concerned and was making one catastrophic decision after another. ZEITZLER was especially shocked by the fact that losses in men which ran into hundreds of thousands, as at STALINGRAD, did not make the slightest impression on HITLER. ZEITZLER learned within those short weeks to recognize HITLER's military incompetence and to hate and despise him because of his personal characteristics. But he was not yet thinking about the overthrowing of the FUEHRER. He rather considered it his duty, come what may, to remain at his post. The inevitability of the collapse was painfully clear to him and to the officers of the Operations Sec. They continued to work out of a sense of duty, and without any hope. I communicated this impression to Admiral CANARIS: the decision was reached NOT to inform ZEITZLER of the plans.

In the course of the year 1943, particularly in the fall and winter, the determination to overthrow HITLER ripened. There were various ideas as to the methods of realizing this aim. For a long time it was hoped that an opportunity would present itself during one of HITLER's so-called "visits to the front" (FRONTREISEN). HITLER's visits usually carried him only as far as Army Group Hq. At Army Group Center as well as at Army Group SOUTH preparations for an assassination were made. It did not come to pass, because HITLER could no longer be persuaded to make a visit to the front. Thus the decision was gradually reached to bring about the overthrow of HITLER, and if possible also HIMMLER, in the FUEHRER Hq.

In Jan 44 I was reported by a junior officer, O/LT BOECKEL, as having a suspicious political outlook. I was classified politically unreliable and, therefore, relieved on 1 Apr 44 of the BRANDENBURG Div command and placed at the disposal of the OKH. After I left BERLIN, I had no opportunity to witness the further unfolding of the plan. I was sent to a div commanders' course at HIRSCHBERG. Having been appointed CG 50 Inf Div on 1 July 44, I was on the Eastern front at the time of the attempted assassination on 20 July.

The Events of 20 July 1944

In KUESTRIN, while under detention, I had occasion to speak to the following officers, HITLER's political prisoners like myself: OBST VON CANNSTEIN, Commandant of the Cav School, BROMBERG: MAJ VON HASSELT, son of the diplomat; and MAJ VON KLUGE, son of the Field Marshal. These three officers were apprehended just after me, and were able to give a detailed account of the attempted execution of the plan. The greatest part of the story, as far as I can recall, was told by OBST VON CANNSTEIN.

OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG, as C of S to the Commander of the Replacement Army, had to report to the FUEHRER Hq to give an account on the state of the replacement forces. This report was to be delivered as part of the so-called situation conference (LAGEBESPRECHUNG) in which HITLER, KEITEL, JODL, ZEITZLER, WARLIMONT, and other officers took part daily. Often HEMMLER, and occasionally GOERING were also present. STAUFFENBERG had no control over the appointment of the date for his report. On the designated day STAUFFENBERG flew in his private plane to the FUEHRER Hq at LOETZEN, East Prussia. He had with him large maps and special large graphs for his report, and also a briefcase with a strong explosive charge. After arriving at the FUEHRER Hq, STAUFFENBERG declared that before the conference he would have to go into the conference room to lay out his maps and graphs. Thus STAUFFENBERG had the opportunity, immediately before the conference, to go alone into the conference room. He spread his maps out on the table so that the view of the floor beneath the table was obstructed. Under the map table, protected from sight, he placed the briefcase with the explosive charge and probably a time fuze.

Since the situation conferences usually lasted several hours, and STAUFFENBERG was to be the last to report, it was not noticeable that he left the FUEHRER Hq at the beginning of the conferences. Without waiting for the explosion he flew back to BERLIN and there reported to GEN OLBRIGHT that the assassination was accomplished. Based upon this belief, the program proceeded further. All the prepared orders were given. These concerned first of all the taking over of the most important government offices in BERLIN and the arrest of the most important Party and SS members such as the higher-ranking SS police officials, GAULEITER, etc. GENOBST BECK tried at the same time to get in touch with the army groups by telephone. As I understand it, the following conversation took place:

GENLT KINZEL, C of S, Army Group NORTH, received the telephone call from BERLIN. A voice, probably that of STAUFFENBERG, said, "I am turning over the call to GENOBST BECK". GENOBST BECK then said, substantially, "I am not sufficiently informed regarding the details of the situation in the Army Group NORTH. However, I am giving you the following directions for the further conduct of the struggle: Take care that Army Group NORTH under no circumstances be cut off and lose contact with the REICH. If necessary the Army Group front must be withdrawn towards East Prussia". With these words the conversation ended. It can be assumed that GENOBST BECK, GEN DER INF OLBRIGHT, and OBST VON STAUFFENBERG gave numerous orders and directives in the same vein. Thus it was easy for the SD later to grab a high percentage of all officers connected with the case, since through the unhappy outcome of the attempted assassination practically all the cards were on the table.

I know that many officers who were not immediately apprehended, their nerves strained by mental uncertainty, sought and found death on the front or through suicide. This was the case of OBST VON VOSS, C of S, Army Group Center, and probably of EPTM VON KOEHNEN and EPTM Helmut PINKERT of BRANDENBURG Div. Some officers, such as MAJ VON HASSELT, are of the opinion that a high percentage of the officers involved in the plot were not seized by the SD and that perhaps only one-fifth were. I personally know of only one, GENLT VON ROST, C of S, III Corps, in BERLIN, who was definitely involved in the preparations for the Coup. Until recently he was CG HOCH-UND DEUTSCHMEISTER Div on the Eastern front, EAST OF VIENNA. At first instrumental in the plans for the overthrow of HITLER, he later got "cold feet" and stepped aside.

S E C R E T

Prison

On 1 Sept I was arrested by the SD, thrown into the RSHA Prison, BERLIN, PRINZ ALERECHE STRASSE, and shackled. The prison cells were located along two corridors in the cellar. There were 32 small single cells in all, and during my stay at the prison most of them were continuously occupied. As soon as one occupant was hanged another was brought in. About 200 to 300 persons were held in the prison of the Criminal Court in MOABIT, BERLIN. All of these were confined because of participation in the 20 July incident. Among these 200 persons were numerous other officers, members of the Foreign Office, economists, merchants, intellectuals. Another prison was located in FUERSTENBERG. In all the larger cities the jails were filled with similar personalities. These were all somehow involved, or suspected of having been involved in the 20 July affair. GENOBST ZEITZLER was probably also apprehended. His whereabouts are unknown to me. A BERLIN lawyer, whose name has escaped me, was asked for advice by my wife. This lawyer, who was well informed on these matters, told my wife that in his estimation about 25,000 persons had been arrested in connection with the 20 July incident.

On 24 Nov I was transferred from the RSHA Prison to the KUESTRIN Fortress. Here the SCHLOSSKASERNE was designated as a concentration camp for politically unreliable officers. When the Russians stood before the gates of KUESTRIN on 30 Jan 45, the fortress of KUESTRIN was evacuated in panic, and many of the prisoners released in utter rashness. I myself was able to go home. The fate of the other officers is not known to me. A new concentration camp for officers was to be set up in Central Germany, in the neighborhood of ERFURT, but I do not know whether these plans have been realized.

Treatment of Officer Prisoners

After the 20 July Putsch GOERING approached HITLER and asked to treat the arrested generals humanely and in a manner befitting their position. This request was rejected by HITLER in the roughest manner possible, and GOERING was thrown out together with his request. SS OBERGRUPPENFUEHRER (Lt Gen) Sepp DIETRICH (also ROMMEL?) reportedly supported this request. All three fell subsequently into disgrace.

Sepp Dietrich

In KUESTRIN GENLT SPEIDEL told me the following: SS OGRUF Sepp DIETRICH had realized a long time ago that HITLER's policy and his methods of waging war would lead to a catastrophe. SPEIDEL told me that DIETRICH saw these things as they really were. It must be remembered that Sepp DIETRICH, as a unit commander, got his impressions directly from the front and from his contacts with many Army officers, - impressions completely different from those of HITLER, able only to estimate the situation from behind a desk. There exists mutual mistrust between HIMMLER and DIETRICH: HIMMLER felt that DIETRICH had grown too powerful and that he might become a dangerous rival in the future. SPEIDEL described DIETRICH as an uneducated country yokel, but having sound common sense. I saw a chit of paper on which DIETRICH had written to SPEIDEL in fall of 44: "With cordial greetings, Yours, Sepp DIETRICH (and not HEIL HITLER)" (MIT KAMERADSCHAFTLICHEM GRUSS, IHR SEPP DIETRICH (UND NICHT HEIL HITLER)).

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #222.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

a. During the night, resistance on W half of front was spotty except for a defensive line between 5035500 and 182500. After heavy mortar barrage 80 ey launched an unsuccessful C/A vic 156512 at 2000B hours. At 2100B hours 10 Arm'd Div continued their spectacular advance, clearing FICHTENBERG (S4444) and moving to the S. On the east flank, ey offered stiff fight in RUPPERTSHOFFEN (S5868) at dusk but elsewhere the resistance was light.

All divisions advanced against light to moderate resistance during the day. On the east flank 44 Div had difficulty maintaining contact. 10 Arm'd Div overcame road-blocks, abatis and terrain difficulties to reach the REMS river at LORCH (4324) and MUTLANGEN (5127). Several SP guns were active vic 495444 and at 1130B hours 200 ey were observed entering woods vic 405381. At noon a heavy concentration of med arty fire fell in S4648 square. PWs from 198 Div and 235 AT Bn stated they were retreating to ULM via GÖPPINGEN (4013).

With 10 Arm'd Divs crossing of the REMS river it appears unlikely the ey has sufficient strength to contain this bridgehead and defend this river line; the ey's capability of falling back into BAVARIA in a series of delaying actions is favored.

b. Red Cross Vehicles in Germany:

International Red Cross is operating many motor vehicle convoys in Germany which carry emergency relief clothing, medical supplies and food to allied PWs. Vehicles are painted white with Red Cross markings and are usually driven by Swiss chauffeurs guarded by Germans. Convoys usually consist of 10-12 trucks and have received safe passage from German authorities and operate unmolested. If any of these trucks are overrun by Allied troops, safe conduct and passage will be given them back to their operating base. This includes safety for supplies, motorcycles, scout cars, passenger cars, trucks, Swiss drivers, German guards, and accompanying Red Cross officials which are part of the convoy.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Considering the inactivity of the past few days, the volume of enemy artillery fire today showed a relatively marked increase, which may indicate that the enemy felt it necessary to bolster his delaying forces with more artillery to halt our rapid advance, or else that we have overtaken large forces still in the process of withdrawal. The mass of fire was directed into two main areas, one along the WESTHEIM - GAILDORF axis and the other along the HEINRIET - BELLSTEIN axis. Most of the shelling appeared to have interdiction as its purpose, with towns along these routes being the principal targets. Harassing fire after dark was very light and scattered. In concentrations varying from five to 25 rounds, light and medium caliber guns shelled the HEINRIET vicinity (1554) intermittently during the day, with other shelling reported vic PREVORST (2151), SPIEGELBERG (2550), MASSACH (2249), and SULZBACH (2847). Both light and medium calibers were active throughout the day in the region S of VELLBERG (5756), subjecting the towns of NEUHAUSEN (4447), STEINBACH (4757), WESTHEIM (4452), HAGUENAU (4648), GROSS ALTDORF (4848), SPOCK (4649), and the road N to WESTHEIM to considerable fire. This general area drew the larger portion of today's shelling, occasioned no doubt by the concern with which enemy troops in the GRAILSHEIM - VELLBERG area view our operations on their left flank.

Shellrep total: 15.

44 Div - 3; 100 Div - 10; 405 Gp - 1; 6 Gp - 1.

EB List:

1147 CC

1195-4770

AP 17 Apr

A

2/G

Suspect List, locations of possible further activity:

1952-4230

AOP

1/G

1504-4586

AOP

Guns

2106-4498

AOP

4/G

Sound turned in one area location in the 1450 sq however, the location is now inside the NFL and therefore is not included on the suspect list.

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SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Although visibility was excellent during the period, activity of the artillery decreased somewhat, especially in the Corps left sector where Armor made rapid advances. In this sector the artillery was busy reconnoitering for and occupying new positions. Observed missions were fired on personnel, vehicles, tanks, machine guns, and mortars. Unobserved fires were chiefly on harassing targets.

The 44th Div Arty joined the ranks of the Artillery with the Corps during the period.

The 100 Div Arty ACP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on an ey gun at 1952-4230. Two target hits were obtained and the area was well covered.

The 938 FA Bn ACP registered his Bn at 2354-4349. During the process of registering a house in the immediate vicinity was hit and exploded.

The 100 Div Arty ACP adjusted the 938 FA Bn on an ey gun at 3844-4534. No visible effect on the gun was observed. However a house in the immediate area was hit. The same observer and unit adjusted on 2 ey vehicles at 318-457 and 1 ey gun at 343-442. 4 hits were obtained on one of the vehicles. The gun and other vehicle escaped into a nearby woods before an adjustment could be obtained on them.

A GOP of the 374 FA Bn adjusted the 976 FA Bn on ey Inf at 2994-5220 and neutralized the area.

The 100 Div Arty ACP fired the 194 FA Bn on 2 ey vehicles at 190-447. 16 rds were fired and the two vehicles were reported destroyed.

The 6 Gp ACP adjusted the 194 FA Bn on an ey tank beside a house at 1198-4859. 20 rds were fired and left the house burning.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		44 IDA		100 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB					3	5
Per			5		23	7
Veh		Not			5	
MG & Mor		Available			3	
Har						13
Reg					22	
TOTAL			5		56	25

(2) Corps Artillery:

Type	6 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	2	2				
Per	1	2	Not		Not	
Veh	3		Available		Available	
Har		12				
Reg	8					
TOTAL	14	16				

Total AOP Missions: 13

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

a. Mission and Attachments:

609 TD Bn (76 mm) SP -- Atchd to 10th AD.
776 TD Bn (90 mm) SP -- Atchd to 44th Inf Div.
822 TD Bn (76 mm) SP -- Rold from VI Corps control.
824 TD Bn (76 mm) SP -- Atchd to 100th Inf Div.

b. Operations:

609 TD Bn continued supporting the attacks of the 10th AD. TD Companies and platoons operated in direct support of respective Armored Commands. Early in the period TD's fired on enemy horse-drawn Arty and supply columns. One Arty piece was destroyed, many horses and enemy personnel were killed, and damage to the enemy material was considered heavy. A total of 24 PW's were captured during the period.

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S E C R E T

776 TD Bn closed elements into VI Corps sector and made preparations for Div support.

822 TD Bn -- No operations reported.

824 TD Bn supporting the attack of the 100th Inf Div. Co "A" fired at enemy occupied house on hill #363 (S1752) with good results and captured 2 PW's. Co "C" cleared 3 road blocks and captured 5 PW's during the period. A late report for the past period gives "C" Co TD's credit for knocking out several enemy MG nests.


SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S065-542, S105-514, S155-500, S190-525, S213-486, S267-434, S295-479, S350-440, S400-350, S395-380, S425-834, S400-270, S440-237, S510-270, S485-325, S505-437, S465-613, S540-651.

Byrne
BYRNE
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: 20 Apr 45
Date: 20 Apr 45
From: 191800B Apr 45
To: 201800B Apr 45DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #223.SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Ey resistance was light and scattered as friendly armor extended its breakthrough to south of FILS River. On our extreme west flank, the ey resisted from dug in positions north of OBER STEINFELD (S1548) while our patrols reported ey still along line S0552 - S0750. SULZBACH (S2946) was cleared of SA and AT fire at 2200B while our armor reported only scattered opposition north of the REMS River. Resistance in LORCH (S4424) was quickly overcome but considerable SA and Panzerfaust fire was received at crossing of bridges at S476230 and S492231.

During the day the 100 Div continued to advance in its sector meeting scattered opposition. Roadblocks, supported by SA and mortar fire, were overcome in the S35-35 grid square while the 10 AD exploited its breakthrough and reached WHINGEN (S3413) and HOLZMADEN (S3105) against light ey resistance.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. In a situation which may well bear the title of "fluid", full reports on enemy artillery activity are not available, but some decline is believed to have occurred from yesterday's volume of fire. Light calibers harassed the HEINRIET area (1554) during the early hours of the night. Except for some light interdiction fire S of BACKNANG (2540) during the day, fire in that region was light. Farther east, however, guns in the area S of VELLEBERG (5656) continued to shell our communication routes in the GAILSDORF (4946) area, MITTELRODT (4544), and W of SWABISCH GEMUND (5224). AOP's picked up a battery at 548-498 at 1600B, also gun flashed S of 585-473.

Shellrep total: 4

100 Div	194 FA Bn	44 Div
2	1	1

b. Suspect List--Locations of possible further activity:

548-498	Btry	AOP	1238-3125	3 Lt AA	AP 19 Apr
2242-3050	Btry	AOP	1317-3154	" " " 1	"
247-338	Btry	AOP		Poss Unocc	
1125-4400	6 Lt AA		1619-2603	3 Lt AA	"
1124-4417	3 Lt AA		1667-2660	2 " " At Ea	"
1106-4407	3 Lt AA		1674-2611	MR	
1070-4408	3 Lt AA		1701-2603	3 Lt AA	"
1211-3013	3 Lt AA	AP 19 Apr	1719-2902	3 " "	
1700-2792	" " "	"	2192-3120	4 " "	"
1699-2801	" " "	"	2259-2571	4 " "	"
1715-2770	" " "	"	2074-3274	4 " "	"
1292-2700	4 Hvy AA	"	2052-2527	3 " "	"
1310-2745	6 " "	"	2058-2518	3 " "	"
1568-2871	6 Lt AA	"	2079-2529	3 " "	"
1599-2934	4 " "	"	2090-2536	3 " "	"
1528-2882	3 " "	"	2099-2522	3 " "	"
1709-2771	3 " "	"	2251-2561	3 " "	"
1711-2776	2-3 Lt AA		2274-2560	3 " "	"
	Btrys	"	2284-2571	3 " "	"
			2282-2553	3 " "	"
			2289-2553	3 " "	"

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

The arty with the Corps was extremely busy during the period in displacing forward in order to keep fire power forward of advancing troops. During the night harassing fire was placed on the road net in front of the advancing infantry.

Immediately after occupying position A Btry of the 976 FA Bn was adjusted by the 100 Div Arty AOP on the type of target an artilleryman dreams about; it was an ey column consisting of 600 infantry and 50 or more vehicles at S265-270.

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The leading two vehicles were disabled after approximately 12 rounds and the entire column was worked over by arty fire, and then the personnel and vehicles took refuge along the secondary road net. The AOP then adjusted this Btry on as many as three targets at a time on these secondary roads. A smoke mission was then fired at S258-268 for the Air Corps who then worked over the target. This one btry fired a total of 143 rds on the above targets and the result was utter confusion among the ey but no definite account of destruction due to the unusual amount of activity in the area.

A Btry 976 FA fired on ey vehicles, personnel and a factory at S317-252 at 1745B. This was observed by 6 FA Gp AOP and 22 rds were fired. The factory was left burning.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

a. Mission and attachments:

- 609 TD Bn (76mm) SP -- No change
- 614 TD Bn (3") towed -- Attached to 103 Inf Div
- 776 TD Bn (90mm) SP -- No change
- 824 TD Bn (76mm) SP -- No change

b. Operations:


Due to the moving of CP groups, current periodic operation reports are unavoidable for the first three units listed in above par.

824 TD Bn continued direct support to Infantry elements of the 100 Inf Div. Co "A" supporting the attacks of the 399 Inf Regt fired on several enemy OP's with excellent results. After TD's fired 36 rds HE on an enemy CP vic S137495 heavy enemy arty fire ceased. Co "B" supported the Bn attacks of the 398 Inf Regt. Co "C" supported the Inf attacks of the 397 Inf Regt.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S105-515, S155-500, S215-375, S245-345, S355-345, S400-270, S360-135, S330-055, S420-010, S475-030, S530-040.


EVANS
Asst S-3

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT NO. 224.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

All units of the Corps continued the rapid advance S against gradually stiffening resistance. 100 Div pushed to the N bank of REMS River in its zone; 44 and 103 Div had motorized Inf elements following closely behind 10 Armd Div, which, after clearing KIRCHHEIM (2507), proceeded SW against increasing opposition to NEIDLINGEN (3599), GRUIBINGEN (4101) and GEISLINGEN (6405). With First French Army reported in SIELINGEN (1009), NURTINGEN (0804) and REUTLINGEN (X0889), the encirclement of STUTTGART was nearly completed. A large column of ey vehicles, numbering in the hundreds and moving S was picked up vic FRICKENHAUSEN (2000) by an AOP in the late morning and our fighter-bombers concentrated their efforts on it with devastating results. During 20 April 33 hostile aircraft were reported over the Corps front. PW's for 24 hr period ending 202400B April: 4,481 (3607 in hospitals).

Ey continued to interdict road vic GALLSDORF between 4846 and 4944. Civilians reported SS troops were forming for C/A in HOLZHEIM (4311). From 10 Armd Div came reports the ey is defending the approaches to the SWABIAN ALPS with arty, AT and intense SA fire. In NIEDLINGEN (X3599) and TOFFGRUBE (X3297) stiff opposition was encountered at the end of the period but elsewhere ey was unable to stop the armor. Many pockets have been by-passed and the ey who cut the SCHLIERBACH (3110) - ALBERSHAUSEN (3412) road during the morning were captured in the afternoon. Tc/R and AOPs reported heavy vehicular and dismounted movement West of KIRCHHEIM (2606) in a Southward direction.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Available reports indicate that enemy artillery fire was generally light and scattered in this period, with no organized activity apparent except possibly in the high ground S of the FILS River. In the morning the enemy offered some slight opposition E of SCHEORNDORF (3224) wherein mortar and some artillery fire was encountered, but this defense was soon overcome. Our AOP's drew intermittent 88mm harassing fire from guns NE of STUTTGART during the day. In the SWABIAN ALPS S of the FILS River the enemy supported his defense of the passes with sporadic concentrations on our advancing elements, particularly in vic of NIEDLINGEN (3599), where excellent observation enabled delaying forces to offer stubborn resistance. The enemy continues to shell GALLSDORF (4946) and to interdict the road NW to OTTENDORF (4749).

Locations of possible further enemy activity:

0814 ZJ	0808-1477	AP 20 Apr	A	5/Lt
1418 ZK	1401-1856	AP 20 Apr	A	6/HAA
1414 ZP	1462-1496	AP 20 Apr	A	3/Lt AA
1515 ZQ	1532-1536	AP 20 Apr	A	3/Lt AA

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

The arty with the Corps was mainly interested in displacing forward and assisting in wiping out ey pockets of resistance. The ey road net was harassed during the night wherever the situation permitted.

The 17 FA Gp rejoined the ranks of VI Corps Arty at the start of the period and brought with them the 741 FA Bn (8" H) who will be operating with the Corps for the first time.

During the period the 69 AFA Bn was relieved of attachment to the 103 Inf Div and attached to the 44 Inf Div. Also the 976 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 6 FA Gp and attached to 17 FA Gp as of 220001B April.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn advanced with the attacks of the 10th AD. TD companies made excellent progress with respective combat commands, covered armored thrusts, and gave fire support where enemy resistance was encountered.

614 TD Bn moved forward supporting the advances of the 103rd Inf Div. TD Cos displaced guns and occupied defensive positions in direct support of the attacking Infantry.

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776 TD Bn continued the attacks with the 44th Inf Div. TD Companies made rapid progress in support of respective Inf Regts. TD's protected the flanks of attacking Inf Bns, covered frontal assaults, and assisted in the capture of many enemy towns.

824 TD Bn provided direct support to Inf Regts of the 100th Inf Div. Co "A" fired on dug-in enemy Inf, killing five (5) and discouraging many more. The other TD companies continued to advance with their Inf Regts assisting in the capture of several enemy towns. Rcn Co was reld from Div Prov Rcn and atchd to 117th Cav Rcn Sq.


SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

S080-450, S175-375, S195-305, S160-270, S310-245, S420-230, S440-090, S360-135, S255-057, S320-040, X350-993, S386-032, X435-984, S470-075, S550-050.

French Corps:

S125-092, S165-073, S190-040, S145-025, S090-000, X100-970, X130-920, X080-890, X040-870.



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S E C R E T

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #225.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

The ey offered light resistance against our armored columns advancing into the SWABIAN ALPS. Our forward movement was hindered by roadblocks, mines, and terrain while the ey employed direct AA and sniper fire vic S2707 and S2109. Infantry elements mopping up reported many roadblocks and blown bridges. Light resistance was met at WESTERHEIM (S3992) and vic S2617, S1622, S2405, S4808 and S4712. Two ey tanks were reported vic WENDHINGEN (S2109) while SP's were active vic S3113.

The general withdrawal precipitated by our breakthrough continued at a rapid rate during the day, with the ey offering generally light resistance. In NURTINGEN (S1804), the 103 Div encountered SA, MG and mortar fire while clearing the town. At the close of the period, the ey withdrawal appeared disorganized and no definite front line existed.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

a. The disorganized enemy, routed from his SWABIAN ALPS delaying positions, found it impossible to oppose our advancing elements with any volume of artillery fire, but individual guns, doubtless attached to improvised bewildered battle groups, continued their activity when opportunity offered during the day. Evidently the enemy used the hours of darkness solely to put distance between us, for no shelling was reported during the night, except for 8 rds est 150mm cal that fell vic KIRCHEIM (2706) at 0100B. Light concentrations fell during the day SW of KIRCHEIM vic S2304, 2799, and 1805, the latter believed to be from SP's supporting a small counterattack. In the middle of the day our forward elements encountered harassing fire vic INGSTETTEN (4179) and JUSTIGEN (4278). E of SCHWABISCH GMUND some artillery is still maintaining its positions for scattered concentrations were reported vic S5120 and STRASSDORF (5122).

b. Locations of possible further activity:

2200-9561	AP 21 Apr	3/Lt AA	2348-9441	AP 21 Apr	3/Lt AA
2208-9562	" " "	"	8848-8544	" " "	"
2202-9543	" " "	"	8860-8557	" " "	"
2181-9554	" " "	"	8858-8527	" " "	"
2335-9405	" " "	"	8873-8545	" " "	"
2341-9449	" " "	"	8889-8425	" " "	"

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

The arty with the Corps supported the advance of the Corps with fire power and movement, mainly movement as practically all the arty displaced forward during the period. Whenever the situation permitted a harassing program was fired on the ey lines of communication during the night.

Due to the poor visibility during the period, the AOP's were unable to fly many missions.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued long advances with the 10th AD. TD's destroyed an enemy MK IV tank with 4 rds APC and 2 rds HE at a range of 400 yds. An enemy GP veh was fired on and destroyed with 2 rds of HE. Over 200 rds of 50 cal was fired at personnel killing several, wounding many more, and capturing 3. At last report TD Companies continued to make good progress in support of respective armored commands..

614 TD Bn made very good progress in support of the 103rd Inf Div. TD Companies displaced and occupied gun positions many times during the period. TD plts are advancing in direct support of respective Bns from each Inf Regt.

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776 TD Bn supported the attacks of the 44th Inf Div. Companies supported the advancing Inf elements, covered exposed flanks, established roadblocks, and assisted in the capturing of several enemy towns.

824 TD Bn supported the rapid advances of the 100th Inf Div. TD's assisted Inf units in capturing and cleaning many enemy occupied towns. Several TD Plts were used as armored Rcn to speed up local attacks. Rcn Co remains attached to 117 Cav Rcn Sq as Squadron reserve.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

S20-06, S24-06, X27-98, X32-95, X37-85, X33-75, X39-72, X42-70, X50-82, X48-90, X53-00,

II French Corps:

S07-34, S11-25, S15-17, S24-13, S20-11, S20-06, S18-04, S16-00, X14-95, X09-90, X04-84.

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S E C R E T
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *PL*
Date: 23 Apr 45
From: 221800B Apr 45
To : 231800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT No. 226.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Ey resistance continued to be light and scattered as our elements advanced farther to the South. The woods surrounding HOHENGEHRE (S2619) were reported to still have many ey armed with SA and Panzerfaust; however enemy withdrawing S and SE offered only scattered resistance. Resistance was overcome at AUFHAUSEN (X4999) with our elements reaching X500930 against light resistance. Disorganized delaying actions opposed our armor which continued its advance to the DANUBE River.

During the day, our infantry elements continued to overwhelm scattered pockets of resistance left behind by the rapid movement of our armored columns. A PW stated that the DANUBE River is to be the ey MLR.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Continued enemy withdrawal and the lack of any well organized delaying positions brought a further decrease in the light ey arty activity of the past few days. Fire during the night was nil, but during the morning our inf, which was cut off for awhile in ERKENBRECHTSWEILER 2597, received lt harassing fire from 105's and in the afternoon troops in the vic of SCHOPFLOCH 325950 were hit with 10 rds of 105 cal. Our elements along the DONAU River in the vic of EHINGEN 4767 were harassed during the morning by guns South of the river, however by late afternoon this fire was reported to have ceased.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

The arty with the Corps continued to support the attack of the Corps during the period. Wherever the situation permitted, a harassing program was fired on the ey lines of communication.

Hq Btry of the 36 FA Bn captured 30 PW's in the Town of GOSSEBACH and one FW pointed out the location of 2 MG's located on the hillside nearby which were manned and capable of firing on the road net. The supporting AA of the 533 AAA (AW) Bn, with one M51 (multiple 50 caliber MG's) and one 40mm Bofor was quickly put into direct fire position and for a few minutes all concerned thought a major air raid was in progress. B Co (3 Btry) of the 36 FA Bn deployed and assaulted the hillside after the "preparation" and captured the objective along with 44 war-weary Krauts.

The 103 Div Arty AOP during the period repulsed a German attack of 30 Krauts, led by a Major, on their air field. After utilizing all available fire power including the attached AA, 17 were captured and 10 wounded, and flying again progressed as usual.

The 938 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 6 FA Gp and attached to 17 FA Gp; also the 242 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 100 Inf Div and attached to the 103 Inf Div. The 6 FA Gp was relieved of their mission of support of 100 Inf Div and given mission of organizing and protecting the Corps left flank with artillery fire.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued direct support to combat commands and Task Forces of the 10th AD. TD's supporting the 634 FA Bn fired on and destroyed a troublesome 88mm gun. The 3rd Plt of "B" Co fired on a group of enemy pers., killing 2, and capturing 12. A late report from "B" Co for the last period reports 1 half-track, 1 towed 88mm gun, and 2 Volkswagons destroyed.

614 TD Bn advanced in support of Inf Regts of the 103rd Inf Div. TD Plts continued to displace and occupy positions in direct support of respective Inf Bns.

776 TD Bn provided direct fire support and assisted the Inf attacks of the 44 Inf Div. Two TD's of 1st Plt, "B" Co fired 90mm HE, .30 and .50 cal MG's helping to repulse an enemy counterattack. After the firing 20 of the ey were wounded, 15 killed, 20 PW's taken with more being brought in by our Inf. 3rd Plt TD's of "B" Co while supporting our tank and Inf attacks fired on and destroyed 2 ey half-tracks and 1 truck.

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
Other operations during the period consisted of direct fire support on enemy strong points, and dug-in Inf delaying our advances.

824 TD Bn continued to support the attacks of the 100th Inf Div. TD Cos assisted Inf units in capturing more enemy towns and reducing isolated ey pockets. 1st Plt TD's of "A" Co fired on an enemy group, killing 4 and capturing 20. One TD crew captured 24 prisoners while one man took 1 Cff and 9 EM PW's. During the entire period the Bn took 54 PW's and continued to make good advances.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS:

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

X150850, X235925, X320940, X340885, X350800, X295655, X235665, X395694, X485641, X500665, X593716, X543845, 5542047.



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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #227.

LIBRARY
Field Artillery School,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Ey opposition was generally light except in the area north of URACH (X2289) where small ey groups resisted at scattered points. Heavy fighting continued in woods vic ERKENBRECHTSWEILER (X2596) and small groups were reported infiltrating toward LINNENGEN (X2896). Heavy SA and MG fire resisted our advance on the high ground NE of GRABENSTETTEN (X2793) while disorganized ey groups were mopped up vic LOTZINGEN (S2709). On the southern front there was little contact but the ey resisted with moderate SA fire vic X4465. A captured field order states that the CP of the 465 VGD is located in SENDEN (X7272).

Throughout the day, the ey was unable to offer substantial resistance to our advance. Friendly infantry, mopping up behind our armored columns, encountered many small groups of ey and participated in numerous firefights. A small group of ey in woods vic X6278 attempted to resist, but after a small firefight, decided to surrender. Moderate SA and AW fire was encountered late in the period by troops of the 44th Div mopping up ULM (X6680). At the end of the period, the ey still had been unable to organize an effective defense.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

As would be expected, a slight increase occurred in artillery activity today as the enemy was driven back on ULM despite his stubborn resistance. The sole harassing fire reported during the night consisted of moderate shelling of the town of OBERDISCHINGEN (5569) at 2120B. Our forward elements advancing on ULM drew light cal fire in vic of GOGGLINGEN (6474), 6578, EISINGEN (6075), and GRIMELFINGEN (6477), which was interdicted rather frequently by 105's, the rest of the fire being reported as 88mm. At least one battery of 88's SE of ULM was active during the day. A single gun cut off by our rapid advance harassed moppingup troops lightly in the area SE of URACH (2390).

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. With the advance of the Corps increasing in tempo, Corps Arty units were primarily engaged in displacements during the period. Firing was at a minimum, principally because of lack of targets. Harassing fire during the night was light due to lack of information of ey movement and accurate locations of our own and adjacent leading elements.

In spite of high winds and cloudy weather through most of the day, AOP's continued to support the Corps effort with both patrol and fire adjustment missions.

OI #14, this Hq, was issued during the period.

b. Summary of Missions:

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		44 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB	3					
Per	2		7		2	
Veh	9		3			
MG & Mor	1		2		7	
Prop					2	
Har		6				20
Reg	5		8			
Misc	3		6		7	
Smoke					2	
TOTAL	23	6	26		20	20

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(2) Corps Arty

	6 Gp		17 Gp		35 Gp		405 Gp	
Type	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
Per				2				
Har				2				
Reg	2		3					
TOTALS	2		3	4				

AOP Missions: 5

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to make long and rapid advances with the 10th AD. TD Companies supported the armored attacks of respective Combat Commands and Task Forces during the period. Due to the fast moving situation, a firing report for the operational period is unavailable.

614 TD Bn provided direct fire support and assisted the Inf advances of the 103rd Inf Div. Co "A" guns expended 68 rds HE destroying 2 ey AT guns, 1 ey OP, and neutralized several strongly dug-in positions. A total of 20 PW's were captured. Co "B" guns expended 60 rds HE; neutralizing enemy strong points in support of Inf attacks. "C" Co fired 56 rds HE and 20 rds APC destroying 1 ey MG, 1 rocket launcher, 10 buildings, and killing 18 of the enemy.

776 TD Bn supported the attacks of the 44th Inf Div. One TD Plt with mounted Inf overran 1 88mm gun, 1 75mm AT gun, and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy with MG's and direct 90mm fire.

The TD's supported several local Inf attacks with direct fire and captured many PW's during the period. A total of 86 PW's were taken for the period, and 1 M-36 TD damaged by enemy bazooka fire.

824 TD Bn assisted the 100th Inf Div in mopping up isolated and by-passed enemy pockets.

At 2330B, a commander on guard killed 2 enemy soldiers attempting to knock out the TD with a Panzerfaust. During the period of operation 19 PW's were captured. At 240900B the Bn was reld from 100th Inf Div and passed to VI Corps control.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

X66Q-995, X630-875, X695-870, X670-805, X670-770, X770-630, X755-515, X700-560, X625-565, X580-550.

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SCHROEDER

Asst S-3

S E C R E T

Date: 25 Apr 45

From: 241800B Apr 45

To : 251800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT NO. 228.

LIBRARY
Field Artillery School,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Enemy resistance along the Corps front was generally light and disorganized. Our entry into ULM was met by SA, MG, 88mm, and Flak fire, however by morning the resistance was broken and by 1400B the City N of the river was clear. Along ILLER River resistance was scattered and our crossing vic 7266 was lightly opposed by some 88's, SA and MG fire. During the day ULM received intermittent fire from 88's and 105's and at 1200B a C/A at X7486 in estimated Bn strength was repulsed. ILLERIEDEN X7166 received moderate 105 and 150 cal fire during the day and some shelling from direct fire weapons to the East. The ey cut off in vic of MUNSINGEN have apparently broken into small groups and are attempting to infiltrate to own lines. In 103 Div sector ey activity was negligible up to DANUBE River where both bridges were blown. At the close of the period friendly inf had crossed the DANUBE into NEW ULM against light resistance.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The stubborn defense of the DANUBE - ILLER River salient wherein the enemy has fought more tenaciously than at any time since HEILBRONN has also been accompanied by an increased volume of arty fire. Today, despite good visibility which aided our AOP's, the enemy artillery risked CB fire in increasing its activity, because of the urgency of its missions, chiefly interdiction of possible river crossing sites. At 0200B, evidently fearful of a crossing, the enemy used his 88's to harass the area vic 7266. During the day, 88's and 105's were quite active shelling our forward elements in the Town of ULM, particularly near the river front vic 6780 and 6880. Just before noon, a counterattack vic VOHRINGEN (7467) was supported by heavy and concentrated 88 mm cal fire, the combined total of mortar and arty fire during an hours time being estimated at 500 rounds. This same area had received intermittent harassing fire earlier in the morning, and again at 1540B 25 rounds 105 mm cal fell there. Near the destroyed bridge at DIETENHEIM (7460) the enemy placed occasional harassing fire, lighter in volume than that above, during most of the day, though a decline was noticeable in the afternoon.

Our alert ACP's took advantage of the enemy artillery's resumption of activity by picking up and firing on ten batteries, located generally in the wooded areas between 7480 and 7670. Photo cover this morning has so far revealed only a three gun HAA battery vic 785-763, indicating no extensive defense in depth has been set up.

Suspect List - Locations of possible further activity:

7585-7335	Btry	AOP
7548-7320	Btry	AOP
7315-8150	Btry	AOP
7612-7517	Btry	AOP
7345-7135	Btry	AOP
6745-7862	Btry	AOP
7628-7275	Btry	AOP
7561-7232	Btry	AOP
7498-7201	Btry	AOP
7482-6922	Btry	AOP
7850-7635	3 HAA	PRU

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. As the attack of the Corps continued to advance rapidly, arty units with the Corps displaced to positions close behind the leading elements in order to better support the attack. Visibility was generally good during the day, allowing both ground and air observers to keep close observation on any ey action or resistance met by our leading elements and to adjust fire immediately. Harassing fire during the night was placed on road nets, supply routes and lines of communications in the principal zones of ey action.

Counter-battery fire, both observed and unobserved, showed an increase during the period. 10 Arm'd Div Arty reported its units had fired on a total of 8 btrys

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during the period. Air observation made the adjustment in each case. These btrys were in the general vic of 7573. In the 44 Div sector AOP's located two ey gun positions and brought fire on them with excellent effect. One was a 3/G btry firing from 758750. 156 FA Bn AOP made the location and adjusted a Bn of Corps Arty on the position. The other was a single gun located at 732740. 157 FA Bn made this adjustment.

25-30 ey at 7798-8218, who were holding up the advance of inf in the 103 Div sector were taken under fire by 384 FA Bn. An inf observer made the adjustment. Excellent effect was obtained, with casualties inflicted on the ey and the area neutralized.

69 AFA Bn was rlvd of atchmt to 44 Inf Div and atchd to 103 Inf Div during the period.

b. Summary of Missions.

(1) Div Arty:

Type	10 ADA		44 IDA		103 IDA	
	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs	Obs	Unobs
CB				1	1	1
Per			9		2	
Veh		Not	2			
MG & Mor		Available	2			
Def Fire				4		
Har			6			
Reg			8		1	
Misc			11	1		
Total			38	6	4	1

(2) Corps Arty: Report Incomplete.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

(a) Mission and Attachments:

609 TD Bn (76mm) SP -- Atchd to 10th AD.
 614 TD Bn (3") Towed -- Atchd to 103d Inf Div.
 776 TD Bn (90 mm) SP -- Atchd to 44th Inf Div.
 824 TD Bn (76 mm) SP -- Atchd to 103d Inf Div.

(b) Operations:

609 TD Bn advanced in support of the 10th AD. TD Companies continued direct support to respective Armored Commands making excellent progress during the period. One TD Plt of "B" Co supporting TF ULRICH, fired 20 rds HE neutralizing 2 ey AT Guns.

614 TD Bn continued direct support to the attacking Inf Regts. The Bn's mission and attachments to the Div remain the same.

776 TD Bn supported the Inf attacks of the 44th Div. A late report for the last period gives "B" Co TD's credit for overrunning and destroying 1 grounded transport plane and 1 fighter plane. TD's also fired on a large group of ey hiding in a cave and draw, killing 38, wounding 29, and capturing 38.

824 TD Bn was atchd to 103d Inf Div at 241800B. After assembling, the Bn moved to new sector and made preparations for further operations.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:

Elements of the 63rd and 103rd Inf Div along North bank of the DANUBE RIVER.
 1770-360; X760-590; X765-550; X773-520; X766-495; X700-560; X660-570; X635-564;
 1583-552.

II Corps:

1585-545; X540-545; X535-465; X400-420; X353-275.

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S E C R E T

(Source: G-2 Report No. 154, Hq 103 Div)

TERRORIST METHODS EMPLOYED BY GERMANS

Until early 1944 there was no indication that the German Sabotage Services were interested in terrorist operations. Agents have been trained in methods for the elimination of sentries and guards as part of an attack on a sabotage target; the Abwehr II in France had an abortive scheme in June 1943 for undermining the morale of American troops in North Africa through widespread distribution of narcotics.

The first anti-personnel attempt known was that of the Amt VI agents in Italy, sent to Anzio in March 1944 with the mission of assassinating Generals Clark and Alexander. Since then there has been an increasing tendency towards assassination and terrorism until, at the present time, it is one of the normal functions of sabotage agents. This may be partly due to the assumption of control by the S.S. who have a long tradition of this type of activity; and partly because the Germans believe that terrorism may still serve a purpose when sabotage to military targets can no longer affect the situation.

1. Purpose:

The Germans hope to achieve a number of purposes by resorting to terrorist operations. In the former occupied countries, they believe that the assassination of important figures and widespread terrorism by the use of anti-personnel bombs will augment political trouble and general unrest, and forms part of the RSHA's general plans for long term political subversion in the Allied countries. In those countries assassination attempts to have been made against former German Intelligence Officers and agents who have deserted to the Allies.

Within German assassination attempts are likely to be made against important Allied individuals and there is evidence that a policy of general terrorism may be adopted against the occupying troops. These operations will be on similar lines to those organized in German-occupied Europe by the underground resistance movements. German nationals working for the Allies will be assassinated as a warning to other collaborators.

2. Equipment:

The following methods and equipment for anti-personnel operations are being used or are in the process of being developed by the German sabotage services:

a. Fire Arms: Revolvers fitted with silencers.

b. High Explosive Bombs: Agents have recently been sent on missions equipped with the following anti-personnel bombs:

(1) Buttermod Bomb: This is a modification of the anti-personnel "Butterfly" Bomb used by the G. A. F. Captured examples have a delay of five minutes, but longer delays are possible.

(2) Nipodisc: This is a cylindrical disc of the German high explosive Nipolit supplies to sabotage agents for use as an ordinary sabotage high explosive or incendiary bomb, and also as a hand-grenade. When used as a hand-grenade, it is initiated by a detonator and the standard German Army Friction Igniter with delay pellet BZE, having a delay time of 4.5 seconds.

(3) Nypocylinder: This is a cylinder of Nipolit 7.5 cms in height and 6 cms in diameter, which, as in the case of the Nipodisc, can be used either as a sabotage high explosive or incendiary bomb or as a hand-grenade with a short delay initiating device.

(4) Pull, pressure and pressure release igniters (switches): Agents have been trained in the use of both Allied and regular German Army types. These devices are used in anti-personnel high explosive bombs, arranged as booty-traps.

The presence of pull, pressure and pressure release igniters or any form of short delay initiating device (i.e. in seconds) in the possession of agents or in equipment dumps, is indicative that anti-personnel operations are intended.

c. Poisons: There is evidence now available that SKORZENY's sabotage service in equipping its agent with poison for assassination purposes. Hauptsturmführer WINTER at the Neu-Strelitz camp is said to be the Amt VI S expert and has been responsible for designing a number of camouflages for poisons, the following of which are known:

(1) Bayer's aspirin tablets in a Bayer's aspirin glass tube: Only one or two of the tablets in the tube contain poison; agents are told which before leaving on a mission. Special cigarettes have been prepared which, if smoked, produce a headache; thus giving an excuse for the agent to offer a poisoned aspirin tablet.

(2) Cigarette lighter: This lighter, if used to light a cigarette, poisons the cigarette smoker. A small spherical pellet about 1 mm in diameter, of

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unknown chemical constitution, is fixed on the lighter near the wick, in such a way that when the wick burns, the chemical becomes heated and volatilizes. The lighter is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ " long and $3/4$ " - 1" wide. The corners are rounded. There is a protective metal cap the color of tin over the top of the lighter. The cap pulls off and is not hinged to the main body of the lighter. The main body of the lighter is made of green bakelite or plastic material. Other lighters of the same size are said to exist with a leather removable top. The pellet can also be placed in an ash-tray; the heat of a cigarette or cigar being stubbed out in the ash-tray would cause the pellet to volatilize, the vapor killing anyone nearby.

This cigarette lighter should not be confused with the dummy cigarette lighter used as a container for the ampule of hydrocyanic acid supplied to agents to enable them to commit suicide if captured.

(3) Food and cigarettes: The following are also to be used as camouflage for poisons: Nescafe, Sugar, Chocolate (particularly the German brand, (Sarotto), German cigarettes.

Captured agents and hidden equipment dumps should be searched for cigarette lighters, medicines, foods and cigarettes, which are obviously not part of a food dump prepared for the use of the agents themselves.

3. Equipment Dumps: Little information is yet available on the types of equipment dumps likely to be found in Germany. Descriptions have been received of underground cement pits measuring 7 ft. in depth, 10 feet in length and 8 ft in breadth and designed to hold boxes of food and equipment. (Seventh Army)

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #229.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Determined ey resistance along ILLER River continued, but east of ULM along the DANUBE River, ey resistance was completely disorganized. The ey attempted to infiltrate vic X688809 and 40 ey attacking vic X670818 were repulsed. An unknown number of ey attempted an attack on our engineers at crossing site vic X685812 while another group of eight ey attacked a btry position of the 157 FA Bn, capturing one cannoneer and wounding another. Small fire fights were reported at ILLERZELL (X7369) and UNTER EICHEN (X7650) while west of the ILLER River, many small pockets of resistance were encountered.

During the day the ey stubbornly resisted our armored columns moving southward along the ILLER River toward MEMMINGEN (X8234), making a strong point of each town along the route. Intense SA and bazooka fire was encountered in FELLHEIM (X8044) while bazooka, arty, and AT fire was received in HEIMERTINGEN (X8040). Ey troops moved into STEINHEIM (X8138) from the woods at (X8338) and defended the town with SA, MG, and AT fire. At the close of the period, the ey still was not able to offer organized resistance to our advance.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Failing in his efforts to delay us materially on the DANUBE - ILLER River line, the enemy made a rapid withdrawal of practically all his supporting artillery during the night, for today arty fire was light over most of the front, indicating that few, if any guns had been left behind with a delaying force. Our forward elements in ULM received moderate harassing fire during the night, but this ceased before daylight. Our advance today was not hindered by shelling except for moderate, scattered interdiction fire reported to have fallen on spearhead elements in vic FELLHEIM (8044) early in the morning where the enemy put up stiff resistance. A roadblock defense at HEIMERTINGEN (8040) was supported by direct arty fire, and the KELLIMUNZ - MEMMINGEN road was interdicted by guns in the area S of MEMMINGEN (8235), described as being of medium and heavy cal.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

Arty with the Corps continued to support the advance of the Corps with both observed and unobserved fires. At the beginning of the period 7 ey btries were TOT'd with all available arty in order to minimize arty fire falling on leading elements of 10 Armd Div.

During the night a heavy harassing program was fired on ey btries, suspected assembly areas, supply points and lines of communication.

Observed missions during the day were generally on pockets of ey resistance encountered by leading elements along the Corps front. AOP's were active in spite of high winds and cloudy weather during the day.

17 FA Gp and 741 FA Bn (8" H) were rlvd of atchmt to VI Corps during the period.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn supported the armor of the 10th AD. TD's in support of attacking Task Forces continued to make rapid progress. TD's supporting TF HANKINS fired .50 cal MG's at enemy personnel with very good results.

614 TD Bn continued to advance in support of the 103rd Inf Div. The 1st and 2nd Rcn Plts are attached and operating with the 103rd Rcn Tp.

776 TD Bn supported the attacks and mopping up operations of the 44th Inf Div. Co "B" TD's fired MG's routing enemy Inf out of strong points and assisted our Infantry in capturing approx 2000 PW's. The 2nd Plt of "C" Co fired on and destroyed an ex half track and killed 8 of its occupants. Same TD's fired on dug-in Inf with very good results. Also captured 87 PW's at a roadblock. Rcn Co while screening Div's right flank captured 130 PW's during the period.

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S E C R E T

824 TD Bn supported the 103rd Inf Div. A periodic report for the period was not received.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of VI Corps reported as follows:

X740-458, X780-445, X825-351, X845-384, X919-418, X928-435, X915-530, X845-685, X840-800.

XXI Corps:

X835-856, X875-850, X950-840, X000-810, Y060-860, Y060-920, Y110-951, Y140-930, Y175-934, Y220-970, Y230-000, Y260-130.

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SCHROEDER
Asst S-3

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

S E C R E T

Auth: CG VI Corps Arty

Init: *JAS*

Date: 27 Apr 45

From: 261800B Apr 45

To : 271800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT NO. 230.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

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Stunned by the slashing, encircling attacks of the 10th A.D., the battered enemy elements on our front found it impossible to offer any effective organized resistance today, and many of them fell easy prey to the closely following Inf of the 44th and 103rd Divs. MEMMINGEN (8235) was entered by our forces after overcoming stiff resistance N of it, and before midnight points 8 and 9 kilometers to the S and E had been reached. It was in the morning, though, that our tanks really began to roll, for the disorganized resistance put up by small enemy groups along the line of advance was in each case quickly overcome. Long streams of prisoners plodding the long road of defeat to our PW cages -- one column included 1000 men and 40 Red Cross vehicles -- gave ample evidence of the magnitude of the enemy's defeat on our front, all cut off and hopelessly surrounded by our speeding columns. By the end of the period armored elements had reached the KEMPTEN area (9305), overrun the KAUFBEUREN region (1624) on a broad front, and found little to impede further progress. LANDSBERG (3443), famous for its fortress prison wherein Hitler wrote "Mein Kampf," was entered by friendly troops in the afternoon.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The virtual rout into which the enemy has been thrown by the rapid advance of our armored spearheads is apparent from the almost complete lack of artillery fire indicated by reports made during this period. During the night our forward elements in the general area of MEMMINGEN continued to be harassed by the same guns which had been troubling them yesterday afternoon, but in lighter volume. With daylight, however, our swift advance toward KEMPTEN (9305) and KAUFBEUREN (1624), as far as can be ascertained, drew at most only light, ineffective fire. Infantry elements following the armor did not report any arty fire at all.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Arty with the Corps continued to support the rapid advance of the Corps by firing on pockets of resistance, road blocks, gun positions and retreating ey columns. Due to the fluid nature of the front, unobserved fires were held at a minimum.

AOP's continued to give their valuable support to the advance by flying patrol, reconnaissance and fire adjustment missions in spite of high winds and intermittent showers during the day.

995 FA Bn was rlvd of atchmt to VI Corps and reverted to Seventh Army control during the period.

b. Summary of Mission Fired -- not available.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

TD Bns supported respective Divisions during the period making excellent progress with the attacking elements. Due to the long and rapid advances, Bn CP's were busy moving forward to control their leading units. Normal information channels were disrupted for the period preventing current and detail operations for this report.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Leading elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:
X813-257; X865-221, X915-205; X910-170; X940-110; Y038-188; Y003-255; Y010-311;
Y015-338; Y135-303; Y150-298; Y195-308; Y220-265.

Schroeder
SCHROEDER
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

US ARMY

SECRET

Auth: CG VI Corps Arty

Init: *PLC*

Date: 20 Apr 45

CHANGE NO. 5 TO STATION LIST NO. 13

UNIT	LOCATION	CL
Hq VI Corps Arty	S390324	
6 FA Gp	S294464	
17 FA Gp	S346445	
35 FA Gp	S438199	
405 FA Gp	S409084	
59 AF1 Bn	S361150	
93 AF1 Bn	S385094	
17 FA Bn	S410102	
A Btry	S406102	2800
B Btry	S406093	3600
C Btry	S386095	4300
36 FA Bn	S430242	
A Btry	S448245	
B Btry	S445240	2500
C Btry	S418245	4200
141 FA Bn	Vic S 4444	
995 FA Bn	S459194	
194 FA Bn	S267484	
A Btry	S124566	3200, 3600
B Btry	S058567	3700
C Btry	S264480	3900
634 FA Bn	S378159	
938 FA Bn	Vic S 2946	
A Btry	S272464	3400
B Btry	S272459	3700
C Btry	S270460	3200
939 FA Bn	S398167	
976 FA Bn	S296467	
A Btry	S303463	3200
B Btry	S283465	4400
C Btry	S244431	3400
741 FA Bn	S334399	
A Btry	S333407	2800
B Btry	S331399	3600
C Btry	S329410	3800
10 Arm'd Div Arty	S378158	
100 Inf Div Arty	S294462	
44 Inf Div Arty	S442267	
103 Inf Div Arty	S349442	

RAEHR
Brig Gen

OFFICIAL:

Evans
EVANS

Post S-3

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #231.

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SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Resistance in the Corps zone was spotty as the enemy continued his disorganized withdrawal toward the National Redoubt. Some road blocks and demolitions were encountered. Bridge at FUSSEN D230895 destroyed. All bridges in Corps sector along LECH River blown. At close of period only contact reported via bridge 203871, defended by one squad enemy infantry and an artillery piece. Slight S/A fire met at D177877. Civilian reports large ammo and TNT dump in woods at YL75280. PW's for 24 hr period ending 272400B, 14,758.

The Commandant of the Hungarian Infantry School of EGGENTAL (0728) formally surrendered his entire command of 200 students to Lt Col Thorson, Survey Officer, of the 2 FOB, at 1800B hours, 28 April 1945. Col Thorson accepted the proffered dress sabre of the Commandant in token of surrender, and then magnanimously offered to return it, but was urged to keep it as a souvenir.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The only enemy artillery activity reported during the period on the entire Corps front was some light harassing fire that fell during the day on advance elements operating in the FUSSEN area (2390) and along the river via 2087. To the long toll of German materiel either destroyed or abandoned to our forces may now be added three 88mm, 8x20mm, and one Italian 75mm infantry gun, found in the general area RETTENBACH (2613), ALTDOERF (1717), BILDINGEN (2419).

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Due to the relatively unopposed advances of the infantry and armor during the period only a few calls for fire were received by the artillery with the Corps. The missions that were fired were mainly against personnel and movement on the roads and were in general fired by the direct support units. Practically all units were occupied during the period in displacing to positions well forward. The weather and visibility were very poor and hampered operations of the AOP's considerably.

b. Summary of Missions Fired: Not available.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued to support the attacking armor of the 10th AD. During most of the period TD crews were busy moving forward and capturing PW's. 3rd Plt guns of "C" Co fired on an enemy column killing 25 personnel and destroying 4 vehicles.

614 TD Bn made rapid and long moves in support of the fast moving 103rd. All units were busy capturing PW's, establishing road blocks, and occupying positions in direct support of the advancing Inf.

776 TD Bn supported the excellent progress of the 44th Inf Div. All units assisted respective Inf elements in mopping up operations, capturing PW's, and usual fire support. TD's of "A" Co fired on an enemy group killing 3 and wounding 5.

824 TD Bn continued direct support to the 103rd Div. TD Companies mounted Inf on tank decks and covered several miles of super soil. Units captured many PW's during the period and assisted the Inf when fire support was needed.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows: D080938, D105934, D205870, D230895, Y280005, Y355075, Y340145, Y363158, Y382170.

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Asst S-3

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *RMB*
Date: 29 Apr 45
From: 281800B Apr 45
To : 291800B Apr 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT NO. 232.

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Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Ey resistance across the Corps front was scattered and disorganized as the Corps penetrated deeper into the Redoubt area. Our infantry elements met little resistance, whereas our armor received some resistance from minor strong points along the route of advance. Mortar, bazooka, and SA fire was received vic D1987, while an ey force of estimated company strength resisted our advance vic WERTACH (D0092).

During the day, ey troops in PINSWANG (D2087) were reported withdrawing SE after resisting for a short period with SA, MG and AT weapons. Some SA and AT fire was received from the woods vic D510925 while a defended roadblock was encountered vic D0190.

PW statements indicate the presence of SS troops in INNSBRUCK (D7558) while GARMISCH-PARTEN KIRCHEN (D5382) and MITTENWALD (D6577) are reported to be assembly areas for troops withdrawing from the N. Ten ey planes strafed vic X9610 destroying one gasoline truck.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Enemy defense of the defiles leading into the ALPS in the Corps sector, insofar as artillery support is concerned, showed no change in pattern or volume of fire from that previously encountered in the pursuit. Artillery fire in general continued to be only light and scattered, usually representing the effort of a few guns to support small delaying actions. During the night light harassing fire fell on Rcn elements along the river vic 1987. At noon it was reported that arty located in the woods vic 5493 shelled the approaches to a defended road-block in OBER AMMEGAU (5094).

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

a. Due to the slight opposition being met and the continued rapid advances of the infantry and armor the activity of the artillery with the Corps during the period was very light.

Visibility during the period was excellent and the AOP's were active in patrolling the Corps front and reporting locations of forward and enemy elements.

The 405 FA Group has been endeavoring to assist CCB, 10th Arm'd Div, in capturing bridges intact by placing harassing artillery fire over them prior to the arrival of our troops.

b. Summary of Missions Fired: Not available.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued the attack with the 10th A.D. TD companies fired in support of respective Combat Command and assisted in capturing many PW's. One ey column was taken under fire destroying 2 wagons, 1 GP veh and inflicting 25 casualties.

614 TD Bn supported the advances of the 103rd Inf Div. TD units assisted Inf elements in capturing many PW's. Same missions and attachments to the Inf remain.

776 TD Bn continued to give close support to the advancing 44th Inf Div. One TD Plt fired 12 rds HE at an enemy moving column and destroyed 6 trucks. Another TD Plt knocked out 4 enemy vehicles and 1 Arty piece with 18 rds of HE. During other supporting missions TD's KO'd another ey veh, fired on several suspected strong points, liberated 13 American PW's, and captured many Germans.

824 TD Bn -- Information and operations report was not received.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

D013907, D100880, D120830, D190850, D230840, D235875, D240990, D265995, Y310040, Y350030, D480850, D513920, D570910.

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Asst S-3

Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init:
Date: 30 Apr 45
From: 291800B Apr 45
To : 301800B Apr 45

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DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #233.

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Taking advantage of difficult terrain and canalized routes, the enemy succeeded in slowing our advance somewhat today by use of roadblocks, craters, and mines, covered by S/A, A/W, sniper, mortar, and MG fire. A blown bridge at 282-757 was defended by mortar and MG fire during the early evening, and an unestimated number of enemy held out vic GRAM until dark and then withdrew. A 7 man ey patrol was dispersed at 122-837 at 0300B. Stiff resistance, supported by fire of all arms except arty was encountered at roadblocks at Y-593-823, LERMOOS (3771), 590-825, 615-825, and 609-821. Other roadblocks with mines in front were reported at 4481, 6182, 3474, with roads mined at 577824, and from MITTENWALD (6576) to OBERHOFEN (5461). At approx 648760 there are imbedded six feet deep in the road 9 half-ton bombs. Civs report undetermined number of SS troops in woods vic D-2174, and infantry dug in vic 660-780 with an AT gun in support. At 1445B in REUTTE D-2481, a building caught fire and burned after an explosion, believed to have been a time bomb. The bridge between GAICHT D-1777 and WEISSENBACH (D-1975) is reported to be out, and a PW states bridge at 578-822 has been blown, with a minefield laid in same vic.

A civilian states that 20 to 30 thousand SS troops left MUNICH, Monday Apr 21, in the direction of SALZBURG-INNSBRUCK. He believes last stand to be at SALZBURG. CIC reports that on two occasions during the past week SS and SD troops have obtained blank civilian identification cards by force from civil officials in the FUSSEN area.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

There was no enemy artillery activity reported during the period. In view of the effectiveness of artillery, when aided by good observation, in interdicting mountainous defiles and blocking vehicular advance, it appears that the failure of the enemy artillery to engage our advance columns can only be ascribed to lack of guns and ammunition, or possibly that the remaining guns have continued an uninterrupted withdrawal, necessitated by the slow pace imposed on their transport in this rugged terrain.

In the town of MARKT OBERDORF (1613) the enemy abandoned two 15cm heavy field howitzers (SFH 18) with their 12-ton tracked prime movers. The guns seem to be in good condition except for removal of the firing pin assembly.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

Except for a few missions fired on ey personnel and on defended roadblocks, activity of the artillery with the Corps during the period was very light. The 6th and 35th Groups were ordered into assembly areas and the majority of their cargo vehicles were used to form truck companies to aid in transporting supplies to the forward areas. Activity of the AOP's was hampered to some extent by haze and low hanging clouds.

The 242 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to the 103rd Division Arty and returned to Corps Artillery control during the period.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued with the 10th AD. TD units were slowed down during the period because of terrain and enemy roadblocks. No firing reported.

614 TD Bn supported the advancing Inf of the 103 Inf Div. All units assisted in capturing many PW's for the period.

776 TD Bn continued direct support to the 44th Inf Div. 2nd Plt TD of "B" Co fired a base of fire with MG's, mopping up a small pocket of enemy resistance. Numerous PW's were captured in support of local attacks. Rear echelon troops captured approx 300 of the enemy during the period.

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824 TD Bn supported the operations of the 103rd Div. Like all other TD Bns, many PW's being taken, highlighted the period. No firing reported.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

Y009-909, Y100-880, Y125-830, Y190-750, Y285-785, Y375-713, Y395-684, Y603-823.

XXI Corps:

Y600-035, D005-993, Y530-484, Y540-505, Y560-520, Y595-545, Y614-568, Y620-590, Y83-69, Y87-66, Y77-68, Y84-67, Y92-70.

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ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #233.

Source: G-2 Report, 103 Inf Div, 29 Apr 45.

THE ROAD TO THE "REDOUBT"

According to reliable information from prisoners of war, HITLER, with his war staff, has used the headquarters at RASTENBURG in the E and at MUNSTERBELFEL and ADLERHORST in the W, according to the state of the battle, with an interlude at BERCHTESGADEN. Meantime, the main bodies of the military ministries (OKW, OKH and SS) were in the BERLIN area, principally underground at ZOSSEN, while the civilian ministries remained in BERLIN itself.

When the Allies reached the Western borders of GERMANY in the fall of 1944, the Western Front was for the first time given priority. All reserves of men and equipment were sent to the W, in an attempt to secure the WEST WALL firmly, before the Russians could strike. A counter-offensive was to eliminate the Allied stocks and bases at LIEGE and ANTWERP. Meanwhile, the Eastern Front was quiet, except in HUNGARY where vital ground was given up, reluctantly and through "blunders." As soon as the W had been dealt with, a counter-blow was to be struck against the Russians.

The offensive in the W failed, though the Germans still thought (wrongly) that they had inflicted lasting damage on the Allied armies. Even as it failed, the Russians attacked, with overwhelming success, in the center. Slowly and late in the day, HITLER switched his reserves of armor, all that was not vitally necessary for patching up the center, to the SE. The plan was perhaps first to reestablish his line firmly along the DANUBE and HIGH TATRA, securing the HUNGARIAN oilfields and threatening ROUMANIA; then to launch a counter-offensive against the flanks, N and S of the Russian central salient, driving it back perhaps to the VISTULA and conserving EAST PRUSSIA. The initial step, however, the counter-offensive in HUNGARY also failed, and the Russians secured, not only the flanks of their salient, but also bridgeheads across the ODER directly threatening BERLIN.

By the end of January, it was foreseen by HITLER that the Russians might reach BERLIN and ZOSSEN. Consequently, a dispersal policy was laid down for the civilian ministries and military high Commands (OKH and OKW and SS). Rear echelons of the OKH and OKW went direct to BERCHTESGADEN area, where elaborate concrete command posts to house the more operational elements were also (at this late date) designed and their construction begun. Meanwhile, the forward echelons stayed in ZOSSEN as the civilian ministries in BERLIN. BERCHTESGADEN was known as "B" echelon, and ZOSSEN as "A" echelon. In case the Russians should actually take BERLIN, a third headquarters area, known as "C", was laid out in the area of OBERDRUF in THURINGIA, to house the A echelons (both civilian and military) in emergency; from here, war was to be waged on the RHINE front facing W and on the ELBE front facing E. During February some elements transferred by degrees to THURINGIA, and on 10 March, when the Russians on the ODER were particularly threatening, a general transfer started, how far it went is not clear.

In late March the immediate Russian threat decreased, while the Allies in the advanced very rapidly up to THURINGIA. On 31 March, all echelons in THURINGIA were ordered to transfer to BERCHTESGADEN, too late to prevent some of them from being overrun with their records.

The BERCHTESGADEN area is now undoubtedly the haven of not only rear echelons but of further large elements of the OKH, OKW, SS and probably also civilian ministries and even diplomats. Accommodation must be very strained. All parties appear to be fairly closely concentrated in this small ALPENSTELLUNG, which has long been reasonably well defended. It is NOT yet known, but is perhaps to be presumed, that the key men themselves and their staffs are by now transferring S from BERLIN.

While this transfer of central headquarters to the S has been naturally forced on the Germans, it is NOT in itself enough to substantiate the story of the "Redoubt". The history of the affair seems to show that, so far from the Nazis having planned a heroic last stand many months in advance, on the contrary events have consistently outstripped all their ideas. Apart from the concentration of headquarters round BERCHTESGADEN, all that has been fairly well substantiated is a natural flocking of influential refugees into BAVARIA, for the most part into area adjoining the Swiss frontier - outside the "Redoubt" therefore, though possessing other and obvious attractions.

S E C R E T

The presence of elaborate defenses and dumps (as opposed to latterday community digging and hut-building) within the sufficiently publicized "boundaries" of the Redoubt, is still very far from being confirmed; and all the stories of large concentrations of troops within it are definitely false, though it is clear enough that the remnants of many Armies are in fact destined to be pushed back eventually towards this barren area.

A glance at the map will show that the enemy has an enormous preponderance of his panzers on the central and southern sectors of the Eastern Front, that is S of the expected line of junction between the Allied Armies. To some, or even a great extent this may be the result of accident; the panzers originally in the N and W were overrun or cut off in large numbers. The armor in COURLAND and EAST PRUSSIA is, like the infantry, largely smashed by now, and illusory, though some can still be salvaged. Infantry divisions are not shown on the map, but of them too, there is a large preponderance in the same area, the SE; after the junction between the Allied armies, the ratio between S and N (disregarding ITALY, NORWAY and the Pockets will probably be more than 2 to 1.

It is clear, therefore, that there will be large forces available in the S. It is not at all clear yet that they can be used for Alpine warfare, or that serious preparations have been made so to use them. It is also noteworthy how large a proportion of these forces is in fact concentrated round CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMANY; only remaining arsenal. (SHAEF)

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: *RUC*
Date: 1 May 1945
From: 301800B Apr 45
To : 011800B May 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #234.

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SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Ey resistance in the Corps sector consisted chiefly of defended and undefended roadblocks, blown bridges and isolated strong points. At 1930B an estimated 75 ey led by two SS Officers defended a roadblock North of STANZACH (D143705) but at 2000B were driven South of Town. SA fire was received vic D3667 and at D3467 heavy SA and bazooka fire was encountered. The road was blown vic D335663 and a roadblock 20 meters long was discovered at D015905.

Small ey groups effectively covering obstacles resisted our advance during the day. Our elements advancing Southwest to HASSELGEHR (D0860) encountered no ey but did meet numerous obstacles and demolitions. At the close of the period the ey was still falling back in spite of the excellent defensive terrain.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Ey arty throughout the period was light with 12 rds med arty falling vic 384700 at 1500B. SP fire opposed our attacks vic blown bridge in SCHARNITZ (D665715) while an AOP reported 2 SP's vic D344674.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

With only light, scattered resistance being reported activity of the artillery with the Corps continued to be very light. Snow and rain prevented operation of the AOP's.

During the period OI No. 15 was issued relieving all Groups of their reinforcing missions and making the following attachments effective as of 011200B May 1945:

<u>6 FA Group</u>	<u>35 FA Group</u>	<u>405 FA Group</u>
36 FA Bn	17 FA Bn	141 FA Bn
194 FA Bn	242 FA Bn	938 FA Bn
634 FA Bn	976 FA Bn	939 FA Bn

The 17th and 634th FA Bns were also given missions of reinforcing the fires of the 44th and 103rd Inf Div Artys, respectively.

The 59th and 93rd AFA Bns were relieved from attachment to the 10 Arm'd Div Arty during the period. The 59 AFA Bn was attached to the 103rd Div Arty and the 93 AFA Bn was attached to the 44th Div Arty during the period.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

All TD Bns supported respective Div's during the period with tactical missions and attachments remaining the same. No firing was reported for the period but numerous PW's were captured by all TD Bns.

The 609 TD Bn assembled with Armored units of the 10th AD.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points:
D010-925, D095-810, D120-637, D153-727, D198-758, D245-800, D356-672, D405-713, D615-827, D660-776.

Byrne
BYRNE
Asst S-3

SECRET

S E C R E T

Annex #1 to Periodic Report 234.
(Source G-2 Report #161, Hq. 103 Div)

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

I - KID STUFF:

On 14 April, one of our reconnaissance patrols pulled into BREITINGEN (K-2886) to check the town. One of the armored cars stopped beside a sullen-looking group of young boys. Becoming suspicious, one of our men opened one boy's coat and found two potato mashers. About this time, others in the group began removing the caps and pulling the strings on their own grenades. Attempts to control the youths failed and they had to be killed to prevent loss of our own men and equipment.

The following day our troops entering HORNBAACH (K-5391) encountered a road block. This block was well defended and the town took quite a beating before being overrun. After-action examination of the road block revealed panzerfausts set up in nearby houses to cover the block and equipped with remote control wires for firing. 1 SS officer, 1 Wehrmacht officer and 15 Hitler youths were responsible for the road block construction and its defense. The boys in both cases were 11-14 years of age.

The fanaticism of the Hitler Jugend is one of the stumbling blocks in mopping up operations in GERMANY. Troops are cautioned again to trust no one. (9th Armd Div,

II - TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED LETTER:

Adelberg, 12 April 45

Dear Hein:

I believe the only still existing mail connection is the one between us two. Mother's letter is from March 6, Else's from February 26. I already answered your letter of March 18. I hope you received that letter.

In the meantime the situation has become worse for us. In four more weeks we finally will know whether there will be a "finis Germaniae" or our existence as a nation will continue. Should the first be the case, then thinking of seeing our family again would be wishful dreaming and we would only have the choice between delivering ourselves into the hands of the enemy or fighting so long with the weapon in hand as well as we can. For myself the only possibility is the latter since, as a professional party man, I have no other choice. But, before I go down, I shall send a sufficient number of enemies into the next world, that they may give the proper reception when I arrive there.

I don't know how a change to our advantage could be made possible, but I just cannot imagine that providence should have decided to dissolve our nation. For the time being there is nothing left to do but resist to the last breath. I don't know exactly the situation as of today, but I heard talk about fighting near Bremen and the fall of Hannover. Since Osnabruck fell also, we cannot count on any mail from home.

So let us continue to write to each other. We are now in Wurtemberg and are spending quiet days in a small but beautifully located village near the ruins of the castle of Hohenstauffen. It doesn't seem right at a time when Germany is fighting for life or death. Our company isn't committed any more because there is no front line. I live with an 80 year old pensioned Lutheran priest. I have a nice room in his beautiful little house. To own such a house has been my desire for years and was to become reality after the war. Of our savings accounts we won't see anything either.

Thinking clearly about our situation one could give up all hope and burst from anger. But neither would change anything. Besides I still possess a spark of belief that a change may come. In any case, I just can't imagine that I may not see my family again. I gave up hope of seeing my brother Emil again. I wonder how mother can stand all this. I wrote her in my last letter to go to Langeforden if the situation should get hot. I hope she did so. Then she would be secure as far as food supply is concerned.

Hein, what a miserable letter I am writing to you. What kind of situation are you in? I hope you are still in good health. Are you still living with the Count? I expected a letter from you. I am quite sure that you have written to me since April 2.

Try to stay healthy and keep your chin up. Perhaps we will meet some day on the other side of the Alps. And we shall drown our sorrow with a bottle of Chianti together. It is impossible that Germany shall perish with all its people. Is there a more precious nation than the German nation in all the world? Which nation has given so much humanity to the world? We will live as long as there is a just God.

With best wishes and regards,

Your

Karli

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

AUTH: CG VI C ARTY

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY

INIT: 216

APO 46, U. S. Army

DATE: 2 May 45

From: 011800B May

TO : 021800B May

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #235

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Field Artillery School
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

No change occurred in the general pattern of the futile ey resistance, for our tps continued their inexorable advance today with the small local struggles serving only to delay the outcome a few days longer. The strongest opposition was encountered in the western sector vic FERNSTEIN (3365) where some 300 ey, supported by AW's and some arty, maintained their positions through most of the period. Our patrol into the town during the night took 70 prisoners but the remainder of the force in the town decided to fight; however in the late afternoon resistance was almost broken. Elsewhere along the front during the day, progress was slowed by rd blocks and demolitions some of them covered by fire. In the afternoon attacking elements ran into unestimated number of ey vic 6262, supported by direct fire, and at 9352 a defended rd block was met.

Bridges between INST (D2753) and FERN PASS (D3467) are reported to be prepared for demolition. The rd is cratered from D348670 to 353667. Ren elements reached BODEN (1753) and reported the rd suitable only for foot tps.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Ey arty activity continued to be very slight, with no indication as yet evident that the ey still possesses any material strength in arty weapons, even though the struggle for INNSBRUCK is in its last stages. Ey defense of FERNSTEIN (3365) was supported by lt arty fire during the day, and was reported as being of lt and heavy cal. A house on high ground vic 3365, overlooking the FERNSTEIN area, suspected of being an OP, was shelled by our arty, and an immediate increase in shelling from direct fire weapons was noted. Between 1700B and 2000B BIBLRSIER (3870) drew 20 rds harassing fire from lt and med calibers. PW's report 4x150mm guns are located vic 349671.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

As ey resistance stiffened around rd blocks on the mountain rds, the direct support bns of the 44 and 103 ID's fired on ey IG's mortars, and personnel during the period. A lt harassing program was fired during the night.

The 220 FA Bn exchanged direct fire with a German anti-tank gun in a house on the side of hill. The German gun fired four rds, incidentally all were short, and the 220 FA Bn silenced gun and destroyed house by direct hits.

The CP of VI Corps Arty opened at 558820 vic PARTENKINCHEN, GERMANY at 1700B.

SECTION IV. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported at the following points: 01-92, 93-32, 07-59, 11-62, 15-60, 17-58, 20-76, 34-68, 40-70, 56-62, 62-61, 66-71.

EVANS
Asst S-3

S E C R E T

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

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Fort Sill, Oklahoma

After wiping out resistance vic D630611 at dusk, our troops moved on to REITH (D-6261) pursuing the enemy who withdrew S of LEITHEN (D-6360). This area was defended by a bn with strength estimated at 250 men, and according to reliable reports, are the only troops in the INNSBRUCK area who desired to fight. During the day these troops continued to fall back slowly vic 6459, making good use of demolitions to delay our advance. Finally our infantry bypassed them by scaling difficult, snowy mountains to the east, and by the end of the period were reported to be advancing without resistance to the outskirts of INNSBRUCK. In the 44th Div sector during the night the enemy showed no aggressiveness, but continued his retreat. The force which has been defending FERN PASS (3466) so stubbornly the last few days has been badly chewed up, with two-thirds of them estimated to be casualties, and the few remaining withdrew by small groups today, enabling our troops to push into the valley at 3461. Ten vehicles and an estimated fifty men were observed moving SW between coordinates D-310578 and D-285550 at 1500B. The road is blown for 100 yards at D-335665, and the bridge at D-338-663 is out. Late reports stated INNSBRUCK was declared an open city, and 103rd Div infantry had entered it.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

The few enemy artillery pieces supporting the disorganized defenders of the IMST-INNSBRUCK area were slightly more active today, but all of their fire was light and scattered. Forward elements of the 44th Div drew small harassing concentrations from guns located at D-387655, D-290560, and D-270540. At 1530B five rounds harassing fire fell vic 3970. The enemy force stubbornly barring our advance along the road vic 6460 was supported during the afternoon by light caliber harassing fire on the hairpin curve, a formidable defile, in that area.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

A moderately heavy harassing program was fired on known ey points of resistance during the night in an effort to convince the few remaining Germans that resistance was useless. The arty with the Corps fired in support of attacking units during the day; however, the morning snow storm limited visibility and the AOP's were grounded.

The 939 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 405 FA Gp and attached 35 AAA Brigade and will execute security mission. The 69 AFA Bn was relieved of attachment to 115 Cav Gp and attached to 6 FA Gp.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 TD Bn continued rehabilitation and maintenance of material. Elements of "B" Co maintained road blocks and security patrols.

614 TD Bn supported the advances of the 103rd Inf Div. Rcn Plts have been very active for the past two periods reconnoitering ahead of advancing Inf columns.

776 TD Bn assembled all TD Companies and started a rehabilitation and maintenance program. Two of the Rcn Plts continued to guard and out post a political prison camp.

824 TD Bn continued direct support to the attacking Inf units of the 103rd Div

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps are reported as follows: C933-523, D205-659, D330-652, D344-619, D560-620, D630-610, D654-585, D699-580.

C. Evans
EVANS
Asst S-3

R E S T R I C T E D

SUNRISE, SUNSET TABLES

1. This table is based upon STRASSBOURG and all times mentioned are "B" Time.

2. Daylight is approximately one hour before sunrise, darkness one hour after sunset.

3. CORRECTION TABLE:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| (1) MANNHEIM - Minus 1 Minute | (5) CRAILSHEIM - Minus 8 Minutes |
| (2) DARMSTADT - Minus 1 Minute | (6) NURNBERG - Minus 12 Minutes |
| (3) STUTTGART - Minus 5 Minutes | (7) AUGSBURG - Minus 12 Minutes |
| (4) WUPPERTAL - Minus 6 Minutes | (8) MUNICH - Minus 15 Minutes |

DATE	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
May 1, 1945	0609	2046	****	0840	
2	0608	2047	0053	0925	
3	0606	2049	0148	1028	
4	0604	2050	0235	1130	
5	0602	2052	0316	1232	Last Quarter
6	0601	2053	0350	1347	
7	0559	2055	0419	1505	
8	0557	2056	0446	1625	
9	0556	2057	0511	1748	
10	0555	2059	0536	1910	
11	0554	2100	0604	2034	New Moon
12	0552	2101	0634	2156	
13	0551	2103	0712	2313	
14	0549	2104	0756	****	
15	0548	2106	0849	0022	
16	0546	2107	0950	0118	
17	0545	2108	1055	0205	
18	0544	2109	1202	0241	First Quarter
19	0543	2111	1308	0310	
20	0541	2112	1414	0334	
21	0540	2113	1517	0355	
22	0539	2114	1621	0414	
23	0538	2115	1725	0434	
24	0537	2116	1828	0453	
25	0536	2118	1934	0514	
26	0535	2119	2039	0537	
27	0534	2120	2144	0605	Full Moon
28	0533	2121	2247	0640	
29	0532	2122	2345	0741	
30	0531	2123	****	0818	
31	0531	2124	0035	0913	

**** Indicates that moon is too close to sun for observation.

R E S T R I C T E D

14D
HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps Arty
Init: P.C.E.
Date: 4 May 45
From: 031800B May 45
To : 041800B May 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT NO. 237.

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Fort Sill Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Resistance collapsed on left half of Corps zone as our troops occupied INNSBRUCK (D77-58) late in afternoon and pushed on unopposed to reach the BRENNER PASS at 0150B. Extensive demolitions continued to offer main resistance on the remainder of the Corps front except at D356L where our troops engaged rear of ey column and after a short fire fight captured 120 prisoners of war and dispersed another 100 ey.

No ey opposition was encountered as our troops entered IMST (D2753) but S of IMST (D2754) SA, arty and Panzerfaust curtailed our advance at the close of the period.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Ey arty activity was light in the Corps sector with the ey making use of arty support only in the 44th Div sector where a light concentration was reported vic IMST (D2754).

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

Due to the tactical situation on the Corps front, the arty with the Corps could lend little material support to the attack. The Bns still supporting the Divisions are being held in readiness in rear areas, should need for their fires arise.

During the afternoon, the 17th FA Bn and the 93 AFA Bn displaced forward in the 44th Div sector to give potential support to the Divisions mopping up operations.

Div Arty Bns continued to fire ground observed missions on targets of opportunity consisting mostly of ey personnel and vehicles.

SECTION IV. TANK DESTROYERS.

Operations:

609 and 776 TD Bns remain assembled in respective Div areas. All units engaged in rehabilitation; care and cleaning of equipment and material.

614 and 824 TD Bns continue to support the operations of the 103d Inf Div. TD Companies established road blocks, security check points, and assisted Inf elements in handling of PW's.

SECTION V. MISCELLANEOUS.

Forward elements of the Corps were reported as follows:

D040-580, D085-600, D184-581, D235-505, D346-616, D450-600, D490-515, D525-615, D560-620, D638-605, D698-580, W100-265, W04-15, E034-720, E058-735.

Evans
EVANS
Asst S-3

SECRET

ANNEX #1 TO PERIODIC REPORT #236.

(Source: G-2 Report #164 Hq
103 Inf Div.)

HIGH LEVEL COMMENT ON ALLIED ARTILLERY TACTICS.

Among the many senior officers whose military career ended in the RUHR pocket was a Corps Artillery Commander of proven skill and experience. He was asked to criticize Allied Artillery tactics, but at first refused on the ground that a victorious army and, especially, the famous American artillery which he had so many recent opportunities to observe were above criticism and could command only praise. Much of what he subsequently said is nevertheless of considerable tactical interest, and may be assumed to apply to Allied methods in general as much as to American in particular. It is emphasized, however, that the comments quoted below represent one officer's opinion only, and must be accepted with the necessary reserve:-

The accuracy of U.S. artillery is outstanding, and its mobility is as good as can be expected from a fully motorized Army with plenty of gasoline. That U.S. artillery fires an abnormal percentage of duds is a myth or propaganda - the ample ammunition supply of U.S. artillery was "breath-taking." "It would be very tactless," he said, "for me to offer criticism. It would be the same as for a poor man to criticize the palace of a millionaire. As for the tribulations of a German ARKO - do you know that I first needed the permission of the Chief of Staff, and later of the commander himself, to fire a single round? Do you know that I had to fire 15 cm French shells in German 15 cm Howitzers and smoke shells instead of HE? There was no movement in daylight on account of the fighter-bombers, and at night I had to worry about a few litres of gasoline to move my guns. If any pieces were lost a court-martial and a concentration camp were awaiting me."

He did not consider, however, that our artillery was superior to the Russian, and in justification, gave some constructive criticism. He thinks that, tactically, our artillery still has lessons to learn. It creates a main effort correctly, but needs too much time for concentrations owing, in his opinion, to our lack of a Fire Direction Troop. This troop is a special radio troop which enables the commander of a Volks-artillerie Korps to give direct fire orders to eighteen troops without first giving them to battalion Hqs. Our artillery main effort always informed the Germans where our main infantry effort would be. This "great mistake" could have been avoided if we would have adopted the German deceptive method of three artillery main efforts - one the real thing, one a feint and the third a half-hearted affair. This method leaves the enemy guessing and prevents the concentration of defense forces at the critical point - especially a concentrated counter-battery effort. That our infantry in a few cases was more successful without artillery preparation is, in his opinion, the direct result of the tactical "mistakes" of our artillery. Moreover, our artillery and infantry main efforts were usually announced to the enemy by the appearance of artillery observation planes, fighter-bombers, and smoke ammunition in the sector of the main effort only. Further, if we had any artillery success it rarely was exploited. "On the first day you had your success. On the second you rested. On the third day you attempted to exploit your success but then it was usually too late." (In the light of subsequent events even this mild criticism may be considered unjustified).

Furthermore, the progress of our artillery fire zone by zone regularly showed the enemy ARKO what points our infantry had reached. It would have been deprived of this information if our artillery had not followed this pattern so rigidly. Another mistake is an insufficient use of roving guns. During the German winter offensive we withdrew much artillery from the DUEREN-JUELICH sector, and this fact was clearly observed. The proper procedure would have been to leave a few roving guns in the old artillery positions to deceive the enemy about the strength of our artillery.

In his opinion, it is another myth that Russian artillery fires prodigious numbers of artillery rounds - he considers our expenditure to be greater. According to his figures (and he believes his reports were always correct, since the situation was sufficiently stabilized) we fired 60,000 rounds daily in the sector of 5 Panzer Army defending the ROER and COLOGNE. He considers this quantity exorbitant; the German Army, with only one-third of this expenditure, was doing just as well. The quantity of shells fired into AACHEN (which he defended from the outside) was a climax, and, he indicated in a polite way, a waste.

He admired our Observation Battalions, which generally forced him to move his guns after firing three rounds, and queried whether we knew that he had two 24 cm railway guns at his disposal at JUELICH. But these guns were only a small part of the arsenal he commanded in his better days. Under his command then was the artillery of two to three divisions and two observation battalions (in addition to the observation troops of the Volksartillerie Korps). Corps artillery missions always had preference over divisional missions and he, therefore, was the master of 400 pieces.

Date: 5 May 45
From: 041800B May 45
To : 051800B May 45

DAILY PERIODIC REPORT #238.

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Fort Sill Oklahoma

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE.

Ey resistance confronting the Corps came to a climactic conclusion with the formal surrender of the German Nineteenth Army effective 051800B. The surrender marked the end of a campaign in which the ey was driven from the coast of Southern France, across the Rhine River, and finally into the famous national redoubt area in the Austrian Alps, where the ey went down in disastrous defeat.

During the period, ey troops continued to surrender in large numbers while several fanatics, with minds warped by years of Nazi indoctrination, resisted with SA fire in the area vic LANDECK (W3944). At the close of the period troops of the 44th Division made contact with our French allies vic C94-53.

SECTION II. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

There was no ey arty activity reported during the period.

SECTION III. OPERATIONS.

There was very little activity on the part of the artillery with the Corps during the period. The 44th Div Arty placed very light harassing fire on a road block vic LANDECK (W39-44). The 103rd Div Arty reports no firing during the period.

This report becomes the last Daily Periodic Report to be issued covering operations of the VI Corps Artillery on the continent of Europe.

Byrne
BYRNE
Asst S-3

~~SECRET~~